



IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE
a think and do tank

Global Futures Bulletin

10°22'20.1"S
51°05'41.1"W

10°22'20.1"S
51°05'42.9"W

10°22'21.0"S
51°05'41.1"W

**TOWARDS A ROADMAP
TO ZERO DEFORESTATION:
TURNING A COP30 PRESIDENCY
INITIATIVE INTO A GLOBAL
FOREST PLATFORM**

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	1
Introduction: From Initiative to Platform.....	4
1. The Roadmap as a Platform: What That Means and Why It Matters	5
2. Global Level: Politically Anchoring the Roadmap in 2026	8
3. Regional, National and Local Levels: What the Platform Facilitates	11
4. Conclusion and the Way Forward	14
Annex I. Country Submissions to the COP30 Presidency Forest Roadmap	16
End Notes	21

Global Futures Bulletin

Towards a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation: Turning a COP30 Presidency Initiative into a Global Forest Platform¹

Executive Summary

The COP30 Presidency Roadmap for Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030 (Forest Roadmap) emerged in Belém with broad stakeholder support and a clear implementation-oriented objective. Politically ambitious, this COP30 Presidency-led initiative has no negotiated mandate within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Crucially, so far the Roadmap lacks clarity on what follows its delivery by COP31, in Antalya, including agreed structures for coordination, intergovernmental grounding, operationalization, and political continuity.

In a previous publication of the Igarapé Institute-led series “Towards a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation”, we suggested the future Forest Roadmap should work as a multilevel, multi-actor Platform that connects the three pillars of the Paris Agreement implementation (mitigation, adaptation and finance) and serves as a space to align existing forest-related efforts across and beyond the United Nations (UN), support countries in developing national pathways, and link actors from the global to the local level.² This second Bulletin focuses on how to bridge the gap between political momentum and operational continuity.

The Roadmap has already mobilized significant momentum since COP30, in Belém. In April, COP30 Presidency’s open call for contributions³ was responded to by 16 countries, three groups and one regional bloc.⁴ Together, these submissions represent 141 Parties, collectively responsible for over 65% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (see Annex I for the full list of countries). The call also received more than 150 contributions from international organizations, civil society, Indigenous Peoples’ organizations, and the private sector.⁵

A set of these submissions highlights a consistent concern that content alone will not determine the impact of the Roadmap. Its effectiveness will depend on how it is politically anchored in multilateral processes, how it connects to existing institutional arrangements and efforts, and how it sustains engagement and tracks progress over time.

This Bulletin further develops the argument that a politically ambitious and viable Roadmap can and should evolve into a multilevel, multi-actor platform, understood as a coordination function across existing actors, processes, and levels of governance. The current landscape is characterized by a dense – yet fragmented – set of initiatives and frameworks addressing

forests across climate, biodiversity, land-use, and sustainable development agendas.⁶ These include political coalitions, UN processes, and financing mechanisms – each contributing to a broader “Global Forest Agenda” but often operating in parallel. The Roadmap offers an opportunity to provide a shared reference point, aligning these efforts around more coherent implementation logic across these multiple fora and processes.

Three priorities emerge for the next months of 2026. The first priority is **embedding the Roadmap in multilateral processes**, where language adopted by governments in official texts (resolutions, COP decisions, subsidiary body conclusions) can anchor the Roadmap in the multilateral system. Key entry points include the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF-21), in May, the June Climate Meeting (SB64), and the desertification, the biodiversity and the climate COPs (UNCCD COP17, CBD COP17 and UNFCCC COP31) in August, October and November, respectively.⁷ It also includes taking advantage of other non-environmental multilateral processes taking place this year, such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) COP. Multilateral embedding must also happen in other politically relevant – and often non-negotiated – intergovernmental or multistakeholder spaces, such as the Action Agenda, Climate Weeks, and high-level political forums, which can build momentum, expand ownership, and shape the political conditions for more ambitious outcomes before COP31.

The second priority is **institutional activation**. Rather than pointing to a single institutional home, the submissions suggest an appetite for a distributed architecture built on existing UN and multistakeholder structures for coordination and alignment, intergovernmental grounding, operationalization, and political continuity, within and beyond the UNFCCC. As a Platform, the future Roadmap should engage and strengthen COP Presidencies and other champion-country coalitions (or “coalitions of the willing”) alongside existing forest-related initiatives and fora, including the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF), the intergovernmental UNFF, and numerous UN and multistakeholder implementation mechanisms (including those under the UNFCCC Action Agenda).

The third priority is **localization**. Translating global ambition into implementation requires engagement with regional dynamics and territorial realities. In the Amazon Basin, Brazil offers elements of a national pilot model through its anti-deforestation plans, monitoring systems, enforcement tools, restoration policies, and economic instruments, while the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) provides a regional institutional base and a space for cross-country learning. Developing regional and national roadmaps could help operationalize the global Roadmap as a multi-level, multi-actor platform: regional roadmaps can address transboundary constraints that individual countries cannot resolve alone, while national roadmaps can translate shared priorities into country-specific planning and implementation pathways. Similar approaches could be applied across other tropical, temperate, and boreal forest basins and ecosystems, where existing regional mechanisms and initiatives can be connected and strengthened.

The window to build this architecture is 2026. The sequence of political moments is clear, the institutional building blocks are in place, and the April submissions to the COP30 Presidency indicate interest in advancing this agenda. The remaining steps are part of connecting these elements into a coherent pathway for implementation, and in this Bulletin we explore some of the options for the months ahead leading up to COP31 and beyond.

Politically Anchoring the Forest Roadmap

Priority	Description	Key Entry Points in 2026
Multilateral Embedding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anchoring the Roadmap in official intergovernmental multilateral texts within the UNFCCC and across the other Rio Conventions • Connecting the Roadmap with other forest-related and forest-relevant negotiating tracks and non-negotiated intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder spaces • Building momentum and expanding ownership ahead of COP31 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNFF-21 (May 2026) • SB64 (June 2026) • UNCCD COP17 (August 2026) • CBD COP17 (October 2026) • UNTOC COP (October 2026) • UNFCCC COP31 (November 2026) • Action Agenda, Climate Weeks, and high-level political forums throughout the year
Institutional Activation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building a distributed institutional architecture on existing UN and multi-stakeholder structures for coordination, intergovernmental grounding, operationalization, and political continuity within and beyond the UNFCCC • Turning the Roadmap into a <i>Platform</i> that mobilises coalitions and existing mechanisms rather than creating a single institutional home 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COP Presidencies and champion-country coalitions/coalitions of the willing • Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) • UN Forum of Forests (UNFF) • UNFCCC Action Agenda and other post-COP30 implementation mechanisms • Other UN and multi-stakeholder forest-relevant implementation fora
Localization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Translating global ambition into implementation through regional and national roadmaps that engage territorial realities • Fostering regional and national zero-deforestation and forest restoration planning • Promoting cross-country learning and cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Using existing national anti-deforestation plans, monitoring, and economic instruments for technical cooperation, capacity building and institutional strengthening across forest countries (e.g. PPCDAm in Brazil) • Activating regional bodies for developing Regional Roadmaps (e.g. ACTO in the Amazon Basin) and supporting National Roadmaps in forest countries • Fostering cross-Basin dialogue to support Regional and National Roadmaps in other forest basins and ecosystems

