Youth, Security and Peace: Brazil Revisited

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Introduction

Brazil the world's most homicidal country. One in ten people violently killed each year is a Brazilian. In just two months, Brazil registers more killings than all terrorist attacks combined around the world. A significant proportion of the country's more than 59,000 deaths a year are young, poorly educated, black males aged 15-29. While rates among youth fell in the 1990s and 2000s, they shot-up by more than 17% in the past decade. The national homicide rate is 28.9 per 100,000: for youth it is 60.9 per 100,000. For young male youth, it is 113 per 100,000.

Brazil has a major criminal justice challenge, especially when it comes to young people. For one, the cost of committing a crime is low: fewer than 10% of all homicides result in a criminal conviction. What is more, the penal system is vastly overstretched and overcrowded. Brazil also registers the fourth largest incarcerated population in the world: murder rates in prisons are six times the national average. About 60% of all people convicted of crimes are repeat offenders. Making matters worse, murder and incarceration rates are rising. Not surprisingly, more than three quarters of all Brazilians fear they could be assassinated in the next year.²

Brazil is not facing so much a conventional "armed conflict" as a systemic crisis of public security. In some states, cities and neighborhoods, policy makers, police and citizens are resorting to the rhetoric of war and militarizing their response to crime.³ While the absolute number of killings is higher than most wars, the country is not affected by armed conflict. Yet the war rhetoric can contribute to a dangerous escalation in heavy handed and repressive responses, especially when the armed forces and reserve are deployed. Indeed, Brazil has some of the most violent police in the world⁴ and their excessive use of force is widely tolerated. Indeed, Brazilians overwhelmingly exhibit conservative attitudes to public security. Over 87% of the population favors reducing the age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 16 and stiffening penalties for juveniles.

Brazil's high levels of insecurity are not due to a single cause but rather a combination of individual, household and societal factors. Notwithstanding important gains in poverty reduction (which have slowed and even reversed in recent years), the country suffers from among the highest rates of income inequality in the world. Social inequalities are reinforced in the built environment separating haves and from have-nots and lowering trust and social cohesion.

¹ Thanks to Ana Paula Pellegrino for substantive background research. This report was commissioned by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) with funds from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The report was developed as a contribution to the Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security mandated by Security Council Resolution 2250. The research and consultations for this report followed the key research questions and methodology developed for the Progress Study. The contents of this report do not necessarily represent the views of the United Nations.

² See Muggah and Garzon (2017).

³ See Extra (2017) and Motta (2017).

⁴ See Human Rights Watch (2016) and Muggah (2016).

Concentrated disadvantage and fragmented families together with limited access to quality education, employment and other opportunities all play a role.

Yet there are also remarkable efforts underway to prevent and reduce violence at national, state and municipal levels. New legislation and policies offer entry-points for designing effective responses. A new national security plan prioritizes homicide reduction, prison reform and fighting organized crime, though suffers from lack of political support and resources. Meanwhile, innovations advanced at the state, city and neighborhood level offer more promise. Youth-led programs and projects are widespread, albeit routinely struggling to scale and secure adequate resourcing.

Notwithstanding immense challenges, Brazil features a rich, if understudied, ecosystem of interventions to promote youth safety and security that offer lessons to the world. The following report is designed to offer insights for the Youth, Peace and Security review. It is necessarily limited – Brazil is a continent sized country of 200 million inhabitants. The report is also descriptive, drawing on a wide range of primary and secondary literature. The report considers first the scope and scale of youth violence. It then turns to the key perpetrators. Next, the report explores the underlying risks giving rise to youth insecurity. The report closes with a review of national, state, city and civil society animated measures to prevent and reduce violence.

As with all studies on "youth" it is important to add a word on definitions. The concept of youth is elastic – with most definitions including populations of between 15 and 29. Indeed, the Youth Statute (2013) determines that young people fall in this age gap. According to Brazilian law, children are under 12. Adolescents are between 12 and 18. Thus, when speaking of youth in this report the focus is on 15-29 year olds. Meanwhile, children and adolescents are between 0-18. It is important to note this variation since studies often use these categories interchangeably.

I. Youth involved in unconventional conflict/violence

Brazil registered 59,080 homicides in 2015 – more than any country on earth. This amounts to a homicide rate of 28.9 per 100,000, roughly four times the global average. Brazil registers the world's second largest burden of homicidal violence in the world for young people. In 2015, some 31,264 youth between 15 and 29 were murdered.⁵ This includes roughly 10,500 murders of children and adolescents (0-18), some 28 a day. Indeed, homicide is the number one cause of death of young people in Brazil.

Brazil's homicide problem has steadily worsened over the past decade with increasingly younger people being victimized. Since the 1980s, the mean homicide age has shifted from 25 to 21.⁶ Between 2000-2010 the homicide rate for youth increased by 2.5%. From 2005-2015, however, the increase in youth homicide was over 17%.⁷ Yet for adolescents specifically, the increase was of 110%.⁸ The latest projections are that the homicide rate will continue rising if no steps are urgently taken.⁹

There are strong racial dynamics to youth violence and victimization in Brazil. The victims and perpetrators of violence are frequently one and the same. They are

⁵ This represents an increase of 3.3% compared to 2014.


⁶ See Cerqueira et al (2017).

⁷ See Cerqueira et al (2017: 26) and Waiselfisz (2016a, 2016b).

⁸ See UNICEF (2015).

⁹ See Eisner (2015).

between 15-29, often male, poor and black. Youth between 15-29 represent just 25% of Brazil's total population, but almost 50% of the total homicidal burden between 2005-2015.¹⁰ Afro-Brazilians are 23.5% more likely to suffer from murder than non-Afro-Brazilians. Between 2005 and 2015, there was an 18.2% increase in the Afro-Brazilian homicide rate, while non-Afro-Brazilians saw a 12.2% decline.



Homicide rate in Brazil: 2005-2015*

Homicide is the leading cause of death for youth (see Annex 1). Depending on how youth are classified, the homicide rate ranges from 54.8 per 100,000 (for 15-24 year olds) to 60.9 per 100,000 (for 15-29 year olds).¹¹ Roughly 92% of all youth homicides are concentrated among young males. Assuming the more expansive definition, homicide rates for male youth reached 113.6 per 100,000 in 2015. And for young men in states such as Alagoas and Sergipe, homicide rates exceeded 233 and 230 per 100,000 respectively.¹² The human costs of these preventable deaths are enormous, including in relation to lost productivity.

Lethal and non-lethal violence are concentrated geographically.¹³ There has been a gradual shift of such violence from the south and southeast of the country to the north and northeast. Youth homicide thus vary intensively between states, municipalities and neighborhoods. For example, in Sao Paulo youth homicide rates fell by 49.4% between 2005-2015 while in Rio Grande de Norte they increased by 292.3%.¹⁴ Of the 100 municipalities registering homicide rates above the national average, 12 featured homicide rates of more than 200 per 100,000 young people. Specifically, two municipalities in the state of Bahia (Mata de Sao Joao Simoes and Simoes Filho) experienced rates of 371.5 and 308.9 per 100,000 young people.¹⁵

^{*}Red line is total number of homicides. Blue line is the homicide rate per 100,000

¹⁰ See Cerqueira et al (2017).

¹¹ For example, in 2012, the homicide rate among adolescents aged 15-19 was 53.8 per 100,000 and for those aged 20-24, 66.9 per 100,000. See Waiselfiz (2014:55).


¹² Op cit.

 $^{^{13}}$ See Muggah et al (2017).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Rural areas of Brazil faces another set of security challenges. Violence linked to land conflict is a significant problem, especially in the northern and central-western Amazonian states, where poor farmers, indigenous groups and powerful ranching and logging interests frequently clash over land rights.¹⁶ Some 1,200 murders have been linked to these types of conflicts over the past 20 years.¹⁷ Violence associated with hydro-electric dam development as well as mining and agro-industry development is also common. There are also concerns related to sexual violence and the exploitation of children in some of these rural areas as well. Overall, there are alarming reports of a surge in the criminal violence in interior zones of Brazil.¹⁸



Homicide rate by Brazilian region: 2005-2015

Light green bars are Brazil. Blue is the north, red is northeast, green is center-west, purple is southeast and blue is south.

A recent survey on homicidal violence highlights the uneven distribution of lethal violence in Brazil. In the southeast of the country – where Minas Gerais is located – 33 per cent of all residents know a friend or relative who was a victim of homicide or robbery followed by murder (*latrocinio*). Another 18 per cent reported having a friend or relative "disappeared". A further 12% claim to have to have been threatened with murder. Another 14% of all respondents report that they have a friend or relative killed by a police officer or municipal guard. Between 4-8% of the population claim that the were injured by a bladed weapon or a firearm.¹⁹ These rates are exceedingly high, though they rise higher still in the north and northeast.

