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Global Futures Bulletin

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TOWARDS A ROADMAP TO ZERO DEFORESTATION: INPUTS AND CONSIDERATIONS

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Global Futures Bulletin

TOWARDS A ROADMAP TO ZERO DEFORESTATION: INPUTS AND CONSIDERATIONS¹

Executive Summary

COP30, in Belém, marks the beginning of a new phase in the global climate agenda: the implementation cycle. In this context, and not without challenges, the Brazilian COP30 Presidency is expected to deliver to the international community, by the end of its mandate in November 2026, two Roadmaps to accelerate the implementation of the Paris Agreement: one on Forests and Climate, and another on the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels.² This is both a challenge and an opportunity for the Brazilian government and its partners, within and beyond the country, to present these Roadmaps as a synergistic and integrated effort. It is also a unique opportunity to elevate forests to the strategic role they should play in climate mitigation and adaptation, environmental conservation, and inclusive sustainable development, while aligning existing multilateral instruments and initiatives that remain dispersed within and beyond the United Nations.

In the spirit of the *Global Climate Mutirão* (a collective mobilization effort proposed by Brazil's COP30 Presidency to accelerate climate action), this Bulletin responds to the call to sustain mobilization by offering initial considerations on both the content and the

development process of a **Roadmap to Zero Deforestation**. Drawing on Brazil's domestic policy and diplomatic practice, we provide inputs to the elaboration of this document, highlighting, first, lessons from forest countries – most notably Brazil's and other tropical forests countries' experiences – in addressing illegality, tackling environmental crime, and advancing economic pathways compatible with standing forests; and second, lessons from Brazilian diplomacy in the development of global Roadmaps at a time when multilateralism is under pressure.

These two sets of experiences jointly provide technical and political grounding for the diagnosis and responses needed to promote and sustain deforestation reduction across tropical, temperate, and boreal forests, including by fostering the social, political, and economic conditions required for economies compatible with standing forests. We also maintain that these takeaways provide a foundation for robust and inclusive processes for developing multilateral instruments, such as Roadmaps, aimed at re-energizing and accelerating multi-actor, multi-level climate planning, action, and mobilization, in light of climate urgency and the prevailing scientific consensus.

This Bulletin is divided into five parts. First, we discuss the importance of multilateral instruments such as Roadmaps in the current context of global climate governance and, in particular, the case for a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation. Next, we present Roadmaps as platforms for multi-actor and multi-level planning, action, and mobilization.

Third, we outline concrete inputs and considerations for a future Roadmap to Zero Deforestation, drawing on two relevant Brazilian experiences: Brazil's trajectory in developing public policy instruments for deforestation prevention and control in the Amazon and other biomes; and Brazil's diplomatic experience in the elaboration of the "Baku to Belém Roadmap to US\$ 1.3 trillion." Fourth, we present strategic considerations on the Roadmap's narrative, argumentation, and operationalization. Lastly, we offer recommendations regarding the Roadmap's conceptual and narrative design, its operational dimension, and its development process.

Finally, while this Bulletin emphasizes Brazil's experience and the challenge of controlling deforestation in tropical forest countries, we underscore the importance of an integrated approach to the broader "Forest Agenda." In this sense, it is strategic for the future Roadmap to encompass different forest types (tropical, temperate, and boreal) and to reinforce forests' contribution, in a broad sense, to climate, people, and nature, including by supporting climate, water, energy, and food security worldwide.

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Introduction

*“We need maps of the path to reverse deforestation, overcome dependence on fossil fuels, and mobilize the necessary resources for these objectives.”*³ With these words, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva called on fellow Heads of State and Government to action during the Leaders’ Summit, days before the start of negotiations at the 30th Conference of the Parties (COP30) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held in November 2025.

President Lula’s appeal sought a multilateral political mandate to accelerate the implementation of the Paris Agreement through the development of two Roadmaps to reverse deforestation, transition away from fossil fuels, and mobilize the resources necessary for the energy transition and forest protection.

Discussions around Roadmaps have multiplied in recent years across multilateral corridors and within Brazil’s federal administration, in light of a succession of global processes in which the country has played a leading role: the Amazon Summit of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) in 2023, Brazil’s G20 Presidency in 2024, and, in 2025, the Presidencies of the BRICS and COP30. Within the climate regime – in debates on climate finance, the transition away from fossil fuels, or zero deforestation – and across other international regimes, this type of instrument has gained traction. It has emerged at a moment when global governance is seeking to reinvent itself to sustain collective mobilization and action. Indeed, Roadmaps can give concrete form to international cooperation and help accelerate it amid shared challenges and increasingly unstable and polarized conditions.

At the Final Plenary of COP30 in Belém, amid growing but still insufficient appetite among Parties for the elaboration of Roadmaps, Brazilian Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago, President of the Conference, announced that the COP30 Presidency would assume responsibility for delivering two global Roadmaps to the international community by the end of the Brazilian mandate, on the eve of negotiations in Türkiye in November 2026.