Introduction: From Initiative to Platform

At COP30 in Belém, Parties and other stakeholders, including civil society organizations and scientists, supported the development of a Global Roadmap to halt and reverse deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.⁸ Yet, despite this political momentum, the Roadmap did not become a negotiated outcome. It remains a COP30 Presidency-led initiative, carried forward by Brazil's Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago's commitment to present it to the international community by COP31, in Antalya, Türkiye.⁹ This gives the Roadmap flexibility, but also creates a challenge: there is no mandate, no dedicated secretariat, and no institutional arrangement for what comes after its formal delivery, by November, 2026.

That gap matters. In March 2026, the COP30 Presidency issued a formal call for contributions¹⁰ to inform the development of two COP30 Roadmaps. By the 10 April deadline, 16 countries,¹¹ 3 groups (the Coalition for Rainforest Nations - CfrN, the Least Developed Countries Group - LDC Group, and the Alliance of Small Island States - AOSIS) and one regional bloc (the European Union), had submitted inputs to the Forest Roadmap. Together they represent a total of 141 Parties (see Annex 1) responsible for over 65% of global GHG emissions.¹² Additionally, the Roadmap received more than 150 contributions from international organizations, civil society, Indigenous Peoples' organizations, and private sector actors.¹³

Read together, many submissions point to a shared concern: for the Roadmap to have lasting value, it will need more than strong content. It will require political anchoring, institutional arrangements, and a way to sustain engagement and track progress over time.

A document delivered at COP31, however well crafted, will not be sufficient on its own. The difference between a Roadmap that shapes implementation and one that fades after its launch will depend on whether this political anchoring is built in 2026. As a platform, moreover, the Roadmap can connect actors, processes, and levels of governance that already exist, but often operate in parallel.

The Igarapé Institute has been engaged in this process from the outset. Before, during and in the aftermath of COP30 our engagement grew from our work on tackling environmental crime in the Amazon basin and beyond, articulating the need for concrete entry-points within the UNFCCC for a forest agenda in the climate agenda that acts on the nexus between climate and nature and openly recognizes environmental crime as a driver of deforestation and degradation. We also advocated for Plans to Accelerate Solutions¹⁴ and a dedicated Forest Roadmap to anchor forests properly in the climate agenda, with tackling environmental crime as a departing point.

In February 2026, the Institute published the first *Global Futures Bulletin* in this series, offering initial inputs and considerations for a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation.¹⁵ In April, it submitted formal contributions to the COP30 Presidency.¹⁶ This second Bulletin builds on that work and advances one step further, arguing that the Roadmap now needs to be politically anchored and evolve into a multilevel, multi-actor platform that can function beyond Brazil's COP30 Presidency, beyond COP31, and beyond the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process alone.

Concretely, the Bulletin helps unpack the very challenge of turning a **COP30 Presidency Initiative into a Global Forest Platform**. It first makes the case for the platform concept, showcasing possible solutions and implementation pathways identified across submissions received by the COP30 Presidency from countries, country groups, and United Nations (UN) system organizations. It then examines the 2026 political calendar as a

sequence of anchoring moments, from Bonn to the Climate COP31, across the three Rio Conventions, and in other forest-relevant policy spaces throughout the year. It closes with three priorities and concrete recommendations for the months ahead.

1. The Roadmap as a Platform: What That Means and Why It Matters

The multilateral forest landscape is not short of initiatives. Over the past two decades, forest-related efforts have multiplied across climate, biodiversity, land, sustainable development, and restoration agendas. In the context of the Climate Convention, these include the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN), the Bonn Challenge, the Global Mangrove Alliance, the Forest and Climate Leaders' Partnership (FCLP), the United for Our Forests Group, and the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF). Several of these initiatives have helped mobilize political attention, finance, and technical cooperation around forests.¹⁷

Within the broader UN system, forests are already embedded across multiple institutional frameworks. The UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) provides an intergovernmental anchor through the Global Forest Goals under the United Nations Strategic Plan for Forests 2017–2030. REDD+ operates within the UNFCCC with its own architecture of results-based payments and safeguards. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also provides an operational instrument to guide forest-related actions, programmes, and partnerships through its Forestry Roadmap 2024–2031.¹⁸ Forests are also central to the Kunming–Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KM-GBF), including the 30×30

target (to protect 30% of the planet's oceans, lands, and freshwaters by 2030) and other ecosystem restoration commitments, as well as to Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN) targets under the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).

The issue, therefore, is not a lack of ambition, institutions, or actors. It is that these efforts operate largely in parallel, without a common reference point or shared implementation logic, in a global environmental governance landscape where even the three Rio Conventions continue to function with limited coordination.

The proposed Forest Roadmap has the potential to respond to this gap, but only if it is designed with that function in consideration. As it stands, it remains a Presidency-led document with a defined delivery moment (by COP31 in Antalya) but without a clear institutional arrangement for what follows. A set of submissions from countries, multilateral organizations and civil society contributions engage with the questions of *institutionalization* and *operationalization*, pointing more explicitly to what would be required for the Roadmap to function beyond a document.

Panama¹⁹ proposes a more operational architecture, encouraging the implementation and follow-up of the Roadmap to be institutionally hosted by an intergovernmental body such as UNFF or FAO. Guyana²⁰ highlights national systems as the foundation for delivery and calls for a menu of complementary finance options, including Jurisdictional REDD+ (JREDD+) and the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF). Suriname²¹ and Mexico²² both frame the Roadmap as an opportunity to translate GST outcomes into practical and actionable pathways. Suriname²³ emphasizes the specific needs of High Forest, Low Deforestation (HFLD) countries, and Mexico points to the Roadmap's role in informing the second GST cycle through more robust and consolidated information on forests as both mitigation and adaptation solutions.

