Igarapé Institute Contributions to the COP 30 Presidency Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030

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In a context of a weakened multilateral system, marked by growing skepticism about the ability of international processes to deliver concrete outcomes, the implementation of commitments made under the Paris Agreement, particularly in light of the first Global Stocktake (GST), has become the primary test of credibility for the climate regime, and for global governance more broadly. The increasing proliferation of generic or non-operationalized commitments deepens the erosion of trust in multilateral institutions and reinforces the perception of a widening gap between political ambition and tangible delivery.

Against this backdrop, "roadmaps" have emerged as strategic instruments capable of translating ambition into concrete implementation pathways. By offering a practical, results-oriented approach, such instruments can help narrow the gap between ambition and execution, strengthen coordination among state and non-state stakeholders and public and private actors, and provide greater predictability in a context of geopolitical fragmentation.

In light of Brazil's continued COP30 Presidency through the beginning of COP31, and in synergy with the Roadmap on the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels and the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T, the Roadmap to Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030 can and should work as one of the core implementation pillars of the Paris Agreement. Land-use change, notably deforestation, accounts for approximately 13% of global CO_2 emissions,[1] and for forest-rich countries such as Brazil, Bolivia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, it represents the dominant source of national emissions,[2] making forest protection inseparable from NDC delivery. This Roadmap also plays a crucial bridging role, connecting climate, nature, land use, and climate finance under an integrated delivery, particularly over the follow-up cycle of the first GST, up to 2028.

The Igarapé Institute is an independent *think-and-do tank* with an observer status with the UNFCCC and the UNCBD since 2022,[3] is actively engaged in this effort. The present contribution is informed by our research and our policy engagement, including a bulletin published in February 2026, providing insights on the substance of the Roadmap and the process through which it is being shaped.[4] The Institute offers inputs structured in four segments preceded by a coss-cutting section on strategic considerations:

1) Critical barriers to halting and reversing deforestation at global, regional, and local levels;
2) institutional, economic, and financial levers to unlock implementation;
3) experiences and lessons from Brazil and the Amazon Basin; and

[1] IPCC (2022). Chapter 7: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Uses (AFOLU). In: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Working Group III contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC.
[2] Our world in Data. CO_2 emissions from fossil fuels and land-use change.
[3] Respectively, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity.
[4] Igarapé Institute (2026). Towards a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation; and Szabó, I., Waisbich, L.T. and Kuele, G. (2026). A roadmap to zero deforestation: a global platform for forests. *Exame*, 23 March 2026.

4) considerations on how the Roadmap can move beyond a political document to function as a practical platform for multi-level planning, action, and mobilization.

Strategic considerations

Three cross-cutting considerations could inform the strategic framework underpinning the Forest Roadmap:

I. **Halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation is central to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement.** As underscored by the first GST, progress on land-use change and ecosystem loss needs to advance alongside the energy transitions, and forests are smart and effective investments to do so as pillars of biodiversity conservation and guarantors of climate, water, energy, and food security at a global scale. This depends on stronger enabling conditions, including efforts to tackle environmental crime, promote forest restoration, and scale up high-integrity nature finance with co-benefits for people and the planet.

II. **The Roadmap should function as a practical platform.** For this Roadmap to fulfill its potential, it will need to function not only as a diplomatic document but also as an implementable framework and a practical platform for coordination, exchange, and mobilization across levels of governance and groups of stakeholders. Concretely, it should align dispersed international instruments and initiatives and support countries in developing national zero-deforestation targets and roadmaps.

III. **Sustained engagement from forest countries across tropical, temperate, and boreal forests, civil society, and other stakeholders will be essential.** Its success will require broader engagement from forest countries across tropical, temperate, and boreal forests, who have policy knowledge and experience to share, as well as civil society and other stakeholders who have already played an important role in advancing this agenda and remain available to support its development and implementation. Sustained and structured engagement will be essential to generate political legitimacy, foster ownership among Parties, and ensure institutional continuity within the UNFCCC and beyond.

A. Critical barriers

The critical barriers to halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation are interconnected and operate across scales. From the Igarapé Institute's perspective, they can be understood at *three mutually reinforcing levels*: *global and transnational* barriers; *regional* barriers, viewed here through the lens of the Amazon Basin; and *local* barriers that affect implementation on the ground.