In this Bulletin, we join this collective effort by offering considerations on both the content and the development process of a Global Roadmap to Zero Deforestation. Drawing on Brazil’s domestic policy experience and diplomatic practice, we provide inputs to the elaboration of this document, highlighting lessons from forest countries – such as Brazil – in addressing illegality, tackling environmental crime, and advancing economic pathways compatible with standing forests, as well as lessons from Brazilian diplomacy in the development of Roadmaps at a time when multilateralism is under pressure.

Together, these experiences provide technical and political grounding for the diagnosis and responses required to promote and sustain deforestation reduction across tropical, temperate, and boreal forests, while also reinforcing the need for robust and inclusive processes for the development of multilateral instruments aimed at re-energizing and accelerating multi-actor, multi-level climate planning, action, and mobilization, in light of climate urgency and the prevailing scientific consensus.

1. The Case for a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation

Forests have become an increasingly unavoidable issue in climate negotiations, beginning with the voluntary Glasgow Declaration in 2021⁴ and gaining further traction in 2023 with the Dubai Consensus on the First Global Stocktake (GST),⁵ through which global leaders committed to halting and reversing deforestation by 2030.

Designated by the Brazilian government in early 2025, the COP30 Presidency proposed from the outset that this edition of the Conference place a strong emphasis on the implementation of the Paris Agreement, in light of the commitments reiterated during the First GST in 2023. It further committed to re-energizing global climate action through a *Global Climate Mutirão*, against the backdrop of an increasingly complex geopolitical context.⁶ In parallel, the choice of Belém, located in the Amazon Basin – the world’s largest tropical forest – as the host city elevated the centrality of forests within the climate regime and reinforced, at the global level, the integration of debates on climate, nature, and sustainable development.⁷

Geopolitical dynamics in the lead-up to and during COP30 ultimately constrained consensus in Belém, preventing the adoption of a formal multilateral mandate to establish a Working Group to initiate the development of Roadmaps, a process that would have continued across subsequent COPs, including negotiations on timelines, types of strategies, the identification of initial implementing countries, and financing arrangements.⁸ Nevertheless, the mobilization of Parties and observers in Belém, together with support expressed by more than 80 countries and numerous observers and experts,⁹ led the Brazilian COP30 Presidency to assume responsibility for developing and presenting both Roadmaps to the international community by November 2026.

In the absence of a formal multilateral mandate, but with discretion over the scope and approach of the Roadmaps, the Brazilian government will have only a few months to finalize its last major deliverable as COP30 Presidency. In response to the frustration and skepticism expressed by many actors, Brazilian authorities have emphasized the unprecedented nature of discussions around Roadmaps and their potential role in accelerating global climate action, including by building bridges with other multilateral regimes related to sustainable development, trade and investment, health, and human rights.

In his address to G20 leaders in November 2025, held in South Africa, President Lula stated: “COP30 showed that the world needs to face this debate. The seed of this proposal has been planted and will bear fruit sooner or later.”¹⁰ A few weeks later, the Brazilian President signed a decree establishing an interministerial Working Group to advance domestic planning related to the “gradual reduction of dependence on fossil fuels in the country” and the financing of the transition through the use of “government revenues derived from oil and natural gas exploration.”¹¹ Around the same time, Norway also announced the creation of a commission to advance its national strategy for moving away from fossil fuels.¹²

Despite persistent uncertainties and frustrations, 2025 ended with growing clarity that the political debate is already underway and that Roadmaps will remain on the multilateral agenda, as well as within the domestic agendas of several countries, including Brazil.

The Case for a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation

There are multiple reasons to invest time and political effort in building a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation. First, it enables continued progress toward accelerating the implementation of the Paris Agreement and operationalizing commitments consolidated under the First Global Stocktake (GST) and reiterated through the “Belém Mission to 1.5,”¹³ aimed at bending the deforestation curve and halting deforestation and forest degradation globally by 2030. A Roadmap of this nature would also support the implementation of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, contributing to targets such as protecting 30% of terrestrial and marine areas by 2030 (30x30), restoring degraded ecosystems, and reducing pressures on biodiversity.¹⁴

Beyond the synergies already established under the Rio Conventions,¹⁵ this Roadmap can provide greater strategic alignment, coherence, and momentum to actions and commitments agreed under other multilateral fora and instruments related to forests, including the Global Forest Goals contained in the United Nations Strategic Plan for Forests 2017-2030,¹⁶ the FAO Forestry Roadmap,¹⁷ the Forest Finance Roadmap for Action led by the Forest & Climate Leaders’ Partnership (FCLP),¹⁸ as well as the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF)¹⁹ and the Bioeconomy Challenge, both launched at COP30.²⁰