Developed countries also contributed to the submissions. Switzerland,²⁴ for instance, calls for a sustained process, not a one-off report, with explicit links to the UNFCCC and the second Global Stocktake (GST). The United Kingdom,²⁵ emphasizes a short, strategic, implementation-centred Roadmap, built around high-impact actions, consultation through existing platforms, and continuity beyond COP31. Meanwhile, the European Union²⁶ proposes a multi-year trajectory with periodic reporting and milestones, calls for consultation with COP31 and COP32 Presidencies, and strongly promotes the use of upcoming sessions under the UNFF, UNCCD, the FAO Committee on Forestry (COFO) and United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 2026 to develop the Roadmap ahead of COP31.

From the UN system, submissions further suggest institutional arrangements that could support the Roadmap's operationalization. FAO,²⁷ on behalf of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF), highlights the role of the CPF, which brings together 16 UN agencies and international organizations²⁸, and its joint initiatives as a delivery mechanism for technical expertise, coordination, data, monitoring, finance information, capacity-building, and outreach. Meanwhile, UN-REDD,²⁹ led by FAO, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) presents itself as a platform at the service of implementation, drawing on its experience supporting more than 65 countries since 2008 and on its updated 2026–2030 Strategy. UNEP³⁰ further adds that dedicated finance windows for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs), who safeguard 36% of the world's intact forests, are essential for implementation to reach the territories where it matters most. Finally, UNDP³¹ emphasizes a country-led architecture that connects existing platforms and support mechanisms. The demand is already visible in national planning: 96% of the latest Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) include forests and land use. What remains missing is the connective architecture to translate that demand into coordinated implementation.

Regional intergovernmental bodies also contributed to the discussion. The Permanent Secretariat of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (SP/OTCA),³² submitting on the basis of its institutional mandate rather than as a common position of its eight Member States, draws a key lesson from its own experience: political mandates gain implementation capacity when translated into concrete sectoral work plans. The SP/OTCA points to the Amazon Regional Network of Forest Authorities (RAFO), the Amazon Network for Integrated Fire Management (RAMIF), and the Special Commission on Public Security and Transboundary and Transnational Illicit Activities (CESPIT) as examples of how regional mechanisms become effective when they combine political decision, technical structure, and dedicated work plans to address different aspects of the deforestation challenge in the region.

Civil society organizations and research institutes further contributed with substantive inputs to the process. International non-governmental organizations such as WWF and WRI argued that the Roadmap should function as an implementation engine – not a parallel process – using NDCs and Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) as a unified tracking mechanism. The Brazil-based Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazônia (IPAM) identified the core challenge as fragmentation across existing mandates, calling for a coordination platform operationalized through a Joint Work Programme across the Rio Conventions. The CIFOR-ICRAF pointed to over a dozen overlapping international mandates with limited coordination, calling for a differentiated approach that links forest policy diagnostics to context-specific governance systems. From the Pan-Amazon region, Plataforma CIPÓ, the Amazon Network of Georeferenced Socio-Environmental Information (RAISG), and the Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) jointly proposed an additional regional architecture for the Amazon anchored in the ACTO, combining ministerial coordination with technical networks and structured participation of Indigenous Peoples and local communities in implementation and oversight.

Taken together, these submissions point to a menu of possibilities for turning the Roadmap into a result-driven, operational platform with a function that connects actors, processes, and levels of governance around a shared objective. This Bulletin builds on that menu of proposals to examine what such a platform would need to do in practice.

At the GLOBAL level, this means aligning existing initiatives and politically anchoring the Roadmap in multilateral processes, both by embedding it in negotiations and high-level political processes and through stakeholder mobilization. This step is important to provide ambition, political ownership and continuity for the Roadmap beyond the Brazilian Presidency and the UNFCCC space.

At the REGIONAL level, it can facilitate cooperation and exchange within and across forest basins and ecosystems, helping to address shared challenges that no country can tackle alone, such as cross-border illicit activities, monitoring interoperability, and regulatory fragmentation.

At the NATIONAL level, it means supporting countries in developing zero deforestation implementation pathways adapted to different forest profiles, governance conditions, and development trajectories. These country-led roadmaps could also align with NDCs, National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs), and Land Degradation Neutrality targets, while connecting existing instruments and support mechanisms rather than duplicating them.

This is the distinction between a Roadmap that shapes implementation and one that fades after its launch. Three questions follow from this, structuring the rest of this Bulletin: how can the Roadmap be politically anchored beyond the Brazilian Presidency? What can it realistically coordinate at the global level, and through which institutional arrangements? And, finally, what can it facilitate at the regional and national levels, where the implementation of zero deforestation goals ultimately takes place?

2. Global Level: Politically Anchoring the Roadmap in 2026

The Roadmap will not be built in Antalya. By the time COP31 starts in November, the key political choices will already have been made or missed. Whether the Roadmap arrives as a living platform or as a well-intentioned document depends on what happens in the months leading up to it. And 2026 offers a dense calendar of multilateral moments to secure political buy-in and get that architecture right.

These moments operate at different levels within the multilateral system. Some provide formal – and negotiated – entry points within the UNFCCC and in other existing Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and fora, where the Roadmap can be reflected in resolutions, conclusions, or decision texts, giving it institutional grounding and continuity without turning it into a negotiated instrument. Others operate in the political – and often in non-negotiated spaces – through leadership statements, the UNFCCC Action Agenda, and stakeholder mobilization. Both are necessary. Formal and negotiated recognition provides structure; informal processes raise ambition and build momentum, coalitions, and political ownership.

2.1 Embedding in multilateral processes: agreed texts and resolutions

Embedding the Roadmap in multilateral processes requires working across a sequence of political and institutional entry points throughout 2026, rather than relying on a

single outcome at COP31. While the UNFCCC is the most immediate and visible forum, the Roadmap should not be confined to it. The year of 2026 offers multiple pathways, including the Conferences of the other two Rio Conventions (biodiversity and desertification), the UN Forum on Forests, and other multilateral fora where forests are addressed indirectly, such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), through its environmental crime agenda.

Taken together, these moments form a pathway through which the Roadmap can progressively gain political recognition and institutional grounding. Early agreed language in resolutions, conclusions, and decisions across these forums can help shape a more consistent narrative, build convergence around its role, and strengthen its legitimacy ahead of COP31. The objective is not to negotiate the Roadmap itself, but to ensure that it is reflected across the multilateral system, supported by agreed language and a clearer basis for implementation.