A.1 Global and transnational barriers: systemic constraints on forest governance and finance

Fragmented environmental governance

A first barrier is the fragmentation of environmental governance, including across the three Rio Conventions.[5] Although these conventions emerged together from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, climate, biodiversity, and land-use agendas continue to operate through different institutions, mandates, indicators, reporting cycles, and financing channels. In practice, this creates overlaps, gaps, and, at times, conflicting incentives, weakening the ability of the international system to address forests in an integrated way. This is particularly problematic because deforestation and forest degradation sit at the intersection of climate mitigation, biodiversity protection, land restoration, human rights, development, and security. The lack of sufficiently coherent multilateral mechanisms to align these agendas remains a structural constraint on implementation.[6]

This fragmentation is reflected in a broader implementation gap. International negotiations have generated important commitments, including under the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, yet persistent difficulties remain in translating agreed language into coordinated, adequately financed, and measurable action. Framed as an "implementation COP," COP30 helped reinforce the need to move from negotiated commitments to delivery, and these efforts now need to be sustained and further operationalized across processes and institutions.[7] Sustaining this momentum will also require stronger institutional alignment and coordination: without a high-level mechanism[8] capable of providing coherence and accountability across the climate, biodiversity, and land-use agendas, coordination tends to remain episodic rather than strategic.

Closing the implementation gap, therefore, requires not only better instruments and more finance but also stronger institutional alignment and coordination at the international level. In this regard, the Roadmap has an opportunity to connect with and inform broader reform efforts currently underway, including the UN80 Initiative[9] and proposals for a Global Climate and Nature Council within the UN system,[10] both of which point toward governance arrangements capable of reducing fragmentation, providing political leadership, and sustaining momentum across the climate and nature agendas.

Transnational environmental crime and illicit flows

A second structural barrier is the expansion of an increasingly transnational environmental crime and the illicit economic systems that sustain it. Deforestation and forest degradation are closely linked to what can be understood as an *ecosystem of environmental crimes*: a web of interconnected activities

[5] The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).
[6] Igarapé Institute (2025). Climate-Nature Synergies.
[7] Igarapé Institute (2026). Climate-nature synergies at COP30 and beyond.
[8] Igarapé Institute (2025). Towards a Global Climate and Nature Council: Underpinning the Global Mutirão and Modelling the Future of Governance.
[9] A system-wide reform process launched by Secretary-General Guterres in March 2025 to make the United Nations more coherent, effective, and fit for purpose. See: United Nations. UN80 Initiative.
[10] Building on the Brazilian President Lula 2024 call for a UN Climate Council: Presidency of the Republic of Brazil. (2024). Speech by President Lula at the 3rd Session of the G20 Leaders' Meeting: Energy Transition and Sustainable Development; and Igarapé Institute (2025). Towards a Global Climate and Nature Council: Underpinning the Global Mutirão and Modelling the Future of Governance.

(including land grabbing, illegal logging, illegal mining, and cattle production associated with illegal deforestation) in which environmental offenses form part of a broader criminal machinery that involves fraud, corruption, money laundering, possession of weapons, and violent crime. These connected, or converging, crimes occur before, during, and after the environmental offense itself, operating to enable it, sustain its profitability, and conceal its proceeds.[11] Deeply embedded in both global commodity trade and transnational criminal networks, environmental crime should not therefore be treated solely as an enforcement problem: it is a governance, security, and financial integrity challenge, enabled by criminal structures that move fluidly across legal and illegal markets and between jurisdictions, exploiting weak institutions, threatening peoples, communities and livelihoods in critical ecosystems, and undermining global financial integrity.

A particularly important dimension of this complex criminal ecosystem is the blurred line between legal and illegal markets. Unlike drugs or weapons, whose illegality is intrinsic, the primary commodities associated with deforestation, such as timber, gold, cattle, and land, are not illegal in themselves. Their illegality arises not in the nature of the product but in how it is extracted, produced, transported, or inserted into supply chains: through unauthorized extraction in protected areas, fraudulent documentation, or falsified permits. Once illicit origin is concealed, through shell companies, fictitious transactions, or corrupt intermediaries, these products circulate in formal markets indistinguishable from legal goods. This creates governance grey zones from which criminal actors systematically benefit and points to a structural gap in how states regulate the key economic sectors most associated with deforestation: comparative analysis across forest countries in the Amazon Basin consistently shows that definitional ambiguity in mining, logging, cattle, and land markets remains one of the most exploited weaknesses, as regulatory divergence across jurisdictions creates cross-border displacement incentives for illegal actors.[12]

Its transnational dimension is especially significant. Forest-risk commodities move across borders through global supply chains, and international demand, opaque commercial networks, and the failure of consuming countries and the financial sector to implement robust due diligence and traceability standards are as much a driver of forest loss as local pressures. [13] Ongoing discussions on additional protocols related to Crimes that Affect the Environment (CAE) to the the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) offer an important complementary framework for tackling this issue at the international level. Closing international legal gaps across other regimes are key for recognizing that illicit deforestation and degradation dynamics rely on cross-border criminal networks and financial flows that exceed the capacity of purely domestic responses. They are also crucial tools in fostering states, markets and the financial sector accountability and action on curbing deforestation-related illicit financial flows embedded in global commodity chains and promoting deforestation-free ones.[14]

The global climate and nature finance gap for standing forests

[11] Igarapé Institute (2022). The ecosystem of environmental crime in the Amazon: an analysis of illicit rainforest economies in Brazil; and Igarapé Institute (2024). Dynamics of the Ecosystem of Environmental Crimes in the Brazilian Legal Amazon.
[12] Igarapé Institute (2025). Markets and Forest.
[13] Igarapé Institute (2024). Dynamics of the Ecosystem of Environmental Crimes in the Brazilian Legal Amazon.
[14] United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Global Analysis on Crimes that Affect the Environment.