To this end, the international community must move from rhetoric to action, seeking to provide greater clarity and specificity on how existing commitments and targets can be translated into implementation and impact, with Roadmaps serving to align existing instruments and initiatives; identify bottlenecks and obstacles; and offer policy and instrument options and, where possible, establish well-defined incentives, guidelines, and targets.²¹

Multilateral Roadmaps may, in theory, be negotiated and even acquire a binding character. This has not always been the case, however, for instruments developed in recent years, including those led by Brazil, such as the *Roadmap to make Multilateral Development Banks “better, bigger, and more effective”* (2024), mandated and endorsed within the G20 framework, and the *Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T* (2025),²² developed pursuant to a multilateral mandate stemming from COP29, whose content was not subject to approval by the Parties. Nor are the two Roadmaps currently under the responsibility of the COP30 Presidency negotiated or binding instruments. In this context, the Brazilian government’s effort should be to present them as a synergistic and integrated response to climate emergency, for at least three reasons.

First, there is broad scientific consensus that mitigation strategies focused solely on the energy transition will not be sufficient to prevent global warming from exceeding 1.5°C.²³ To rescue “Mission 1.5,” the international community must act simultaneously across three fronts: (1) accelerating the transition away from fossil fuels; (2) pursuing a credible pathway toward zero deforestation; and (3) scaling up forest-based measures, alongside oceanic and coastal, or “blue carbon” solutions, that capture carbon while protecting communities and strengthening livelihoods.²⁴

Second, rather than being subordinate or merely complementary to the energy transition, halting and reversing deforestation constitute smart and effective climate strategies. Forests, particularly tropical forests, represent one of the most accessible resources for emissions reductions in the short term and for advancing the transition toward a green economy. Preventing deforestation and restoring what has been lost remain among the most affordable and readily available large-scale options for carbon removal.²⁵

In parallel, addressing deforestation generates additional planetary benefits, including the protection of biodiversity and rainfall regimes, thereby safeguarding ecosystem integrity.²⁶ The Amazon Basin, which is approaching what scientists describe as a “point of no return” (or a “tipping point”),²⁷ illustrates the critical importance of forest conservation for global climate, water, energy, and food security.

Third, decarbonization efforts in the energy sector and in the land-use, land-use change, and forestry sector (LULUCF) must be conceived in an integrated manner in order to promote co-benefits and avoid trade-offs.²⁸ This includes, for example, limiting pressure on forested and ecologically sensitive areas arising from the expansion of economic activities framed as “low-carbon,” such as mining for materials required for renewable energy production or for industries described as “green.”²⁹

“Rather than being subordinate or merely complementary to the energy transition, halting and reversing deforestation constitute smart and effective climate strategies.”

2. Roadmaps as Platforms for Multi-stakeholder and Multi-level Planning, Action, and Mobilization

Recognizing that efforts to address climate change extend far beyond the realm of environmental policy and are fundamentally challenges of economic and social transformation, multilateral instruments such as Roadmaps should support countries in undertaking coordinated planning efforts involving the State, markets, and society. In this sense, Roadmaps should function as platforms for planning, action, and mobilization, enabling the engagement of diverse stakeholders and sectors across local, national, regional, and global levels. They should therefore contribute to, and provide political and technical support for, multi-actor and multi-level planning, action, and mobilization. They should also consolidate evidence-based guidance and serve as spaces for coordination and exchange through appropriate incentives and instruments.

In practical terms, the Roadmap to Zero Deforestation should include tools that support national planning and provide a reference for international cooperation aligned with nationally determined objectives for halting and reversing forest loss and native vegetation degradation. In this regard, it should recommend, and politically and technically support, the establishment of National Working Groups tasked with developing National Roadmaps.

In addition, it should function as a repository of policies and best practices, drawing on initiatives such as the “Policy Basket” developed under the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty during Brazil’s G20 Presidency,³⁰ as well as the “Granary of Solutions” of the COP30 Action Agenda,³¹ in order to inspire and foster the exchange of experiences and mutual learning³² among countries on addressing deforestation and promoting economies compatible with standing forests. Reducing and ultimately achieving zero deforestation is a pathway already being pursued by forest

countries such as Brazil, other developing countries with tropical forests,³³ and countries with temperate and boreal forests, including Canada and Norway. These countries are already on this path and must continue along it, positioning themselves as models and repositories of global solutions for the protection and restoration of native vegetation.³⁴

Respecting national sovereignty and policy autonomy, the Roadmap developed under the COP30 Presidency should seek alignment and synergy with ongoing national and international processes. This includes instruments such as Country Platforms,³⁵ designed to improve the coordination and effective use of diverse sources of climate and nature finance, including Vertical Climate Funds and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).³⁶ It should also seek convergence with existing international governmental and non-governmental initiatives dedicated to forest conservation, such as the FAO Forestry Roadmap and the recently launched TFFF, among other relevant initiatives within the broader forest agenda.

