




IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE
a think and do tank



CIVIC SPACE GPS

QUARTERLY BULLETIN 7

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CIVIC SPACE GPS

April—June 2022

Democracy thrives on Civic Space. Although difficult to measure, this is the layer between state, business, and family in which citizens organize, debate and act to influence public policy and determine the directions of their country. In Brazil, this important sphere of influence is under attack. The constant assaults on civic space threaten civil and political rights, hinder transparency and curtail freedom of expression, tolerance, and civil liberties. Such attacks also clash directly with basic rights and liberties guaranteed under the Brazilian Constitution, as well as in countless international conventions and treaties, so representing a grave threat to democracy itself. Brazil is not the only country where civic space is under assault, but the threats are becoming troublingly common in Latin America's biggest country.

To monitor and assess these threats, the Igarapé Institute launched “**The Civic Space GPS**” in 2020. The objective is to track these attacks, the responses by State institutions, as well as acts of resistance led by civil society. Published quarterly, these bulletins follow and analyze such attacks as reported across multiple media outlets, including Folha de S. Paulo, G1, O Estado de S. Paulo, O Globo, and UOL. Our researchers then catalog and classify this data by the types of strategies and tactics employed to circumscribe civic space. This typology was published in the Igarapé


Institute's Strategic Article 49, “[The ‘Agora’ is under attack: Assessing the closure of civic space in Brazil and around the world](#)”, and in the supporting Technical Note, “[A Typology to Understand the Strategies and Tactics for Attacking the Civic Space](#)”.

In this seventh edition, covering the second quarter of 2022, the Institute assesses **352** threats to Brazilian civic space reported between April and June. The bulletin also examines **175** reactions to such threats — **118** institutional responses and **50** acts of resistance – by civil society and other groups. The media spotlighted another **7** changes of position, mainly government reversals. Political violence escalated during the second quarter, often devolving into physical altercation. This quarter also saw an increase in attacks on the electoral system, polls, and democratic institutions. Environmental insecurity was also on the rise, with criminal attacks against environmental defenders and Indigenous peoples. The murder of British journalist Dom Phillips and Indigenous rights activist Bruno Araújo, in the Vale do Javari, in Brazil's northwest Amazon, was an alarming case in point of the assault on Brazilian civic space.

The threats

The Igarapé Institute identified **352 threats to Brazilian civic space** between April and June, a 4% reduction compared with the previous quarter and 13% below the level recorded during the same period last year. The bulletin also observed a change in the most recorded types of threats. **Fake news and disinformation campaigns** stand out among the most commonly used attacks, with **157** threats recorded during the three months under review, followed by **intimidation and harassment**, totaling **66** cases. **Abuse of power (45 cases)** was the third most common threat. **Violation of civil and political rights (24 cases)** ranked as the fourth most frequently used attack strategy, surpassing constitutional hardball with 22 cases.


FIGURE 1 – Threats in the second quarter of 2022



Source: Own elaboration, based on the systematic collection of information published in the press.

The sharpest shift reported this quarter were acts of **physical violence**, which doubled over the first quarter, reaching a total of **12** incidents from April to June. **Violation of civil and political rights (+33%)** and **intimidation and harassment (+32%)** also increased significantly, while cases of **abuse of power** fell by **46%** and **constitutional hardball**, by **40%**.

FIGURE 2 – Comparison of threats to civic space between 2022 first quarter and 2022 second quarter




Source: Own elaboration, based on the systematic collection of information published in the press.

Fake news and disinformation campaigns accounted for **44.6%** with **157 threats** recorded in the second quarter. Most fake news events targeted political opponents (65%), while about a fifth (19%) of these campaigns sought to falsely lay claim to successful deeds or policies by others. President Lula and the current President Bolsonaro were the principal beneficiaries of such deceptions, either by overstating their governments' performance or exaggerating their appeal to voters. The same two candidates were also the primary victims of such false flags: 70% of the incidents targeted Lula while 12% took aim at Bolsonaro.

