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Global Futures Bulletin



**TOWARDS A GLOBAL
CLIMATE AND NATURE
COUNCIL:** UNDERPINNING
THE GLOBAL *MUTIRÃO* AND
MODELLING THE FUTURE
OF GOVERNANCE

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TOWARDS A GLOBAL CLIMATE AND NATURE COUNCIL: UNDERPINNING THE GLOBAL *MUTIRÃO* AND MODELLING THE FUTURE OF GOVERNANCE¹

Preamble

At the close of the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro in November 2024, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva proposed the creation of a new [Climate Change Council](#). Rather than putting forward a finalized plan, the Brazilian government invited the international community to explore the possibility of establishing such a body under the United Nations (UN)—one that could better coordinate the currently fragmented efforts, mechanisms, and institutions addressing climate challenges.

This paper responds to that invitation and contributes to a broader conversation about reimagining global governance—particularly in the lead-up to COP30, where Brazil holds the presidency. As part of a wider effort to revitalize multilateralism in a time of compounding crises, we explore the case for a Global Climate and Nature Council.

In joining this global *mutirão* — a collective, cooperative effort — we offer reflections on how such a council could be designed and advanced. Building on the initial scope of President Lula’s proposal, we argue for a more integrated approach that unites climate and nature governance, grounded in Earth system science, poly-governance, networked multilateralism, and systems thinking. Our contribution outlines the rationale for connecting climate and nature within a single institutional framework, reinforcing the need to mainstream and strengthen planetary-related action across the UN, as well as practical options for doing so in a way that enhances coherence, accelerates delivery, and respects political feasibility.

To that end, the paper highlights three pathways that would not require amending the United Nations (UN) Charter at the start: combining the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Rio Conventions through an official ‘UN80’ proposal; establishing a new council under one or more Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEA); or creating a subsidiary council within an existing UN body, such as the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. The council could potentially be “upgraded” to a principal organ through Charter reform at a later stage.

While no single new or reformed body can resolve all the fragmentation or implementation challenges in today’s global governance landscape, we argue that a Global Climate and Nature Council could play a catalytic role in bridging gaps and fostering a more coherent, inclusive, and effective international response to the planetary emergency.

Our reflections on the creation of such a body are not meant to close the discussion, but to offer a practical and forward-looking contribution to an important debate that began in 2024 with Brazil’s call for action and will continue to evolve in the months and years ahead. While building on the growing consensus around the climate–nature nexus at the UN and beyond, we see this new Council as one that must continuously adapt its mandate and design to address the rapidly shifting dynamics of planetary politics.

“A Global Climate and Nature Council could play a catalytic role in bridging gaps and fostering a more inclusive response to the planetary emergency”

Introduction

The 1992 Earth Summit was game-changing. Held in Rio de Janeiro, it brought together governments, scientists, and an unprecedented number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to produce a blueprint for international action on climate, development, and nature. The Summit recognized the interdependence of social, economic, and environmental factors, and the need to balance growth with equity and sustainability. States adopted three UN Framework Conventions on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Biological Diversity (UNCBD) and Desertification (UNCCD). They created the UN Commission on Sustainable Development to monitor implementation and endorsed Agenda 21, a roadmap for action by stakeholders at all levels. They also agreed on principles for forest management and Indigenous lands.

More than three decades later, however, the world is careening toward irreversible ecological tipping points. In 2024, global temperatures exceeded [1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels for over a 12-month period](#). More than [three-quarters of the Earth's land surface is degraded](#), and we [cut down forests](#) the size of Portugal each year. Extreme weather causes well [over \\$100 billion in insured losses annually](#), and soaring [temperatures kill around half a million people](#) annually. Food chains are collapsing as insect populations vanish. Nearly [200 land and environmental defenders are murdered](#) each year.

Despite these stark realities and the institutional advancements, the architecture of global governance remains siloed and under-resourced. Authority is fragmented. Agency is diffuse. Accountability is often non-existent. The proliferation of mechanisms and instruments has arguably created both impact and complexity. A decade on, the 2015 Paris Agreement now feels like a high-watermark of cooperation from a different era. Without it, the world could be heading toward [5°C of warming](#). Current estimates point to 2.7–3°C, with over 80% of

global GDP now covered by net-zero targets. Even if these are important signals of progress, they still fall short of what is needed.

Recent UNFCCC conferences (COPs) have mainly generated headlines for their perceived lack of delivery — despite important steps forward, such as the establishment of a [Fund for responding to Loss and Damage](#) and the completion of the first [Global Stocktake](#) (GST), assessing the collective impact of state commitments. Meanwhile, the international financial institutions (IFIs) are under pressure from their biggest shareholders to reduce their focus on climate, nature, and sustainability.

Against this backdrop, and with the world's spotlight once again on Rio de Janeiro, Brazil's President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva used the G20 Summit in 2024 to [urge](#) the international community to discuss creating a climate council. The need for this conversation has grown more urgent after funding cuts by major donors brought the UN's longstanding financial crisis to a head. There are also proposals to [merge](#) the UNFCCC and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).

This paper considers the proposal for a “new council”² or similar structure in this context. It summarizes the main features, gaps, and shortcomings of current climate governance structures before looking at the potential for a climate and nature council to address them. It then presents options and considerations for the council's structures, functions, and methods. Finally, it lays out pathways and political considerations for creating and developing this new body.

While it cautions against overreach and wishful thinking, it concludes that a new council — if created with a strategic political approach and institutional design — could boost political leadership, support coordination and implementation, and insert “planetary thinking” and “systems thinking” into climate governance, while also laying the basis for more inclusive, effective, and accountable global governance systems in the future.

Climate Governance: An Ecosystem Without Planetary and Systems Thinking

The current state of global climate and environmental governance reflects its evolution: agreements, forums, mechanisms, and processes developed at different times to respond to different challenges. Diverse, expansive and loosely connected, it is better understood as an ecosystem, or even a constellation, rather than a unified system with clear roles, responsibilities, and linkages.

At present, there are over [500 multilateral environmental agreements](#) (MEAs), ranging from the Paris Agreement on climate change to conventions on preventing pollution from ships and preserving cultural and natural heritage. The scale and scope of these MEAs reflects the scale and scope of climate, nature and sustainability issues, as well as their wide-ranging impacts on virtually every aspect of planetary existence and human endeavour.