In this sense, drawing on the narrative approach adopted in the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T,” the resulting product should reflect the landscape of existing international and regional initiatives, as well as ongoing efforts to coordinate and align initiatives and processes that are at times dispersed and fragmented, thereby contributing to building bridges and strengthening political coherence at both the multilateral and local levels.³⁷ It should also give visibility to successful national solutions and promote international cooperation (technical, political, and financial), including the exchange of experiences, thus contributing to the translation of existing commitments and knowledge into coordinated and sustainable action at the local and global levels.

3. Advancing Global Action to Zero Deforestation: Inputs and Considerations for a Multilateral Roadmap

As the Brazilian COP30 Presidency advances the development of the Roadmap to Zero Deforestation, it is important to emphasize that this is neither an abstract exercise nor an unprecedented one. On the contrary, the Brazilian government itself holds accumulated experience and reflection that can and should be incorporated into this document. Two experiences are particularly relevant. On the one hand, Brazil's own trajectory of more than two decades in addressing deforestation, especially in the Amazon, through normative and public policy instruments as well as international cooperation initiatives, notably the Forest Code, the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm), the Amazon Fund, and regional dialogue on forest conservation and sustainable development in the context of the Pan-Amazon. On the other hand, Brazil's diplomatic experience in the development of the "Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T,"³⁸ led jointly by the governments of Brazil and Azerbaijan in 2025, as COP29 and COP30 Presidencies, with the objective of scaling up climate finance.

Taken together, these experiences offer relevant lessons for the construction of the future Roadmap to Zero Deforestation. They do so both by providing technical and political substantiation for the diagnosis and responses required to promote and sustain deforestation reduction in forested regions and to advance forest-based sociobioeconomies, and by validating robust and inclusive processes for the elaboration of multilateral documents in the form of Roadmaps.

Brazil's Experience in the Prevention and Control of Deforestation

Brazil, a country that hosts more than 60% of the Amazon Forest as well as other forested and non-forested biomes of high ecological importance, has extensive experience with national policies aimed at halting deforestation and forest degradation. Between 2005 and 2012, the country reduced deforestation rates by approximately 70%.³⁹ After renewed increases in subsequent years, since 2023 the federal government has invested in multisectoral efforts to control deforestation and forest degradation, reaching in 2025 the lowest deforestation rate in the Amazon in 11 years and sustaining a downward trend for the third consecutive year.⁴⁰

Brazil's trajectory in the design and implementation of Action Plans for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Amazon and other biomes demonstrates that halting deforestation requires starting from clear diagnoses of the specific drivers of native vegetation loss and advancing toward the transformation of underlying structural conditions. This involves combining enforcement measures, known in Brazil as "command and control", with the promotion of new sustainable economic pathways.⁴¹

The results achieved since the early 2000s, as well as the obstacles and setbacks encountered throughout this process, highlight the importance of treating deforestation control as a long-term State policy, rather than a government-specific initiative. Such an approach depends on sustained political will at the highest level, strong inter-federative and intersectoral

coordination, and continuous processes of updating and revising diagnoses and responses – as evidenced by the successive phases of long-standing Action Plans such as the PPCDAm in the Legal Amazon and the PPCerrado in the Cerrado biome.

Beyond political will and the convening power of the federal government, particularly the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (MMA), the successful implementation and positive outcomes of these Action Plans, both during the first decade up to 2012 and in more recent years (since 2023), have resulted from the effective mobilization of a set of interconnected instruments enabled through technical, political, and financial partnerships at both national and international levels. Of particular relevance are financing instruments and partnerships such as the Amazon Fund, created to mobilize non-reimbursable donations, including international REDD+ contributions, and managed by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES).⁴² Like the Action Plans themselves, the Fund's objectives combine deforestation reduction with the promotion of sustainable development, acting simultaneously on components related to “monitoring and enforcement,” “territorial planning,” and “science, innovation, economic instruments, and sustainable production.”⁴³

Over the years, the “environmental monitoring and control” pillar of the PPCDAm, one of its most successful components, has received significant support from the Amazon Fund through projects implemented by environmental agencies such as the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (Ibama)⁴⁴ and by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, notably through the Amazon Plan: Security and Sovereignty (AMAS Plan).⁴⁵ These projects have been instrumental in operationalizing an integrated enforcement strategy, strengthening environmental inspection in priority areas, advancing legal accountability, and increasingly integrating public security components.

“The projects of the Amazon Fund were instrumental in implementing a smart command-and-control strategy by strengthening environmental enforcement in priority areas, advancing legal accountability, and increasingly integrating the public security component.”

In parallel, a second set of key partnerships has enabled the development of technological instruments for monitoring changes in forest cover. Since 1988, this monitoring has been conducted by the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) through the PRODES system (Measurement of Deforestation by Remote Sensing) and the rapid alerts generated by DETER (Deforestation Detection in Real Time),⁴⁶ as well as, more recently, through the Integrated and Secure Environment Brazil Programme (Brasil MAIS)⁴⁷ of the Ministry of Justice.