At the same time, attempts to constrict Brazilian civic space were intensified. Two headline targets were the electoral process (11% of attacks) and discrediting the electoral polls (15%) through the dissemination of fake news and disinformation. Public authorities played a relevant role in minting and spreading fake news. Deputy Onyx Lorenzoni (of the Liberal Party - PL in Portuguese) claimed in an interview that the Superior Electoral Court (TSE in Portuguese) transformed a public vote count into a secret one, a version refuted by the media portal UOL. UOL also pointed out that Bolsonaro had raised unfounded doubts about the reliability of electronic voting machines, while his son Flávio Bolsonaro sought without evidence to discredit surveys by pollster Datafolha.

FIGURE 3 – Fake news and disinformation campaigns




Source: Own elaboration, based on the systematic collection of information published in the press.

Reports of Intimidation and harassment also increased, from 50 to **66** occurrences. Threats to the Supreme Court (STF in Portuguese) accounted for 27% of all cases. The media homed in on incidents whereby Bolsonaro publicly singled out the Justices of the high court to intimidate them. On one occasion, according to Folha de S. Paulo, the Brazilian leader presided over an [official event criticizing the Supreme Court](#) and demanded that representatives of the Brazilian Armed Forces take part in counting the ballots for the October elections alongside officials of the TSE. In another newsworthy event, as reported by Estado de S. Paulo, Bolsonaro [accused Justice Alexandre de Moraes](#) of committing crimes and [appealed to the Attorney General's Office](#) (PGR in Portuguese) when the high court dismissed the case. Following Bolsonaro's lead, loyalists at a political rally

in Rio de Janeiro in May, [echoed his attacks against STF Justices while also targeting the LGBTQIA+ population](#).

Intimidating critics (19% of cases) and subjecting them to authoritarian rhetoric (16%) are recurring forms of harassment in Brazilian civic space. Taken together, these attacks have a chilling effect on freedom of expression. In some cases, attackers have even resorted to issuing death threats against dissenters. One widely reported case was of a young man who received [anonymous death threats after criticizing a lawmaker](#). Another targeted organizers of the LGBT parade in São Paulo, who received threats by email. The monitor also flagged recurrent incidents of political gender violence (6%), including death threats against a pre-candidate for the Senate of the State of Sergipe, police chief [Danielle Garcia](#).

FIGURE 4 – Intimidation and harassment




Source: Own elaboration, based on the systematic collection of information published in the press.

The bulletin reviewed **45** cases of **abuse of power**, most of them related to misuse of public funds. The use of public institutions for personal benefit accounts for 33% of these cases. Headline examples included Rio de Janeiro governor Claudio Castro's [deployment of the official state helicopter](#) for parties and personal travel, and his use of [R\\$2.5 million in state money](#) to decorate his parade box during Rio de Janeiro's carnival pageant with tourist posters. The quarterly bulletin also covered the Irregular use of public money by members of the Judiciary branch. In one case, Folha de S. Paulo reported that Superior Military Court (STM in Portuguese) president General Luis Carlos Gomes Mattos, took weekend trips to

Rio de Janeiro with [all expenses covered by public funds](#), even when no official business was on the agenda.

The use of public resources to favor government allies accounted for 20% of recorded incidents of abuse of power. Noteworthy cases included [granting diplomatic passports to religious leaders](#) and [allocating public funds for presidential Chief of Staff Ciro Nogueira's political strongholds](#). Another high profile example of abuse of power, according to G1, was President Bolsonaro's phone call [alerting Education Minister Milton Ribeiro](#) that he was a target in an impending Federal Police investigation involving influence peddling.

FIGURE 5 – Abuse of power




Source: Own elaboration, based on the systematic collection of information published in the press.