MEAs have different governing bodies, memberships, rules, and procedures. UNEP, for example, has been designated by the governing bodies of [15 MEAs \(eight global and seven regional\) to provide secretariat functions](#). The World Trade Organization (WTO), meanwhile, discusses issues relevant to trade-related MEAs through its Committee on Trade and Environment³. Even the three Earth Summit conventions (UNFCCC, UNCBD and UNCCD) have separate secretariats and agendas.

Many of the MEAs operate through a hybrid or poly-governance approach. Under the Paris Agreement, for instance, states submit nationally determined contributions (NDCs) within a voluntary pledge-and-review structure, supported by a transparency framework for ambition ratcheting. Non-state actors — such as civil society, cities and private sector entities — are engaged not only as observers, but also as contributors to implementation, monitoring, and pressure mechanisms.

Areas such as climate finance draw in multiple MEAs, with stakeholders including the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), as well as private investors and philanthropic organizations. There are also numerous transnational initiatives that operate outside formal MEAs, such as the [C40 mayors' network](#), the [ICLEI local government sustainability council](#), and the [Net Zero Asset Managers Initiative](#), to name just a few.

Regional and minilateral efforts add further layers of complexity. The African Union and European Union have comprehensive regional plans in areas such as energy, as well as group positions in certain multilateral arenas. Regional organizations and forums such as the G20 and BRICS can provide political heft and policy direction, in addition to practical support on climate finance, technology transfer, and capacity building. Meanwhile, [groupings](#) such as the Coalition for Rainforest Nations and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) shape dynamics within larger multilateral processes such as the UNFCCC. In addition, new initiatives are emerging in areas such as critical minerals governance (e.g., the [Quadrilateral Security Dialogue](#)), and this paper does not attempt to list the many touch points that have developed in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Challenges

Despite the proliferation of MEAs and initiatives, gaps still persist. Traditional peace and security bodies have struggled to formulate responses to climate-related conflict, while environmental forums have resisted attempts to address these issues – fearing politicization as well as diversion from their primary agendas. Climate mobility and displacement also sit uncomfortably within current migration and refugee arrangements. Meanwhile, “means of implementation”, climate finance in particular, remain both crucial and divisive in driving multilateral negotiations and national climate action forward. Furthermore, there is widespread recognition that legal frameworks and mechanisms must evolve to address environmental rights, crimes and accountability, including in areas such as corporate responsibility and ecosystem damage.

Perhaps most importantly, there is a [lack of planetary and systems thinking](#). Actors and efforts are fragmented, ignoring critical dependencies and the impacts of action (and inaction) across issues, industries, sectors, and geographies.⁴ Many actors that should be at the table, including national, multilateral and central banks and planning ministries, are not. This plays into criticisms that Global North-led efforts to address climate change fail to incorporate nature-based concerns and solutions (e.g., valuing natural capital); often run counter to sustainable development needs (e.g., green tariffs on developing-country imports); and prioritize mitigation over adaptation, while Global South countries are, as a whole, more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, and many have already suffered loss and damage.

Fragmentation

There are merits to having distinct processes. For one, the terrain to be covered is so vast that any single body would struggle to manage its workflow, let alone provide for in-depth expertise and technical coordination, without adopting a model similar to that of the UN General Assembly, long criticised for being unwieldy and ineffective. Different forums also enable states to move at different speeds and can (in theory) avoid “political contagion” in one spilling over into another.

However, this means that oversight of the entire climate governance ecosystem is virtually non-existent. Different targets, indicators, definitions, and data sources make it hard to measure progress. Different rules, processes, and dynamics mean that stakeholder engagement is uneven and often tokenistic.

Authority is diffuse, with reporting cycles spread over different periods and across different entities. As a result, issues are siloed. These divisions are often replicated at the national level and within civil society. Within countries, climate policies can be spread across ministries, from agriculture to transport, and it is often the finance ministry that has the last word. Despite self-evident synergies, NGOs working on climate mitigation may not track what their country is doing within the UNCBD or on financing.

Implementation

This fragmentation is compounded by weaknesses across the system. The limited budgets and mandates of UNEP and the UNFCCC, for example, constrain their operational and enforcement capabilities. Many MEAs lack robust implementation pathways and enforcement provisions.

Indeed, the Paris Agreement was deliberately constructed around NDCs after negotiations on mandatory targets failed repeatedly.⁵ The [first Global Stocktake](#) (GST) of NDCs in 2023 found an urgent need for accelerated implementation. It also found that even if all NDCs submitted at the time were fully implemented, they would still be insufficient to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. Similarly, the previous major set of goals under the CBD – the [Aichi Targets](#) – are widely seen to have failed: [none of the targets were fully met and only six were “partially achieved”](#) by their 2020 deadline.

Across the climate and nature space, there are a number of shared implementation challenges. These include vague goals and targets (in international agreements as well as in country-level commitments); lack of data, inadequate monitoring and evaluation; insufficient mainstreaming of climate and environmental targets into economic and social policies; and partnerships and networks that are not sufficiently robust (e.g., inclusion of Indigenous peoples).

Above them sit two overarching and interconnected factors: political will and finance. The first is a built-in feature of all multilateral forums and processes. The latter has long been a source of contention between Global North and Global South countries, as it goes to the heart of the core principle of [“common but differentiated responsibilities”](#).

Many developing countries that want to invest in climate action are unable to do so. At present, over 50 developing countries are in [debt distress](#). Collectively, they are home to

40% of the world’s population living in extreme poverty. Meanwhile, financing – especially for adaptation and nature-based solutions – continues to fall far short of what is needed.

In 2009, Global North countries agreed to mobilize USD 100 billion a year for developing countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change. It took 12 years to reach this target – most of it in the form of loans. Low-income countries received only a small share, and just a quarter went to Africa. Meanwhile, adaptation finance needs are 10–18 times larger than current finance flows. At COP29 last year, governments agreed on a New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035, and to scale up all public and private finance to USD 1.3 trillion. Even so, that falls short of the USD 2.3–2.5 trillion needed by emerging markets and developing countries (excluding China).