The first strategic moment is the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF-21) in New York in May, as a formal intergovernmental entry point outside the UNFCCC. UNFF operates under the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with a multi-biome mandate and universal membership, and its resolutions carry political weight across the UN system. Its omnibus resolution offers a concrete opportunity to recognize the Roadmap as an implementation initiative connected to the UN Strategic Plan for Forests and its Global Forest Goals. Strategically anchoring the Roadmap in this space extends it beyond the UNFCCC and the Brazilian Presidency, strengthening its resilience to political-electoral cycles, COP presidencies, and global governance transitions. This logic is also reflected in Panama's submission, which encourages the implementation and follow-up of the Roadmap to be institutionally hosted by an intergovernmental body such as the UNFF or FAO.³³

In Bonn in June, at the sixty-fourth sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB64), the objective is to create an early direction within the UNFCCC process and prepare the ground for COP31, without turning the Roadmap itself into a negotiated instrument. Two entry points are particularly relevant. The first is the agenda item on *Cooperation with Other International Organizations*, which COP30 opened in a more substantive direction and which could become a formal locus for Rio Convention synergies within the UNFCCC.³⁴ Under this item, the Roadmap could be positioned as an implementation instrument supporting the objectives of the three Rio Conventions. The second entry point is the Global Stocktake cycle. Paragraphs 33 and 34 of the first GST outcome explicitly called for halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.³⁵ Connecting the Roadmap to this mandate at SB64 – and situating it as part of the GST follow-up cycle – would give it technical grounding and institutional continuity as the second GST process begins at COP31.

The UNCCD COP17 in Mongolia and the CBD COP17 in Armenia provide opportunities for cross-convention anchoring. Under the UNCCD, references to the Roadmap in relation to land restoration, sustainable land management, and land degradation neutrality would reinforce its relevance beyond the climate agenda. Under the CBD, references within decisions on synergies and integrated implementation could position the Roadmap as a complementary instrument supporting the Kunming–Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. Together, these moments complete the so-called “Rio triplet” and strengthen the Roadmap’s role as a connecting action-oriented framework across climate, biodiversity, and land agendas. The Rio Conventions’ Joint Liaison Group could also play a role in supporting coordination across the three processes.

A less obvious but strategically relevant entry point is the 13th Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC COP13), meeting in October 2026. States will decide at this COP whether to open formal negotiations on an additional protocol on crimes that affect the environment – an issue championed within UNTOC by a range of countries, including Brazil, France, and Peru,³⁶ and directly connected to the criminal economies that drive deforestation. A reference to the Roadmap in the UNTOC COP13 outcome, recognizing the connection between organized environmental crime and forest loss, would anchor it in the security and rule-of-law dimensions of forest governance that the climate and biodiversity conventions cannot fully address. This would send a signal that the international community is treating deforestation as a governance and criminal justice challenge, not only a climate one.

COP31 in Antalya is the main delivery moment, but not the only one that matters. Outcomes can range from a minimal political reference – taking note of the Roadmap as a Presidency initiative – to more substantive language that welcomes the Roadmap and invites Parties to use it in the development and updating of national plans, including NDCs, NBSAPs, and land-related strategies. A further step would be to invite relevant multilateral organizations, including FAO, UNEP and UNFF, as well as the Joint Liaison Group, with the support of the three Rio Convention secretariats, to develop options for operationalization and voluntary progress tracking. This option would directly connect the Roadmap to the GST follow-up cycle and provide a pathway for continuity beyond COP31.

Timeline of Strategic Entry Points in 2026

- **May**
→ UN Forum on Forests (UNFF-21), New York
- **June**
→ 64th sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SB64), Bonn
- **August**
→ 17th Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD COP17), Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
- **October**
→ 17th Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD COP17), Yerevan, Armenia
→ 13th Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC COP13)
- **November**
→ Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP31), Antalya, Türkiye

2.2 Beyond negotiated spaces: expanding ownership and momentum

Alongside embedding the Roadmap in agreed texts and resolutions, non-negotiated spaces will be essential to build political momentum, broaden ownership, and shape the narrative around the Roadmap before COP31. These spaces do not necessarily produce agreed texts, but they often enhance ambition and create momentum for what becomes politically possible within negotiating rooms. They range

from forest-specific and environmental forums – where the technical and political communities most directly engaged with the Roadmap convene – to broader high-level political spaces where forest considerations can be integrated into trade, finance, and security agendas, reaching actors and constituencies that the multilateral climate and nature processes do not easily engage.

Forest-related multilateral spaces offer a first layer. The FAO Committee on Forestry (COFO), as a technical and ministerial forum focused on forests, can help connect the Roadmap to existing forest policy discussions. Climate Weeks in 2026, including Rio Climate & Nature Week, London Climate Action Week, New York Climate Week, and the UNFCCC Regional Climate Weeks can help build champion-country coalitions (or “coalitions of the willing”), engage civil society, philanthropy, and the private sector, test political language, and mobilize support ahead of COP31. Stakeholder mobilization spaces, including side events at UNFF, SB64, UNCCD COP, CBD COP, and UNFCCC sessions, also provide opportunities to advance the Roadmap across a range of constituencies.

Within the UNFCCC, the Action Agenda is particularly relevant. Since Brazil took over the Climate COP Presidency, Brazil’s President Lula da Silva made sure forests, particularly tropical forests like the Amazon, were central to COP30, due to their role in delivering across mitigation, adaptation, and nature goals³⁷. Forests also gained an unprecedented level of centrality in the 2026 Action Agenda, which was reorganized around the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake, shifting it toward a more implementation-oriented structure through the Granary of Solutions and the Plans to Accelerate Solutions (PAS).³⁸ Among these, the PAS on Tackling Environmental Crime to Achieve Zero Deforestation,³⁹ for Synergistic implementation across the Rio Conventions⁴⁰ and for promoting Bioeconomy⁴¹ are especially relevant. On the one hand, the former identified concrete areas for cooperation to tackle illegal deforestation, including monitoring and detection, legality and traceability in supply chains, and regional and global coordination,

including through policy arenas and legal frameworks such as ACTO in the Amazon Basin and UNTOC within the UN System. On the other hand, the latter foster economic conditions and incentives for public and private actors to move away from deforestation-related economic activities and supply chains.

Moving forward, the Action Agenda can help translate the Roadmap into initiatives, coalitions, and implementation partnerships. It can also provide continuity beyond formal negotiations by linking the Roadmap to the COP30 Plans to Accelerate Solutions (PAS) and to the broader COP31 stakeholder ecosystem.