Data generated by these tools have multiple applications, including supporting environmental enforcement by specialized agencies, such as through Ibama's Crotalus system (System for Receiving, Prioritizing, and Sharing Geographic Information on Deforestation in the Amazon),⁴⁸ enabling environmental governance instruments such as the Rural Environmental Registry

(CAR), and supporting investigation and legal accountability efforts related to environmental damage and crimes, including in the criminal sphere, by the Federal Police (PF) and the Federal Prosecution Service (MPF).

Specifically regarding illegal gold mining in protected areas, since 2021 the Federal Police has employed technologies to enhance mineral traceability for investigative and prosecutorial purposes. Through the *Ouro Alvo* Program, the Federal Police has used isotopic analysis to identify the origin of seized gold samples, while building a National Forensic Database on Gold Profiles (Banpa).⁴⁹ Promising and innovative in addressing money laundering, terrorist financing, environmental crimes, forced labour, theft, and the broader risks and vulnerabilities associated with illegal gold extraction in forest areas in Brazil and Latin America, the program is supported by the Amazon Fund, via BNDES, and by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).⁵⁰ It is currently being expanded at the regional level to include sample collection from other parts of the Amazon Basin.

A third set of partnerships includes those established both among federative entities within Brazil and with international partners to enable more territorialized action, including in municipalities with high deforestation rates and in areas of particular concern, such as protected areas, Indigenous lands, and border regions. Examples include the Union with Municipalities Program (*Programa União com Municípios*) for the Reduction of Deforestation and Forest Fires in the Amazon, which supports coordinated intergovernmental action in priority municipalities,⁵¹ as well as coordinated engagement with international partners in border areas through bilateral and regional dialogue with neighbouring Amazonian countries.

At the regional level, since 2023 there has been strengthened political, technical, and operational exchange within the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO), the International Police Cooperation Center (CCPI), headquartered in Manaus and operational since 2025, and through technical dialogues on gold traceability with neighbouring countries in the Amazon Basin, such as French Guiana, Colombia, and Peru.⁵²

Beyond monitoring and control actions, the PPCDAm and other deforestation prevention and control plans have increasingly invested in partnerships and instruments aimed at fostering productive and economic alternatives, promoting economies compatible with standing forests. Examples include initiatives to promote forest restoration and low-carbon agriculture under the ABC+ Plan, led by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAPA); the Restoration Arc, led by MMA and BNDES;⁵³ and payment for environmental services and bioeconomy initiatives under programs such as Floresta+, led by MMA.⁵⁴ While the number of programs has grown significantly in recent years, many of these initiatives remain incipient or limited when compared to the scale of incentives and subsidies allocated to carbon-intensive economic activities, particularly in agriculture and livestock production through instruments such as the Plano Safra.⁵⁵

Finally, although brief, this reflection on Brazil's experience illustrates the complexity of planning and implementing actions to address deforestation, an effort that requires robust technical capacity and sustained political commitment. It also underscores the importance of dialogue and international cooperation, including both North-South and South-South cooperation, particularly at the regional level and among forested countries, whether tropical, temperate, or boreal.

Brazil's Experience with the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T

The second key source of inputs for the future Roadmap to Zero Deforestation stems from Brazil's diplomatic experience in leading the "Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T" throughout 2025. Mandated by the UNFCCC in 2024 following the unsatisfactory outcome of COP29 negotiations in Baku on the New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance (NCQG), the Roadmap was conceived both as an engagement process and as a "solutions-oriented" report, as defined in the document itself, intended to "provide a coherent action framework reflecting initiatives, concepts and leverage points to facilitate all actors coming together to scale up climate finance in the short to medium term."⁵⁶

The process of elaborating the document, led by the Ministry of Finance, reflects a diplomatic effort initiated during Brazil's G20 Presidency in 2024 and carried forward to COP30 to bring together state and non-state actors from the finance and climate communities. Throughout 2025, the Brazilian government gathered technical inputs through "advisor circles" (including finance ministers⁵⁷ from several countries and experts) and organized consultations and dialogues across multiple forums. These included official consultations with Parties and Observers organized by the UNFCCC Secretariat, as well as *ad hoc* consultations held on the margins of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (WB and IMF, respectively) meetings in Washington, D.C., and during UNFCCC negotiations in Bonn.

The structure of the final report included: (i) reflections on the foundations underpinning the exercise; (ii) detailed action fronts, including regionally and thematically relevant analyses; (iii) concrete steps toward implementation; and (iv) more politically oriented messages from the COP29 and COP30 Presidencies aimed at fostering buy-in and anchoring the Roadmap in future negotiations among Parties.