While not widely discussed, self-directed violence is also a challenge in Brazil. Roughly two children and adolescents between 9-18 years old commit suicide each day in the country. There are also signs of worsening levels of such incidents. Suicide rates increased between 2003 and 2013. In 2003, the suicide rate in the for 9-19 year olds was of 1.9 per 100,000 in 2003. By 2013, the rate had risen to 2.1.

¹⁶ See Arsenault (2016).

¹⁷ See CIMI (2014).

¹⁸ See Ingram and da Costa (2016).

¹⁹ See the full survey at http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/wp-

content/uploads/2017/05/FBSP_Apresenta%C3%A7%C3%A3o_InstintodeVida.pdf for a survey on victimization in Brazil.

There is a growing literature on the subject, pointing to a range of factors ranging from exposure to high-stress environments to the impacts of cyber-bullying.

Children and adolescents in Brazil are victims of many forms of victimization. While difficult to measure, there are challenges associated with sexual exploitation, domestic abuse and maltreatment. The costs of youth violence extend beyond physical injuries. Studies in Brazil have shown how it can generate fear and anxiety, undermine performance in schools, and contribute to a culture of permissiveness and impunity.²⁰ Cyber crime - crimes that range from banking fraud and identity theft to drug trafficking and child pornography – are also widespread. Brazil is ranked second globally when it comes to malware and identify theft.²¹ While not as active as cyber cartels and digital gangs in Mexico, local drug trafficking groups, militia and even police are avid Facebook and (to a lesser extent) Twitter users. They use social media like most other criminals – to intimidate rivals, show off their spoils and sell their product.²²

The costs of youth violence have been examined by a number of scholars.²³ Using a combination of models, including contingency valuation, Cerqueira (2013) estimated that the murder of 15-29 year olds cost the equivalent of BRL79 billion (\$40 billion) in 2010. This represented roughly 1.5% of the GDP at the time and as much as 6% of the GDP of the most affected states such as Alagoas (where homicides among 15-29 year olds reached 456 per 100,000 in 2010). Most of those people killed share a common profile apart from being young – they also have between 4-7 years of education and are killed by a firearm in encounter violence.

II. Perpetrators of violence

Military and civil police

Brazil's police are notoriously violent. According to the Brazilian Public Security Forum, a network of leading crime researchers, at least 3,345 people were killed by police in 2015 – an increase of 6% on the previous year. To put this in perspective, approximately 1,100 people were killed by police in the US, a country with a population 55% larger than Brazil. Brazilian police killed more people every seven days than UK police have killed in 26 years. Extra-judicial killings, torture and disappearances have a corrosive effect on public security.²⁴ Indeed, gang members are less inclined to surrender peacefully when cornered. They are also more likely to assassinate police when they have an opportunity. Citizens are also less motivated to report on related crimes fueling a cycle of impunity. Police killings of civilians were especially high in Pará (2.2 per 100,000), though lower in Minas Gerais (0.5 per 100,000).²⁵

²⁰ See INEP (2011), Bautman (2009), Reichenheim et al (2014), Kowarick (2009), Waiselfisz (2013), Souza (2012 and Paviani (2007).

²¹ See Muggah and Thompson (2016).

²² Meanwhile, Brazil's federal and state police are resorting to social media to track down and arrest criminals. *Programa Procurados*, a police hotline, uses WhatsApp and other interactive platforms to solicit tips from citizens. Likewise, the civil police force's Cyber Crime Repression Unit is mapping social media to build cases against drug traffickers

²³ See Rosen (1988), Murphy and Topel (2003), Soares (2006).

²⁴ See HRW (2017).

²⁵ Rio de Janeiro's military and civil police excessive use of force is systematic and widespread. This is not a new challenge; according to ISP, in 2003 Rio de Janeiro's police killed 1,195 civilians (classified as *auto de resistência*, at the time), most of them young black men. In 2007, 1,330 citizens reportedly died in the course of police action. These numbers are astonishing when considering that in 2015, across

Brazil's police have long faced accusations of abuse and excessive use of force, especially in connection to misreporting the extrajudicial killing of civilians as acts of self-defense.²⁶ According to a 2009 report by Human Rights Watch, in 2008 Rio de Janeiro police killed one person for every 23 arrests, compared to the United States, where one person is killed for every 37,000 arrests. In addition to the issue of police brutality, corruption remains a problem within the police, especially at the local level. Aside from the illegal militias operating inside urban slums, corrupt elements of the civil and military police are routinely accused of working with local drug traffickers and running arms trafficking networks.

Police corruption and extortion is common across Brazil.²⁷ The scope and scale of such activities varies from state to state and city to city. There are various reasons for this heterogeneity. First, the extent of corruption depends in part on the relationships between the military and civil police. In principle, the civil police has oversight over investigations of military police. A lack of routine supervision, standardized protocols and capacity gives rise to opportunities for corruption. Second, the extent of opportunity varies from place to place. In large bustling cities with a wealthy elite and middle class as well as markets for drugs, contraband, and gambling, there may be more occasion to undertake extortion. In smaller cities of the interior, the options may be fewer, though there are clearly exceptions to the rule.

It is worth stressing that politicians, police and criminal organizations frequently adopt strategic alliances. The extent of corruption among the federal, state and municipal political class is being revealed by ongoing criminal investigations, including Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato). There is also a high level of "informality" in how police conduct their affairs, and they often have multiple streams of income to supplement their low pay. The taking or bribes, use of blackmail, practice of extortion are all common practices – indeed, the civil police in Rio de Janeiro have no fewer than 26 separate categories that they classify as "corruption".²⁸ There is a relatively high involvement in other forms of organized crime, including the so-called *jogo de bicho* gambling rackets, prostitution rings and drug trafficking.²⁹ There are frequently arrests of military and civil police involved in aspects of the drug and arms smuggling.

There is widespread fear of police – particularly state military and civil police, but also to a lesser extent federal road police – in Brazil. There is a sensation that they cannot be trusted and that there are often alliance with paramilitary – what are referred to in Brazil as "militia" – groups. Police are widely viewed as "corrupt" in public surveys. They are implicated in thousands of killings and disappearances nationally each year.³⁰ On and off duty officers are themselves frequently victims of

the whole United States (a country with a population more than 50% larger than Brazil's) an estimated 1,134 people were killed by police.

²⁶ See https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionalsnetwork/2016/aug/03/rio-police-violent-killing-olympics-torture.

²⁷ The low legitimacy accorded to state police may partly explain the rise in private security. According to the Index of Trust in the Brazilian Justice System (ICJBrasil) released by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation's Law School in São Paulo in 2014, only 31 per cent of those surveyed said police are trustworthy. While there is no current plan to increase the size of state security forces, private security forces have grown 74 percent over the past decade. According to Federal Police statistics, there are currently 700,000 private security personnel in Brazil.

²⁸ See Nascimento (2017).

²⁹ See Misse (1997).

 $^{^{30}}$ See Muggah (2016).

violence.³¹ Some 393 police officers were killed in 2015 alone, one third of which died in the line of duty.³² Indeed, surveys conducted of police exposure to violence reveal that almost 62% of all professionals in the military and civil police have a colleague who was murdered in the line of duty. At least 70% know of a law enforcement colleague killed while in civilian clothes.³³

The penal system is overseen by the National Penitentiary Department (Departamento Penitenciario Nacional) which is housed under the Ministry of Justice (Ministério da Justiça). Yet the prison system is considered even more inefficient than the judiciary.³⁴ A previous Minister of Justice is on record in 2014 as saying he'd "rather die than go to a Brazilian prison". HRW described Brazil's prison system as "plagued by inhumane conditions, violence, and severe overcrowding." The prison system was memorably described as hellish, overcrowded and stuck in the middle ages by *The Economist*. According to HRW, in 2009 some 60,000 inmates were being held arbitrarily. This has helped swell the prison population, which reached approximately 633,000 inmates in 2017. Brazil's prisons are operating at a 172 percent of capacity and just 56 per cent of prisoners have been convicted, with the other 44 per cent awaiting trial.

Armed factions

Brazil faces several significant criminal threats to public security. Organized criminal groups – including both more traditional mafia organizations and drug trafficking gangs - are well-established across most major cities. Generating a precise profile of gangs and inter-gang dynamics is challenging owing to poor reporting on the phenomenon. There has until recently been an unspoken embargo on naming specific factions in media outlets for fear of legitimizing them. This is a common challenge across Latin America, where public authorities are opposed giving gangs legitimacy or "diplomatic recognition". It appears that this informal embargo no longer applies in Brazil, with major news outlets now reporting gang faction activities in more detail in the wake of massive increases in prison violence in 2017.

