




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Global Futures Bulletin



**THE GROWING THREAT
OF DISINFORMATION
AND MISINFORMATION
IN LATIN AMERICA AND
HOW TO FIGHT BACK**

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Global Futures Bulletin

THE GROWING THREAT OF DISINFORMATION AND MISINFORMATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND HOW TO FIGHT BACK¹

Executive Summary

The rapid spread and borderless reach of disinformation and misinformation are amplified by our growing reliance on digital connections and devices and supercharged by artificial intelligence (AI). The proliferation of fake news, conspiracies, and malign content coincides with declining trust in mainstream media and waning support for democracy. While all countries are susceptible to an unchecked infodemic, some are more vulnerable than others. Concerns over digital harms are already afflicting the major democratic powers of North America and Western Europe. Yet the threat is also rising fast in emerging nations, such as Brazil, where social media is ubiquitous, and the consolidation of democratic institutions is still underway.

Disinformation and misinformation are not inevitable. As fake and malicious news grew in visibility, decibels, and audience share across the media, Brazilian authorities moved forcefully to contain the threat, expunge egregious misinformation, and keep elections free and fair. Brazil's judiciary, and especially the electoral court, spearheaded those efforts, while also enjoining political parties, civil society actors, and social media companies in the campaign. With societies everywhere puzzling over the challenge of how to contain the spread of online harms, Latin America's largest nation offers lessons that can and should have broader relevance for democracies, globally.

Introduction

Disinformation and misinformation are nothing new. The 6th-century Greek historian Procopius amassed a dossier of smears against the Byzantine emperor Justinian.² During the Cold War, the Russian KGB's Operation Infektion concocted a bogus US plot to spread HIV/AIDs.³ Indeed, ever since *homo sapiens* learned to communicate with one another, they have embellished, hyped, spun, and fabricated information outright to malign and advance special interests. Digital connectivity and social media are now transforming these age-old bad habits into a civilizational challenge for 21st-century democracy. Look no further than the conflagrations in Ukraine, Israel, and Palestine, where online smoke and mirrors are just part of the arsenal.⁴

Never has it been easier or more effective to disseminate deceit or pass off false witness as gospel. The difference today is the scale and speed of the spread of bad information and lies. The breakneck growth of social media, broadband internet, and ubiquitous smartphones are helping politicians, influencers, and everyday citizens to weaponize falsehoods and deliver curated malicious content directly to the public square, faster, and more convincingly than ever. Add to this applied and generative artificial intelligence, with its impressive toolkit of expanded content creation and hyper-realistic deep-fakes, and the potential reach and resonance of artful deception looks limitless.


A glossary of bad information⁵

Misinformation	Misinformation is inaccurate information that, while not necessarily shared in bad faith, nonetheless causes harm when presented and repeated as factual.
Disinformation	Disinformation is false or deliberately deceptive information designed to manipulate, distort, or skew public opinion.
Malinformation	Malinformation refers to partial truths that become harmful or misleading to the degree they are replicated or presented as whole truths.

Part of the problem is our disproportionate dependence on all things digital. Indeed, social media platforms and curated websites – rather than independent print, radio, or television media – are increasingly regarded as primary sources of news,⁶ especially among young people⁷ and newly enfranchised voters (see Figure 1). That unfiltered, unverified, and brazenly slanted content can reach billions of people instantaneously is especially troubling for democratic institutions and civic engagement. If tainted information is imperiling even mature democracies with solid institutions, the threat is far greater in more fragile countries with weaker democratic guardrails.

Figure 1. Social media has overtaken traditional news among the young (93,000 people surveyed in 46 countries between 2015 and 2022)


Proportion of 18-24s who say each is their main source of news
Average of 12 markets



Source: Reuters Institute [Digital News Report 2022](#)

The massive expansion of the digital world has turned the way people create and consume information upside down. Over 5 billion individuals, almost two-thirds of the global population, are online. Virtually all of them (4.8 billion people) are habitual social media users (see Figure 2). The increasing reliance on Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, and WhatsApp groups for news parallels a commensurate decline of public trust in traditional media⁸ outlets, where information is subject to journalistic codes of conduct and vetted by editors and filtered by fact-checkers before it is shared as news. All the better for the legions of internet gatekeepers and self-declared “influencers” who compete for clicks amid the gathering climate of information anomie.