While promising, the Roadmap was received with a mix of interest and scepticism. This response stemmed less from the substance of the report itself, though there were specific critiques in this regard,⁵⁸ and more from broader frustration with the non-binding nature of the exercise and its perceived inadequacy in the face of political deadlocks and divergences between developed and developing countries in Baku. The impasse at COP29 around the NCQG highlighted the multiple challenges involved in forging new binding consensus on finance under the Climate Convention and, more broadly, in implementing commitments previously agreed in this and other fora. In this context, a key concern raised by experts relates to the absence of clear implementation mechanisms associated with the Roadmap, which could limit its impact, since the real test lies in whether it moves "beyond diagnosis" to action by providing "clear guidance and a credible plan for implementation and follow-up".⁵⁹

Without overlooking the limitations of this type of exercise in light of the current challenges facing global climate governance, particularly regarding financing, it is also important to acknowledge that the Baku to Belém Roadmap includes a set of concrete and specific recommendations addressed to a broad range of international actors and fora. These recommendations outline ways to engage with and advance the proposals contained in the report, while linking existing financing initiatives to the priorities identified therein. In parallel, the UNFCCC Secretariat made available a Catalogue of approximately

400 instruments, case studies, and best practices compiled from submissions made through official consultations.⁶⁰ Taken together, the combination of targeted recommendations and the cataloguing of existing experiences, initiatives, and processes strengthen the robustness and potential impact of documents that, in theory, lack binding force.

Figure 1 below presents a synthesis of some of the main lessons drawn from Brazil's experience with national plans for deforestation prevention and control and with the development of multilateral Roadmaps.

Figure 1. Summary Table: Building a Roadmap to Zero Deforestation



4. What the Roadmap to Zero Deforestation Must Deliver: Narrative, Argumentation, and Operationalization

The timeframe of less than one year for the Brazilian COP30 Presidency to finalize the document means the process will necessarily be shorter than the development of the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T.” This requires a careful balance between ambition and pragmatism, so that a document of this nature – and the process through which it is developed – can effectively accelerate the implementation of global commitments to achieve zero deforestation.

For the document to be credible, two elements are particularly important. First, at a conceptual or preambular level, the Roadmap must articulate a clear and robust narrative and argument about the importance of forest cover loss for “Mission 1.5,” as well as on the drivers and dynamics of deforestation and how they can be addressed globally. Second, at an operational level, it must clearly explain how the Roadmap can support member countries in achieving zero-deforestation commitments by fostering national-level planning, action, and mobilization.

Narrative and argumentative clarity: from illegality to sustainable development compatible with standing forests

Conceptually, the Roadmap should clearly reflect the scientific consensus and the accumulated political recognition regarding: (i) the importance of achieving zero deforestation to safeguard “Mission 1.5;” (ii) the contemporary drivers and dynamics of forest cover loss and degradation; and (iii) existing strategies and experiences to address these challenges across countries with tropical, temperate, and boreal forests.

Accelerated forest cover loss constitutes one of the greatest threats to global climate, energy, and food security and lies at the heart of the so-called triple planetary crisis: climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution. Forests regulate the climate, sustain hydrological cycles essential for food production and energy generation, and host a significant share of the planet’s biodiversity. Deforestation and forest degradation undermine these ecosystem services, amplify socio-economic vulnerabilities, and reduce the resilience of productive systems. Addressing deforestation and forest degradation is therefore not merely an environmental agenda, but a strategic imperative for sustainable development and global stability.

Within the context of “Mission 1.5,” tackling deforestation plays a decisive role. Maintaining and restoring forests are necessary conditions for limiting global warming to 1.5°C, both by reducing emissions associated with land-use change and by strengthening natural carbon sinks. Moreover, forests provide a concrete bridge between climate and biodiversity agendas, fostering synergies that enhance mitigation,

adaptation, and conservation outcomes.⁶¹ Integrating these dimensions is essential to accelerate pathways consistent with the Paris Agreement and other international frameworks and to avoid fragmented solutions that overlook the socio-economic drivers, as well as the governance and integrity challenges, underlying forest cover loss.

The drivers of deforestation are, however, complex and interconnected. They include the expansion of legal and illegal economic activities into areas of native vegetation, the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms in increasingly globalized commodity chains linked to logging, agriculture, and mining, as well as large-scale infrastructure and urbanization projects. Crucially, the irregular, illegal, and even criminal dimensions of land use and land conversion have become an integral – and increasingly decisive – feature of deforestation and forest degradation processes, particularly in tropical forests.⁶²

In this sense, collective action to tackle illegality and organized environmental crime reinforces commitments widely agreed and reiterated in the GST to halt and reverse deforestation (paragraph 33) and to enhance support and investment for the conservation, sustainable management and restoration of forests and their resources for mitigation and adaptation purposes (paragraphs 34 and 55).⁶³ It is also a fundamental condition for implementing strategic sustainable development plans related to forests, such as the FAO Forestry Roadmap and the Global Forest Goals of the United Nations Strategic Plan for Forests 2017-2030.