The largest of these criminal groups include the Red Command (Comando Vermelho) and the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital - PCC). There are at least 23 other gangs in the country, virtually all of them aligned with either the Red Command or First Capital Command. Brazil has adopted a staunchly anti-narcotics posture which is supported by hardline politicians, military and law enforcement personnel. As a result, police-faction and inter-factional violence is endemic across many major Brazilian cities. There is growing scrutiny of gang activities after a decades-long truce between the PCC and CV has crumbled, resulting in a sharp increase in violent competition.

The PCC and CV exhibit vastly different models of organization. The former is on the ascendant and operates through robust codes of conduct, a vertical command and control structure and a system of welfare in and out of prisons. The PCC was formed in 1993. The CV, by contrast, was formed in 1979, is more decentralized and works through local factions who loosely affiliate themselves or with larger crime groups outside of Rio de Janeiro such as the Familia do Norte. The CV is very

³³ See http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/wp-

³¹ See Muggah (2015).

³² Roughly half of all police killed died in Rio de Janeiro or Sao Paulo. See http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/More-Killed-in-Brazil-Than-Syria-Police-Killing-Rising-Report-20161029-0004.html.

content/uploads/2017/02/Vitimizacao-e-risco-2015-com-regionais.pdf for the full survey results.

³⁴ See Muggah and Szabo (2017).

territorial with a stronghold is metropolitan Rio de Janeiro, where it competes with other factions – TCP, ADA, Povo de Israel, and the militia – over drug shipment and retail locations.

Organized gangs are involved in the transnational drug trade, arms trafficking, robberies, extortion and kidnapping. The Red Command has a presence across the country, as well as in Bolivia, Colombia and Paraguay. The Red Command at one point controlled 53 percent of Rio de Janeiro's most violent areas, according to civil police estimates, though the group's influence is believed to have been drastically reduced in the city, due to a pacification campaign (2009-present). With public security budgets dramatically scaled back (32% in 2016), they are making a comeback, especially in satellite cities. The First Capital Command is present in 22 of Brazil´s 26 states (and one federal district) and is reportedly operating in six neighboring countries, with connections to both the Colombian and Mexican cartels.

Prison gangs

Brazil has the fourth largest prison population in the world – some 657,000. While there are separate prisons for adults and juveniles (under 18), under-age detainee regularly slip through the cracks. Making matters worse, roughly 37% of all detainees are pre-trial, many of them languishing in cells for months or even years before receiving a sentence. Brazil's prison population rate has tripled over the past decade, from 133 (in 2000) to 313 (2016) per 100,000.³⁵ What is more, there is a 70% recidivism rate. Not surprisingly, prisons are running at 164.9% official occupancy and are in exceedingly poor condition. Given current trends of mass incarceration, by 2020, Brazil's prison population could exceed one million.

There is a long-standing link between drug factions and the prison system in the country. Brazil's policies of mass incarceration – Brazil has the fourth largest prison population in the world – have helped create the conditions for the criminalization of the jails. For years, prisons have served as recruiting grounds for new labor and headquarters for complex drug-trafficking and extortion schemes. While in some prisons cellblocks are divided by faction, in others the gangs exert direct control - sometimes of the whole unit - and will persecute rivals should their affiliation come to their attention. They also "baptize" newcomers and offer a de facto protection network for the prisoner's family, covering the state's lacking social services branch, in exchange for loyalty and latter contribution to the group.

Prison violence increased sharply across Brazil in 2016 and 2017 - much of it attributed to the violent competition between the PCC and CV. There are at least 26 different prison gangs in the country, and ruptures between the two principle groups has led to flare-ups within the prison walls. Some reports estimate that the prison system was 60% more violent in 2016 than in 2015. There were at least 88 murders in prison facilities located in Acre, Ceará, Mato Grosso do Sul, Piauí and Roraima in 2016, compared to 55 in 2015. Ceará registered the greatest number of deaths (50), while Roraima saw a rise from four in 2015 to over 30 in 2016. Mato Grosso do Sul registered an increase from nine to 17. The escalation of violence quickened in the months of September and October of 2016. In late September 2016, roughly 200 inmates rioted and escaped from the overpopulated Jardinopolis prison in Sao Paulo state. Several other riots occurred in October 2016 including in Acre and Roraima.

The violence escalated dramatically inside and outside prisons across Brazil in 2017. There were three horrific massacres in the first two months of 2017 resulting in

³⁵ See http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/brazil.

over 130 killed.³⁶ These occurred in Amazonas with 56 slaughtered (all PCC in a privately run prison in Manaus), in Roraima (on January 5) with 33 murdered (mostly The Northern Family, associated with CV), and again in Manaus with four killed (on January 9), though the victims' affiliations were not clear. This wave in prison violence was linked to a dispute over the northern international drug trafficking route, over which the Família do Norte wants to consolidate its domain. As shocking as the 2017 riots were, such mass killings are not unprecedented. The most lethal episode of prison violence in Brazil occurred in 1992 when 111 inmates were killed during a riot in the Carandiru prison in São Paulo.

Militia

Another lesser known group involved in perpetrating violence and extortion are the militia. Militia have existed in Brazil since at least the 1970s, though they began expanding in power and influence in the 1990s. These groups originally emerged in selected favelas as informal "security patrols" ostensibly to protect residents from factions such as the CV. Then, as now, they combined active-duty and retired police, firefighters and prison guards who offered security services in return for payment. They were quietly tolerated by law enforcement and the potential threat they posed to public security was generally overlooked by scholars.

The militia have long adopted a range of strategies to "protect" communities in key state and metropolitan region. They typically charge a wide range of rents in communities where they were active. Unlike drug factions that establish territorial control to protect a single activity, militia extract rents from community residents in exchange for protection, but also illegally pirate and tax basic public and private services such as gas, cable TV, energy access, and informal transport. Both groups prey on low-income neighborhoods and have interests in protecting their turf, as well as intimidating and attacking competitors where necessary.

Attitudes toward the militia were initially sympathetic. Early on, they were regarded by citizens and the authorities as "better than the traffickers", constituting not so much a failure of existing policies than as quasi-legitimate forms of "community self-defense". These attitudes are often amplified by elected officials. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, former mayor Eduardo Paes claimed that the "polícia mineira", as militia were known, offered a better alternative to drug factions and could ensure the safety of the residents of Jacarepaguá, Vila Sapê and Curicica. Rio de Janeiro's (now imprisoned) former governor, Sergio Cabral, also met frequently with notorious militia leaders, praising them for their community leadership role and dedication to protecting Rio de Janeiro's infamously dangerous West Zone.

Public opinion turned abruptly against the militia after a highly visible episode of violence. In 2008, three local journalists assigned to covering the activities of the militia and their interaction with local residents in Batan, a favela bordering Rio's main avenue, were kidnapped and tortured. Before being released, the three were brutally assaulted, had their equipment destroyed and received death threats should they continue publishing on militia-related activities. Once the story was featured in the national news, local politicians rapidly distanced themselves from militia members who had previously mingled with cabinet-level secretaries and local business elite.

Risk factors giving rise to youth involvement/victimization

There are several individual risk factors shaping violence among young people. These various factors are typically examined at the individual, household and

³⁶ See Muggah and Szabo (2017).

community scale. Each of these contexts are connected, yet these provide a means to organize thinking and action. For example, at the individual level, chronic exposure to violence can influence future likelihood of perpetration and victimization. In households that are single-headed and fragmented, the risk of youth exposure to violence also increases. In neighborhoods and communities affected by organized violence, the overall risk of exposure increases.

In Brazil – and across Latin America - there is a particularly high concentration of violence in peripheral urban areas where there are the most acute rates of social and economic vulnerability. It was only in 2013, however, that Brazil developed a specialized national plan– *Plano Juventude Viva* – The Live Youth Plan – that focused on young black youth. As part of this plan, the Brazilian Public Security Forum developed a youth insecurity index to better understand the socio-economic and spatial dimensions of violence in the county.³⁷

The youth insecurity index adopted an ecological model focusing on individuals, households and communities. At the individual level, the Forum examined indicators related to level of schooling and frequency of school attendance, unemployment and the nature of labor contracts, and exposure to drugs, including use. At the household level, the organization examined the role of young people as income earners. Finally, at the societal level the Forum examined municipal levels of income, inequality, education, health and access to leisure activities.

The youth insecurity index highlighted a number of risks for particular groups in particular parts of the country.³⁸ Not surprisingly, it detected higher levels of vulnerability among lower-income black youth. It found common vulnerabilities across all 26 Brazilian states and the capital district. Exposure to violence was especially acute in areas lacking public services and experiencing concentrated disadvantage, in areas where organized crime groups were present, and where firearms were readily available.