A third structural barrier at the global level is the persistent gap in climate and nature finance, one that is as much qualitative as it is quantitative. Despite growing political commitments under the Paris Agreement, the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, and initiatives such as the TFFF, flows of finance directed toward forest conservation, restoration, and nature-positive land use remain far below what is needed. Nature-based Solutions (NbS) currently receive approximately USD 133 billion per year globally (mostly from public sources), a fraction of spending on the energy transition or on subsidies for activities that degrade nature.[15] Investment continues to be heavily concentrated in mitigation in energy, infrastructure, and transport, while forests, ecosystems, and NbS remain significantly undercapitalized.

The qualitative dimensions are equally significant. Available finance is often poorly aligned with the realities of forest territories, particularly in developing countries, insufficiently accessible to the countries and communities that need it most, and inadequately designed to address the specific risks of long-term investments in nature. Voluntary and market-based approaches must be complemented by more robust public policies that increase public financing, mobilize private capital as catalytic capital, and provide guarantees and de-risking instruments for forest and nature-positive investments.[16] At the same time, perverse incentives embedded in subsidies, fiscal frameworks, and commodity supply chains continue to favor forest conversion over conservation, demanding not only more finance but also a fundamental reorientation of public and private incentive systems.[17]

A.2 Regional level: the case of the Amazon Basin

As the world's largest tropical forest, home to around 10% of global biodiversity, the Amazon is critical to climate stability, biodiversity conservation, freshwater cycles, and the livelihoods of millions of people, including Indigenous Peoples and local communities.[18] Given its global significance and the transboundary nature of many of the governance challenges involved, the regional dimension is examined here through the Amazon Basin. In this context, forest loss is shaped not only by environmental pressures but also by weak territorial governance, cross-border criminal dynamics, and persistent institutional fragilities.[19]

The Amazon Basin presents particular challenges due to its scale, geography, and governance conditions. Its vast territory, dense forests, extensive river systems, porous borders, and remote areas make monitoring, enforcement, and public service delivery especially difficult. These characteristics, combined with uneven State presence and differing institutional capacities across Amazonian countries, create favorable conditions for illegal actors to operate across jurisdictions and adapt to fragmented responses.

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[15] Climate Policy Initiative (2024). Toolbox on Financing Nature-Based Solutions.; and United Nations Environmental Programme (2025). High-risk forests, high-value returns: A co-benefits assessment for decision-makers

[16] Igarapé Institute (2025). Climate-Nature Synergies.

[17] Igarapé Institute (2025). Climate-Nature Synergies; and Igarapé Institute (2026). Towards a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation.

[18] Flores, B.M., Montoya, E., Sakschewski, B. et al. (2024). Critical transitions in the Amazon forest system. Nature 626, 555–564. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06970-0.

[19] Igarapé Institute (2025). Under the Radar: Territorial and Regulatory Security Risks in the Brazilian and Colombian Amazon.

Another important challenge is the still limited level of coordination and interoperability across the Basin. Differences in regulatory frameworks, enforcement capacities, and sanction regimes in key sectors associated with deforestation, such as mining, timber, land and cattle, continue to create incentives for the displacement of illegal activities across borders. At the same time, limited integration between environmental monitoring systems, law enforcement, and financial intelligence reduces the effectiveness of coordinated responses. Fragmented data systems and the lack of interoperable early warning and monitoring platforms further constrain the ability of countries to act collectively. All together, these barriers not only hinder regional intergovernmental cooperation on illicit economies but also pose limits to alternative standing forest-compatible economies, limiting the scale and impact of green investments[20] across the region.[21]

A.3 Local level: delivering impact for forests on the ground

At the local level, a key barrier is the persistence of interventions that do not sufficiently account for the interlinkages between climate, biodiversity, and social realities. In many forest territories, climate-related measures may still be designed or implemented in ways that overlook ecosystem integrity, local ecological conditions, land-use dynamics, and the rights and knowledge of Indigenous Peoples and local communities. As a result, actions intended to support mitigation or adaptation can generate trade-offs rather than co-benefits for forests, especially when they are based on standardized approaches that are not adapted to place-based conditions. For example, large-scale monocultures for bioenergy or carbon sequestration can reduce forest carbon stocks and degrade critical habitats; renewable energy infrastructure sited in ecologically sensitive areas can harm biodiversity and disrupt the ecosystem services that underpin food security, water availability, and climate resilience for millions of people.[22]