Beyond environmental and climate spaces, broader political and economic forums can also help create an enabling international environment on the road to COP31. Moments such as the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) and the UN General Assembly in New York, the annual meetings of cross-regional spaces (including the G7, G20 and BRICS) or even ad hoc thematic summits (such as the Illicit Finance Summit in London) are not forest-specific, but can help elevate political ambition and integrate forest considerations into wider discussions on trade, investment, finance, illicit flows, and bioeconomy. They also offer opportunities to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation on deforestation-free commodity trade and forest-compatible development.

These additional – and often informal, *ad hoc*, or non-negotiated – pathways should not be treated as secondary. They are where coalitions are built, narratives are tested, and implementation partnerships are formed. Taken together with formal anchoring, they can help ensure that the Roadmap arrives at COP31 as a platform already supported by a broader ecosystem of state and non-state actors.

3. Regional, National and Local Levels: What the Platform Facilitates

A global Roadmap has limited impact if it does not translate into concrete regional, national, and local pathways. Forest countries operate across different stages of forest transition, from high forest cover and low historical deforestation (HFLD) contexts, such as Guyana and Suriname, to active deforestation frontiers, such as Brazil, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This diversity means the Roadmap cannot offer a single model, a “one size fits all” approach. Its role is to facilitate a menu of implementation and financing pathways, enabling countries to develop nationally determined approaches aligned with their forest profiles, institutional capacities, and development trajectories.

The previous section examined how the Roadmap can be anchored in multilateral processes throughout 2026 – the spaces and texts that can recognize and legitimize it globally. This section takes a complementary perspective: what regional, national, and local elements should the Roadmap incorporate, and what processes should it facilitate, to be effective on the ground. The underlying logic is that forest regions often face shared challenges, particularly in transboundary contexts where environmental crime, regulatory fragmentation, and weak territorial governance interact. These dynamics create common constraints, but also open opportunities for shared solutions. Regional cooperation and targeted tools to support national and local implementation are therefore essential.

In this context, as a platform, the COP30 Presidency Roadmap can support the development of Regional and National Roadmaps that help identify these pathways and create the enabling conditions for implementation at the local and territorial levels. This includes strengthening cooperation across forest basins, aligning policy and regulatory approaches, and supporting countries in translating global ambition into actionable strategies adapted to local realities.

3.1 Facilitating Regional Cooperation across Forest Basins

This section focuses on the Amazon Basin as a concrete case to illustrate the regional logic behind a Roadmap that serves as a platform, highlighting common challenges and pathways. The underlying approach, however, is not Amazon-specific and can be recognized and adapted across other forest biomes and basins, including the Congo Basin, Mesoamerica and in South-East Asia, where regional mechanisms and ecological corridors already exist or are emerging.

Across transboundary forest regions, a set of interlinked challenges shapes the regional implementation landscape. Differences in regulatory frameworks and sanction regimes in sectors associated with deforestation create cross-border displacement incentives for illegal actors. Limited integration between environmental monitoring systems, law enforcement, and financial intelligence reduces the effectiveness of coordinated responses.⁴² Compounded risk environments – marked by insecurity, weak land governance, unclear tenure, and limited State presence – raise operational and financial risks for both public policy delivery and responsible investment while creating conditions for illicit economies to persist.⁴³

These challenges not only hinder regional cooperation on illicit economies that drive deforestation but also limit the development of forest-compatible economic alternatives, constraining the scale and impact of green investments across the region.⁴⁴ The forest and nature finance gap is as qualitative as it is quantitative: even when capital is available, it often cannot reach the territories where it is most needed. These are not isolated national governance failures; they are structural, cross-border challenges that require regional responses.

In this context, as a global platform the Forest Roadmap can play a facilitating role by recognizing and connecting National and Regional Roadmaps, respecting differences in ecosystems, governance conditions, institutional capacities, and development trajectories. While it cannot resolve these structural challenges on its own, it can provide a shared reference framework through which countries identify common priorities, exchange solutions and best practices, align regulatory approaches, and strengthen the cooperative arrangements needed to address challenges that exceed any single jurisdiction.

Stronger cooperation within and across forest basins is a key pathway. In South America, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) plays a central role in promoting coordination on forest governance, environmental monitoring, law enforcement, and information sharing across the eight Amazonian countries.⁴⁵ A key lesson from ACTO's experience is that political mandates gain implementation capacity when translated into concrete sectoral work plans. Its recently created Special Commissions illustrate this: the Amazon Regional Network of Forest Authorities (RAFO), the Amazon Network for Integrated Fire Management (RAMIF), and the Special Commission on Public Security and Transboundary and Transnational Illicit Activities (CESPIT) each combine a political decision, a technical structure, and a dedicated work plan.⁴⁶

Building on this foundation, strengthening ACTO's coordinating function will require reinforcing these institutional mechanisms and improving interoperability between national monitoring systems and regional platforms such as the Amazon Regional Observatory (ORA).⁴⁷ Connecting these systems with law enforcement and financial intelligence networks is essential to enable more effective responses to cross-border illicit activities and to support a more integrated regional approach to forest governance.

The Andean Community (CAN) offers a complementary pathway, particularly through its Andean Strategy to Combat Environmental Crimes and its frameworks for technical coordination, data exchange, and regulatory convergence in sectors linked to deforestation, such as mining, timber, and land governance.⁴⁸ More systematic integration of these regional mechanisms into a Regional Roadmap's implementation architecture could reduce incentives for the displacement of illegal activities across borders and support more coherent enforcement at the basin level. Supporting the development of Regional Roadmaps in the Amazon and in other critical forest ecosystems would help facilitate the Global Roadmap implementation and operation as a multilevel, multi-actor platform.

Financial instruments also play an important supporting role. Regional and multilateral development banks, including the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), have advanced innovative financing mechanisms in this direction. Initiatives such as Amazonia Bonds, launched by the IDB in partnership with the World Bank,⁴⁹ aim to mobilize long-term, sustainable capital for critical ecosystems such as the Amazon. As MDBs undergo ongoing reforms to become more effective and better aligned with climate and nature goals, integrating forests and ecosystems into their mandates will be critical to scaling investment in forest protection, restoration, and forest-compatible development.⁵⁰

3.2 National and local implementation

Regional Roadmaps can serve as a critical enabler for national and local implementation. By aligning regulatory frameworks, strengthening cross-border enforcement, and improving monitoring interoperability at the basin/ecosystem-level,⁵¹ they address the transboundary constraints that individual countries cannot resolve alone – creating more stable and coherent conditions for national policies and territorial investments to take effect. Supporting the development of Regional and National Roadmaps would therefore help operationalize the Global Roadmap as a multi-level, multi-actor platform, connecting regional cooperation with national planning and local implementation.