The extremes in risk for young black youth between areas are worth highlighting. The areas presenting the highest risks to young black youth were Alagoas, Paraiaba, Pernambuco and Ceará – all states in the northeast. In Paraiba, the risk of a young black man dying was 13.4 times that of a young white man. In Pernambuco, Alagoas and Ceara it was 11.5, 8.7 and 4 times respectively. Meanwhile, the areas presenting the lowest levels of risk were for the most part in the south, including Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, Minas Gerais and the district capital.

The wider political, economic and social environment in a community invariably influences the exposure of young people as victims and perpetrators of violence. Settings marked by extreme social inequality, concentrated disadvantage, and uneven services – especially education - can exacerbate the determinants of violence. The exposure of young people to these structural risk factors at the neighborhood scale influences their likely involvement in and exposure to violent behavior.

Spatial and socio-economic segregation in cities can exacerbate youth violence. When governments are unable or unwilling to provide services to poorer residents, it can contribute to feelings of exclusion. When entire communities are ghettoized and cordoned-off, it also fuels social marginalization and systemic grievances,

³⁷ See

http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/storage/publicacoes/lote_02_2016_12_12/FBSP _Indice_vulnerabilidade_juvenil_violencia_2014.pdf.

³⁸ See http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002329/232972POR.pdf.

undermining social efficacy and cohesion. Some scholars believe these conditions give rise to social disorganization and, potentially, crime and even "civic conflict" – the violent expression of political, economic and social grievances against the state.

Urbanization processes are unevenly distributed. The quantity and quality of services – from public security to health and education – can vary across municipalities. Youth living in neighborhoods experiencing concentrated disadvantage are more likely to lack access to basic services. Combined with poverty and pressures to support household livelihoods, the probability of dropping out of schools increases. Living in poorer areas is not only correlated with lower primary school attendance, but also predicts lower secondary enrolment (Lewis 2010).

Meanwhile, at the individual level, the lack of education and educational opportunity are statistically correlated with insecurity. Specifically, age-grade discrepancy and drop-out rates see to have a strong statistical effect on the vulnerability to lethal violence. When young people do not complete primary, elementary and secondary schooling, their exposure increases. These problems are especially acute for youth inmates in prisons. At least 49% of the inmates of Rio de Janeiro's prisons had not completed primary education.³⁹ And 50% of all young people under 18 with a "judicial" record and enrolled in "social and educational service" rehabilitation were not enrolled in school.⁴⁰

Tears of study for nonnelide victims between 13-19											
	Homicide			Population		Total					
	victims			in this age							
				range							
	Number	%	Rate	Number	%						
0-3	1,726	22.4	262.7	657,048	3.8	4,473					
4-7	4,473	58	107.7	4,152,428	23.9	1,775					
8-11	1,475	19.1	12.3	12,008,608	69	114					
12 or	34	0.4	5.7	591,876	3.4						
more											
Total	7,708	100	44.3	17,409,960	100						

Years of study for homicide victims between 15-19

Years of study for homicide victims aged 20-29

			_			
	Homicide			Population		Total
	victims			in this age		
				range		
	Number	%	Rate	Number	%	
0-3	3,713	22.4	264	1,406,481	4.5	6,516
4-7	8,234	49.6	198	4,158,042	13.3	4,863
8-11	4,339	26.2	23.9	18,137,213	57.9	500
12 or	305	1.8	4	7,43,609	24.4	
more						
Total	16,591	100	52.9	31,345,345	100	

There is an ongoing debate about the specific relationships between education and violence. Smith and Vaux (2003) determined that the absence of education can aggravate collective violence, just as education itself can be part of the solution. In Brazil, most research on the relationships between education and violence focus on one of two relationships: (i) the way educational performance suffers due to

³⁹ Ministrerio da Justica, 2012.

⁴⁰ CNJ, 2012: 15.

violence exposure and (ii) how violence is reproduced in class environments. Abramovay (2002) detected comparatively limited research on the issue.⁴¹

In Brazil, the relationship between violence and the relative quality and access to education is comparatively robust. Monteiro and Rocha (2013) demonstrate how factional violence between Rio-based gangs negatively affected the performance of students attending schools in affected areas (between 2003 and 2009). Specifically, it contributed to increases in absenteeism rates of teachers and students and the temporary and permanent closure of schools.

National responses

Brazil has elaborated a vast array of laws and policies designed to protect children, adolescents and youth. Starting in the 1990s, much of the relevant legislation reflects progressive norms associated with protection. ⁴² This is due in part to the influence of the scholarly literature that critically assessed the relationships between youth, insecurity and under-development.⁴³ Academics and activists alike have sought to reverse laws that intentionally and inadvertently stigmatized of young people. Indeed, there is a lively ecosystem of state and non-governmental groups involved in shaping youth policy across Brazil.

At the center of Brazil's legal approach to protecting and empowering young people is the Statute of Children and Adolescents (ECA) adopted 1990.⁴⁴ The ECA applies to all young people up to 18 years old. It incorporates the principles of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, is an important milestone for the country and a regional and international reference legislation for the guarantee of child and adolescent rights. The ECA reaffirms the rights to life, freedom, respect and dignity. It also sets out provisions for caregivers, guardians, families together with rights for recreation, work (and protection), violence prevention and more.

There are several positive impacts attributed to the ECA. For example, an analysis of the Municipal Human Development Index (HDI) reveals that child and adolescent-related indicators between 1991 and 2010 improved at a faster rate than for adults. This is especially the case in education, longevity and child mortality, exceeding the planned target in the MDGs. Between 1990 and 2012, the infant mortality rate reduced by 68.4%, from 62 deaths per thousand live births in 1990 to 14 deaths in 2012.⁴⁵ However, despite significant advances in recent decades, there are still serious discrepancies in the access to protection and development opportunities across the region.

Several new youth programs were implemented throughout the 1990s to secure the rights set out in the ECA and Youth Statute. In 1992, for example, at least 18 separate initiatives were launched on youth-related priorities and overseen by eight Ministries and the Executive. Some of these interventions were narrowly focused on public security including a Presidential led intervention to "save youth from crime,

⁴¹ See Goncalves and Sposito (2002) who focus on the ways in which governments in São Paulo, Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte sought to prevent/reduce violence in schools.

⁴² See Sposito (2007).

⁴³ Specifically, researchers such as Miriam Abramovay, Maria Cecilia Mynaio, Mary Garcia Castro, and Julio Jacobo Waiselfisz examined the ways youth were both victims and perpetrators.

⁴⁴ The ECA applies to 18 year olds. In some exceptions, it can apply to youth from 18-21. See http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L8069.htm

⁴⁵ See UNICEF (2015).

narco-trafficking and violence".⁴⁶ These early programs focused not just on delinquency, but also the underlying risk factors such as poverty. They also viewed young people as agents, as individuals with the ability to resist crime.

By the early 2000s, the Brazilian government was hosting annual youth weeks and launched a Special Commission on Public Policy for Youth (CEJUVENT) and a new secretariat.⁴⁷ In 2005, the government launched a National Youth Plan. The plan sought to increase access to education for young people, fight illiteracy, prepare young people for work, generate employment opportunities, promote healthy living, amplify access to sports, leisure, culture and information technologies, promote human rights and social participation, and improve living standards for young people and "traditional" communities. The state created a National Council for Youth (CONJUVE) in 2005 and launched 143 interventions distributed across 19 ministries.⁴⁸

Another key legislative framework designed to protect young people is the Youth Statute that was signed into law in 2013.⁴⁹ The Statute sets out the rights of young people, including to citizenship, education, health, liberty of expression, as well as political, social and economic participation. The law also highlights the importance of protection from violence on grounds of race, ethnicity, deficiencies, sexual orientation, gender and other fronts. The Statute notes that "all youth have the right to live in a secure environment, without violence ... [and] with guarantees of equality of opportunity and opportunities for intellectual, cultural and social improvement."

The Youth Statute sets out a range of concrete strategies to prevent violence and support for related programs. For example, Articles 18 and 38 require federal, state and municipal authorities to launch public programs to ensure equality of rights across all youth. It supports training of teachers to provide basic schooling without discrimination – especially for indigenous populations. It requires authorities to ensure public security, including programs that involve youth. Many of the key objectives of the Statute are also advanced by CONJUVE, created a decade earlier. The newly formed national Ministry of Cities, for example, has also made youth empowerment a priority and supports the Statute.⁵⁰

The National Youth Council was key to creating the *Juventude Viva* program in 2014-2015⁵¹ as well as advocating for more progressive approaches to public security and drug policy.⁵² The Council has also led calls to reduce youth violence in Brazil. For example, the National Youth Council called for national plan for reducing homicide among young black males in 2015. The proposal also demanded the federalization and reform of the police, reductions in police killings, greater access

⁴⁶ See Sposito and Carrano (2003).