Negotiations over compensation for loss and damage were fraught, although ultimately successful in creating a [fund](#). In addition, Global North countries have been unwilling to press ahead with reforms to the IFIs on issues such as tackling debt and borrowing costs.

In recent years, efforts to address these issues have gained momentum through initiatives such as the [Bridgetown Initiative](#), led by Barbados’ Prime Minister Mia Mottley, and the [Climate Vulnerable Forum](#), which now has over 70 member states. This momentum appears to have stalled, as public development finance more broadly has come under severe pressure, and as the United States (U.S.) has not only cut climate funding itself but also called on others, including the IFIs, to do the same.

Meanwhile, fossil fuel subsidies remain high across the world and among major emitters, undermining climate action by encouraging continued reliance on high-carbon energy and delaying investment in renewables. Despite repeated pledges to phase them out at both COP and G20 talks, global progress remains slow, weakening the credibility of climate commitments and slowing the energy transition.

Coordination Approaches, Efforts and Hurdles

Fragmentation is not unique to global environmental governance. Calls to enhance coordination and collaboration, harness synergies and joint resources, and avoid duplication and competition are perennial concerns in every international sphere.

Efforts to advance coordination generally fall into three categories. The first is **soft** coordination. This is achieved through collaboration between individuals (e.g., secretariat staff) or existing bodies (e.g., scientific panels) and includes activities such as knowledge sharing, joint communications, or events. Examples include the assessments by the [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change \(IPCC\)](#) and the [Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services \(IPBES\)](#) that integrate climate and nature issues.

The second is **hard** coordination. This is achieved through policy coherence at the intergovernmental level (e.g., [decisions in the UNCBD](#)), which is underpinned by the emerging general principle of mutual supportiveness and the notion of international law as a system.

Such coherence can be challenging to secure. It requires negotiations between the parties to two or more MEAs, which in turn may require managing differences in the membership composition and rules of procedure, as well as a reluctance to expand the mandate of a particular convention. For example, the UNFCCC has struggled to address climate finance: many donors states, who belong to Annex II and are required to provide financial resources to developing countries, insist that these conversations should happen within

the IFIs, where voting structures play to their advantage, while several developing countries have turned to “arena-shifting” as a strategy, given the challenges of holding donors to their commitments in any forum. On the other hand, the UNCBD has adopted some decisions on the synergies between climate and nature, such as the [voluntary guidelines for the design and effective implementation of ecosystem-based approaches to climate change adaptation](#).

Coordination mechanisms — such as working groups, inter-agency committees, advisory boards, and multistakeholder platforms — can sit between **soft** and **hard** approaches, depending on how formalized they are. The Joint Liaison Group (JLG) between the three Rio Conventions comprises members of each secretariat, for example, and was designed as an informal forum to exchange information and explore opportunities for joint activities. However, as a staff-level mechanism, the JLG is limited in terms of what it can achieve. At the other end of the scale, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is an intergovernmental principal organ of the UN charged with coordinating the activities of the UN funds, programs and agencies (although it has never managed to discharge this function). Its sprawling agenda allows for breadth but not necessarily in-depth consideration of particular issues, which is reserved for its subsidiary bodies (see Annex 1).

The third category encompasses more comprehensive attempts to streamline functions. This includes bodies such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Youth Office or the UN Office on South-South Cooperation, which were created to implement systemwide strategies and serve as focal points for their respective areas, in addition to providing technical assistance to states. It also includes bodies such as the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), which addresses inter-agency policy coherence; and the UN Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG), which coordinates development activities at the country level.

On rare occasions, offices with similar mandates have been merged. The most prominent example is the merger of four entities to create UN Women in 2010. But as a rule, member states and UN officials have tended to create coordination mechanisms rather than rationalize

existing bodies. The ongoing [UN80 initiative](#) is currently exploring reforms of this nature. Its aim is to strengthen the UN's ability to address contemporary global challenges while also responding to growing external pressures for institutional coherence and efficiency.

Box 1. UN reform under duress

The UN is facing a liquidity crisis as a result of decisions by a number of countries to cut Official Development Assistance, including voluntary funding to UN agencies and programs, and the potential zeroing out of U.S. contributions to a number of entities. This has compounded the organization's longer-term financial woes, arising from late or non-payment of dues by member states, rising humanitarian needs; and a growing list of mandates given to the UN by governments.

To not only improve efficiency but also to reassert the value of multilateralism, UN Secretary-General António Guterres has launched the UN80 initiative – a three-workstream process intended to achieve a leaner and cheaper organization by the end of its 80th anniversary session (2025-26). The first workstream is currently underway. It involves immediate cost-cutting measures (primarily cutting staff, relocating posts and offices to cheaper locations, and reducing programming, including humanitarian aid). The second workstream reviews mandates to address duplication, fragmentation, and coordination gaps, with the [Report of the Mandate Implementation Review](#) (August 1, 2025) proposing solutions for both the Secretary-General and Member States to implement.

The third is likely to entail a major restructuring of the UN, with proposals including the creation of four “mega clusters” (peace, development, human rights and humanitarian), and the potential merging of several entities. A [leaked memo](#) suggested integrating UNFCCC and UNEP and raised questions about the future of climate COPs in their current format.

Changes in workstreams 2 and 3 will require approval from the various governing bodies of these entities and potentially an amendment of the UN Charter if Charter-based bodies are involved. Depending on the actual proposals, the first stage may also need approval from, for example, the General Assembly.

Apex Contenders

In recent years, both UNFCCC and UNEP have been seen as potential contenders for an “apex” environmental body. As the most high-profile global environmental forum, UNFCCC COPs provide an opportunity to assess national and global progress on climate action, notably through the NDCs and the GST. They have also yielded some progress in politically contentious areas such as climate finance (e.g., the [Fund for responding to Loss and Damage](#) and the [REDD+](#) forest initiative). However, efforts to enhance implementation, ambition, and accountability have been limited.