Figure 2. An explosion of digital devices is driving the world to social media



Source: Datareportal <https://datareportal.com/global-digital-overview>

The eclipse of legacy or mainstream news sources and the subsequent fragmentation of narratives across sprawling digital ecosystems coincide with steadily declining faith in democratic institutions in many parts of the world. This trend is particularly striking in post-pandemic Latin America and the Caribbean, where the sitting political establishment is bleeding credibility and tolerance for authoritarianism and autocratic governance is on the rise. Deepening disenchantment has sent waves of protestors to the streets to rail against legacy politicians and incumbents, regardless of their ideological persuasion.⁹ Messages from centrists and moderates¹⁰ – traditionally vital to democratic civility – stand little chance against the digital soap box. It's not just that dissatisfaction with democracy has been growing across the region (see Figure 3). A July 2023 poll by Latinobarómetro found that support for constitutional democracy hit all-time lows in all 20 nations surveyed.¹¹ More troublingly, the survey also showed that the younger the voter, the greater the indulgence in undemocratic forms of government. Consider that just 43% of Latin America's 16-to 25-year-olds prefer democracy to authoritarianism, compared to 55% of those 61 and over.

This growing “democratic deficit,” as some analysts describe it, in turn, fortifies political dissonance and distrust, even as it elevates the shrillest voices.¹² The 2023 World Values Survey also found a multidimensional corrosion of trust in public institutions, in government, and even between individuals in Latin America and Caribbean nations, which scored consistently lower than peer nations.¹³ What is more, political mistrust is also a proxy for support of populist candidates, according to Harvard political scientist Pipa Norris and the late political analyst Ronald Inglehart.¹⁴ Consider that just one in five Brazilians said they trust the government in 2022.¹⁵ Such disenchantment is fraying faith in the region’s largest democracy and turning elections into a seller’s market for populist barkers and fabulists.


The rapid digitalization of society combined with declining support for democratic institutions constitutes a foundational shift in the way citizens perceive, interact, and participate in politics and civic life. These trends also pose dramatic challenges to the integrity of democratic keystones, such as free and fair elections, the rule of law, and public institutions that safeguard democratic governance. To a large extent, “[t]he fate of democratic governance ultimately depends on the quality and credibility of democratic institutions. And when it comes to the quality of institutions and governance, as measured by the World Bank, the performance of the [Latin America and the Caribbean] region is decidedly uneven,” the Group of 30 Working Group’s most recent analysis concluded.¹⁶

Figure 3. Creeping dissatisfaction with democracy in Latin America. Share of population in 17 nations and regionwide. (1995 - 2023)

Dissatisfaction with democracy

Total Latin America 1995 - 2023
Totals by country 2023

In general, would you say you are Very satisfied, Rather satisfied, Not very satisfied, or Not at all satisfied with the functioning of democracy in (Country)? Here: 'Not very satisfied' plus 'Not at all satisfied'.



Source: Latinobarómetro, 2023. <https://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp>

The corrosive effects of increasing reliance on social media and declining support for democracy are amplified in an age of AI. Machine learning and large language models are ushering in a new era of disinformation-as-a-service and highly targeted digital harms, including the creation and dissemination of wholesale disinformation, sophisticated deep fakes, and brazen manipulation of digital content.¹⁷ As well as driving down the cost of digital attacks, the scalable use of generative AI systems has created a whole new benchmark in the art of deception.¹⁸ This next-level fakery is already roiling the conversation about creativity, copyright and royalties¹⁹ in the entertainment industry (as Hollywood studios²⁰ have learned) and will do the same for electoral politics. With public trust, governing institutions, and democratic civility on the line, these technologies pose a global challenge. So, too, must be the response.

A comprehensive plan to detect and inoculate societies against such digital harms must start with the commitment to promote a transparent, accountable, and ethical digital commons. Among the most encouraging strategies in play are measures to promote digital and media literacy, enhance online oversight, regulate content moderation, and ensure fairness in algorithms. This will be anything but trivial; societies everywhere are puzzling out how to hold platforms and users accountable for malicious content and abuses without abridging freedom of expression. No strategy will be effective without collaborative efforts from governments, technology companies, and civil society. Only by harnessing collective action, preferably through all-of-society initiatives, do societies stand a chance to mitigate the corrosive impacts of digital harms in an increasingly complex and hyperconnected world.