⁴⁷ This was approved by Law 4.530/2004.

⁴⁸ See http://juventude.gov.br/conjuve.

⁴⁹ It is worth noting that adolescents aged 15-18 applies to the ECA, and exceptionally, the 2013 Youth Statute. See

http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2013/lei/l12852.htm.

⁵⁰ See http://www.cidades.gov.br/.

 ⁵¹ See http://juventude.gov.br/articles/0009/4790/Guia_Plano_JuvViva_Final.pdf.
 ⁵² See

http://juventude.gov.br/articles/participatorio/0011/0383/secaoXI_juventude_segu rancapublica_e_acessoajustica_OK.pdf.

to justice, and specific proposals to reduce violence.⁵³ The Juventude Viva program was relaunched in 2017, though suffers from a lack of resourcing.

Notwithstanding these normative gains, there are still tremendous challenges and gaps when it comes to protecting and empowering young people. These shortcomings are not due to an absence of legal provisions, but rather profound neglect at the state and municipal levels. According to the National Council for the Rights of Children and Adolescents (CONANDA), for example, there is a shortfall of 632 "Guardianship Councils" (entities responsible for receiving and investigating complaints of child/adolescent rights violations). There are also major gaps in Youth Courts that translates into protracted delays in trials involving young people.⁵⁴

There are also significant capacity constraints to putting lofty plans into action. For example, a National Education Plan was established from 2011-2020. It called for a minimum of 12 years of education for young people by the time they reach 18-24 years of age. It also advocated for a minimum of 33% of all high school graduates to enter tertiary education, whether university or a technical college. But many communities in Brazil lack basic secondary and tertiary educational infrastructure. Young people must frequently travel great distances to attend, and this is made difficult owing to spatial segmentation and segregation. Universities themselves are chronically under-funded and lack space to accommodate students.

Even so, the emphasis of the national authorities on educational measures for youth is warranted. There is ample evidence demonstrating how large-scale schoolbased programs can generate positive effects on violence reduction as well as youth empowerment. Chioda et al (2013) examined the effects of the *Bolsa Familia* (Family Grant) program on crime rates. Bolsa Familia provides grants to lowincome female heads-of-households for every child that is retained in school. The study found that when the program expanded to include adolescents of 16-17, not only were there education dividends, but also a 20% reduction in reported crime in neighborhoods where the program was underway.⁵⁵

There are many examples of violence prevention efforts across Brazil and a range of assessments to examine their effects. Examples of the most effective interventions are those that promote self-esteem among young at-risk people, that promote social reinsertion programs for at-risk youth, that prevent child labor and also that prevent inter-personal violence (including bullying) between young people. Other strategies that are regarded as having a positive impact are those that prevent sexual exploration, intra-family or domestic violence, and that reduce the probability of young people being exposed to negative influences, including drug trafficking or violence in schools.⁵⁶

State-level

There are multiple efforts by states across Brazil to promote youth violence prevention and reduction. Many of these initiatives explicitly target youth, and also often seek to engage them in their design and implementation. Some of these initiatives are facilitated by international financial institutions such as the Inter-

⁵³ See https://www.unicef.org/brazil/pt/media_33713.html and http://www.caminhomelhorjovem.rj.gov.br/principal/noticias/saiba_mais.php?idne w=415.

⁵⁴ The National Council of Justice claims that just 12% of the 1,303 Youth Courts do not accumulate shares in other spheres, such as criminal, civil, family law, among others.

⁵⁵

⁵⁶ See Souza (2009) and Gomes et al (2007).

American Development Bank (IADB), World Bank or UN-Habitat. While international agencies have played a role in financing some measures, most public security interventions for youth are undertaken by a combination of public, private and civic actors at the state level.

Public security is constitutionally the responsibility of state-level police, justice and penal systems. Some state programs have adopted comprehensive approaches – combining both community and proximity policing – together with prevention programs addressing at-risk youth. Prominent examples include *Fico Vivo* (Stay Alive) in Minas Gerais, *Pacto Pelo Vida* (Pact for Life) in Pernambuco, *Estado Presente* (State Presence) in Espiritu Santo, and the *Unidade de Policia Pacificadora* in Rio de Janeiro.⁵⁷ Many of these interventions have been evaluated to measure their overall impact on youth safety and security.⁵⁸

One of the best known youth violence prevention programs is *Fica Vivo* (2002present) which targeted 12-24 year old residents living in high risk neighborhoods in Belo Horizonte, the capital of Minas Gerais. The program adopted a comprehensive approach – bringing together law enforcement, criminal justice and social protection agencies with a network of local non-governmental assistance networks.⁵⁹ From 2009-2014 after it was scaled-up, the program reported a 69% reduction in homicides.⁶⁰ Today there are 45 interventions across the state (up from 19 in 2005). At least 11,000 youth are processed a year with more than 180,000 conflict mediation cases attended.

Another widely recognized youth violence prevention initiative is the *Estado Presente* program started in 2014. The intervention focused on reducing a range of crime rates in 78 municipalities of Espiritu Santo state. The targeted areas account for an estimated 75% of all homicides involving young people aged 15-29. The key priorities of the program were to increase the effectiveness of the military and civil police to attend to crimes, reduce violent crime rates among 15-24 year olds, and reduce recidivism of young people in contact with the law. The early results demonstrated a dramatic reduction in homicidal violence. The total value of the program is roughly \$70 million to date.⁶¹

Pacto Pela Vida is another program launched in 2007 to reduce lethal and nonlethal violence in Pernambuco.⁶² The program is overseen by a variety of state secretaries, and includes a governance committee, executive committee, five key sector task forces focused on public security, social prevention, governance, controlling crack and prison reform, and a management team. The intervention set targets of 12% reductions per year but achieved an estimated 40% reduction in homicide from 2007-2013. The program is credited with having made significant reductions in violence in its first five years, but weaknesses in coordination and financing, particularly in relation to prison reform, applying new technologies for

⁵⁷ See

http://www.lav.uerj.br/docs/rel/2016/Relato%CC%81rio%20Final%20Ingle%CC%8 2s.pdf.

⁵⁸ Of the more than 90 homicide reduction programs pursued across Latin America over the past decade, roughly 14 of them were undertaken in Brazil. See Cano and Rojido, I. (2016).

⁵⁹ The program provided focused deterrence based activities, together with psychosocial support, community-programs for youth, and other opportunities for education, employment and leisure.

⁶⁰ See Silveira et al (2010, 2008.

⁶¹ See IADB 2016, http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/project-descriptiontitle,1303.html?id=BR-L1387.

⁶² See http://www.pactopelavida.ba.gov.br/pacto-pela-vida/o-que-e/.

policing and prevention in the most hard-hit areas weakened the outcomes since then. 63

Meanwhile, in Rio de Janeiro, two programs are credited with making some reductions in lethal violence between 2009-2014. The first is the "system of targets" which set performance incentives for statewide homicide reduction. The second is the pacification police units (UPP) that focused on the most crime-affected areas of metropolitan Rio de Janeiro. The state's military police deployed newly recruited officers into 38 key areas reaching over 1.5 million people. Homicide rates dropped by 66%, though started creeping back up in 2015 due to a series of political and economic crises. In addition for falling short on social and economic grounds, the intervention also came under heavy criticism for a series of abuses committed by newly recruited officers for the pacification police units.⁶⁴

The UPP program also involved a specialized intervention focusing on youth – *Caminho Melhor Jovem* (Better Path for Youth).⁶⁵ Focused on areas with a police presence⁶⁶ and financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the program offered employment alternatives for at-risk youth between 15-29. It was manage by the State Secretary for Sport, Leisure and Youth (SSELJE) and worked with young people to create services and opportunities for their personal and professional development.

Municipality-led

Brazilian municipalities have played a low profile role in youth violence prevention programs or measures to promote youth empowerment to avoid involvement in violence and extremism. This is partly because states are legally responsible for public security. Yet it is also because security is narrowly defined in Brazil as a policing responsibility, and municipalities have yet to fully acknowledge their central role in primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. This is especially the case considering that Brazil is 85% urbanized and has 5,570 municipalities spread across its 26 states and 1 federal district.