At the same time, COPs have grown in scale and scope, reflecting the success of climate COPs in galvanizing attention and action on a series of climate-related matters with real-life economic and social implications and trade-offs. As a result, governments and a diverse range of stakeholders increasingly approach these meetings as the primary venue to advance — or prevent — action. They have sought to introduce an increasing number of issues that the UNFCCC framework was not initially established to address, from climate mobility to transition minerals, conflict, trade and the role of philanthropy. While it may be desirable for these issues to be discussed at COP, doing so would likely be challenging in practice given the already heavy existing agenda and workload, and prospects of fewer staff and resources following the UN80 cuts.

This has affected the dynamics of formal negotiations, already hampered by consensus-based decision-making and political divisions. The primacy of the ‘climate COPs’ is itself a marker of the divisions, representing the Global North’s prioritization of emissions reductions and mitigation, as opposed to issues relating to adaptation, nature and sustainable finance.

These developments have contributed to a growing backlash against COPs as expensive, emissions-producing jamborees with [surging attendance](#)⁶ but few outcomes. Successive COP presidencies by petro-states and the [influence of fossil fuel lobbyists](#) have drawn further criticism. Now, as the UN faces political and financial pressures to downsize, [leaked proposals consider “whether COP in current form should be discontinued.”](#)

UNEP, meanwhile, has grown in prominence as governments and stakeholders place greater emphasis on the links between climate and nature. Ahead of the 20th anniversary of the Earth Summit, there was a renewed push to [upgrade UNEP](#) to a World Environment Organization. This forum was envisioned as an apex body with universal membership that would provide leadership and coordination, as well as support compliance — potentially with powers similar to those of the WTO in terms of censuring countries. This proved a step too far, and the [UN Environment Assembly](#) (UNEA) was created as a compromise.

As the highest-level body for environmental issues, UNEA has sought to incorporate developments in other bodies into its work. The current session is set to consider advances such as the High Seas Treaty and Loss and Damage Fund. The Assembly has also launched negotiations on a binding instrument to end plastic pollution and adopted resolutions on challenging issues such as protection of the environment in areas affected by armed conflict. However, it has not come close to being “the world’s parliament on the environment”. It spends much of its time re-litigating issues, and debating overlaps with other bodies. One frequent criticism of its consensus-based decision-making is that it results in weak resolutions: symbolic and general in nature. Stakeholder engagement is also more limited.

ECOSOC itself could be a potential contender. As a principal organ of the UN with a wide-ranging mandate that includes coordination, it could potentially enable a “systems thinking” approach to climate, nature, and sustainable development. It also has models it could draw on, such as the High-Level Political Forum, which reviews progress on the SDGs, including through [Voluntary National Reviews](#) by countries.

However, ECOSOC’s processes have long been considered unwieldy and weak, and its sprawling agenda duplicative of other entities. Previous attempts to reform it have resulted in [modest changes](#), while a fundamental overhaul of its mandate would require an amendment of the UN Charter, which is notoriously hard to achieve.⁷

In addition to the above, there have been a number of proposals for new bodies. Several research and civil society organizations have suggested establishing a [Global Resilience Council](#) or a [Global Council on Existential Risk](#) to manage climate, nature, and security threats. Others have proposed repurposing the [UN Trusteeship Council](#) as a body to manage global public goods and global commons, and to serve as custodian of these resources for future generations. Others still have called for the creation of, or upgrading ECOSOC to, an [Economic Security Council](#), more recently incorporating climate and environmental issues.

Reform: Context, Opportunities, and Risks

To date, no comprehensive reform proposal has gathered sufficient political traction. The push to create a World Environment Organization (WEO) is illustrative. Led by France and supported by nearly 50 countries, the [effort failed](#) due to underlying dynamics that have scuppered other efforts as well.

Large emitters across the North–South divide balked at the prospect of robust targets and enforcement mechanisms. Many developing countries were wary of creating an organization that prioritized the concerns of Global North. Others feared the move would “import” institutional deadlock from climate negotiations into the wider environment space. Campaigners, meanwhile, were concerned that centralization would not ameliorate — and could even exacerbate — the primary obstacle to progress: political will. Across these groups, there was also skepticism about the extent to which a WEO would be able to address existing gaps.

Today, this calculation may be different. The damage caused by climate and environmental degradation is increasingly apparent, including in wealthy countries. Meanwhile, successive global shocks have strengthened the international consensus on integrating climate, nature, and sustainable development. Efforts by its most vocal detractors do not appear to have derailed this trajectory. Despite the challenges there may still be ambition elsewhere — and other opportunities.

Indeed, the U.S. decision to leave the Paris Agreement may create opportunities for progress; its withdrawal from discussions at the International Maritime Organization, for instance, paved the way for a landmark agreement on shipping emissions in 2025.

Similarly, cuts by the U.S. and other donors have forced the UN and its member states to consider significant structural reforms to address the organization's short-term liquidity crisis and long-term financial challenges.

Documents leaked from the [UN80 initiative](#) floated the potential integration of UNEP and the UNFCCC to “create a stronger global environment authority.” There is no clarity yet on whether this will emerge as an official proposal, what a merged body would do differently, or what its membership would be (UNEA comprises all UN 193 member states while UNFCCC has 198 parties).⁸ A concrete proposal for a body such as a climate and nature council could well be taken up in this context.

Finally, Brazil's ambition for COP30, along with its strong emphasis on strengthening multilateralism and governance innovation, and on making forests and nature a central feature of climate action, provides a clear opportunity within an established process and timeline. COP30 Designated-President André Aranha Corrêa do Lago has convened a “Circle of COP Presidents” to provide insights on how the international community can strengthen global climate governance and called on [“community leaders, scholars, and scientists to explore the best available science and ancestral wisdom around how our institutions can gain exponentially.”](#) Building on President Lula's speech at the 2024 G20 Summit, he has also invited the UN General Assembly to debate [“innovative governance approaches to endow international cooperation with capabilities for rapid sharing of data, knowledge, and intelligence, as well as for leveraging networks, aggregating efforts and articulating resources, processes, mechanisms and actors.”](#)

Risks and Considerations

Nonetheless, risks and considerations remain. With systemwide reform efforts underway, plus the ongoing fallout from cuts to Official Development Assistance, states and stakeholders may not have the bandwidth to launch a concerted push in such a high-stakes area. Some have questioned whether the UN is the right focus for such a “climate mainstreaming” effort. Reform efforts within the organization have often been notoriously slow – Security Council reform being the most obvious example. Others point out that major trade deals (e.g., between the EU and India or bilateral agreements on critical minerals) may have deeper climate and environmental implications than any resolution adopted by a UN body.