Brazil on the front lines of disinformation²¹

Fake news and conspiracies – alongside the bots and algorithms that spread them – are the bane of democracies everywhere. Whether it is massive troll farms²², campaign interference²³, or selective internet blackouts²⁴, there are multiple ways to control the flow of unreliable information. The quandary is how to confront the shapeshifting threat of digital harms in real time without circumscribing freedom of expression and the unfettered exchange of opinions upon which all healthy democracies thrive.

There is no hack for fixing online aberrations. Disinformation (lies), misinformation (inaccuracies repeated as fact), and what is increasingly described as malinformation (partial truths that distort and mislead), not only coexist but routinely overlap and drive one another. They also constitute moving targets for policymakers, legislators, and courts. That societies rely on governing institutions and jurisprudence anchored in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to guard against digital menaces moving at twenty-first-century velocity only underscores the challenge. Nations struggling to come to grips with the problem would do well to pay attention to the Brazilian experience, both as a cautionary tale and an object lesson.

The volume and intensity of disinformation and misinformation in Latin America's biggest nation have grown exponentially over the last decade. Part of the reason for this is the unprecedented speed at which Brazil has digitalized. The number of internet users has jumped from 103 million to 182 million since 2013.²⁵ Seven out of ten Brazilians use social media.²⁶ They own 221 million mobile phones in a population of 203 million.²⁷

An assessment by the Igarapé Institute examined the ways in which the proliferation of disinformation and misinformation impacted elections over the past decade.²⁸ The contemporary wave of politically skewed disinformation hit the country during a nationwide bout of protests in 2013, perhaps the country's first major civic upheaval to play out not only on the streets but also across social media.²⁹ The flow of bad and bogus information increased during the general elections of 2014. Then it rose sharply in the 2018 campaign and again in the 2020 municipal race, before spiking during the 2022 presidential election.³⁰

A key catalyst was the rise of Jair Bolsonaro and his far-right supporters, who had found their political voice online. Bolsonaro and his family were early adopters of social media as a campaign tool and rode a wellspring of indignation and digital miscreance into office in 2018, and nearly to reelection four years later. The Igarapé Institute closely tracked how Brazil's vociferous rightwing proved to be particularly proficient at crafting, packaging, and replicating online untruths.³¹ A parliamentary inquest later traced much of their campaign screed to a so-called hate cabinet, essentially a rightwing troll factory answering to the former president's most digitally adept son, Carlos Bolsonaro.³²

The Igarapé Institute found that politicians, influencers, and online communities sympathetic to the far-right incumbent significantly outpaced their left-of-center adversaries during the 2022 election campaign.³³ In competitive terms, the "Bolsonaristas" outplayed Workers Party challenger Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's supporters and opposition sympathizers three posts to one on the video-sharing platform.³⁴ The same research showed the incumbent president's base likewise overperformed on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and TikTok, migrating freely between platforms to share videos, memes, catchphrases, screen grabs, and photographs. Often, women³⁵, journalists, LGBTQIA, favela dwellers³⁶, and other vulnerable groups in society became the preferred targets of online predators.

By 2022, the political obfuscation machine had cranked into overdrive, with online deceptions and aggressions resonating across social networks. The fallout reached beyond familiar figures in the political establishment to hit select targets in Brazilian civil society.³⁷ Parsing 3,088 incidents between January 2021 to December 2022, Igarapé Institute's digital security team identified fake news as the biggest driver (37% of the sample) of attacks on Brazil's civic space – including measures to constrain citizen initiatives to organize, interact and shape the public policy agenda.

To be sure, Brazil had many of the preexisting conditions for the infodemic. The 2022 Ipsos Global Trustworthiness Monitor indicated that just 19% of Brazilians trusted the government,³⁸ leaving the region's biggest democracy vulnerable to toxic and unreliable news. With more than one mobile phone per capita,³⁹ the world's fifth-largest social media market,⁴⁰ and a growing aversion to conventional politicians and news sources, the country has become a proving ground for online opportunists.