A noteworthy effort to develop a more coherent approach to municipal planning on youth violence prevention emerged in 2007. UNICEF, the Inter-Church Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO), the Laboratorio de Analise de Violencia and the Observatorio das Favelas teamed up with the national Human Rights Secretary of the President's office to launch a program to reduce lethal violence against adolescents (PRVL) that year. A "how-to" manual was developed setting out how to design the institutional architecture of a program, develop diagnostics, training and support, communications plan, and ultimately an implementation strategy.⁶⁷ The consortium worked across the country to help drive a youth focus to violence prevention.⁶⁸

⁶³ See http://www.diariodepernambuco.com.br/app/noticia/vidaurbana/2017/05/09/interna_vidaurbana,703035/pacto-pela-vida-completa-10anos-sob-muitas-criticas.shtml.

⁶⁴ See Muggah et al (2016).

⁶⁵ See http://www.caminhomelhorjovem.rj.gov.br/principal/home/.

⁶⁶ The program targeted in August 2013. It is now spread out to Borel e Formiga, Cidade de Deus, Complexo do Alemão, Jacarezinho, Complexo da Maré, Complexo da Penha, São João, Cantagalo, Mangueira, Rocinha, Fumacê, Mangueirinha, Chatuba and São Carlos neighborhoods.

⁶⁷ They produced a municipal guide to prevent violence at http://prvl.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/GuiaPRVL_.pdf.

⁶⁸ See http://prvl.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/IHA-2009.pdf and http://prvl.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/IHA-2014.pdf.

There is still a need for municipalities to step-up their activities in relation to youthbased programming to prevent violence and promote safety. The Igarapé Institute, Sou da Paz, Instituto Fidenigna, together with a number of public and nongovernmental organizations, launched the minimum public security agenda for municipalities during the 2014 and 2016 elections precisely to narrow down key violence prevention priorities, including for youth.⁶⁹ The agenda calls for more focus on information collection, addressing risk factors shaping recourse to violence, and reformed municipal guard with skills in conflict medication and resolution.

A number of international agencies have launched programs to support municipalities engage more thoroughly on questions of youth security and safety. For example, UNICEF launched the Platform for Urban Centers (PCU) in 2008 specifically to promote protection in cities suffering from extreme violence. The platform has reached 10 capital cities, reaching as many as 9 million children from 0-19 years old.⁷⁰ The focus of the PCU platform is homicide reduction, as well as reducing school exclusion, early childhood support, and promoting reproductive and sexual rights.⁷¹

Cities have less discretion to undertaken violence prevention than states. That said, strategies that include educational programs, youth-based activities, and gun and alcohol control have generated some positive dividends. For example, Diadema, a city in Sao Paulo, introduced a new security policy in 2000.⁷² It include controls on alcohol sales at night, monitoring alcohol-selling vendors, installing public lighting and security cameras, and changes in public safety management. The city's homicide rate declined by 44% and assaults against women also dropped by 56% by 2002.⁷³ Key elements of success included public education and support (83% of the community supported it), alcohol retailer education, strong enforcement, and progressive administrative penalties.

There are also several municipality-supported programs involving education and violence prevention in Rio de Janeiro. Many of these involve partnerships with international agencies, private sector actors and non-governmental organizations and foundations. For example, the state secretary of education has worked with ICRC (2011-2014) to develop two projects – *Abrindo Espacos Humanitarios* (Opening Humanitarian Spaces) to promote dialogue in secondary schools on non-violence and *Comportamento Mais Seguro* (Safer Behavior) to train teachers and students to develop school-based security plans.⁷⁴ Both these initiatives are intended to be scaled-up.⁷⁵

The Rio de Janeiro city secretary for education has also launched initiatives to prevent youth violence. The *Escolas do Amanha* (Schools of Tomorrow) program focuses on the most vulnerable neighborhoods and features programs to improve learning and reduce dropout rates.⁷⁶ It includes full-time education (for the entire

⁶⁹ See https://igarape.org.br/agenda-municipal-de-seguranca-cidada-2/.

⁷⁰ The first round of the platform reached Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Itaquaquecetuba. The second was focused on Belém, Fortaleza, Maceió, Manaus, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, São Luís and São Paulo. The third includes Belém, Fortaleza, Maceió, Manaus, Rio de Janeiro, Recife, Salvador, São Luís, São Paulo and Vitória.

⁷¹ See https://www.unicef.org/brazil/pt/where_13615.html

⁷² See World Bank (nd)

⁷³ See WHO (nd).

⁷⁴ Qualitative reports suggest that these have been successful.

⁷⁵ See ICRC (2015).

⁷⁶ See http://www.escolasdoamanha.com.br/.

day), together with extracurricular activities in the arts/sporting areas. Likewise, the military police in Rio de Janeiro launched the so-called PROERD initiative to reach hard-hit schools. The goal is to improve the quantity and quality of interactions, and police officers regularly host workshops and events on issues related to public safety, drugs and other crimes.

Civil society responses

The use of sports and recreation as an opportunity to prevent violence is widespread in Rio de Janeiro. There is a long tradition of linking sporting activities – from football to mixed martial arts – to wider education, training, job placement and development programs. There are several such activities in Brazil, including a well-known initiative involving boxing. The *Luta Pela Paz* (Fight for Peace) program combines boxing with accelerated education programs to empower young people.⁷⁷ It was established in 2010 in Rio de Janeiro, and has now spread to 25 countries. It also oversees a special project to support former members of drug trafficking factions demobilize and reintegrate with some success.⁷⁸

Other programs offer football, judo and martial arts as the entry-point for violence prevention. For example, *Instituto Bola Pela Frente* (Ball in Front Institute) operates in key metropolitan areas of western Rio that are dominated by drug factions and militia groups. The Institute uses football as an entry-point to draw kids from criminal organizations.⁷⁹ Likewise, *Instituto Gol la Letra* (Goal and Letters Institute) is also operating in areas of concentrated poverty in the center of metropolitan Rio, providing a community center and quality services to high-risk adolescents.⁸⁰ Another similar group is *Instituto Reacao* (Reaction Institute) which brings together children and adolescents into disciplined training in martial arts.⁸¹

Some of Brazil's most effective youth-based programs also combine art and music to drive violence prevention programming. The The Hip Hop *Pró Ativo* project was launched by the Institute for Research and Community Action to address kids that were vulnerable to violence in Brazlândia in the federal capital district of Brasilia.⁸² The project was itself informed by a diagnostic that examined how kids self-identified, including through music. The NGO provided spaces for young people to learn and record hip hop, and then to engage in more focused violence prevention activities. Likewise, the Plazas of Peace initiative was launched by the Instituto Sou da Paz in Sao Paulo to revitalize urban space and promote community cohesion. The intervention also launched a diagnostic with community members to identify low- and high-risk areas. The project harnessed music and samba schools to drive messages, but also built recreational facilities including skateboarding areas, which were seen as priorities by young people.

A growing number of Brazilian non-governmental organizations are combining information and communications technology to empower young people to prevent violence. One approach is to providing youth with skills and opportunities necessary to avoid negative family/peer influences. Another goal is to empower young people to influence decision-making processes themselves. Take the case of the Viva Rio

⁷⁷ See http://fightforpeace.net/pt-br/.

⁷⁸ See evaluations athttps://www.ucamcesec.com.br/projeto/monitoramento-e-avaliacao-do-projeto-luta-pela-paz/ and

https://www.ucamcesec.com.br/projeto/jovens-em-carreiras-criminais/.

⁷⁹ See http://www.institutodacrianca.org.br/tag/bola-pra-frente/.

⁸⁰ See https://goldeletra.org.br/.

⁸¹ See https://goldeletra.org.br/.

⁸² See http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Brasil/0,,MUL5333-5598,00-

DF+PROJETO+HIP+HOP+PRO+ATIVO+ATRAI+JOVENS.html.

program Viva Favela, a social and digital inclusion initiative that trains local "community correspondents" in drafting, editing, video, web design. The idea is to ensure youth have not just educational opportunity, but marketable skills in the digital economy.⁸³

Likewise, there are groups looking to help shape leadership among youth, including through technology transfer. For example, the School for Youth Formation was launched by the Catholic University of Goias in order to help develop young autonomous and independent youth who were self-aware of their basic rights. The school supports training in digital education, together with community outreach to discuss wider themes related to criminal justice, environmental stewardship and opportunities in the labor market. Another example is the *Fundacao Cidadania Inteligente* (Intelligent Citizenship Foundation) which opened in 2017 in Brazil. The Foundation was originally launched in Chile and uses technology to promote transparency and engage young citizens in political causes.⁸⁴

Private actors and foundations are supporting youth in violence prevention activities. For example, the Oi Futuro Foundation developed *Oi Kabum!*, an art and technology school. It offers low-income youth undergraduate and graduate-level courses in graphic and web design with a view of shaping both career opportunities, but also life-skills and the building of self-esteem. Likewise, major banks and public utilities have supported AfroReggae, one of the larger non-governmental organizations working with at-risk you with favelas.⁸⁵ The organization offers a range of high-quality training and opportunities in music, theater, dance and the arts.⁸⁶ The organization 's *Juventude e Policia* (youth and police) program, initiated with CESEC and Ford Foundation, seeks to strengthen positive interactions between youth and police.⁸⁷

A number of civil society groups have also supported strategies to protect young people involved in the drug trade. For example, the Observatorio de Favelas launched the *Rotas de Fuga* program from 2004-2007 in partnership with the ICCO and the International Labor Organization.⁸⁸ The program was focused specifically on children, adolescents and youth and featured a phased approach.⁸⁹ The Observatorio also claims to support a network of 46 institutions in Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco to strengthen the rights of children, adolescents and youth who are most vulnerable to violence.⁹⁰ AfroReggae and Luta Pela Paz also offers similar programs, albeit most of them focused on a very specific area of metropolitan Rio de Janeiro.