At the national and local levels, a central pathway lies in strengthening the enabling conditions for implementation on the ground, including through nature-based solutions and integrated approaches to land use and ecosystem management. In many forest regions, weak land governance, insecurity, unclear tenure, informality, illicit economies, and limited State presence continue to raise operational, reputational, and financial risks for both public policy delivery and responsible investment. Accelerating implementation therefore requires not only better instruments, but stronger territorial governance – including reinforcing the rule of law, addressing environmental crime, increasing transparency, and strengthening institutional presence in high-risk areas.⁵²

In this context, territorial de-risking emerges as a particularly relevant approach. Rather than focusing only on individual projects or financial instruments, it addresses the structural conditions that make forest territories high-risk environments for sustainable investment and long-term implementation. By reducing governance failures, legal uncertainty, and illicit pressures, de-risking strategies can help create the conditions for forest protection, restoration, and forest-compatible economies to scale.⁵³

The National Roadmaps can also draw on existing policy experiences. As highlighted in the first Bulletin of this series,⁵⁴ Brazil offers a relevant example of how coordinated public policies can reduce deforestation at scale, combining monitoring, enforcement, and economic instruments. Initiatives such as the Action Plans for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation (PPCDAm and related plans), together with investments in real-time monitoring systems, demonstrate the importance of sustained political commitment and institutional coordination. Also, enforcement innovations such as Brazil's Federal Police's Ouro Alvo program illustrate how forensic tools can strengthen traceability and accountability in high-risk sectors.⁵⁵ At the same time, Brazil's updated NDC incorporates restoration and land-use transitions through instruments such as the National Plan for Native Vegetation Recovery (PLANAVEG). Complementing these approaches, the Environmental Reserve Quota (CRA), established under the Brazilian Forest Code, provides a domestic example of how regulatory frameworks can begin to assign economic value to conservation and restoration, offering lessons for the development of nature-based and biodiversity-related credits and markets.⁵⁶

4. Conclusion and the Way Forward

The COP30 Presidency Roadmap for Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030 (Forest Roadmap) has a delivery date and a political mandate. What it does not yet have is an institutional arrangement that ensures political continuity and operationalization beyond its formal delivery. This Bulletin has argued that the difference between a Roadmap that works as a Platform and shapes implementation and one that fades after its launch will be determined in the months leading up to COP31. The year 2026 offers a window to build that institutional arrangement that will not easily reopen.

Three priorities stand out.

The first is political anchoring across multilateral processes. The 2026 calendar offers a sequence of formal and informal entry points, from UNFF and SB64 to the UNCCD and CBD COPs, and other non-environmental but forest-relevant fora such as UNTOC COP, through which the Roadmap can progressively gain recognition and institutional grounding. These moments should not be treated as parallel tracks. Early agreed language in resolutions, conclusions, and decisions can shape ambition within the UNFCCC, while non-negotiated spaces – including the Action Agenda, Climate Weeks, and high-level political forums – can build momentum, expand ownership, and strengthen the conditions for more ambitious outcomes. Together, they will start embedding the Roadmap across multilateral processes, so in Antalya it gets its formal recognition.

The second is institutional activation. A set of complementary pathways and ideas for institutionalizing the Roadmap across multilateral arenas are showcased here. Rather than converging on a single institutional home, they suggest a distributed architecture that builds on existing structures. This includes strengthening engagement and coordination with existing forest-related UN fora and platforms, such as the UNFF, the Collaborative Partnership on Forests and other UN system initiatives for political grounding and delivery support on the ground. It also includes mobilizing successive COP Presidencies, stakeholders already engaged in the UNFCCC Action Agenda, and above all multistakeholder “coalitions of the willing” to ensure political ambition and continuity beyond 2026. This would allow the Roadmap to draw on existing mandates and capacities across the UN system while giving them a clearer common direction toward 2030.

The third is localization. A global Roadmap that does not connect to regional, national, and local implementation realities will remain a statement of ambition. The Amazon Basin offers one of the most advanced cases. At the national level, Brazil provides elements of a pilot model, drawing on decades of experimentation with anti-deforestation plans, monitoring systems, enforcement tools, restoration policies, and economic instruments. At the regional level, the existing regional inter-governmental body, ACTO, provides emerging political mandates, institutional structures, and monitoring infrastructure. What is needed in the Amazon and elsewhere is a facilitation function that strengthens and connects national systems, improves interoperability, supports regulatory alignment in high-risk sectors, and links environmental enforcement with financial intelligence. Supporting the development of Regional and National Roadmaps would demonstrate that the platform is operational in practice.

The Forest Roadmap emerged in Belém with political momentum and a 2030 horizon. Together with transitioning away from fossil fuels, protecting and restoring forests are central to keeping Mission 1.5 alive.⁵⁷ The question now is whether ambitious goals and robust evidence-based diagnosis and implementation-oriented frameworks will be matched by political anchoring and institutional arrangements capable of enabling and sustaining action across national political cycles, Climate COP presidencies, and global governance transitions. Building a Roadmap that serves as a platform is the task of 2026. The window is open, the sequence of moments is clear, and the instruments already exist. What remains is the political choice to connect them.

Annex I. Country Submissions to the COP30 Presidency Forest Roadmap⁵⁸

Country	Submission Channel ⁵⁹
Afghanistan	LDC
Angola	LDC
Antigua and Barbuda	AOSIS
Argentina	CfRN
Armenia	National
Australia	National
Austria	EU
Azerbaijan	National
Bahamas (The)	AOSIS
Bangladesh	CfRN, LDCs
Barbados	AOSIS
Belgium	EU
Belize	AOSIS, CfRN
Benin	LDCs
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	CfRN
Botswana	CfRN
Brazil	CfRN
Bulgaria	EU
Burkina Faso	LDCs
Burundi	LDCs
Cabo Verde	AOSIS
Cambodia	CfRN, LDCs
Cameroon	CfRN
Central African Republic	LDCs, CfRN
Chad	LDCs
China (The People's Republic of)	CfRN
Colombia	National
Comoros	LDCs, AOSIS
Congo	CfRN