The selective risk aversion strategies of large social media companies may be partly to blame. Despite the global outcry over digital harms, social media platforms pay disproportionate attention to abuses in the English-speaking world. After all, these are the markets where regulation and litigation hit the hardest. So, while platforms in anglophone societies are induced to invest in content moderation and machine learning to curb malfeasance and defend against legal blowback (and suffer financial penalties if they do not), much of the rest of the world is left to the laissez-faire of the infodemic. Compounding the problem is the narrow gauge of existing computer tools which are better modeled to detect toxic language in English⁴¹ than in other languages, such as Portuguese. Analysts argue that until tech companies can improve the quality of multilingual data screening, social media platforms remain at risk of flying blind into the expanding international frontier of online falsity, gaslighting, and extremism.

While not all partisan narratives are lies, the unregulated digital commons invites real-world fallout in emerging markets, including Brazil. In the run-up to the country's bitterly polarized 2022 presidential elections, Global Witness submitted 10 Brazilian Portuguese-language ads containing patently false election misinformation to Meta (formerly Facebook) for screening; despite the platform's content-moderation protocols, all the ads were cleared for publication.⁴² When the advocacy group repeated the experiment, just three weeks before the first round of voting in early October, four of the same 10 tainted ads slipped through again.⁴³ One of the spots falsely claimed that the country's Superior Electoral Court, or TSE, had rigged the vote by doctoring electronic voting machines.

Fake news and online fabrications are not just hypothetical risks. The Brazilian Ministry of Health's 2020-2021 campaign to flog unproven Covid-19 medication⁴⁴ reverberated online, stoking vaccine hesitancy and outright anti-vax sentiment, even as pandemic deaths spiked.⁴⁵ The lesson was stark. What starts online does not necessarily stay online, especially during elections. Social media clashes between political partisans continued on the street, occasionally stoking physical aggression and politically charged violence. In one widely reported pre-election incident, a poll taker in São Paulo state was beaten up by a hardcore "Bolsonarista" convinced that doctored voter surveys skewed the election in favor of the leftwing challenger, Lula.⁴⁶

Nor did online tensions abate after Brazil's 2022 election was completed. Ten days after Lula was sworn in as Brazil's new president, on January 1, 2023, a survey showed that just under 40% of Brazilians still believed Bolsonaro was the rightful winner and the victim of a stolen election.⁴⁷ The same magical thinking, turbocharged by tweets, lives, and screengrabs shared for months across social media platforms, propelled a hardcore legion of election denialists to bivouac in front of army garrisons for weeks after the election to demand military intervention.⁴⁸

The same mobs went on to storm Brasilia on January 8, 2023, vandalizing the Congress, Presidential Palace, and the Supreme Court, in a disinformation-saturated bid to oust the new government just a week after Lula was sworn to office.⁴⁹ Only after the rampage did Brazil's Supreme Court justice Alexandre de Moraes order the rioters expelled from their encampments and de-platformed from social media, on the argument that "freedom of expression is not freedom of aggression."⁵⁰ More than a brazen copy-and-paste of the January 6, 2021 insurrection engineered by loyalists of the defeated U.S. incumbent Donald Trump, the Brazilian revolt was a telltale sign that untruths also have consequences.

Brazilian lessons for disrupting digital harms

Brazilians are not taking the disinformation and misinformation onslaught passively. Indeed, few countries have responded to the problem as assertively as Latin America's biggest democracy. Last decade, the country began preparing for the worst externalities of the digital agora through forward-looking legislation and regulatory frameworks (see Figure 4). The Digital Bill of Rights (Marco Civil), sanctioned in 2014, laid out the rules and red lines of the digital commons, replete with guarantees of online liberty and privacy.⁵¹ Then came the General Data Protection Law, a 2018 bill encompassing 40 separate laws to ensure the rights and obligations of individuals, government, and companies, including protection of diversity, freedom of expression, and association, as well as ensuring access to data.

Brazil has since become a living laboratory for how individuals, society, and constituted authorities respond, in real time, to one of modern democracy's most disruptive and mercurial marketplaces. Indeed, no sooner were these vanguard rules drafted than they

came under siege, as a blitzkrieg of digitally manipulated news and images battered the electoral justice system, politics, and democratic civility.