The **24** reported cases of **violation of civil and political rights** illustrate the deterioration of civic space in the run-up to the 2022 elections. Half of the recorded incidents were attributable to gender (33% of cases) and race-based (16%) political violence. A significant number of these acts targeted transsexual and black transvestites lawmakers. In one, congressman Rodrigo Amorim called trans councilwoman Benny Briolly a “freak of nature”, UOL reported. In another, also according to UOL, state congressman Douglas Garcia slurred Erica Malunguiho in an openly transphobic speech. The Black population

and traditional communities were recurring targets; indeed, abuses of racial and ethnic rights accounted for 20% of total rights violations. Among the most widely reported examples were the racist floor speech by a São Paulo alderman during an official city council session; Bolsonaro’s quip about a heavy-set black supporter who he said ought to be weighed, like farm animals, in arrobas (roughly, in stones); and the chronic absence of Indigenous Affairs Bureau officials posted on the besieged indigenous lands of Javari Valley, in the northwest Amazon.


FIGURE 6 – Violation of the civil and political rights



Source: Own elaboration, based on the systematic collection of information published in the press.

Constitutional hardball refers to a series of actions designed to circumscribe civic space by bending or breaking norms and gaming the rules of order. One example of constitutional hardball is the omission or use of official prerogatives to favor allies. The last quarter saw **22** such cases (27% of the total). In one, Bolsonaro granted an [individual pardon](#) to Daniel Silveira, a core legislative supporter, who had been condemned for attacking democracy and political institutions. Another area of contention centers on the Attorney General’s Office’s reported [lack of independence](#), regarding the executive branch, representing 22% of the total cases of constitutional hardball. Such a lack of prosecutorial autonomy could explain why [investigations against Bolsonaro](#) and [his allies](#) have repeatedly failed to advance.

FIGURE 7 – Constitutional hardball



Source: Own elaboration, based on the systematic collection of information published in the press.

The spike in observed cases of **physical violence (12 cases)**, which grew **100%** in the period, is closely related to the rise in violations of civil and political rights of minorities, and to political violence in general. In two important second quarter incidents, a [councilwoman was assaulted](#) by a colleague in the City Council of Caçapava, and a [quilombola leader was shot to death](#) in a conflicted region of rural Maranhão state. The **8** recorded occurrences of **censorship in the quarter** indicate the federal government’s attempt

to curb transparency. Examples include [the government’s omission on cases of police violence](#), and the decisions to keep the record of [Bolsonaro’s meetings](#), and the [details of his trip to Russia](#) under seal. The **7** cases of **cooptation** point to the government’s tendency to favor allied groups in exchange for electoral support. Two widely reported examples include the government [credit line for truck drivers](#) and its authorization of [evangelical churches to provide engineering services](#) to National Institute of Agrarian Reform (Incra).

The latest quarterly bulletin logged **3** episodes of **violation of social and environmental rights**, such as the illegitimate use of [resources originally dedicated to the advancement of culture to unclear purposes](#), irregular activities in the Amazon region, including [illegal mining](#), and the [government's failure to safeguard protected areas](#). There were also **2** recorded cases of **restrictions imposed on civic engagement and participation**, one affecting [the National Human Rights Council](#) and the other, an attempt to discredit [complaints filed by Brazilian Workers](#) before the International Labor Organization (ILO). The **2** cases of **coercion** on record arose refer to official pressure to [exclude the European Union \(EU\)](#) from the list of outside observers at the 2022 elections, and another involving a [Bolsonaro's](#)

[alleged threats](#) against a physician who balked at prescribing medication with no proven effectiveness against Covid-19. The **2** cases of **funding restrictions** were related to [financial constraints imposed on Incra](#), the agrarian reform institute, and the other to Federal Police budget shortfalls for environmental policing. Finally, the bulletin also reported **2** incidents of **infringement of privacy**. One surfaced when employees of the São Paulo Court of Justice (TJ-SP) found that their [phones had been flooded with campaign messages](#) promoting the candidacy of the court's former chief justice, Ivan Sartori. Another followed complaints by a former aide to Rio de Janeiro city councilor Gabriel Monteiro who discovered that his [personal data had been released](#) after he had reported Monteiro's alleged wrongdoings to the police.