A related but distinct barrier in territories concerns the structural conditions of forest and critical ecosystem territories themselves. In many regions, a compounded risk environment — shaped by insecurity, informality, weak land governance, unclear tenure, limited State presence, and high levels of impunity — raises operational, financial, and reputational costs for both public policy delivery and responsible investment while creating favorable conditions for illicit economies to persist and expand. These are not isolated governance failures: when high-integrity actors cannot effectively enter and remain in a territory, extractive and illegal activities tend to fill the vacuum. These conditions also help explain why the finance gap persists in practice—responsible capital, even when available, often cannot reach or remain in the territories where it is most needed.[23]

B. Unlocking implementation through institutional, economic and financial levers

[20] Igarapé Institute (2025). Private Sector Roadmap for a Sustainable Amazonia; and Inter-American Development Bank. Amazonia Forever.

[21] Risso, M., Calderoni, V., Caldas, R. (2025). Amazônia em Alerta: Por uma Segurança Multidimensional e Sustentável [Amazon on Alert: For a Multidimensional and Sustainable Security]. *Rev. Susp*, 4(1).

[22] IPBES & IPCC (2021). Scientific Outcome of the IPBES-IPCC Co-sponsored Workshop on Biodiversity and Climate Change; and United Nations Environmental Programme (2025). High-risk forests, high-value returns: A co-benefits assessment for decision-makers.

[23] Igarapé Institute (2025). Under the Radar: Territorial and Regulatory Security Risks in the Brazilian and Colombian Amazon.

Accelerating implementation will require action across multiple fronts. The contribution below focuses on *institutional, economic, and financial levers*, while recognizing that social and technological dimensions cut across all three and are essential to their effectiveness in practice. Particular attention is given to those levers most relevant to addressing fragmented governance, environmental crime, weak territorial governance, and the persistent gap in climate and nature finance.

B.1 Institutional levers

At the international level, a key institutional lever is stronger **policy coherence across the three Rio Conventions**. As climate impacts intensify, biodiversity loss accelerates and land degradation deepens, the costs of fragmented governance have become increasingly evident. In recent years, both the CBD and the UNCCD have advanced decisions aimed at strengthening policy coherence and multilateral coordination.[24] Within the UNFCCC, a relevant opening emerged at COP30 through the agenda item on "cooperation with other international organizations," which can help create a more structured basis for dialogue across conventions and processes.[25]

The year 2026 will be particularly important for sustaining this momentum and consolidating progress made over the past two years. It also provides an opportunity to build on the direction set by the first GST, which made clear that achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement requires addressing land-use change and ecosystem loss alongside the energy transition, including through efforts to halt and reverse deforestation by 2030. As all three Rio Conventions will hold COPs in 2026, the year offers a timely political opportunity to strengthen coordination across the three processes and give greater continuity and practical relevance to cooperation agendas that can support implementation in forest-related issues.[26]

A second institutional lever can also be found in the **implementation-oriented initiatives that emerged from COP30** related to the renewed Action Agenda and its Plans to Accelerate Solutions (PAS). In this context, the Plan to Accelerate Solutions on Tackling Environmental Crime to Achieve Zero Deforestation[27] is especially relevant, as it points to practical avenues for international cooperation on monitoring and detection, legality and traceability in timber and mineral supply chains, and regional and global coordination, including under the UNTOC. In this regard, the workings of the global anti-money laundering initiative, Financial Action Task Force (FATF), offers a complementary lever. Following the October 2025 updates[28], the current round of country evaluations includes specific attention to environmental crimes, an important step toward strengthening suspicious transaction reporting and ensuring consistent treatment of environmental crime as a money laundering risk across the globe.

[24] Convention on Biological Diversity (2024). Decision 16/22 on biodiversity and climate change; and United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (2024). Decision 8/COP.16 on promotion and strengthening of relationships with other relevant conventions and international organizations, institutions, and agencies.
[25] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2025). Decision 3(a) on cooperation with other international organizations.
[26] Igarapé Institute (2026). Climate-nature synergies at COP30 and beyond.
[27] See Plan to Accelerate Solution: Tackling Environmental Crime to Achieve Zero Deforestation.
[28] Financial Action Task Force (2025). The FATF Recommendations.

A third lever that helps organize political direction, coordination, and accountability around implementation is the **"roadmap-type process"** that emerged from recent Climate COPs. In this regard, the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T is particularly relevant, as it helps connect climate ambition with the practical challenge of mobilizing finance at scale for forests and nature. In the forest context, its value lies in helping align financial reform efforts, public and private actors, and implementation priorities around the need to direct a greater quantity and quality of finance toward standing forests, restoration, and forest-compatible development. Its alignment with the COP30 Presidency's two implementation roadmaps (on halting and reversing deforestation and on the transition away from fossil fuels) will also be essential. Taken together, advances across these three tracks can help strengthen coherence between climate, land-use, nature, and finance agendas, creating more practical conditions for moving the "implementation cycle" of the Paris Agreement forward, in line with the outcomes of the first GST.