Multiple government agencies and institutions joined forces to curb disinformation and educate the public about its perils, with Brazil’s justice system setting the pace. The Supreme Court, or STF, led the early pushback. After all, the country’s highest bench and some of its most prominent justices in recent years have become the favored targets of fake and malicious news.

As politics grew more fraught with each electoral cycle, the TSE took point. Headline measures included a program to flag voters to surging online disinformation ahead of the bitterly contested 2018 race.⁵² Two years later, the court switched to a web-based early warning system, Fact or Rumor,⁵³ which drew some 13 million hits through the 2020 municipal elections and upgraded the portal in 2022.

Additional innovations included a popular WhatsApp chatbot, which allowed voters to verify election information, and an online media campaign cautioning against reposting fake news,⁵⁴ which garnered 130 million page views in 2022. All these initiatives fell under a broad institutional reset – including the Permanent Program to Counter Disinformation,⁵⁵ the Election Transparency Commission⁵⁶ and the civil society-driven Observatory for Election Transparency⁵⁷ – designed to shore up the court’s democratic credentials, educate voters, and fight fake news.

Figure 4. Key Brazilian institutional responses to disinformation and misinformation between 2014-2022

Brazil’s key institutional actions to combat election misinformation

LEGISLATURE:

2014

- Brazilian Congress passes the Digital Bill of Rights, the [“Marco Civil”](#) (April 2014)

2018

- Brazil lawmakers sanction [General Data Protection Law](#) (August 2018)
- **Superior Electoral Court**
- Signing fake news [nonproliferation agreement](#) with political parties (August 2018)
- [Partnership with political marketing professionals](#) to contain false election information. (June 2018)
- Creation of the page [“Clarification on False Information Published during the 2018 Elections”](#) (October 2018)

2019

- Launch of the [Program to Combat Disinformation with a Focus on the 2020 Elections](#) (August 2019)

2020

- Creation of the [Fact or Rumor](#) page (Fato ou Boato) (January 2020)
- Creation of the [“If It’s Fake News, Don’t Share”](#) media campaign (Se for Fake News, não transmite) (July 2020)
- Creation of an [extrajudicial channel](#) for denouncing mass messaging in partnership with WhatsApp (August 2020)
- [Partnerships with some of the main internet application providers](#) (including Facebook/Instagram, WhatsApp, Google/YouTube, Twitter and TikTok); (September. 2020)

2021

- Creation of the [Permanent Program to Combat Misinformation](#) by the Electoral Justice (Programa Permanente de Enfrentamento à Desinformação da Justiça Eleitoral) (August 2021)

2022

- Celebration of [154 partnerships](#), between verification institutions, digital platforms, political parties, research institutions, civil society organizations, public bodies and media associations (July 2022)
- Creation of the [“Institutional Strengthening Program based on Image Management of the Electoral Justice”](#) and the “Manual for Combating Disinformation and Reputation Defense of the Electoral Justice” (March 2022) and the “Manual de Enfrentamento à Desinformação e Defesa Reputacional da Justiça Eleitoral” (April 2022)
- Launch of the [Electoral Transparency Commission](#) (Comissão de Transparência Eleitoral/CTE) (July 2022)
- Creation of the [National Front to Combat Disinformation](#) (Frente Nacional de Enfrentamento à Desinformação) (March 2022)
- Launch of the [“Disinformation Alert System against the Elections”](#) (“Sistema de Alertas de Desinformação contra as Eleições”) (August 2022)

Sources: Igarapé Institute. The Disinformation Pulse, April 2023. <https://igarape.org.br/en/disinformation-pulse/>, Marco Civil (<https://www.jusbrasil.com.br/artigos/marco-civil-da-internet-neutralidade-de-rede-e-liberdade-de-expressao/613570046#:~:text=Os%20princ%C3%ADpios%20da%20neutralidade%20de.respeito%20cada%20vez%20maior%20ao>), and General Data Protection Law (<https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/porta/p/Leis-e-normas/lei-geral-de-protecao-de-dados-pessoais-lgpd#:~:text=A%20Lei%20Geral%20de%20Prote%C3%A7%C3%A3o.vigor%20em%20setembro%20de%202020>)"

Brazil's new government has doubled down on actions to get ahead of the problem. The same day that Lula took office in 2023, his government announced the creation of the National Prosecutor's Office for the Defense of Democracy, tasked to counter disinformation regarding government policy.⁵⁸ Lula's government went on to sponsor a bill to hold social media platforms responsible for bogus content and breaches of the "democratic rule of law."⁵⁹ Brasília has also dialed up pressure on federal lawmakers to enact PL 2630,⁶⁰ the so-called Fake News bill, which has been languishing in the Legislature since 2020.