Reactions


Between April and June, the quarterly bulletin counted **175 such reactions**, a **near 36% decrease** compared to the previous quarter. These included **118 institutional responses**, most of them initiated by the Judiciary branch, the Public Prosecutor's Office (MP), and the Legislative branch. Another **50 acts of resistance** were attributed to a diverse array of groups, among them civil society organizations, political parties, social media, indigenous leaders, and international organizations. State entities also reacted, **changing official position 7 times**.

Pushback against threats to civic space is critical. Even if such resistance falls short, these reactions can strengthen democratic institutions and thwart official attempts to asphyxiate public liberty and engagement. Institutional responses ranged from blocking antidemocratic threats to defending arenas of public debate and civic assembly. Even when such countermeasures fell short, they still helped keep society vigilant and mobilized in defense of fundamental rights and freedoms.

Institutional responses

In the second quarter of 2022, the institutions leading the effort to defend civic space were the Judiciary branch (35.6% of initiatives), the Public Prosecutor's Office (29.7%), and the Legislative branch (22.9%).

FIGURE 8 – Authors of institutional responses



Source: Own elaboration, based on the systematic collection of information published in the press.

Leading the way for the **judiciary**, the **Supreme Court** issued some **60%** of responses led by this branch. The high court proved instrumental in protecting the environment and promoting Indigenous rights. The Court gave the National Council for the Environment 24 months to define a more efficient norm to regulate [air quality standards](#). It also overturned three decrees by President Jair Bolsonaro that [limited the role of civil society and governors](#) to influence environmental decision making. The STF also sought to advance the agenda for Indigenous [health](#) and [safety](#), while also demanding

that the executive branch account for and prioritize the federal [investigations into the disappearance](#) of journalist Dom Phillips and indigenist Bruno Pereira.

The Supreme Court's responses to federal congressman Daniel Silveira's repeated attacks on democratic institutions were widely covered in the media. The high court not only sentenced Silveira to eight years and nine months in prison for "antidemocratic" acts, it also slapped him with several [fines](#), authorized the freezing of his bank [accounts](#) and [assets](#), and ordered punitive deductions on his

parliamentary paycheck.

The **Public Prosecutor's Office** also led the way, initiating **29.7%** of **institutional responses** to threats on civic space. Prosecutors spoke out on pivotal social issues, investigated acts of violence and probed irregularities in a congressional inquest (the "CPI do Sertanejo," which examined reported overbilling of shows by country singers paid with public funds). The Prosecutor's Office (Ministério Público) played a leading role in pressing [complaints](#) against Rio de Janeiro city councilor Gabriel Monteiro for sexual harassment, among other crimes. It also [launched an investigation](#) into allegations of sexual harassment against that Pedro Guimarães, then president of Caixa Econômica Bank. The MP also took part in investigating the case of Genivaldo de Jesus Santos, who died in police custody after being tear gassed in the trunk of a police cruiser. Prosecutors questioned why the highway police (PRF in Portuguese) [ordered case records sealed for 100 years](#), filed an injunction against highway police acting outside their jurisdiction, and called for reinstating the police [Human Rights commissions](#). Prosecutors also took part in investigations into a police raid of a Rio de Janeiro community, Vila Cruzeiro, which left [multiple deaths](#). Public prosecutors also responded to threats to indigenous communities, [investigating invasions](#), [monitoring conflicts](#), and [calling on the federal police to intervene when necessary](#). Following the disappearance of journalist Dom Phillips and indigenous rights advocate Bruno Pereira, state prosecutors [filed inquiries with the federal government](#) and [demanded heightened security in Vale do Javari](#), where Phillips and Pereira were traveling.