In addition, reform initiatives provide detractors with an opportunity to unravel or weaken existing arrangements. From the 1987 Montreal Protocol that has helped limit global heating to the innovative structure of the Paris Agreement, with its “ratchet mechanism,” there are many elements of the current system that merit preservation. Furthermore, no single body could address all of the gaps in global climate and environmental governance — not least when the most glaring is political will. Nor could it be expected to oversee all MEAs or absorb all the functions of existing actors. Indeed, a highly centralized approach would sit uncomfortably with the vibrant ecosystem of actors we have today, and which is necessary to achieve a “whole of society” approach to climate, nature, and sustainable development.

Brazil's communications on climate governance have been carefully calibrated to reflect the above. They position a potential new climate council as a solution to some issues, not a *panacea*. They focus on complementarity and mutual supportiveness, embracing poly-governance approaches and working alongside the UNFCCC without duplication. They stress implementation; alignment of

actors, resources, processes; enhancing data, information, ancestral knowledge sharing, while leaving climate negotiations and international rule-making in the hands of the UNFCCC.

Such a body would likely find political support, as UNEA did. However, without further elaboration, it may be considered too incremental to merit pursuing amid competing priorities. If UN80 precipitates a broader reorganization, it may also be overtaken by the resulting changes. The broader context, therefore, cannot be ignored and should be factored into Brazil's political approach and institutional design.

As such, Brazil should use its COP Presidency to discuss and advance an evolutionary model for the new council, one that ratchets ambition like the Paris Agreement, and can also serve as a testing ground for global governance innovations.

*“Brazil's COP
presidency can
also serve as a
testing ground for
global governance
innovations”*

A Global Climate and Nature Council: Solution and Stepping Stone

The proposed council should be designed to address current gaps and silos, serve as a stepping stone to more robust climate and nature governance *and* action, and pilot approaches that could strengthen global governance more generally.

First, it should provide a vision and narrative that unify disparate processes around shared goals such as delivery, equity, and ambition; and that embraces Earth System and systems thinking, networked multilateralism and poly-governance. This should include integrating climate, nature, and sustainable development in the first instance. It could also involve building on efforts such as the UNEP-led Global Environmental Outlook report to convey a clearer, more comprehensive sense of progress.

Second, it should provide political leadership, if not oversight, of existing parts of the ecosystem, and help maintain momentum between summits and meetings. This would likely mean taking on norm-setting functions similar to those of the General Assembly, and could be augmented by a subset of council members functioning like the Chief Executives Board. Again, this might be challenging to achieve for certain bodies at the outset, so the focus should be on those where progress is more likely, for instance, the three Rio Conventions (climate, biodiversity, and desertification) and UNEP.

Third, it should foster coordination and collaboration across different forums.

This should include harmonizing action across bodies where such pathways may not exist (e.g., between the G20, UN, and IFIs), as well as engagement with regional bodies and informal groupings of states. The International Energy Agency serves as a potential model, as it provides support to bodies including OPEC, the G20 and the UNFCCC. As global governance forums grow more numerous and dynamic, it is essential for them to connect and ensure that issues can flow to the right body for a particular function (e.g., norm-setting, political direction, implementation, funding etc.).

Fourth, it should be multistakeholder.

Drawing on the models provided by the International Labour Organization (ILO), the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), and the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the council should integrate stakeholders into its work from the outset. This could include formal membership and structured channels modeled on the Major Groups; dynamic links with existing networks of youth, Indigenous peoples, trade unions, scientists, finance institutions, etc; and emerging forms of public engagement such as citizens' assemblies. Crucially, the council should adopt principles and rules for engagement to provide stakeholders with simplified entry points and a consistent process for accreditation and participation across different bodies.

Fifth, it should support implementation.

This could include practical support for countries that request it (similar to the PBC), as well as resources such as data and digital tools (e.g., forecasting to support policymaking, integration of future generations). The council could also seek ways to build local and national support, through activities such as inclusive monitoring processes modelled on the Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR); parliamentary outreach; regular polling and consultations; and AI sensemaking to gauge reactions to policies.

Sixth, it should rationalize resources. For instance, it could build on the JLG to create a single secretariat. It could seek to create synergies between entities such as the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund, the Global Environment Facility, and the Green Climate Fund, provided that access to finance for the developing world remains a core principle. It could also play a role in catalyzing climate and nature finance, by providing the political predictability of investment in the green transition that the private sector needs, by supporting countries in negotiating debt agreements with the IMF and private creditors, or by engaging the MDBs.⁹

Seventh, it should support alignment of calendars and processes to rationalize meetings and reduce the burden on states and stakeholders. This could include streamlining monitoring and reporting on NDCs, National Adaptation Plans, National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans, and Land Degradation Neutrality Targets. It could also include establishing a science-policy-action network, as recommended by the [High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism](#).

Eighth, it should have the scope to evolve and take on new functions, so it can respond to issues that may present political hurdles at present. Over time, the political dynamics may change and allow for a climate and nature council to accrue some of these responsibilities. As such, the council should be designed with the flexibility to address the intersection of climate and nature with peace and security, human rights, trade, and sustainable development. It should also be able to address issues, including emerging and future challenges, that do not yet have MEAs (e.g., critical minerals). Other potential functions it could take on include supporting stakeholders in responding to urgent situations (e.g., environmental disasters) and investigating (or referring to other competent bodies) issues brought to it by its members (e.g., serious environmental disputes, violations and crimes) similar to the Human Rights Council.

Finally, it should embrace new ways of working. This could include enhanced virtual and hybrid meetings, the use of VR to augment or replace in-person meetings and negotiations, and AI-driven analysis and scenario generation.

“The Global Climate and Nature Council should be designed to address current gaps and silos, serve as a stepping stone to more robust governance and action”

Pathways and Politics

It is unlikely that all elements set out above would be approved. However, having this fuller picture is important to ensure that any agreed proposal can remain flexible and evolve over time.