The same initiatives have provoked an outcry from the hard right to libertarians, a preview perhaps of the arduous political arguments ahead. Predictably, critics quickly attacked the official campaign as a ploy to throttle dissent, describing it in Orwellian terms as a "Ministry of Truth."⁶¹ Not all the misgivings come from the ideological fringe. Many digital rights activists and defenders of free speech are likewise deeply troubled by how the authorities will define disinformation and what distinguishes incitement from opinion. And how much discretionary power will the new office wield in the name of defending democracy?

For many large technology companies, the heavy-handed government response poses an existential risk. They claim that making social media platforms responsible for airing false information is not just impractical but contradicts Brazil's pioneering Digital Bill of Rights. The sticking point is Article 19 of the Marco Civil, which exempts platforms from liability for damages arising from third-party content unless a court has explicitly ordered its removal.⁶² The Supreme Court is still weighing the constitutionality of Article 19.⁶³

Especially galling to some critics is what they perceive as creeping judicial activism, led by Justice Alexandre de Moraes, who since August 2022 also has presided over the Superior Electoral Court. As fake news intensified, Moraes resorted to a number of proactive and – some argue – overweening

decisions. He ordered social media companies to remove hundreds of posts deemed malicious and threatened to shut down Telegram in Brazil for failing to take down others.⁶⁴ He directed federal police to raid the homes of rightwing business executives who had commented favorably, on a private WhatsApp group, about a coup should Bolsonaro lose the election.⁶⁵ Moraes also de-platformed some outspoken web influencers from social media and had one Brazilian lawmaker arrested for posting a defamatory video attacking the high court.⁶⁶

Justice Moraes's actions made him as easy a target for disaffected right-wingers as he was a hero for Brazilians for the left. By increasingly leaning in, he also helped remake the country's highest bench into a combatant in a society already cloven by partisan quarrels. Yet it is important to note that Moraes's activist approach met with *carte blanche* from fellow magistrates, who shared his interventionist instincts, if not his initiative. Some Brazilians have since taken to calling Moraes "the sheriff."⁶⁷ State University of Rio de Janeiro political Scientist Beatriz Rey prefers "protector of the realm," a reference to the overlord in the TV drama *Game of Thrones*.⁶⁸

Ultimately, no one familiar with contemporary electoral politics denies the pernicious effect of disinformation and misinformation on the integrity of democratic institutions. At the same time, however, there is more limited consensus about how to contain tainted news and plenty of misgiving over the risks of judicial and regulatory overreach. Latin Americans know this story. The "anti-hate" law⁶⁹ scripted by Venezuela's Nicolás Maduro, Nicaragua's special cybercrimes law⁷⁰ sponsored by the Ortega regime, and the serial gag orders⁷¹ and ban on "offending" literature⁷² at the behest of El Salvador president Nayib Bukele, the self-proclaimed "world's coolest dictator,"⁷³ are more than aberrations. Rather they can be seen as the dangers to constitutional democracy when the government du jour decides what can and cannot be said.

Brazilians appreciate the difference between combative partisan narratives and fake news. Yet they also have seen up close how the fierce competition between social media warriors for clicks, likes, and notoriety can turn toxic and spill from the web into the wider world. Latin America's biggest and perhaps its most unruly democracy deserves credit for meeting the challenge mid-stride.⁷⁴ It has arguably prevented the furies of hyperpolarized political campaigns from erupting into precisely the sort of turmoil and factional violence that menaces free and fair elections, the rule of law, and public institutions everywhere.

In a country where screens never go dark, and netizens devote an average of 3 hours and 49 minutes daily⁷⁵ to social media, compared to the global mean of 2 hours and 31 minutes, the problem looks certain to intensify. That half of these digital devotees are under the age of 35 is a clear message from the future. Confronting the disinformation explosion and its collateral damage, while at the same time safeguarding democratic institutions and liberties, is a work in progress that will fall to the next generations to complete – in Brazil and beyond.

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