Within the **legislative branch** led responses, Brazil's Chamber of Deputies launched around **40%** of responses, followed by the Federal Senate (**22%**) and the City Councils (**18.5%**). All three institutions remained vigilant, responding to attacks on the Indigenous peoples, the Black population, and in the cases of gender violence. As well as creating


[mechanisms to follow up on reports of violence](#) against Indigenous peoples, the legislature demanded information on the [investigation into the case of Bruno and Dom](#) and called for the creation of external commissions to monitor the case in [the Chamber of Deputies](#) and in [the Senate](#). Genivaldo's death also prompted the legislature to act: Senator Randolfe Rodrigues called for authorities to explain [the 100-year seal on the police case records](#). The City Councils of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo also did their part, initiating impeachment proceedings in their respective chambers: one involving Rio de Janeiro councilor [Gabriel Monteiro](#), accused of rape and moral and sexual harassment; the other targeted São Paulo alderman Camilo Cristófar, accused of racial slur for racist speeches.

"The Public Prosecutor's Office also led the way, initiating 29.7% of institutional responses to threats on civic space. Prosecutors spoke out on pivotal social issues (...)"

Resistance

Among the acts of resistance to threats on civic space recorded during the last quarter, civil society led the way (52% of all initiatives) followed by political parties (22%) and social media (14%). International organizations (8% of actions), press (2%), and academia (2%) also took part in the pushback.

FIGURE 9 – Authors of Resistance Acts



Source: Own elaboration, based on the systematic collection of information published in the press.

The disappearance of Dom and Bruno triggered strong reactions, starting with the group of organizations that [took the case to the International Court of Justice](#), at the Hague. While citizen organizations set the pace, launching 61.53% of acts in defense of civic space and democracy, Indigenous leaders also weighed in, accounting for 15.38% of the

total civil society response. They demanded [stronger government protection of their communities](#) and [tighter security of the entire Amazon region](#). [FUNAI employees voiced support](#) of demonstrators in a national strike in tribute to Phillips and Pereira, demanding more protection to carry out their work in the region of where the two travelers disappeared.

Civil society organizations also spearheaded efforts to defend [the elections](#), demand [press freedom](#), [boost the youth vote](#), and defend the integrity of the [Brazilian electoral system](#). Political parties denounced President Jair Bolsonaro and his supporters for holding irregular campaign events, such as his frequent [motorcycle demonstrations](#) and appropriating air time to televise partisan [statements](#). For its part, social media put up resistance by calling out fake news and disinformation campaigns, initiatives which led to the exclusion of erroneous or malicious content by [Youtube](#) and [Facebook](#) and led to an agreement with the TSE to prevent the spread of fake news on [Spotify](#) and [Telegram](#).

Changes of Position

Reversals of norms and policies by state entities are also a meaningful measure of the impact of public pressure on institutional decision-making. During the quarter under review, the federal government changed its position after the public outcry and a series of demonstrations over the murder of Dom Phillips and Bruno Pereira. After initial statements [by the Army](#) and [federal police](#) triggered major demonstrations, both institutions quickly reversed course and mobilized. Funai, having failed to adequately monitor officially protected areas, was pressured to [renew a lapsed ordinance](#) restricting access to the Pirititi indigenous Land. The revised measure would bolster protection for the besieged community in an area under constant threat by land grabbers and illegal logging operations.

Civil society pressure also helped lower the government bid for purchase of [overpriced school buses](#), resulting in significant savings for the federal budget. Finally, civic pushback also forced the government to [disclose details of the group of pastors allegedly acting as lobbyists at the Ministry of Education, reportedly with the knowledge of the Palácio do Planalto](#). Earlier demands to divulge that information were previously denied by the Institutional Security Office (GSI in Portuguese).

"Funai (...) was pressured to renew a lapsed ordinance restricting access to the Pirititi indigenous Land. The revised measure would bolster protection for the besieged community (...)"