One crucial factor is the **council's composition**. Pursuing universality in terms of UN member states has advantages, but it could create difficulties in establishing the council and in adopting decisions if states default to consensus-based decision-making. It may therefore be prudent to consider options such as a smaller membership elected by the General Assembly, based on pledges similar to those required for the Human Rights Council. Another option is to create a council with limited membership but sufficient leverage to make a meaningful difference.

The **integration of stakeholders** is another essential, but politically charged, element. Models such as the ILO's tripartite structure are likely to be unattractive to states reluctant to expand stakeholder participation, let alone formalize it. The PBC, a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, may provide a more acceptable, lower-key option. It has a mandate to engage stakeholders but operates on the basis of self-referral by states.

Then there is the question of **where the council should sit**: within or outside the UN system. Establishing a new body outside the existing system is likely to be less attractive to states, against the broader backdrop of rationalizing global governance institutions. The IEA, which was created as an autonomous organization under the umbrella of the OECD, could be a potential model. However, a body created within the UN system (at least initially) to address existing gaps is likely to be the most attractive and (cost-)effective option.

Finally, **nomenclature**. Depending on the pathway pursued for establishment, the council may need to be a 'commission' or another such designation. While councils are perceived — and in some instances mandated — to have more robust functions, there is often little difference between their powers and profile and that of bodies with different titles.

Pathways

Major changes to the UN's structure require amendment of its Charter. For example, creating a new council as a principal organ of the UN or upgrading ECOSOC to become a broader-based, more robust body that incorporates climate and nature.

The General Assembly can amend the Charter at any time, with decisions requiring a two-thirds majority (Article 108). While the permanent members of the Security Council cannot veto decisions in the Assembly, their assent is required at a later stage in the form of ratification of proposed changes through their respective constitutional processes.

In practice, agreement has been tricky to achieve. The Charter has been amended just three times since the UN's founding, reflecting the difficulties in securing the political buy-in required, not least because states would want to address challenging issues, such as reform of the Security Council. The Assembly can also decide to hold a Review Conference (Article 109), which does not change the process or political dynamics, but could create pressure by setting a deadline while raising the stakes.¹⁰

As such, it might be beneficial to take a two-step approach. First, establishing a council that does not require Charter amendment, and then potentially "upgrading" it to principal organ at a later stage. This was proposed for the Human Rights Council, for instance.

The following pathways do not require Charter amendment:

An official UN80 proposal to combine UNEP and the Rio Conventions. This sits at odds with Brazil's current exposition of the council as complementary to the UNFCCC and COPs, but it could be a way to achieve many of the desired outcomes, notably the integration of climate and nature.

Similar to efforts to amend the Charter, there is a risk that the new council proposal could be derailed by the wider challenges of UN80. However, many governments and stakeholders are keen to ensure that the UN's 80th anniversary is not solely seen as a cost-cutting exercise. A new body would reinforce the message that UN80 is about preparing the organization for the future.

In practice, this could involve bringing the secretariats of the three Rio Conventions into UNEP, thereby streamlining servicing as it has for other MEAs. Some of UNEP's mandates could be removed or transferred to other bodies (e.g., disaster response), allowing it to focus on technical support and data. For instance, by managing a broader climate-nature science network.

UNEA, meanwhile, could be retooled to perform the "council" functions, becoming the primary intergovernmental body for climate and nature. The result would be the creation of a single climate and nature office, combining agenda-setting and policy responses with technical support for implementation. At some point, this entity could be upgraded to a principal organ of the UN through Charter reform.

However, the prospect of a "mega" climate and nature office could be off-putting in the current context, and the dynamics that thwarted previous attempts to upgrade the body may resurface. It is also likely that a revamped UNEA would continue to issue non-binding resolutions.

Creating a climate and nature council under an existing MEA or, ideally, multiple MEAs. One way to increase pressure on implementation would be to establish such a council through a joint decision by the UNFCCC, UNCBD, and UNCCD. This approach would have the benefit of being a member state-driven process — or rather, three processes — within frameworks where states already have existing obligations. The prospect of a single calendar to replace current processes may also be welcomed by overwhelmed states and stakeholders, as would a proposal that "unites" the three Rio Conventions.

In practice, this route could produce something similar to the above scenario, in which UNEP becomes the secretariat and UNEA is repurposed to absorb (and potentially reduce or combine) the three COP processes. While the idea of a single calendar might be attractive, this option would likely be cumbersome and drawn out, given the need to initiate, align, and conclude negotiations between three different sets of organizational stakeholders. The resulting body, meanwhile, would probably face greater constraints if grounded in these three conventions, potentially limiting the flexibility and evolutionary capacity needed to bring the new council idea to life.

Establishing the council as a subsidiary of an existing UN body. Given the proposed functions, the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council are the most likely candidates.

The Assembly has the advantage of comprising all UN member states. It is more prominent, often described as the closest thing to a world parliament, where every state has a vote and where global norms are created. Longstanding efforts to revitalize the Assembly have gained traction in recent years. As the Security Council has battled growing tensions, the Assembly has sought to reassert its authority as the UN's main deliberative, policymaking, and representative forum. The Assembly will also have a high-profile president from September 2025: former German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock.

ECOSOC, meanwhile, is considered to be one of the less prominent and less effective parts of the UN. Nonetheless, there may be advantages to conducting discussions and negotiations in a lower-profile body that has fewer members. It would also have the benefit of breathing life into longstanding attempts to strengthen ECOSOC.

Both the Assembly and ECOSOC are viable options for establishing a new climate and nature forum as a subsidiary body. Both would require the adoption of a resolution by simple majority, along with the necessary political groundwork leading up to it. While proposals have often been foreshadowed in outcome documents (e.g., the 2005 World Summit) or through reports by the Secretary-General or other experts, this is not essential. Either body can request options for addressing perceived gaps and then decide to act on those gaps the following year (e.g., UN Commission on International Trade Law).

More detail on both routes is included in **Annex 1**.

Conclusion

As the multilateral system moves through its biggest shake-up in decades, COP30 may be the last conference of its kind. What happens in Belém could set the tone for climate and nature governance, as well as climate action, for years to come. And we may have fewer years than we thought.