Beyond the conservation of ecologically sensitive ecosystems, tackling environmental crime is therefore a central pillar of a broader agenda to strengthen governance and integrity in enabling and delivering long-term climate finance, promoting public and corporate policies aligned with the 1.5°C temperature goal in the run-up to the 2028 Global Stocktake, and advancing sustainable development in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Addressing these challenges requires coordinated responses across actors. The State has a responsibility to strengthen environmental inspection and broader law enforcement measures while promoting incentives and policies for new economies based on bioeconomy, regenerative agriculture, and restoration. Governments must also accelerate the reallocation of subsidies towards low-carbon and regenerative economies. The market and the financial sector, in turn, play a central role in implementing deforestation-free supply chains, due diligence and traceability mechanisms, and green finance instruments that value nature and natural capital. These actors are also responsible for curbing illicit financial flows associated with illegal economies and environmental crimes. Clearly distinguishing responsibilities and aligning public and private instruments is essential to transforming production and consumption patterns and permanently halting global deforestation dynamics.

In summary, it is imperative that the document clearly and forcefully articulates the logical thread that underpins the path towards zero deforestation.⁶⁴ It should explicitly state that, in many contexts, especially in countries with tropical forests, this path begins with tackling environmental crime and promoting governance and integrity in supply chains and financial flows. This demands multisectoral action from the local to the global level: strengthening international cooperation, involving the private sector as a responsible partner in tracking deforestation-free supply chains, closing loopholes in global illicit financial flows, and investing in bioeconomies through technical capacity building and inclusion. The path is completed by strengthening innovative mechanisms and initiatives in forest and nature finance that support economies compatible with standing forests. Among them are international initiatives such as TFFF, the Emergent Forest Finance Accelerator, Forest Tenure Funders Group and the Forest Finance Roadmap for Action, among others, but also national efforts to migrate incentives and subsidies on a large scale towards low-carbon agriculture and especially towards regenerative agriculture.

Operational clarity: supporting member countries to plan for and achieve zero-deforestation targets

At the operational level, the document should begin by recognizing that the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation are both shared and country-specific, and that diagnoses and responses must therefore be context-specific. At the same time, it should acknowledge existing progress and lessons learned across countries, reinforcing the potential for sharing experiences and technologies through international cooperation.

To guide domestically and nationally determined processes, the operational sections of the future document should map existing bottlenecks and obstacles, as well as strategies, instruments, successful experiences, and lessons learned related to challenges and shortcomings in halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation worldwide. The document should also recognize the importance of – and provide guidance for – the development of National Roadmaps, treating them as planning instruments to accelerate land-use decarbonization by addressing deforestation, promoting restoration, and investing in low-carbon and regenerative agriculture.

In parallel, the document should recognize the role of international cooperation, including REDD+ mechanisms and other external finance instruments, as well as the transfer and exchange of policies and technologies. Such cooperation should not be limited to traditional North-South cooperation, but should also be fostered at the regional level, across countries with similar forest types, and through international organizations among developing countries (the so-called South-South Cooperation).

In this regard, COP30 leaves important legacies to be leveraged. The efforts of the Brazilian Presidency and the Climate Champions team to renew the Action Agenda, organizing it around thematic axes linked to the First Global Stocktake and introducing innovations such as the “Granary of Solutions” and the “Plans to Accelerate Solutions” (PAS).⁶⁵ Together, the “Granary of Solutions” and the PAS represent opportunities to accelerate intra- and inter-basin cooperation and deepen dialogue between forest countries and their consumer markets. Such cooperation should be strengthened to reflect existing ambitions and initiatives – many of which were debated and documented during COP30 – related to tackling environmental crime, integrated fire management, advancing synergies across the Rio Conventions, operationalizing innovative finance instruments such as the TFFF, and strengthening sustainable productive activities compatible with standing forests through the bioeconomy, among others.

Taken together, the mobilization of multiple actors around the implementation of the Plans to Accelerate Solutions – launched at COP30 and linked to the zero-deforestation objective – and the renewed political efforts of current and future Climate COP Presidencies to sustain and elevate collective ambition beyond negotiations, through initiatives such as the Global Implementation Accelerator and the “Belém Mission to 1.5,”⁶⁶ constitute strategic pillars for the political viability and operationalization of the Roadmap to Zero Deforestation in the years ahead.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The Brazilian COP30 Presidency, held in the Brazilian Amazon, brought deforestation, nature, and forests to the forefront of the climate debate in an unprecedented way. In Belém, the agenda encompassed not only the urgency of halting and reversing land-use-related emissions, but also concrete solutions and alternatives already being implemented around the world.

Over recent years, Brazil – a country with a wide range of innovations and solutions across the State, the market, and society that connect climate, nature, and people – has been able to give this agenda visibility, political support, and scale. In Belém, the Brazilian government and civil society brought challenges to the table while also highlighting pathways to overcome them: acknowledging obstacles and barriers, showcasing multiple solutions already underway, and pointing to investment opportunities in traceability and new bioeconomies as alternatives to prevailing paradigms of destruction and illegality.