⁸⁸ See http://of.org.br/projetos/direitos-humanos-projetos/rotas-de-fuga/.
⁸⁹ These include research into the trajectories of 230 young people working in the drug trade from 34 favelas (2004-2006), outreach to society about the risks they face, prevention opportunities to facilitate a safe-exit, and methods to create sustainable alternatives. See http://of.org.br/wp-

⁸³ See http://vivafavela.com.br/.

⁸⁴ See https://www.facebook.com/cidadaniainteligente/.

⁸⁵ See https://www.afroreggae.org/

⁸⁶ The organization's founder also hosts youth culture television shows with a national audience.

⁸⁷ See https://www.policiamilitar.mg.gov.br/portal-

pm/daop/conteudo.action?conteudo=1667&tipoConteudo=itemMenu and https://www.ucamcesec.com.br/projeto/juventude-e-policia-2a-etapa-capacitacaode-policiais/. See also Ramos (2006).

content/uploads/2016/03/licoes_aprendidas_Rotas.pdf.

⁹⁰ See http://of.org.br/projetos/direitos-humanos-projetos/redes-de-valorizacaoda-vida/.

action ⁹¹		1
Thematic focus	Core activities	Examples
Training and education	Basic literacy programs, accompaniment, mentoring, digital literacy courses, public libraries, specialized university courses	Escola Formacao da Juventude (School for Youth Formation), O Project Luz, Camera, Paz! (Lights, Camera, Peace!), Projecto Novos Caminhos (New Pathways), etc
Sporting alternatives	Classes in specialized sports, training in discipline, competitive activities between separate groups, spaces during peak crime hours	Atletas da Paz (Atheletes for Peace), Esporte a Meia noite (Midnight sports), Associacao Cultural Esportiva Ecologica Raizes da Natureza Vanderlei Karate (Vankate), etc
Work options	Capacity training, specialized apprenticeship, professional job placement, scholarships and stipends for work	Crescer (Grow), Guardiao Cidadao (Guardian Citizen), Instituto Mirim, etc
Culture	Training and classes in percussion, circus, dance (including capoeira), theatre, cinema, hip-hop, grafitti, support for theater/film projects and shows, etc.	Arta da Paz (Art for Peace), Picasso nao Pichava, Oficina Cultural Consciencia Negra (Culture Office for Black Conscienceness)
Empowerment	Training in community collective action, Training in youth action as political or cultural agents, debate space on key topics (e.g. teenage pregnancy, drug policy, violence prevention), youth-driven community projects	Etapas – Juventude e Acao Politica (Steps – Youth and Political Action), Programa Jovens Urbanos (Urban Youth Program), Papo de Responsa (Respose Talk)

Civil society programs to prevent youth violence and empower youth action $^{\rm 91}$

Youth movements

Of course, it is ultimately youth themselves who are key to building resilience to insecurity and violence. Youth-led initiatives are particularly well suited to reaching out to at-risk peer groups to prevent them from (re)engaging in violent behavior. They can build social capital, cohesion and efficacy – a sense of belonging with social controls – to deter future involvement in violence. Young people tend to be innovative, open, and prepared to work hard, even if their real and latent capacities go underappreciated. A new generation of youth journalism initiatives are emerging across Brazil, including the widely known *Papo Reto* (Straight Talk) collective launched in 2014.⁹² Papo Reto initiated the *Nós e Nós* app that streams police

⁹¹ See PRONASCI (2014).

⁹² See https://ponte.org/tag/coletivo-papo-reto/.

violence videos from smartphones into the cloud.⁹³ Meanwhile, MeuRio's *Defezap* provides similar services, empowering citizens to report on police use of excessive force.⁹⁴

Other social movements are emerging honing in on specific approaches to preventing and reducing youth violence. The network *#Movimentos: Drogas, Jurventude e Favela* (Movement for Drugs, Youth and Favelas) group consists of leaders from low-income informal areas to discuss drug policy and its local effects in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Salvador.⁹⁵The *Iniciativa Negra por uma Nova Politica de Drogas* (The Black Initiative for a New Drug Policy) is another group led by young people who are making the link between prohibitionist drug policy and violence against young black males.⁹⁶ *Juventudes Contra a Violencia* (Youth Against Violence) that started in Belo Horizonte in 2013⁹⁷ has also spread to other cities, including Rio de Janeiro.⁹⁸ Another initiative is Amnesty International 's *#jovemnegrovivo* (black youth alive) initiative launched in 2014.⁹⁹

Some social movements are working on redefining notions of masculinity to address organized and inter-personal violence. A chief proponent of this is ProMundo, which operates in Rio de Janeiro, Recife, Ceilandia and Chapeco.¹⁰⁰ The organization is focused primarily on transforming "harmful" gender norms and promoting healthier notions of masculinity and positive notions of manhood. Projects such as *Prevention+* and *Violence-Free Childhood* are all designed to support more healthy, respectful and equal relationships, focusing on both youth, but also parents and caregivers.¹⁰¹ A related group is AfroBapho that is using music and dance to raise awareness about the vulnerabilities facing LGBTQ youth in low-income areas.¹⁰²

There is also an ecosystem of decentralized and modest groups of artists and activists promoting an alternative view of the "periphery". Their goal is to encourage society to rethink the margins and to value the cultural contributions of the poor. Initiatives such as *Favelados Pelo Mundo* (Favala Dwellers in the World) consists of young people from a massive favela in Rio de Janeiro who share information of their travel to inspire young people to leave the confines of their community.¹⁰³ The *Poetas Favelados* (Favela Poets) group also includes poets who speak about their lives on public transport¹⁰⁴, including some who practice slam poetry and have been featured at the country 's most prominent literary festivals.¹⁰⁵

Recommendations

⁹³ See https://www.facebook.com/appfjrj/.

⁹⁴ See https://www.defezap.org.br/.

⁹⁵ See https://www.ucamcesec.com.br/2016/10/07/projeto-movimentos-produz-guia-sobre-politica-de-drogas-nas-favelas/.

⁹⁶ See https://www.facebook.com/innpd/.

⁹⁷ See http://juventudescontraviolencia.org.br/.

⁹⁸ See http://www.anf.org.br/jovens-empreendedores-participam-de-imersao-noalemao/.

⁹⁹ See https://anistia.org.br/campanhas/jovemnegrovivo/ .

¹⁰⁰ See http://promundo.org.br/recursos/jovemovimento-youth-for-the-end-of-violence/.

¹⁰¹ See http://promundoglobal.org/work/?program=preventing-violence.

¹⁰² https://www.facebook.com/AFROBAPHO/.

¹⁰³ See https://faveladospelomundo.wordpress.com/.

¹⁰⁴ See https://www.facebook.com/PoetasFavelados/.

¹⁰⁵ See https://www.facebook.com/FlupRJ/videos/1465759500178529/.

A comprehensive approach to protecting and empowering youth is essential to Brazil's public security and development progress. Whether pursued at the national, state or municipal scale, measures must be informed by data-driven and evidence-informed policing, criminal justice and penal reform priorities together with prevention social and welfare policies focused on early childhood and support for at-risk youth. Where interventions are guided by a balanced and resourced plan, clear targets emphasizing reductions in violence, and a strategy for ensuring implementation and evaluation, the chances for success rise. Moreover, strategies that emphasize interventions focusing on hot spots of concentrated disadvantage, there is a higher likelihood of success.