Annex 1 - Typology of legal, illegal and extralegal strategies and tactics used to close civic space (updated)

Strategies	Description	Examples of tactics / actions
I. Cooptation	Cooptation is the process of garnering or strong-arming political support by offering privileges or advantages, generally to manage the opposition and attend to the demands and interests of allied groups or potential supporters, thus maintaining the group's power and stability. (Selznick, 1948; Piven and Cloward, 1977).	<p>Offer of privileged relationship, including access to public contracts and funding, if given unrestricted support.</p> <p>Public incentives, subsidies, and actions allocated specifically for the support, funding, and strengthening of allied groups, as a concession of excessive privilege in order to maintain loyalty and unconditional support from the allied base.</p>
II. Coercion	Coercion is the use of threats to influence another's behavior by limiting choice (Schelling 1966).	<p>Veiled or open threat to dismiss or disempower public servants and political appointees if they don't adhere to government's false narratives or wrongdoings.</p> <p>Veiled or open threats to suspend ongoing partnerships and/or public funding in light of public criticism.</p>
III. Fake News and disinformation campaigns	<p>Fake news are false stories circulated on the news, social media, and spread on the internet, which try to appear as real news. There are six types: news satire, news parody, fabrication, manipulation, advertising, and propaganda (Tandoc, Lim, Ling, 2007).</p> <p>Disinformation is false information spread deliberately to cause public harm or for profit, going beyond fake news (EC, 2018).</p>	<p>Mass production and dissemination of false content to earn political influence.</p> <p>Hiring bloggers, using fake profiles, bots and other digital tools to create and spread false stories using public money or resources from supporting groups.</p> <p>Deliberate spread of disinformation campaigns to distract or deceive.</p> <p>Attacks against facts and science.</p>
IV. Censorship (overt or veiled)	Censorship refers to the "policy of restricting the public expression of ideas, opinions, conceptions and impulses which have or are believed to have the capacity to undermine the governing authority or the social and moral order which that authority considers itself bound to protect" (Laswell, 1930)	<p>Intent to provoke self-censorship of individuals that are targeted online or offline.</p> <p>Creation of obstacles to access public information.</p> <p>Classification or restriction of publications and documents.</p> <p>Direct intent to disqualify research results.</p> <p>Defunding of cultural projects not aligned with the government's views.</p> <p>Filtered content or close down of the internet.</p> <p>Vastly enforced censorship of media, research, cultural manifestations and debate.</p>

continuation

<i>Strategies</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Examples of tactics / actions</i>
V. Intimidation and Harassment	<p>Intimidation refers to direct or indirect actions against others to prevent them from continuing their work or to induce fear of an attack (CIVICUS, 2019).</p> <p>Harassment is legal or physical actions or behavior that demeans, humiliates or embarrasses a citizen when expressing critical opinions (CIVICUS, 2018).</p>	Use of state security forces and intelligence apparatus to intimidate opponents.
		Persecution and intimidation of activists, artists, civic leaders, journalists, and scientists.
		Blackmail.
		Harassment or attack of institutions by authorities.
		Public targeting / harassment of activists, artists, civic leaders, journalists, and scientists by high level authorities.
		Misogynist attacks against women with a public profile.
		Dehumanization / defamation / delegitimization campaigns against individuals, groups or institutions (direct or indirect action).
		Organized, online attacks and campaigns against individuals, groups or institutions (bots and digital mob mobilization).
		Threats to cancel public concessions of independent media channels.
Pressure and threats to private companies to stop advertising on non-aligned media channels.		
VI. Infringement of Privacy (State surveillance)	<p>Infringement of Privacy refers to the violations of the fundamental human right to privacy, which underlines that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation.” (Declaration of Human Rights, 1948).</p> <p>State Surveillance is the collection of information, including the monitoring, tracking, and identification to the administration of subject populations, supervised by officials and administrators, hinged to some specific purpose (Giddens, 1984; Lyon, 1994). It usually inhabits a shadowy realm of public affairs (Starr et al).</p>	Illegal wiretapping.
		Digital media monitoring for profiling, harassment, and intimidation.
		Closure of accounts, websites, servers.
		Hacking profiles to intimidate or harass, or to use private profiles in digital mob campaigns.
		Misuse of private citizens' data on micro-targeting disinformation campaigns and other digital actions without permission.
		Illegal monitoring of opposition, including protest organizers.