The [latest assessment](#) analyzing key climate indicators shows that we may have just three years before our remaining carbon budget is used up and we cross the 1.5 degree Celsius threshold permanently. The withdrawal from the Paris Agreement by the U.S. — the world's second-largest emitter of greenhouse gases — has raised the specter of wider backsliding. As a Global South leader, an active member of BRICS and G20, and home to 60% of the Amazon Rainforest, Brazil can use COP30 to show there is a strong coalition of middle powers and climate-vulnerable countries willing to step up. The conference could also model different ways of working and advance discussions on a climate and nature council, as the UN80 process moves to its structural phase.

Brazil has expressed hope that COP30 can be a [pivot point](#). It may be one of the last we have.

Annex 1. Institutional Pathways: UNGA and ECOSOC Options

1. General Assembly

The General Assembly (UNGA) is mandated by Article 10 of the UN Charter to “discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter.” In the climate and environmental sphere, the Assembly has been able to address a range of issues, including climate finance, climate vulnerability, and debt, that are often discussed in forums where smaller countries lack representation. It has adopted resolutions addressing the intersection of peace and climate, for instance; recognising the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment; and seeking key advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

UNGA also has the potential to drive implementation and accountability. The Assembly is often described as reflecting “world opinion,” with important normative functions derived from its broad mandate and membership. While its recommendations are generally considered non-binding, UNGA resolutions can move beyond the advisory realm on issues ranging from administrative matters (e.g., membership dues) to urgent peace and security concerns. In the past, the Assembly has authored peacekeeping missions, mandated investigations, and called for coercive measures such as sanctions (see, for instance, the [digital handbook on UNGA's past practice on peace and security](#)).

In addition, UNGA has established pathways for stakeholder participation, such as the Major Groups, although these could be improved. Its subsidiary bodies, like the PBC and HRC, have additional opportunities and procedures for stakeholder participation, which are considered among the most progressive and flexible in the UN system.

Both the HRC and the PBC are high-profile bodies within and outside the UN system, despite their subsidiary status. Indeed, many of those who initially called for the HRC to be “upgraded” to principal organ status no longer believe that is necessary. The PBC, meanwhile, reports to both the Assembly and the Security Council allowing (at least in theory) for strategic coordination. As such, the Assembly is a strong candidate to house a Global Climate and Nature Council.

In terms of the process, Article 22 of the Charter permits the UNGA to “establish subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.” This is reaffirmed by Rule 161 of the UNGA Rules of Procedure. The Assembly has a number of subsidiary bodies, including:

- Advisory bodies, such as the ACABQ on budgetary questions
- Procedural or process bodies, such as the General Committee, which brings together all Main Committee chairs and vice-presidents, and the Credentials Committee
- Bodies set up to draft or advise on proposed treaties or summits, such as the Ad Hoc Committee on the elaboration of a Convention against Corruption
- Substantive inter-governmental forums with programmes of work, such as the PBC and the HRC

Some subsidiary bodies have been a long time in the making. The Human Rights Council, for example, was formally established by UNGA resolution 60/251, following the decision to create it at the 2005 World Summit. The Summit itself was the conclusion of a five-year follow-up process to the Millennium Summit, which included a high-level panel report and lengthy negotiations.

Other bodies have taken a year or less to establish. For instance, the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) followed a much shorter timeline. In 1965, the Assembly asked the Secretary-General to produce a report on the progressive development of the law of international trade. One year later, the Assembly adopted a resolution noting the report, recognising there was no existing UN organ “which is both familiar with this technical legal subject and able to devote sufficient time” to it, and creating UNCITRAL.

In some cases, ad hoc committees have been established without much prelude — either in response to recent developments (e.g., on the Middle East) or to longstanding issues under discussion (e.g., reviewing the Charter). Often, these committees have continued to exist for decades thereafter.

While the origins of each of these bodies vary, the mechanism for establishment is almost always a General Assembly resolution adopted by a simple majority. However, it is important to note that there is also another stage of discussion in the Fifth Committee, which advises the UNGA on the budgetary implications of decisions, including resourcing for new mechanisms.

According to [Rule 153](#) of the UNGA rules of procedure: “No resolution in respect of which expenditures are anticipated by the Secretary-General shall be voted by the General Assembly until the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee) has had an opportunity of stating the effect of the proposal upon the budget estimates of the United Nations.” As such, even though the

2005 World Summit decided to create the HRC and PBC as UNGA subsidiary bodies, the Assembly’s Fifth Committee [discussed resourcing](#) prior to the formal adoption of the UNGA resolutions establishing them.

The extent to which the Fifth Committee review affects decisions on new mechanisms depends on the budgetary implications, which will be higher for mechanisms requiring regular budget support than for those largely envisaged as functioning with extrabudgetary support. Given that budgetary matters require a two-thirds majority in the UNGA (and are often adopted by consensus in practice), this could add a layer of complexity to the creation of a subsidiary body.

2. ECOSOC

ECOSOC is the UN’s main body for coordination, policy review, and dialogue on economic, social and environmental issues. Its smaller membership (54 states) means it does not have the advantage of UNGA’s claims to universality, norm-setting, and “world opinion.” It has a much lower profile — the move from a Commission on Human Rights reporting to ECOSOC, to its successor body reporting to the UNGA, was seen as “elevating” human rights within the UN system.

Moreover, ECOSOC’s functions have often been eclipsed by other bodies or processes — for example, global development goals-setting through summits, economic policy coordination by the G20, or policy development by UN funds, programs, and agencies. It has been criticised for its lack of effectiveness and duplication. This has led to efforts to rationalize its subsidiary bodies, which may hamper efforts to establish a new one.

However, ECOSOC has many of the same functions as the Assembly, including initiating studies, making recommendations, preparing draft conventions, engaging with other principal organs, and setting up commissions. Indeed, some of its commissions – notably

the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) – have had a much higher profile than ECOSOC itself.