This also reinforces the case for stronger coordination mechanisms across multilateral processes. In a fragmented governance landscape, proposals such as a UN Climate and Nature Council[29] could serve as institutional levers to improve coherence, provide political leadership, foster coordination across forums, and sustain momentum between summits and meetings. Designed as a complementary rather than substitutive arrangement, such a mechanism could help connect the Rio Conventions, other multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), and related institutions in ways that support more integrated implementation, particularly in forest-related agendas where climate, biodiversity and land-use issues are deeply intertwined.[30]

At the regional level, stronger cooperation across forest basins is also an important institutional lever. In South America , the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) has a central role to play in promoting coordination among countries on forest governance, environmental monitoring, law enforcement, information sharing, and institutional capacity. Strengthening ACTO's coordinating role should include improving the interoperability of national monitoring systems with regional platforms such as the Amazon Regional Observatory System (ARO) and connecting these with law enforcement and financial intelligence networks. The Andean Community (CAN) also offers a complementary entry point, particularly through its frameworks for technical coordination, data exchange, and regulatory convergence among member states in areas such as mining, timber, and land governance. Integrating these regional mechanisms more systematically into the Roadmap's implementation architecture could help reduce the incentives for displacement of illegal activities across borders and support more coherent enforcement responses at the basin level.

At the national and territorial level, one of the most important institutional levers is the strengthening of enabling conditions for implementation on the ground. In many forest regions, weak land governance, insecurity, unclear tenure, informality, illicit economies, and limited State presence continue to raise operational, reputational, and financial risks for both public policy

[29] Marques Kuele, G., & Weisberg, M. (2026). The Politics of Global Climate Governance Reform. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, *32*(1), 83-94. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-03201007

[30] Igarapé Institute (2025). Towards a Global Climate and Nature Council: Underpinning the Global Mutirão and Modelling the Future of Governance.

delivery and responsible private investment. In this context, accelerating implementation requires better instruments and stronger territorial governance. This includes improving land governance, reinforcing the rule of law, addressing environmental crime, increasing transparency, and strengthening institutional presence in high-risk areas.[31]

From this perspective, **territorial de-risking** is a particularly relevant lever. It shifts attention from de-risking individual projects or financial instruments to addressing the structural conditions that make forest territories difficult environments for sustainable investment and long-term implementation on the ground. By reducing governance failures, legal uncertainty, and illicit pressures at the territorial level, de-risking strategies can help create the conditions for forest protection, restoration, and sustainable local economies to scale more effectively.[32]

B.2 Economic levers

A key economic lever is the **integration of natural capital into economic systems**. Better reflecting the value of ecosystems in economic indicators, national accounting frameworks, and corporate decision-making can help realign incentives and support more resilient and sustainable development pathways. As highlighted by the World Economic Forum,[33] current economic models and metrics continue to undervalue nature, even though healthy ecosystems underpin long-term socioeconomic well-being and resilience and a significant share of global economic output depends on nature. Integrating natural capital can therefore improve risk assessment, inform public and private investment, and help move decision-making beyond narrow measures of produced capital toward approaches that better capture environmental, social, and economic value. For forest regions, this shift is particularly relevant because it can help move from an economic logic that rewards forest conversion toward one that recognizes standing forests, restoration, and sustainable use as productive assets that generate long-term value.

B.3 Financial Levers

No single financial mechanism can fully address the forest financing gap.[34] What is needed is a menu of options (both existing and innovative instruments) capable of mobilizing resources at scale while improving the quality, alignment, and accessibility of finance for forest conservation, restoration, and sustainable land use. This includes not only expanding volumes but also directing capital toward areas with high climate, nature, and development co-benefits that remain underfinanced despite their strategic importance.

MDB reform

[31] Szabó, Ilona (2024). De-risking to scale nature-based economies in the Amazon. *Folha de S. Paulo.*
[32] Nature Investment Lab (2025). Territorial Risk Manual.
[33] World Economic Forum. (2025). Mainstreaming Natural Capital: Advancing the Global Agenda to Integrate Nature in Decision-Making. Community Paper; and Think 7 (T7) Taskforce on Biodiversity Finance (2026). Standardising and strengthening accountability for biodiversity finance. Solutions Paper. IDDRI.
[34] United Nations Environmental Programme (2025). High-risk forests, high-value returns: A co-benefits assessment for decision-makers.