<i>Strategies</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Examples of tactics / actions</i>
<p>VII. Civil and Political Rights Violations</p>	<p>Violations of political rights include denial of the right to a fair trial and due process; and rights of participation in civil society and politics such as freedom of association, the right to assemble, and the right to vote (Dahl 2005).</p> <p>Violations of civil rights include discrimination on grounds of race, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, color, age, political affiliation, ethnicity, religion, and social origin; and restrictions of individuals' freedom. (ICCPR 1976).</p>	Restrictions or bans on public protests / demonstrations.
		Constraints for the incorporation, registration, operation and lifecycle of CSOs.
		Shutting down CSOs which resist conforming to authoritarian or draconian rules.
		De-registration or cancellation of licenses of operation for CSOs who comply with the law.
		Invasion / destruction of CSO offices.
		Seizure of property.
		Expulsion from or prohibition to operate in a determined country.
		Travel bans.
		Illegitimate legal investigations.
		Fomenting discrimination and infringing on the rights of minorities and vulnerable groups.
Fomenting religious intolerance.		
<p>VIII. Restrictions on Civic Participation and Engagement</p>	<p>Restrictions to any forms of individual or collective work to solve community problems and to address issues of public concern (civic participation) as well as any forms of following, having knowledge, beliefs, opinions and attitudes on public issues (civic engagement) (Barrett and Brunton-Smith 2014), especially when contributing and interacting with policy design, monitoring and/or decision-making process.</p>	Exclusion of language on civil society participation in national and international resolutions.
		Hardening of rules which allow civil society access to the National Congress.
		De-authorizing State institutions' work with NGOs.
		Penalization of public officers who disobey instructions of cutting access to civil society.
		Shutting down participatory councils and mechanisms.

continuation

<i>Strategies</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Examples of tactics / actions</i>
IX. Funding Restrictions	Restrictions on the capacity for civil society and technological-scientific research institutions, public or private, to access public funding, whether national or foreign, through laws, administrative measures, and extralegal activities coordinated by the government (Wolff and Poppe, 2015). Restriction can also be applied through the action of omission of the Government as a means to complicate, limit, or preclude public funding.	Governmental institutions stop granting authorization for CSOs to participate in projects and receive funds from international cooperation donors or from public programs which subsidize, give incentives, and provide financial support to civil society.
		Overly broad application of anti-money laundering and counterterrorism measures.
		Using defamation, treason, and other laws to bring criminal charges against recipients of international funding.
		Restrictions for domestic and international funding and/or prohibition of specific donors.
		Requirement of advance government approval and/or international funds routed through government-controlled entities.
		Capping the amount of international funding per CSO.
		Restriction of activities undertaken with international funding, including content-based restrictions (e.g. ban on human rights work or 'political activity').
		Taxation of international funds.
		Categorizing CSOs that receive international funding as 'foreign agents', adopting specific treatment of these organizing or imposing a burden on their work.
		Burdensome procedural requirements.
		Freezing or seizure of funds targeted toward funding civil society.
		Prohibition from receiving international funding and public budgets allocations.
		Shrinking public universities through excessive budget cuts.
Cutting fiscal benefits for scientific research and academic development.		