Key to strengthening Brazil's long-term public security environment is comprehensive drug policy reform and a move away from mass incarceration. This is the country's current approach is outdated and punitive, privileging repressive approaches to counter-narcotics, criminalizing use, punishing non-violent offenders, and filling Brazil's appalling prions well past their breaking point. Some progress is being made in the Supreme Court to shift the country's legislation to decriminalize cannabis consumption which would go some way to reducing the flow, though not necessarily the existing stock, of inmates.¹⁰⁶ An evidence-based debate is required on arrest referral, alternative sentencing, harm reduction and rehabilitation strategies if Brazil is to fundamentally address its public security dilemmas.¹⁰⁷

Brazil's federal and state police and military need greater oversight of the country's firearms and ammunition. More than 75% of Brazilian homicides are perpetrated with firearms, far higher than the roughly 40% global average. But national and state registration systems are semi-functional and legislation on ownership and misuse poorly enforced. Yet rather than tightening responsible regulation, a small group of lawmakers – the so-called Bullet Caucus – is seeking to make arms more accessible and less traceable. The idea is to allow Brazilians over the age of 21 to purchase up to six weapons and 100 rounds per firearm a year.¹⁰⁸ Yet there is evidence that for every 1% increase in firearms in Brazil there is a 2% increase in homicides.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, a significant disarmament program pursued in the 2000s is credited with saving more than 135,000 lives.¹¹⁰

Investment in education, including civic and life skills, is central to improving youth safety and security. Brazil has made tremendous advances in the improving the quantity of education over the past two decades. By 2011, the government spent close to 20% of its total budget on education – well above the OECD average of 13%.¹¹¹ While still low compared to the OECD average, enrollment rates increased sharply across early childhood, primary age groups and adolescents and youth. Yet the quality of education still needs considerable improvement not just to retain students, but ensure they can move into meaningful employment. Likewise, there must be a balancing of education from tertiary to primary and secondary, together with a greater emphasis on vocational opportunities. Finally, training in civics and wider life-skills is essential.

¹⁰⁶ See Szabo and Pellegrino (2015).

¹⁰⁷ See Muggah and Thompson (2016) and Muggah (2016)

¹⁰⁸ The 21 law-makers are all funded by Brazil's considerable firearms manufacturing industry, ranked second in the western hemisphere. They are also seeking to lower the age of concealed weapons carrying from 25 to 21. ¹⁰⁹ See Ricardo and Cergueira (2014).

¹⁰⁹ See Ricardo and Cerqueira (201

¹¹⁰ See Matioli (2016).

¹¹¹ However, when calculated per student the average was well below the average.

Challenging identity stereotypes is central. Brazil's public security is still unevenly accessible across race and socio-economic status. Laws, policies and programs that give voice to young people, especially poor, black males in favelas, are essential to reversing these deep-seated prejudices. The images of young men as violent criminals are reproduced in the media, entertainment, criminal justice and other sectors. Yet such images need to be challenged. Yet this is only possible when children and adolescents have adequate skills and self-esteem and when young people are empowered and enabled. Groups like AfroReggae and VivaRio, for example, were created in response to the killings of young black men by the police and have helped create platforms for youth communication. New youth movements and journalist collectives are critical to organizing resistance, projecting the voice from the street and demanding alternatives to the status quo.

Public, private- and non-government led strategies to promote youth safety and security should focus on high-risk places, people and behaviors. An emphasis on social and economic marginalization and social disorganization is advisable since these circumstances are strongly associated with youth violence. Income inequality, youth unemployment, and family disruption – especially young poorly educated women with young children and adolescents – are all correlates of lethal violence. This is especially the case since homicide in one neighborhood is a good predictor of homicide in a neighboring neighborhood. Programs providing specialized support to at-risk young black males are also advisable, especially activities encouraging school attendance and sustained employment. Tailored interventions minimizing exposure to alcohol and firearms as well as high-risk areas - are also highly recommended.

Explore the scaling of effective social and economic policies that strengthen the protection of at-risk youth. For example, there are empirical grounds to increase coverage of at-risk families to particular social programs, including cash-transfer schemes. Measures such as Bolsa Familia have a statistically significant protective effect against lethal and non-lethal violence. Part of the reason for this is due to its positive effects on early childhood care and also the way it reduces school evasion. Likewise, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) programs that help promote positive thinking, self-esteem and self-help are also strongly associated with declines in delinquent and violent behavior.

Identify opportunities to empower youth movements and youth engagement in design and decision-making processes on public security. Youth have the most to lose from exclusion and the most to gain from participation. There needs to be a move away from paternalistic and statist programs to ones that give more discretion to youth coalitions and incentivize policy entrepreneurship. There is a rich ecosystem of political and social youth movements in Brazil, many of them digitally connected. Youth are and will create their own solutions, drawing on creativity and resourcefulness borne out of challenging circumstances.

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	Homicide rate for young males											Variation (%)	
						2010	2011	2012		2014			
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2005- 2015	2014- 2015
Brasil	96,5	97,4	94,3	99,0	100,1	100,7	98,7	108,9	109,7	116,9	113,6	17,7%	-2,9%
Acre	60,5	80,2	62,3	68,0	67,9	62,3	58,7	86,0	95,7	89,1	81,7	35,1%	-8,3%
Alagoas	147,2	205,5	232,0	244,3	235,9	273,5	283,6	264,4	285,5	270,2	233,0	58,3%	-13,8%
Amapá	131,9	137,2	114,3	142,4	105,3	162,1	108,2	147,4	128,6	135,0	141,0	6,8%	4,4%
Amazonas	67,6	80,0	79,1	87,2	97,8	111,6	139,1	123,1	111,6	113,1	131,1	93,9%	15,9%
Bahia	74,3	84,1	94,1	131,8	153,8	159,6	145,6	170,0	157,3	173,5	176,3	137,2%	1,6%
Ceará	75,4	75,0	84,6	89,9	92,8	117,2	121,5	183,3	210,4	222,6	194,7	158,2%	-12,5%
Distrito Federal	112,1	107,9	116,7	128,8	135,4	115,0	122,7	127,5	112,6	110,2	91,7	-18,2%	-16,8%
Espírito Santo	169,0	180,7	184,7	202,8	208,9	188,9	181,2	175,3	179,2	176,2	153,6	-9,1%	-12,9%
Goiás	95,7	93,2	95,0	108,9	107,9	117,3	127,4	160,7	170,0	164,0	171,9	79,7%	4,8%
Maranhão	50,5	51,7	61,3	69,9	76,2	81,6	80,1	96,1	118,7	133,9	129,3	156,2%	-3,5%
Mato Grosso	89,0	93,0	78,0	90,3	97,7	99,2	99,9	113,2	117,1	133,8	110,0	23,6%	-17,8%
Mato Grosso do Sul	85,3	89,4	93,4	94,2	96,3	77,8	79,5	77,3	70,3	82,0	70,1	-17,8%	-14,6%
Minas Gerais	85,2	81,9	79,9	74,2	70,0	65,8	76,9	86,5	91,6	92,2	85,6	0,4%	-7,2%
Pará	95,6	103,9	108,5	138,9	144,6	159,3	145,9	145,5	145,5	146,1	155,9	63,2%	6,8%
Paraíba	71,3	81,4	80,8	99,4	124,0	148,1	162,1	163,2	163,0	161,8	155,5	118,2%	-3,9%
Paraná	112,8	114,4	118,3	126,8	136,6	128,3	118,5	123,3	100,5	97,2	99,7	-11,7%	2,5%
Pernambuco	201,6	200,9	207,1	201,1	173,5	151,6	148,6	142,1	132,3	148,1	171,2	-15,1%	15,6%
Piauí	42,3	47,6	37,5	37,1	42,4	41,1	48,3	58,0	73,4	89,2	73,4	73,3%	-17,7%
Rio de Janeiro	203,2	198,6	178,6	150,6	138,9	148,4	116,3	116,6	131,3	147,4	134,7	-33,7%	-8,6%
Rio Grande do Norte	47,7	48,5	64,4	81,1	94,0	88,2	121,0	135,7	183,6	208,8	197,4	313,8%	-5,5%
Rio Grande do Sul	69,7	67,0	76,3	80,6	70,8	64,6	67,5	76,5	73,9	93,5	97,8	40,4%	4,6%
Rondônia	94,0	98,4	83,0	79,9	84,5	87,1	67,4	82,8	76,7	83,6	93,9	-0,1%	12,2%
Roraima	66,4	66,0	68,8	53,2	63,7	65,2	49,6	90,5	94,4	68,6	91,4	37,6%	33,2%
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Santa Catarina	36,2	35,0	34,7	43,7	45,2	38,6	40,2	41,4	36,5	40,3	45,5	25,5%	12,7%
São Paulo	80,0	71,8	52,2	49,3	49,1	43,6	42,1	48,8	43,0	46,9	40,0	-50,0%	-14,7%
Sergipe	81,4	107,0	94,7	99,5	103,5	110,3	113,9	149,8	164,3	198,3	230,4	183,3%	16,2%
Tocantins	40,2	56,0	40,6	53,8	57,7	76,5	65,3	78,6	60,0	82,4	108,2	169,0%	31,3%