One first lever lies in strengthening the role of multilateral and national development finance institutions in supporting nature-positive investments. The G20 Roadmap Towards Bigger, Better and More Effective Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs),[35] finalized in 2024, provides an important political basis for expanding the role of these institutions in climate and nature finance. In the forest context, these reform efforts should help improve the capacity of MDBs to finance forest conservation, restoration, bioeconomy, and other nature-positive activities. This includes developing more tailored tools for forest regions, such as blended finance, guarantees, and other de-risking instruments, as well as strengthening cooperation with national development banks and country-level platforms. The BRICS-led NDB, for instance, has affirmed that 40% of its total project approvals are dedicated to climate change mitigation and adaptation, supporting the national strategies of its member countries through financing renewable energy and resilient infrastructure for low-carbon growth[36]. NDB investments in NbS and bioeconomy-related projects remain limited but could be expanded considering the finance gaps for those areas in several NDB members.

Amazonia Bonds

Thematic bonds are another high-potential financing instrument for unlocking responsible investments in the region. As MDBs undergo critical reforms to become bigger, better, and more effective, one key priority is integrating nature and climate into their mandates, an essential shift for scaling up sustainable investments. Financial institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)[37] and the World Bank have advanced innovative financing mechanisms in this direction, including the **Amazonia Bonds,**[38] launched as a landmark effort to mobilize long-term, sustainable capital for critical ecosystems like the Amazon. In addition, coordination with national development banks is essential to understand local realities and help ensure that investments are tailored to the region's specific challenges and opportunities.

Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF) and Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES)

A particularly relevant financial lever is the expansion of long-term, predictable mechanisms that reward forest conservation and restoration. COP30 marked the official launch of the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF),[39] with announced commitments exceeding USD 6.7 billion by the end of the conference in its first phase and 63 countries endorsing the initiative.[40] The Facility aims to mobilize USD 125 billion in predictable finance and dedicates at least 20% of payments directly to Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs), while a Country Access Platform was introduced to support eligibility and technical readiness. In parallel, Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) remain an important complementary lever, particularly where they can provide direct incentives for conservation, support local livelihoods, and help translate the value of standing forests into concrete economic returns.

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[35] G20 Brazil (2024). G20 Roadmap Towards Better, Bigger, and More Effective MDBs.
[36] Igarapé Institute (2025). The BRICS and the Decarbonization and Biodiversity Protection Challenges.
[37] Igarapé Institute (2025). Private Sector Roadmap for a Sustainable Amazonia; and Igarapé Institute (2024). Re-Imagining Bioeconomy for Amazonia.
[38] Inter-American Development Bank (2025). IDB and World Bank Launch New Amazonia Bond Issuance Program; and Inter-American Development Bank. Amazonia Bonds Guidelines.
[39] Igarapé Institute (2024). Tropical Forests Mechanism: A New Approach for Funding Forest Conservation.
[40] COP30 Presidency (2025). COP30 approves Belém Package.

Nature credits

Another emerging financial mechanism with the potential to mobilize resources for a nature-positive future is a **high-integrity nature market**. At CBD COP16, the International Advisory Panel on Biodiversity Credits (IAPB) launched a Framework[41] to establish principles for these markets. It is now moving toward implementation, focusing on ensuring environmental and social integrity, transparency, and impact-driven investments. The next steps involve building credibility and demand for these credits, demonstrating their effectiveness through well-designed pilot projects, and advancing policy dialogues to support their long-term adoption. National regulatory frameworks can also play an important role in creating enabling conditions for nature credit markets to develop with legal certainty and institutional grounding. Brazil's Environmental Reserve Quota (CRA) , established under the Forest Code (discussed in further detail in the section below), offers one such precedent illustrating how domestically anchored instruments can help translate conservation commitments into tradeable economic value

C. Experiences and lessons from Brazil and the Amazon Basin

Relevant experiences, best practices, and lessons learned are drawn here from both national and regional perspectives. At the national level, major forest countries like Brazil provide a particularly important example, as it holds around 60% of the Amazon, the world's largest tropical forest, and has accumulated significant experience in developing public policies and instruments for forest governance. At the regional level, the Amazon Basin offers an equally relevant perspective, illustrating how forest conservation and restoration depend not only on national action but also on regional cooperation. Together, these experiences show how progress can be advanced through a combination of public policy, monitoring and enforcement, economic instruments, and cross-border coordination.

C.1 National experiences from Brazil

Brazil offers one of the clearest recent examples of how a combination of public policy instruments can reduce deforestation at scale. Between 2005 and 2012, deforestation in the Amazon fell by approximately 70%, and in 2025 Brazil recorded the lowest deforestation rate in the region in 11 years, sustaining a downward trend for the third consecutive year.[42] This trajectory demonstrates the importance of sustained political commitment, cross-sector coordination, and the combination of monitoring, enforcement, and economic instruments.