Cook Islands ⁶⁰	AOSIS
Costa Rica	CfRN
Croatia	EU
Cuba	AOSIS
Cyprus	EU
Czechia	EU
Democratic Republic of the Congo	LDCs, CfRN
Denmark	EU
Djibouti	LDCs
Dominica	AOSIS, CfRN
Dominican Republic	CfRN, AOSIS
Ecuador	CfRN
Equatorial Guinea	CfRN
Eritrea	LDCs
Estonia	EU
Ethiopia	LDCs
Fiji	CfRN, AOSIS
Finland	EU
France	EU
Gabon	CfRN
Gambia (Republic of The)	LDCs
Germany	EU
Ghana	CfRN
Greece	EU
Grenada	AOSIS
Guatemala	CfRN
Guinea	LDCs
Guinea Bissau	LDCs, AOSIS
Guyana	CfRN, AOSIS, National
Haiti	AOSIS, LDCs
Honduras	CfRN
Hungary	EU
India	CfRN
Indonesia	CfRN, National
Ireland	EU

Italy	EU
Jamaica	CfRN, AOSIS
Japan	National
Kenya	CfRN
Kiribati	AOSIS, LDCs
Lao People's Democratic Republic	CfRN, LDCs
Latvia	EU
Lesotho	LDCs, CfRN
Liberia	LDCs, CfRN
Lithuania	EU
Luxembourg	EU
Madagascar	LDCs, CfRN
Malawi	LDCs, CfRN
Malaysia	CfRN
Maldives	AOSIS
Mali	LDCs, CfRN
Malta	EU
Marshall Islands	AOSIS
Mauritania	LDCs
Mauritius	AOSIS
Mexico	National
Micronesia (Federated States of)	AOSIS
Mozambique	LDCs, CfRN
Myanmar	LDCs
Namibia	CfRN
Nauru	AOSIS
Nepal	LDCs
Netherlands (Kingdom of the)	EU
Nicaragua	CfRN
Niger	LDCs
Nigeria	CfRN
Niue ⁶¹	AOSIS
Norway	National
Pakistan	CfRN

Palau	AOSIS
Panama	CfRN, National
Papua New Guinea	CfRN, AOSIS
Paraguay	CfRN
Poland	EU
Portugal	EU
Romania	EU
Russian Federation	National
Rwanda	LDCs
Saint Kitts and Nevis	AOSIS
Saint Lucia	CfRN, AOSIS
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	AOSIS
Samoa	CfRN, AOSIS
Sao Tome and Principe	AOSIS
Senegal	LDCs
Seychelles	AOSIS
Sierra Leone	LDCs, CfRN
Singapore	CfRN, AOSIS
Slovakia	EU
Slovenia	EU
Solomon Islands	CfRN, AOSIS, LDCs
Somalia	LDCs
South Africa	CfRN
South Sudan	LDCs
Spain	EU
Sudan	LDCs, CfRN
Suriname	CfRN, AOSIS, National
Sweden	EU
Switzerland	National
Thailand	CfRN
Timor-Leste	AOSIS, LDCs
Togo	LDCs
Tonga	AOSIS
Trinidad and Tobago	AOSIS

Tuvalu	AOSIS, LDCs
Uganda	LDCs, CfRN
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	National
United Republic of Tanzania	LDCs
Uruguay	CfRN
Vanuatu	CfRN, AOSIS
Viet Nam	CfRN
Yemen	LDCs
Zambia	LDCs, CfRN

End Notes

1. This Bulletin was written by Aline Lara, Laura Trajber Waisbich, and Giovanna Kuele. The authors would like to thank Raisa Pina, Lucas Vidal, and Ilona Szabó de Carvalho for their valuable contributions to the document.
2. Igarapé Institute (2026). [Towards a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation](#). Global Futures Bulletin. Rio de Janeiro.
3. COP30 Presidency (2026). [COP30 Presidency Announces Consultations on Roadmaps](#)
4. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [COP30 Presidency Roadmaps. Forest Roadmap](#)
5. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [COP30 Presidency Roadmaps. Forest Roadmap](#)
6. Igarapé Institute (2025). [Climate-Nature Synergies](#). Strategic Paper 65. Rio de Janeiro.
7. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), collectively known as the Rio Conventions.
8. World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) (2025). [After COP30, is it time for reform?](#)
9. O ECO (2025). [Roadmap for Phasing Out Fossil Fuels Left Out of Final COP30 Text](#)
10. COP30 Presidency (2026). [COP30 Presidency Announces Consultations on Roadmaps](#)
11. These are: (1) Armenia, (2) Australia, (3) Azerbaijan, (4) Colombia, (5) Guyana, (6) Indonesia, (7) Japan, (8) Mauritius, (9) Mexico, (10) Norway, (11) Panama, (12) Russian Federation, (13) Sudan, (14) Suriname, (15) Switzerland, and (16) the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Those were the submissions available online by 7 May 2026. Noting the Russian Federation submission did not express support for the Roadmap.
12. Based on 2023 data from Climate Watch, covering all sectors (including energy, transport, agriculture, industrial processes, land use and forestry, and waste) and gases. Climate Watch Data (n.d). [Historical GHG Emissions](#).
13. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [COP30 Presidency Roadmaps](#)
14. See [Plan to Accelerate Solution: Tackling Environmental Crime to Achieve Zero Deforestation](#).
15. Igarapé Institute (2026). [Towards a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation](#). Global Futures Bulletin. Rio de Janeiro.
16. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [Igarapé Institute Contributions to the COP 30 Presidency Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030](#)
17. Igarapé Institute (2025). [Climate-Nature Synergies](#). Strategic Paper 65. Rio de Janeiro.
18. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2024). [The FAO Forestry Roadmap: From Vision to Action 2024–2031](#). COFO/2024/5.1.
19. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [Submission by Panama on the COP 30 Presidency Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030](#)
20. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [Submission to the COP30 Presidency Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Forest Loss by 2030](#)
21. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [Submission SURINAME on Roadmaps UNFCCC COP30 President_Final](#)
22. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [Mexico's Input to the COP30 Presidency Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Deforestation](#)
23. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [Submission SURINAME on Roadmaps UNFCCC COP30 President_Final](#)
24. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [Switzerland Contributions to the Presidency Roadmaps](#)
25. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [UK Submission to the COP30 Presidency Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030](#).

26. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [Submission by Cyprus and the European Commission on behalf of the European Union and its Member States: COP30 Presidency Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030](#)
27. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [Submission by the Collaborative Partnership on Forests \(CPF\): Input to the COP30 Presidency Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030](#)
28. Chaired by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Coalition members are the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) Secretariat, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Secretariat, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) Secretariat, the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) Secretariat, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the International Union of Forest Research Organizations (IUFRO), United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) Secretariat, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), and the World Bank.
29. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [UN-REDD Programme Contribution to Roadmap for Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030](#)
30. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [Part II - The COP 30 Presidency Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030](#)
31. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [Submission by the United Nations Development Programme to the UNFCCC COP-30 Presidency invitation to submit contributions to the "Roadmap for Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030"](#)
32. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [Technical Contribution of the Permanent Secretariat of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization \(SP/OTCA\) to the COP30 Presidency Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030](#)
33. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [Submission by Panama on the COP 30 Presidency Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030](#)
34. Igarapé Institute (2026). [Climate-nature synergies at COP30 and beyond](#). Global Futures Bulletin. Rio de Janeiro.
35. See Decision 1/CMA.5 Outcome of the first global stocktake in: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2024). [Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on its fifth session, held in the United Arab Emirates from 30 November to 13 December 2023](#). FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/16/Add.1
36. These countries have led the efforts to create an Intergovernmental Expert Group (IEG) on crimes that affect the environment, at the 12th Conference of the Parties to the UNTOC in October 2024. The IEG met in June 2025 and February 2026 to examine the feasibility and added value of an additional protocol to the UNTOC on environmental crimes, but ended with no formal recommendations to UNTOC Parties due to lack of consensus. Brazil and other 20 countries, including many tropical forests countries, gathered around the Coalition for Multilateral Action against Crimes that Affect the Environment, are working towards establishing a binding legal framework on these matters under UNTOC.
37. Igarapé Institute (2026). [Climate-nature synergies at COP30 and beyond](#). Global Futures Bulletin. Rio de Janeiro.
38. Climate High-Level Champions (n.d.). [2025 Action Agenda Granary of Solutions](#)
39. See [Plan to Accelerate Solution: Tackling Environmental Crime to Achieve Zero Deforestation](#).
40. See [Plan to Accelerate Solution: Synergistic implementation across the Rio Conventions](#).
41. See [Plan to Accelerate Solution Bioeconomy](#).
42. Igarapé Institute (2025). [Markets and Forest](#). Rio de Janeiro; Igarapé Institute (2025). [Strengthening Anti-Money Laundering Systems Against Environmental Crime: Comparative Legal and Policy Frameworks in Amazonian Countries](#). Rio de Janeiro.
43. Igarapé Institute (2025). [Under the Radar: Territorial and Regulatory Security Risks in the Brazilian and Colombian Amazon](#).
44. Igarapé Institute (2025). [Private Sector Roadmap for a Sustainable Amazonia](#); and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (n.d.). [Amazonia Forever](#).

45. Federal Police of Brazil (PF) (2024). [PF and Igarapé Institute outline strategies to combat environmental crimes in the Amazon.](#)
46. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [Technical Contribution of the Permanent Secretariat of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization \(SP/OTCA\) to the COP30 Presidency Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030](#)
47. See [Amazon Regional Observatory](#).
48. See [Comunidad Andina](#).
49. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (2025). [IDB and World Bank Launch New Amazonia Bond Issuance Program](#); and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (n.d). [Amazonia Bonds Guidelines](#).
50. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2025). [Submission on behalf of Igarapé Institute for the "Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T"](#)
51. On ecosystem governance, see for instance, Paes, L. O. (2022). 'The Amazon Rainforest and the Global-Regional Politics of Ecosystem Governance'. *International Affairs* 98 (6): 2077–97.
52. Szabó, Ilona (2024). [De-risking to scale nature-based economies in the Amazon](#). *Folha de S. Paulo*.
53. Nature Investment Lab (NIL) (2025). [Territorial Risk Manual](#).
54. Igarapé Institute (2026). [Towards a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation](#). Global Futures Bulletin. Rio de Janeiro.
55. Federal Police (2025). [PF holds International Seminar and inaugurates Electron Microscopy Laboratory of the Ouro Alvo Program](#)
56. BVRio (2026). [Forest Reserve Credits Market: Giving greater efficiency and liquidity to the Environmental Reserve Credits \(CRAs\) mark](#); Brazilian Forest Service (2025). [Government launches Brazil's first Environmental Reserve Quotas and Conservation Strategy Fund \(2018\)](#). [New publication on Environmental Reserve Quotas \(CRA\) in Brazil](#); World Economic Forum (2025). [Mainstreaming Natural Capital: Advancing the Global Agenda to Integrate Nature in Decision-Making](#). Community Paper; Think 7 (T7) Taskforce on Biodiversity Finance (2026). [Standardising and strengthening accountability for biodiversity finance](#). Solutions Paper. IDDRI
57. Igarapé Institute (2025). [Resgatando a Missão 1.5°C](#). See also Planetary Science Pavilion (2025). [Scientists statement on state of COP30 Negotiations](#)
58. This table was compiled by the Igarapé Institute on the basis of submissions made to the COP30 Presidency Forest Roadmap by three negotiating groups (CfRN, LDCs, and AOSIS), one regional bloc (European Union), and 16 Parties that submitted individually. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2026). [COP30 Presidency Roadmaps. Forest Roadmap](#)
59. [Coalition for Rainforest Nations](#) (CfRN), Least Developed Countries Group (LDCs), [Alliance of Small Island States](#) (AOSIS), [European Union](#) (EU), Individual national submission (National)
60. Not a UN Member, but a Party to the UNFCCC
61. Not a UN Member, but a Party to the UNFCCC



IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE

a think and do tank

The Igarapé Institute is an independent think-and-do tank that conducts research, develops solutions, and establishes partnerships to influence public and corporate policies and practices, addressing key challenges related to nature, climate, and security in Brazil and worldwide. Igarapé is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization based in Rio de Janeiro, operating at both local and global levels.

Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brazil

Tel.: +55 (21) 3496-2114

contato@igarape.org.br

igarape.org.br

Press Office

press@igarape.org.br

Social Media

x.com/igarape_org

linkedin.com/company/igarapeorg

youtube.com/user/InstitutoIgarape

instagram.com/igarape_org

How to cite:

IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE. Towards a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation: Turning a COP30 Presidency Initiative into a Global Forest Platform. Rio de Janeiro. Igarapé Institute, 2026.

Available at: <https://igarape.org.br/en/publications>

DOI number:

10.5281/zenodo.20090047



igarape.org.br