In addition, ECOSOC has a mandate (albeit one it has struggled to fulfil) to coordinate action across the UN system and its specialized agencies in the economic, social, and environmental fields (this last element was added in 2005). The fact that ECOSOC has historically focussed on development may be politically beneficial in addressing the concerns and arguments made by countries that feel the climate agenda is being prioritized over their development concerns. Meanwhile, the High-Level Political Forum established under ECOSOC at Rio+20 and SDG voluntary national reviews provide potential models for similar engagement on climate.

Finally, ECOSOC plays a key partnership role drawing in constituencies such as parliamentarians, academics, foundations, businesses, youth, and over 3,200 registered NGOs, as well as the wider UN system of funds, programs, and agencies. A number of its subsidiary bodies integrate stakeholders such as civil society and private sector into their work to varying degrees.

Like the UNGA, ECOSOC has a number of subsidiary bodies, including:

- Regional commissions, which promote economic and social development, foster intra-regional integration, and promote international cooperation for development
- Functional commissions and expert bodies (e.g., CSW, groups of governmental or independent experts), which are deliberative bodies that can provide policy options, suggest indicators or benchmarks, carry out research and analysis, and help establish norms and standards
- Standing committees (e.g., on NGO accreditation)
- *Ad hoc* bodies (e.g., advisory group on Haiti, although it has existed for decades)

The examples below may be illustrative when considering the establishment of a climate and nature council – or “commission,” as it would be in case this route is taken:


- The UN Statistical Commission was created in 1946 by a simple resolution acknowledging the need for coordination of national and UN entity statistics, development of centralized statistical services, and advice to member states.
- The Commission on Science and Technology for Development grew out of an intergovernmental committee with the same name to provide high-level advice through analysis and recommendations to guide the work of the UN, develop common policies and actions, and raise critical challenges posed by rapid technological development
- The Committee of Experts on International Cooperation and Tax Matters was created in 2004 through a resolution, following a 2003 request by ECOSOC to an ad hoc group to consider an international framework on the subject (the resolution formalized the ad hoc group)
- The International Narcotics Board and UN Nutrition were created by merging the functions of two earlier bodies

Again, similar to the UNGA, these bodies have different origins, but the only procedural requirement is an ECOSOC resolution adopted by a simple majority. In theory, the smaller membership makes this threshold an easier one than seeking a UNGA resolution.

However, as for subsidiary bodies established by the UNGA, those created by ECOSOC may also require consideration by the Fifth Committee for budgetary implications and subsequent UNGA decisions. Some ECOSOC resolutions address budgetary implications. For example, the [ECOSOC resolution to create the UN Forum on Forests](#) included recommendations to the UNGA on funding from the regular budget and from extrabudgetary resources.

Endnotes

1. This paper benefited from the contributions of Natalie Samarasinghe, Giovanna Kuele, Laura Trajber Waisbich, Robert Muggah, Ilona Szabó de Carvalho, and Aline Lara Romeu.
2. ‘Council’ is used as shorthand throughout the paper, as this is the language used by the Brazilian government. See section on ‘nomenclature’ on page 11.
3. Agreements include: [Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora \(CITES\)](#), [United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement \(UNFSA\)](#), [Agreement on Port State Measures to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing \(PSMA\)](#), [International Tropical Timber Agreement \(ITTA\)](#), [International Plant Protection Convention \(IPPC\)](#), [Convention on Biological Diversity \(CBD\)](#), [Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity](#), [Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity](#), [Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety](#), [Montreal Protocol and the Vienna Convention on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer](#), [United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change \(UNFCCC\)](#), the [Kyoto Protocol](#) and the [Paris Agreement](#), [Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal](#), [Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade](#), [Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants](#), [Minamata Convention on Mercury](#)
4. There have been efforts to adopt a systems-thinking approach across the climate and nature space, as well as in relation to specific challenges. For instance, [Earth Systems Governance](#) seeks to understand the complex interactions between human societies and the environment; craft solutions that integrate various governance levels and actors; and emphasize interconnectedness, feedback loops, and emergent properties. Meanwhile, the World Economic Forum’s 100 Million Farmers initiative brings together governments, corporations, academic institutions, and farming associations to help up to 20% of the global farmer population transition to regenerative, low-carbon agricultural practices. Instead of adopting a top-down approach, the initiative focuses on collaboration between actors across the value chain.
5. [This does not mean the Paris Agreement is “non-binding”](#). Rather, it stipulates that participation and reporting are binding, bolstered by a number of transparency and review processes, but it eschews globally-set emission reduction targets. Instead, it provides for a “Global Stocktake”: a periodic assessment of collective progress. This is a model that may find favor going forward.
6. Participation at COPs has increased dramatically in recent years, with COP28 in Dubai attracting over 84,000 people. COP29 in Baku drew fewer attendees, but still more than 60,000.
7. Amending the Charter requires a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, followed by ratification of the changes by two-thirds of all UN member states, including the permanent members of the Security Council. This has only happened three times: twice to change the membership of a principal organ (the Security Council and ECOSOC), and once to update an article to reflect those changes.
8. The Holy See and State of Palestine have UN observer status but are full members of the UNFCCC. The Cook Islands and Niue – both self-governing territories with close links to New Zealand – are not members of the UN, but have ratified the UNFCCC. The European Union is also a party to the UNFCCC.
9. While current US positioning has made it more challenging to secure enhanced climate and environmental finance from the World Bank and the IMF, the regional development banks and New Development Bank (NDB) provide opportunities. The NDB has already committed to allocating 40% of its total approved financing during 2022-2026 in support of climate change activities, while the African and Asian Development Banks have increased their financing, issued green bonds and backed debt-for-climate swaps
10. In 2024, President Lula convened a historic G20 ministerial meeting at UN Headquarters that resulted in a [Call to Action on Global Governance Reform](#). He [also announced](#) Brazil’s intention to submit a proposal to convene a Review Conference under Article 109. At the subsequent [IBSA Forum](#) — a trilateral grouping comprising India, Brazil and South Africa — New Delhi and Pretoria added their support.



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The Igarapé Institute is an independent think-and-do tank that conducts research, develops solutions, and establishes partnerships to influence public and corporate policies and practices, addressing key challenges related to nature, climate, and security in Brazil and worldwide. Igarapé is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization based in Rio de Janeiro, operating at both local and global levels.

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