On the **institutional and law-enforcement side,** the **Action Plans for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Amazon and other biomes** (including PPCDAm and PPCDCerrado) were central to this trajectory, particularly through their environmental monitoring and control pillar, which has

[41] International Advisory Panel on Biodiversity Credits (2024). Biodiversity Credit Framework.
[42] Zero Deforestation Working Group (2017). A Pathway to Zero Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon; and National Institute for Space Research (2025). Prodes data indicate a reduction in deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon and Cerrado.

been one of the most effective components of Brazil's deforestation response.[43] Over time, this pillar has been strengthened through support from the National Development Bank (BNDES)-led **Amazon Fund** and through projects implemented by institutions such as the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (Ibama) and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, including under the Amazon Plan: Security and Sovereignty (AMAS Plan). [44]

A second important lesson comes from Brazil's investment in **monitoring and data systems.** Since 1988, the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) has played a central role through **PRODES**, which measures annual deforestation, and **DETER**, which provides rapid alerts to support real-time action. More recently, these capacities have been complemented by the Integrated and Secure Environment Brazil Programme (Brasil MAIS), under the Ministry of Justice. Monitoring systems are most impactful when their outputs are effectively connected to enforcement action, legal accountability, and governance instruments. The data they generate can support environmental inspections, through systems such as Ibama's Crotalus, the working of governance tools such as the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR), and investigations and accountability efforts led by law-enforcement institutions such as the Federal Police and the Federal Prosecution Service.

A third lesson relates to **traceability and forensic** tools in high deforestation-risk sectors and supply chains. Building on the enforcement infrastructure supported under the AMAS Plan, the Federal Police's **Ouro Alvo Program** has developed forensic capacity to determine the geographic origin of seized gold through isotopic analysis and electron microscopy, supported by the National Forensic Database on Gold Profiles (Banpa),[45] the Amazon Fund, via BNDES, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).[46]A particularly important complement by Brazilian civil society and research institutions is the **Gold Transparency Portal (PTO),**[47] which crosses public databases and uses remote sensing to assess regulatory compliance across licensed artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) areas. Its architecture, based on automated data integration rather than physical inspection alone, could offer a replicable model for other high-risk commodity sectors and forest countries seeking to strengthen supply chain transparency.

Beyond enforcement and compliance, Brazil's experience also highlights the importance of complementing control measures with **financial instruments that help value standing forests and scale up restoration and other bioeconomy efforts.** In the Brazilian context, where land-use change remains a major source of emissions, durable climate action depends not only on reducing deforestation but also on strengthening mechanisms that assign economic value to standing forests and native vegetation recovery. This direction is reflected in Brazil's updated NDC, submitted in 2024

[43] Mello, N.G.R., Artaxo, P. (2017). Evolution of the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon. Revista do Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros , n. 66, p. 108; Costa, E. (2023). PPCDAm: new plan against deforestation has technologies to predict devastation and bioeconomy to develop the Amazon.
[44] Brazil. Presidency of the Republic (2023). Decree No. 11,614, of July 21, 2023. Establishes the Amazon Plan: Security and Sovereignty - Amas Plan. See also the Amazon Fund (n.d.). AMAS Plans – Amazon: Security and Sovereignty.
[45] Federal Police (2025). PF holds International Seminar and inaugurates Electron Microscopy Laboratory of the Ouro Alvo Program.
[46] Federal Police (2024). Federal Police and IDB join forces against organized crime; and Federal Police (2025). PF holds International Seminar and inaugurates Electron Microscopy Laboratory of the Ouro Alvo Program
[47] See Gold Transparency Portal (PTO).

with targets for 2035,[48] which refers to a broader mix of policies and instruments to support forest protection, restoration, and a more integrated land-use transition. The **National Plan for Native Vegetation Recovery** (PLANAVEG), which aims to restore 12 million hectares by 2030, is one of the clearest examples of this policy orientation.

From this perspective, **restoration** deserves particular attention. Relevant examples include initiatives to promote forest restoration and low-carbon agriculture under the ABC+ Plan, led by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAPA); the Restoration Arc, led by the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (MMA) and BNDES; and PES and bioeconomy initiatives under programmes such as Floresta+, led by MMA. At the same time, an important lesson from the Brazilian case is that, despite the expansion of these initiatives in recent years, they still operate at a scale that remains limited when compared to the incentives and subsidies directed to carbon-intensive activities.[49]

Within this landscape, the **Environmental Reserve Quota (CRA)**, established under Brazil's Forest Code, deserves particular attention as a domestically anchored instrument for the economic valuation of native vegetation conservation and recovery. The CRA allows landholders with surplus native vegetation to generate tradeable titles that can compensate for Legal Reserve deficits under conditions defined by law, creating a market signal for standing forests within a nationally recognized legal framework.[50] While the instrument still operates at a limited scale and faces implementation challenges — including issues of additionality, registry integrity, and market liquidity — it represents a relevant precedent for the development of nature credit markets grounded in national legislation. As international frameworks for biodiversity credits move from principles toward implementation, Brazil's experience with the CRA could offer practical lessons on both the potential and the limitations of using regulatory instruments to assign economic value to conservation at scale.