Strategies	Description	Examples of tactics / actions
<p>X. Physical Violence</p>	<p>Physical Violence is the intentional and direct infliction of harm on people, from physical suffering or bodily harm to violent death (Kalyvas 2006). In the context of this research, acts of physical violence can be perpetrated by state or non-state agents, including paramilitary, militia, gangs, private security and others emboldened by the hate rhetoric of political figures to get rid of opposition.</p>	Violent responses to protests by the State.
		Refusal to protect those who are threatened.
		Violent attacks on minorities and vulnerable groups.
		Threats of physical violence by State and non-State actors.
		Illegal imprisonment of civil leaders.
		Tortures / maltreatment.
		Forced disappearance.
		Taxation of international funds.
		Assassination / extrajudicial killing of human rights defenders, civil leaders, and journalists.
<p>XI. Constitutional Hardball*</p>	<p>Constitutional hardball consists of political actors exploiting procedures, laws, and institutions to obtain partisan gains while violating pre established norms and testing the limits of legality, which could undermine the shared understanding of democratic norms and the expectation that the other side will comply with them (Tushnet 2004, Levitsky and Ziblat 2018). The inappropriate use of institutional prerogatives in the interest of political groups and/or private or non-republican interests.</p>	Excessive use of executive and infralegal measures to govern, ignoring Congress, principals, and constitutional guarantees.
		Issuing of norms and decrees that contradict the Constitution.
		Nonconforming with non-written norms that serve to respect the separation of State Powers.
		Executive decisions which reduce budgets, structure, and alter the functioning of public agencies created to audit, inspect, and supervise the Executive Branch.
		Reducing the power of opposition parties in Congress, restricting broader debate on votes.
<p>XII. Abuse of Power</p>	<p>Abuse of power is when political actors take advantage of their position for personal gain, preventing basic managerial responsibility and/or acting against the public interest and institutional responsibilities (Sankowsky, 1995).</p>	Political interference in ordinances from the Armed Forces that violate laws and/or the Constitution.
		Political interference in the public administration with nominations and dismissals of public servants to favor private interests.
		Political interference in nominations of public universities, research centers and participatory councils to impose censorship.
		Political interference in procedures and nomination of leadership of law enforcement and other independent public agencies to protect private interests.
		Nominations geared toward controlling agencies for political means or for satisfying private interests while clearly violating an institution's prerogatives, in a manner contrary to the public interest.

continuation

Strategies	Description	Examples of tactics / actions
<p>XIII. Violation of social, economic, cultural, and environmental rights.</p>	<p>Social, economic, and cultural rights (PIDESC, 1966) are human rights which guarantee the development and dignity of individuals and communities. They are fundamental for engagement in the civic space. Violations of these rights include the failure to respect, protect, and guarantee (Eide, 2001) adequate nutrition and housing, education, work, health, social security, participation in cultural life, water, and sanitation. In terms of the environment and its essential place in human rights (OC-23/17, CIDH), it is the State's duty to prevent, avoid, mitigate, and cooperate when it comes to environmental conservation.</p>	<p>The failure to elaborate or adopt plans for environmental disasters or emergencies, including safety measures and mitigating actions.</p>
		<p>Block, hamper, or preclude access to information relative to possible environmental interference.</p>
		<p>Promoting environmental destruction.</p>
		<p>The failure to consult or negotiate with populations and communities affected by environmental impacts and damages.</p>
		<p>Adopting measures which directly or indirectly discriminate against segments of the population.</p>
<p>* Even though most tactics which fall under the category “constitutional hardball” and “abuse of power” do not directly target agents in the civic space, these tactics diminish transparency, can undermine the separation of powers, as well as the checks and balances which can keep the tactics described in other categories from being implemented.</p>		
<p>Sources for these tactics: off the record interviews with civic leaders; Buyse 2018; Civicus 2017, 2018, 2019; ICNL; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; OHCHR; Rutzen, 2015; WEF 2017; World Movement for Democracy.</p>		

Learn more

For more information of the typology used and for academic reference, read the strategic paper, “The ‘Agora’ is under attack: assessing the closure of civic space in Brazil and around the world”. The typology was updated and can be accessed in the note “A typology to understand strategies and tactics used to close the civic space”. Both materials are available at <https://igarape.org.br/en/issues/civic-space/civic-space-gps/>



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