The Roadmap to Zero Deforestation, currently under development by the Brazilian COP30 Presidency and expected to be finalized by November 2026, offers a unique opportunity to translate political ambition into pragmatic diagnoses and strategies, many of which have already been extensively tested, refined, and validated. In doing so, it can provide inputs, incentives, and tools to support concerted, multi-actor and multi-level collective action to achieve zero deforestation by 2030.

“The Roadmap to Zero Deforestation, currently being developed by the Brazilian COP30 Presidency until November 2026, represents a unique opportunity to leverage political ambition based on pragmatic diagnostics and strategies, many of which have already been widely tested, refined, and validated.”

Recommendations

1. Recommendations for the **conceptual and narrative design** of the Roadmap

Rec. 1 - Position the Roadmap as a platform for climate action

Design the Roadmap not as a descriptive report, but as a political and technical platform to induce national and international climate planning, action, and mobilization, giving visibility to existing experiences and creating permanent channels for short-, medium-, and long-term technical, political, and financial cooperation.

Rec. 2 - Place deforestation at the centre of the “Mission 1.5” narrative

Anchor the document in a clear and robust narrative that presents achieving zero deforestation as a necessary condition for maintaining the 1.5°C limit, highlighting the role of forest cover loss and restoration in short-term mitigation, the integrity of carbon sinks, and the synergies between climate, biodiversity, and development.

Rec. 3 - Start from tackling environmental crime as a structuring axis

Explicitly treat the fight against environmental crime and illegality as the starting point on the pathway to zero deforestation, linking the Plans to Accelerate Solutions (PAS) of the COP30 Action Agenda related to environmental crime with other relevant PAS (forest finance, bioeconomy) in order to build a coherent narrative between governance, integrity, sustainable development, and standing forests.

Rec. 4 - Clarify sectoral responsibilities and incentivize behavioral change

Reinforce the role and responsibility of key sectors (agriculture and livestock, mining, the financial sector, and global commodity supply chains) in driving deforestation and forest degradation, as well as their central role in the responses, including law enforcement measures, product and financial flow traceability, due diligence, and the realignment of financial flows and incentives toward economies compatible with standing forests.

Rec. 5 - Align the Roadmap with climate finance efforts and avoid fragmentation

Highlight the Roadmap as an instrument for alignment and synergy among climate and nature finance initiatives, with a focus on scaling up, avoiding double counting, reducing overlap, and connecting existing instruments (REDD+, TFFF, MDBs, vertical funds) rather than creating new institutional layers.

2. Recommendations for the **operational dimension** of the Roadmap

Rec. 6 - Explicitly support national planning

Include clear guidance on how the Roadmap can support countries with tropical, temperate, and boreal forests in developing National Roadmaps, respecting sovereignty while offering common references for diagnosis, policy prioritization, and the mobilization of finance to achieve zero deforestation.

Rec. 7 - Create a living repository of policies and best practices

Incorporate into the Roadmap a structured repository of successful policies, instruments, and initiatives, inspired by models such as the “Policy Basket” of the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty and the “Granary of Solutions” of the COP30 Action Agenda.

Rec. 8 - Give visibility to national experiences and foster cooperation

Highlight proven national solutions (e.g. PPCDAm and other Brazilian instruments in the case of tropical forests), invite other forest countries to contribute their own examples, and explicitly identify priority areas for international technical, political, and financial cooperation. In this context, it is important to give visibility to the experiences of developing countries with tropical forests in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, as well as to those of countries with temperate and boreal forests.

Rec. 9 - Include recommendations directed at existing actors and processes

Avoid generic recommendations and include concrete, specific messages directed at existing forums, processes, and actors (COPs, MDBs, regional initiatives, sectoral coalitions), increasing the likelihood of uptake and implementation and, therefore, the legitimacy of the document as a multilateral instrument.

3. Recommendations for the **construction process** of the Roadmap

Rec. 10 - Establish an Expert Group to multilateralize the process

Create an Expert Group (geographically and sectorally diverse) to support the development of the Roadmap, ensuring technical robustness, political legitimacy, and multilateral anchoring. It is particularly important that the process include climate scientists and forest experts, ensuring representation across tropical, temperate, and boreal forests, and promoting synergies between the two Roadmaps being developed by the Brazilian COP30 Presidency.

Rec. 11 - Use the Roadmap as a platform for continuous mobilization

Treat the Roadmap not as a final product, but as a platform for continuous mobilization connected to the COP30 and future COPs Action Agenda, the Action Agenda PAS, and to regional and inter-regional processes.

Rec. 12 - Conduct inclusive and action-oriented consultations

Carry out public and expert consultations focused on including governments, the private sector, the financial sector, Indigenous Peoples, civil society, and academia, prioritizing contributions oriented towards implementation.

Rec. 13 - Create a high-level political advisory group

Complement the technical expert group with a high-level international political advisory group, strengthening leadership, diplomatic engagement, and multi-level coordination capacity.

Endnotes

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