C.2 Regional cooperation within the Amazon Basin

At the regional level, an important recent development has been the strengthening of political, technical, and operational exchange across Amazonian countries since 2023. Two developments are particularly worth highlighting. The **Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO)**, the principal intergovernmental body for cooperation among the eight Amazonian countries, has played a central role in promoting dialogue, environmental monitoring, and the gradual but significant incorporation of security-related dimensions into regional agendas — a shift reflected in the growing engagement of law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and financial intelligence units from across the basin in regional platforms and dialogues.[51] The Belém Declaration,[52] adopted at the Amazon Summit in 2023,

[48] United Nations Framework on Climate Change (2024). Brazil's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC): National determination to contribute and transform.
[49] Igarapé Institute (2026). Towards a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation.
[50] BVRio. (2026). Forest Reserve Credits Market: Giving greater efficiency and liquidity to the Environmental Reserve Credits (CRAs) mark; Brazilian Forest Service. (2025). Government launches Brazil's first Environmental Reserve Quotas; and Conservation Strategy Fund. (2018). New publication on Environmental Reserve Quotas (CRA) in Brazil;
[51] Federal Police of Brazil (PF). (2024). *PF and Igarapé Institute outline strategies to combat environmental crimes in the Amazon*.
[52] Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (2023). Belém Declaration.

reaffirmed ACTO as the main regional coordination platform and updated the common agenda for cooperation across the Basin. This political momentum was further advanced by the Bogotá Declaration,[53] adopted at the V Meeting of ACTO Presidents in August 2025, which explicitly emphasized the need to curb environmental crimes through stronger police, judicial, and intelligence cooperation.

Two operational developments are particularly worth highlighting in this regard. The Amazon **Regional Observatory System (ARO)**,[54] developed under ACTO, has strengthened regional monitoring and information-sharing capacities — though important gaps remain in its interoperability with law enforcement and financial intelligence systems. The Brazil-led **International Police Cooperation Center (CCPI),** headquartered in Manaus and operational since 2024, complements this monitoring infrastructure by supporting cooperation against transnational organized crime, including environmental crimes, illegal mining, and money laundering, through joint operations and technical dialogues, including on issues such as gold traceability (based on Brazil's Ouro Alvo experience) with neighboring countries, including French Guiana, Colombia, and Peru.[55]

Beyond ACTO, the **Andean Community (CAN)**[56] also plays an important complementary role in regional cooperation, particularly given the significant overlap between its member states (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) and the Amazon Basin. The CAN's Andean Strategy to Combat Environmental Crimes established frameworks for technical coordination, data exchange, and regulatory convergence that remain relevant today, particularly for harmonizing enforcement standards in high-risk sectors such as mining, timber, and land governance across national jurisdictions.

D. From political document to implementation platform

To fulfill its full potential, **the Roadmap should function not only as a political document but also as a practical platform for planning, action, and mobilization in support of forest conservation, sustainable management, and restoration.** Recognizing that climate and forest challenges extend far beyond environmental policy and are fundamentally linked to economic and social transformation, the Roadmap should help countries undertake coordinated efforts involving the State, markets and society. In this sense, it should support multi-actor and multi-level planning, including through "national roadmaps" and foster coordinated action and mobilization across local, national, regional, and global levels. When doing so it should avoid one-size-fits-all solutions by creating a living space for sharing policies, tools, experiences, and lessons learned adapted to different stages of development, forest types, governance conditions, and territorial realities.

Such a platform should also serve as a space for coordination and exchange, consolidating evidence-based guidance, giving visibility to successful national and local solutions, and supporting

[53] Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (2023). Bogotá Declaration.
[54] See Amazon Regional Observatory (ARO).
[55] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Brazil. (2025). UNODC Brazil strengthens strategic partnership at the inauguration of the Amazon International Police Cooperation Centre; and Risso, M., Calderoni, V., Caldas, R. (2025). Amazônia em Alerta: Por uma Segurança Multidimensional e Sustentável [Amazon on Alert: For a Multidimensional and Sustainable Security]. *Rev. Susp*, 4(1).
[56] See *Comunidad Andina*.

international cooperation aligned with nationally determined objectives. It could also help connect existing initiatives and processes that are often dispersed or fragmented, while fostering technical, political, and financial cooperation across countries and regions. In this way, the Roadmap could combine shared objectives with differentiated pathways and help translate existing commitments and knowledge into more coordinated and sustained implementation on a broader "Forest Agenda" that serves Mission 1.5 as well as other sustainable development objectives.[57]

About Igarapé Institute

The **Igarapé Institute** is an independent *think-and-do tank* that conducts research, develops solutions, and establishes partnerships to influence public and corporate policies and practices, addressing key challenges related to security, nature, and climate in Brazil and worldwide. Igarapé is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization based in Rio de Janeiro, operating at both local and global levels. The Igarapé Institute holds United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) consultative status since 2016 and observer status with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) since 2022.

[57] Igarapé Institute (2026). Towards a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation.