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Brazilian Peace Operations  
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# Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH (2004-2017):

perceptions, lessons and practices for  
future missions

**Special Issue** - A Collection of Articles

Organisers: Dr Eduarda Passarelli Hamann and Col. Carlos Augusto Ramires Teixeira

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## Introduction

Brazil's contribution to United Nations (UN) missions started exactly 70 years ago, when Brazilian military officers and diplomats participated in the first multinational team authorised by the Organisation to act in the Balkans in October 1947. About 10 years later, the first UN mission with troops (formed units) also included Brazilian military soldiers. Since then, Brazil has participated in 47 UN missions, including 43 peacekeeping operations, and has deployed over 50,000 men and women.

Over these seven decades, Brazil's participation in UN missions saw at least four different stages: (i) 1947-1967; (ii) 1968-1989; (iii) 1990-1999; and (iv) 2000-2017. The first represents the initial landmark and includes the deployment of five Brazilians to the Balkans (1947-1949) and a battalion to Suez (1956-1967). The second stage was marked by the absence of Brazilians in international missions at a time that coincided with the Brazilian military regime. The third stage, albeit short, marks Brazil's return to multilateral operations with the deployment of military observers, staff officers and police officers in individual missions, as well as troops to three Portuguese-speaking countries: Angola, Mozambique and Timor-Leste. The fourth and last stage is the most important in the history of Brazil's participation in UN missions, due to the size of the Brazilian contingents and, above all, to the strategic roles played by our soldiers in two important missions: the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and, in an unprecedented manner, the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

There are several reasons to highlight MINUSTAH, as demonstrated by the 13 unpublished articles included in this collection. They prompt an original reflection on this complex experience by providing a rear-view analysis of the past without losing sight of the future. From a diplomatic point of view, MINUSTAH was an important foreign policy instrument at a time when Brazil sought a leading international role, especially as a relevant player in Latin America and the Caribbean. During the course of the mission, Brazil was elected twice for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council (2004-2005 and 2010-2011), which gave the country an opportunity to express sophisticated views on Haiti and peacekeeping operations in general, including the relationship between security and development. In addition, Brazil began reaping several political fruits of its soldiers' continued success on the ground and in the rearguard.

In military terms, Brazil deployed about 37,000 troops to MINUSTAH, distributed in 26 contingents on a rotation basis, which provided important professional and personal experiences with positive impacts for the Armed Forces. MINUSTAH was critical for the improvement of Brazil's preparedness for peacekeeping missions, and became a

world reference in this regard. In strategic terms, Brazil managed to keep a general as Force Commander during the whole mission – something unprecedented in the history of the UN. Such accomplishments indicate that solid steps have been taken towards consolidating Brazil as a relevant country in the international peace and security system, with a desirable role to play in other important multilateral operations.

From a police perspective, it is important to note that the officers sent to Haiti performed key roles, both within the UN Police (UNPOL) and in support of the Haitian National Police, albeit in smaller numbers. Such contribution exposes an existing gap in the discussions about sending Brazilian police to missions overseas, and demonstrates that there is still a lot to be explored.

Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH also prompted other stakeholders (such as the Chamber of Deputies, the Military Justice System and Brazilian academia) to pay even more attention to UN operations. In Brazilian universities, for instance, specific research lines focused on this area have been created at first degree, master's and doctoral levels. This led to new and more sophisticated discussions with important decision-makers, such as the military and the diplomatic corps.

These and other extremely important topics relative to Brazil's participation in UN missions are addressed for the first time in this collection of articles. Indeed, our reflections on what happened over those more than 10 years in Haiti must be deep and diverse. As such, not only will this experience contribute to historiography, but it will also enable the identification of critical elements to guide decision-making processes in the near future, when Brazil shall define how, when and where to deploy its troops to yet another mission in which the Brazilian flag shall fly alongside the UN banner. This publication aims at contributing with diverse views to this irrefutable discussion.

Rio de Janeiro, October 2017.

Dr Eduarda Passarelli Hamann  
Igarapé Institute

Col. Carlos Augusto RAMIRES Teixeira  
Commander of the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre

# Foreword

During the 13 years of its military presence in Haiti, Brazil fulfilled its duties as a Latin American country and as an international player in its widest sense. In fact, the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) managed to achieve a lot more than expected.

Firstly, there is the issue of regional solidarity. Brazil took an interest in the evolution of Haiti's political process and made a significant effort to help that country solve its terrible problems.

Secondly, we should consider Brazil's global integration and its ability to work within the UN, in particular at the Security Council (UNSC), where power concerns are predominant. This volume provides a significant contribution to the collection and dissemination of reliable data on the Brazilian presence in that country, and more specifically in MINUSTAH, i.e. a peace operation conducted by the United Nations.

This publication has been organised by the Igarapé Institute and the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre (CCOPAB, in the Portuguese acronym, or Sergio Vieira de Mello Centre). It seeks not only to corroborate the experience acquired by Brazil in Haiti, but also to understand the perspectives for Brazilian action in future or ongoing UN peace operations in other countries.

The book has benefited from several diverse contributions and is bound to become a must-read for all that are interested in peace operations. In addition to their expertise in the topics about which they write, the authors also demonstrate a wider understanding of the issues afflicting Haiti and the reach of MINUSTAH.

The situation in Haiti proved to be multifaceted as it presented challenges on several fronts, including political (diplomatic), military and police, human rights (humanitarian), etc. It is clear that peace and security concerns have almost always been present, but they do not exhaust the MINUSTAH agenda.

In the political and diplomatic fields, Brazil's foreign policy and global integration efforts comprehend peace missions; participation in the UNSC and other UN bodies; the country's diplomatic role in the context of the Organisation of American States (OAS); and its bilateral relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries.

In the military and police spheres, the views presented herein include:

- a) the military experience and post-earthquake lessons;
- b) the evolution in the training of military contingents for peace operations;
- c) the pacification of hot zones in Port-au-Prince by the Brazilian Battalion (BRABATT) and lessons learned for future missions;
- d) the experience of the Brazilian Army's Land Operations Command (Comando de Operações Terrestres – COTER, in the Portuguese acronym) in training and deploying its troops;
- e) the Navy's views regarding its participation in MINUSTAH and future missions; and
- f) the presence of Brazilian police in MINUSTAH and the possibility of future deployments.

In other important areas, the main perspectives include:

- a) the perception and role of the National Congress in topics relative to peace operations;
- b) Brazilian academia's point of view on what happened in MINUSTAH and what may lie ahead;
- c) the relationship between BRABATT and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, highlighting the learning acquired through MINUSTAH and the legacy for Brazil and other UN missions;
- d) the civil and criminal responsibilities of Brazilian peacekeepers;
- e) Viva Rio's perspectives and its relationship with BRABATT and other Brazilians in Haiti with a view to assessing what has been learned and what can be replicated in other contexts; and
- f) the role of music in Brazilian military operations in general, and how it was used in BRABATT/MINUSTAH activities.

Considering the length, size and complexities of this UN operation, it is not surprising that different views about it have arisen over time. The range of this book is illustrative. It helps to develop points of view, but also promotes discussions involving political, military and police stakeholders, as well as academia.

It is important to bear in mind that time was a key factor to organise and operationalise MINUSTAH in view of the gravity of the political, social and economic situation in Haiti (including the country's low life expectancy, extreme poverty, difficult access to means of livelihood and water supply, and persistent energy crisis). Not less important was the uniqueness of the situation in Haiti with regard to the experience of Brazil and other Latin American and Caribbean countries.

MINUSTAH successfully fulfilled its mandate. It played a key role in the establishment of conditions that enabled the peaceful consolidation of three electoral cycles for the first time in the history of Haiti. Despite not having a specific mandate for social and economic development, the mission promoted both by interpreting its role more widely.

From a Brazilian perspective, it is important to point out that MINUSTAH was the country's most important contribution in the history of the UN. In total, about 37,500 Brazilian troops were deployed to Haiti between 2004 and 2017 on a rotation basis. This number in itself writes a new chapter in the country's military history. On top of that, one must not forget that a formidable earthquake hit the country in 2010 and killed 220,000 people, including 21 Brazilians. In addition, every year Haiti is struck by devastating hurricanes between May and November: last year alone, Hurricane Matthew caused incalculable losses.

However, these facts alone cannot represent all the significance of MINUSTAH. We are confident that the mission provided concrete assistance, and indeed it was assessed as perfect by all its partners. In addition to that, it is worth pointing out that the technical cooperation provided by Brazil was also recognised by Haiti as extremely useful for the mission, together with the stabilisation efforts. Such efforts focused on the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the country and the maintenance of security in the most violent areas in Port-au-Prince. A new smaller mission named MINUJUSTH is set to follow MINUSTAH with a focus on consolidating the rule of law and the judicial system in Haiti.

Brazil's participation in the mission was very positive. In view of all this, the present volume collects valuable experiences and suggests key guiding principles for the construction of our policy in the area of United Nations peace operations.

On 11 September 2017.

Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg  
Ambassador



Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, Brazil's Permanent Representative to the UN, speaks at a press conference in Port-au-Prince next to the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative and Head of MINUSTAH (April 2005)

Credit: Sophia Paris/UN Photo

# About the Authors

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Lt. Gen. (R1) Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto – as a colonel, he headed the operations section of the 1st Brazilian contingent in Haiti, and as a major general, he was the MINUSTAH Force Commander at the time of the earthquake. While in the reserve, he integrated the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. He is a visiting professor at King's College, United Kingdom; Dalhousie University, Canada; National Defense University, US; and a lecturer on peace operations in several Brazilian universities.

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Col. Mendonça graduated from the Agulhas Negras Military Academy in 1988 as an Infantry Officer. In addition to the standard training for someone in his career, provided by the Officer Development School, he attended the following military training programmes: Basic Parachuting, Master Parachuting, Military Climbing, and Jungle Warfare, among others. He has a master's in Military Sciences from the Brazilian Army Command and General Staff School (Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército – ECEME, in the Portuguese acronym). He has a Brazilian Army degree in Politics, Strategy and High Studies. His civilian academic background includes an MBA in Project Management from the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV, in the Portuguese acronym). In addition to that, he took part in UN Peace Missions in Mozambique and in the Ivory Coast, and is currently the Head of the Peace Missions Division of the Land Operations Command (Comando de Operações Terrestres – COTER, in the Portuguese acronym).

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First degree in Law from the National Law School (FND, in the Portuguese acronym) of the University of Brazil (1963). He was a member of the Brazilian diplomatic service from 1962 to 2010. He served as Brazilian Ambassador in Moscow and Madrid, and headed the Brazilian Permanent Mission to the UN twice. At the Brazilian President's Office, he served as Secretary for Strategic Affairs (SAE, in the Portuguese acronym) from 1995 to 1998. He was also Minister for Science, Technology and Innovation (1999-2002) and Chairman of the National Telecommunications Agency (ANATEL, in the Portuguese acronym) from 2007 to 2011.

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Credit: Evan Schneider/UN Photo

# Brazil's Role in the International System

## 1. MINUSTAH, Brazil and the United Nations Security Council

Ambassador Paulo Roberto C. T. da Fontoura and Counsellor Eduardo Uziel

## 2. The Brazilian military experience in Haiti

Lt. Gen. (R1) FLORIANO PEIXOTO Vieira Neto



On 30 April 2004, the Security Council adopts resolution 1542 (2004) establishing MINUSTAH. On the left, with his back to the camera, Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenberg casts the Brazilian vote.

Credit: Devra Berkowitz/ United Nations Photo

# 1. MINUSTAH, Brazil and the United Nations Security Council

Ambassador Paulo Roberto Campos Tarrisse da Fontoura<sup>1</sup>  
Counsellor Eduardo Uziel

## Introduction

Participating in the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for over ten years has been an invaluable source of learning for Brazil. Studies on peace missions<sup>2</sup>, including MINUSTAH, tend to focus on actions on the ground from an operational, military and humanitarian perspective, as well as with regard to interactions with the local population. The present text aims at filling a gap by considering the establishment and operation of MINUSTAH from the standpoint of international politics, as expressed at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This means seeking a better understanding of the political dynamics within the UNSC and other UN bodies during the process of structuring the mandate, gathering contributors and running MINUSTAH.

This article is organised in four sections. The first one presents a brief context of Brazil's foreign policy, its role within the UNSC and its views of peace missions until 2004. The second part addresses the process of establishing MINUSTAH and tries to explain how several issues that would guide political negotiations around Haiti in the following years were already present back then. The third section highlights some aspects related to the evolution of the mission from the perspective of politics at the United Nations. The last section tries to extract lessons for Brazil from its long participation in MINUSTAH.

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<sup>1</sup> The opinions expressed by the authors are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Throughout the text, the terms 'peace mission' and 'peacekeeping operation' are used as synonyms. The expression 'peace operation' shall not be used. See Uziel (2015a), pp. 28-33 and 246-248.

## Context in 2004

In 2004, Brazil was resuming its investment in the United Nations and reconfiguring its strategies for the Organisation. After one year of the Lula administration, the country increasingly sought a broker role in multilateral initiatives, as a player to be consulted by others. In practice, this meant forming coalitions such as the 'India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum' (IBSA) or the 'Group of 20' (G20), created in Cancun in 2003, with positive and negative objectives. It also signalled a willingness to expand its area of action from a geographical and thematic perspective, and to become a normative player<sup>3</sup>. The United Nations and its Security Council had become a privileged locus for Brazil's foreign policy ambitions to unfold.

In the areas of peace and security, two processes converged at the time: firstly, the resumption of General Assembly debates on the reform of the UNSC, which would lead Brazil to form the G4 (the Group of 4) that year<sup>4</sup>; and within the UNSC itself, the beginning of the ninth Brazilian term as an elected member for the 2004-2005 period. From a Brazilian diplomacy perspective, the beginning of a new biennium presented an opportunity to show activism, build coalitions and join the peace and security decision-making mechanism. According to the tradition of its previous participation – particularly in the period after re-democratisation – Brazil had the understanding that its work should follow certain principles and actively oppose the unilateralist drive shown by the US<sup>5</sup>.

At the time, peacekeeping operations, which had reached their lowest point in the late 1990s, were again gaining momentum within the UNSC as an international instrument to contain crises. Brazil had a history of supporting missions and had been the fourth biggest troop contributor in April and June 1996. However, since 1999, it only kept a small contingent in Timor-Leste (UNTAET, later UNMISSET). In 2003, Brazil started expanding the number of observers and officers individually appointed to missions, and at the same time sought to identify a potential destination for a new contingent. In Brazil's perception, peace missions served to maximise its international performance in the area of peace and security<sup>6</sup>.

Haiti was not initially identified as a likely destination. In 1993-1994, as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Brazil had vehemently criticised the work of the United Nations, having abstained four times from voting on whether to send multinational troops or peace missions to that country. In Brazil's views, during the ten-year interregnum, the UN, largely due to pressure from the US, had erred by establishing mandates exclusively focused on security and by deciding to leave a country before the root causes of instability could be addressed with the support of a peacekeeping operation<sup>7</sup>.

When the threat of a 'blood bath' led President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to flee the country and the UNSC to establish an emergency force – to be replaced in the near future by a peace mission – it became clear to Brazil that an opportunity had arisen, provided that the conditions for participation could be properly negotiated.

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3 Amorim (2005); Vigevani & Cepaluni (2011), pp. 129-152; Cervo (2010); Villa & Viana (2010).

4 See <http://csnu.itamaraty.gov.br/o-brasil-e-a-reforma>, accessed on 26 July 2017.

5 Sardenberg (2005); Viegas (2008), pp. 27-32; Ziemath (2016); Sardenberg (2013). Brazil's performance in the first year of that biennium was favoured by the composition of non-permanent members (Algeria, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania), many of which had consolidated international agendas that aimed at inhibiting the characteristic unilateralism observed in the George Bush administration. The most notable case was the US's giving up on trying to renew the UNSC resolution to exempt US troops from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, as they realised that they would not obtain all the votes needed to approve it. See: Uziel (2015b), p. 79.

6 Contributions with a limited number of staff officers and observers to a large number of missions are usually classified as token contributions, a term that indicates that the country lacks the willingness or the capacity to contribute with large units, while wishing to mark its presence in peace missions. In the case of Brazil in 2003, it is more likely that the country wanted to express an intention to expand its participation in peacekeeping operations and, in order to do so, create a critical mass in civilian and military decision-making fora, which eventually happened the following year through MINUSTAH. See: Coleman (2013), pp. 47-67; Official Letter 3 (Aviso) of 12 February 2004 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Defence. For more background information on Brazil's participation in peace missions, see: Fontoura (1999) and Fontoura (2009).

7 Souza Neto (2010a), pp. 229-240. Interestingly, both in 1993-1994 and in 2004-2005, the Brazilian Mission to the UN was headed by Ambassador Ronaldo M. Sardenberg. This provided Brazilian diplomacy with a special memory on the issue, as well as a high-profile and well-experienced representative.

# Establishing MINUSTAH

On Sunday 29 February, when the UNSC adopted Resolution 1529 (2004) establishing a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) and calling for a peace mission, Brazil started an effort to mainstream itself in the decision-making process regarding Haiti. Within the Security Council, it was necessary to work directly on the wording of any decisions regarding the future peace mission<sup>8</sup>. Hence, Brazil joined the recreated Group of Friends of Haiti, which at the time also included Canada, Chile, France and the US (the four contributors to the MIF). Brazil had two trump cards to ensure that it would have a voice, despite not having any troops on the ground: as a new biennium had just started, the permanent members had an interest in cooperating with Brazil so as to develop a constructive relationship within the UNSC; and when Brazil signalled that it could contribute with troops to the upcoming MINUSTAH, cooperation became even more desirable.

In the two months following the establishment of the MIF, the MINUSTAH mandate and composition were negotiated, which for the UNSC meant determining its political function. In simple terms, one might say that the US, the UK and France preferred a mandate emulating those of the 1990s, i.e. where the United Nations would remain in the country for a short period of time and focus on public security, repressing the actions of local gangs. Brazil, Chile, Argentina and other Latin American countries advocated an approach that favoured addressing the root causes of instability in Haiti, where security was just one aspect, with the knowledge that their stay in the country might last for a longer period. On a different perspective, there were converging interests regarding the need to send a peace mission to Haiti, but not its characteristics. Whereas the US based their approach on their incomparable military and economic strength, Latin American countries, in particular Brazil, used troop contributions and regional support as trump cards to strengthen their negotiating position<sup>9</sup>.

For Brazil, establishing a mandate that clearly demonstrated that the new mission in Haiti would not be an accessory to the US security policy was essential at that time. In the regional context, CARICOM was clearly displeased with the idea of discussing Haiti at the UNSC. CARICOM would rather have it addressed at the OAS, and had developed a plan to solve the crisis, which was eventually overtaken by events. Several stakeholders claimed that there had been a *coup* in Haiti, and that President Aristide had fled the country under threat by the US<sup>10</sup>. In Brazil, left-wing groups echoed the understanding that MINUSTAH would be an arm of 'Yankee imperialism' and that Brazil would be serving that purpose<sup>11</sup>. Brazil wanted to overcome regional frictions as soon as possible and remove any speculation on MINUSTAH's violating Haiti's right to self-determination.

These diverging preferences for the mandate within the UNSC became evident in the issue of references to Chapter VII and to development issues in Resolution 1542 (2004). The US wanted to include, as often done at the UNSC, a reference to Chapter VII of the Charter in the last paragraph of the preamble, which would signal a preponderance of security issues in the mission and the authorisation to resort to force, if necessary. Brazil would rather restrict that mention to the part of the mandate relative to restoring order (paragraph 7, section I, 'Secure and Stable Environment'). While some argued that Brazil rejected 'Chapter VII peace-enforcing missions', what was at stake was a political signal on the nature of MINUSTAH. For Brazil, including aspects such as humanitarian aid and institutional strengthening in the framework of Chapter VII seemed contradictory, as it would suggest to Caribbean and Latin American countries that there was a preference for the 'Powell doctrine', i.e. employing force and leaving soon<sup>12</sup>. What Brazil wished to introduce in the text – as eventually happened in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15, albeit in a diluted manner – was support for reconstruction and development in Haiti, where the root causes of instability were believed to lie. Whereas the US opposed this idea due to their preference for a security mandate, the Secretariat and countries such as Russia failed to see why a peace mission should be concerned with development. Although MINUSTAH's initial mandate included few Brazilian demands for development support, this aspect gained strength over the years and became more consistent in the mandate of the mission<sup>13</sup>.

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8 It has been common practice for the UNSC to appoint a country to start tabling proposals on a given matter. When MINUSTAH was established, this role was known as 'lead country', and, in the case of Haiti, it lied with the US; later, the term 'pen-holder' was adopted. See: [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-10/in\\_hindsight\\_the\\_security\\_council\\_penholders.php](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-10/in_hindsight_the_security_council_penholders.php), accessed on 27 July 2017.

9 Uziel (2015a), pp. 210-215.

10 See: [http://www.oas.org/en/media\\_center/press\\_release.asp?sCodigo=E-028/04](http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-028/04), accessed on 28 July 2017; <http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2004/hait0304.htm>, accessed on 28 July 2017; and <http://caricom.org/communications/view/statement-on-haiti-issued-by-the-fifteenth-inter-sessional-meeting-of-the-c>, accessed on 28 July 2017.

11 *Diário do Senado Federal*, 13/5/2004, pp. 13969-13975; *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, 14/5/2004, pp. 22031-22050; *Diário do Congresso Nacional (Sessão Conjunta)*, 19/5/2004, pp. 661-665.

12 Marten (2004), pp. 152-153.

13 Uziel (2013); Kenkel (2013a).

## Developing the mission and developing the mandate

A core element of the policy around MINUSTAH was the composition of the group of countries that joined to influence the mandate and the conduction of the mission. Generally known as 'groups of friends' in several UN fora, these small informal groups of States have existed since the 1950s. In the 1990s, these groups multiplied in response to growing demands on the UNSC. They were known by different names (core group, contact group, or friends of the Secretary-General) and took different formats. States met informally to provide good offices, support UNSC and UNSG decisions, and, in the case of MINUSTAH, support the development of peacekeeping operation mandates. They usually included UNSC member and non-member countries, as well as regional players. There was no set mechanism for the inclusion of new members, but it was common practice to seek consensus within the group before adding any new country<sup>14</sup>.

Brazil understood very early the relevance of these groups of friends as a means to overcome impasses within the UNSC, since the reform of the body has always proved difficult. In 1970, Ambassador João Augusto de Araujo Castro submitted a memorandum to Secretary-General U-Thant proposing a 'diplomatic reactivation' of the United Nations, where these groups would become a critical instrument to enable a wide range of members to participate in a substantive examination of the topics in the UNSC agenda and provide concrete proposals for conflict resolution<sup>15</sup>. Over the past few decades, Brazil has participated in groups of friends for different countries, such as Haiti, Timor-Leste and Guinea-Bissau.

The group of friends of Haiti was created during the negotiations for the MINUSTAH mandate, and it included the US, France, Canada, Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Over the years, the membership of Latin American countries has grown and varied, as some non-permanent UNSC members or troop contributing countries joined or left the group. As the mission comes to an end, the Haiti group is composed by the six countries above plus Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay (Mexico was also a member in the past). The group partially symbolises how MINUSTAH was conducted under the strong influence of Latin American countries, which were its main troop contributors and had a strong interest in inserting support for development in its mandate. A notable case was that of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) – low cost initiatives aimed at benefiting the population, such as digging wells, rebuilding bridges and clearing roads. Usually, UNSC mandates do not make reference to QIPs, but MINUSTAH's started doing so in 2007, at the request of Latin American members of the group of friends<sup>16</sup>.

Very early on, the group of friends of Haiti grew in importance within the UNSC. This enabled Brazil and other Latin American countries to maintain their influence on the mandate and composition of MINUSTAH, even when they were not members of that body. In general, the dynamics within the UNSC with regard to Haiti has been for the group of friends to draft a resolution, which was then approved with few amendments by the members of the body. This implies the group's high degree of legitimacy<sup>17</sup>.

Coordination among the Latin American countries participating in MINUSTAH expanded beyond the UNSC. In 2005, a cooperation mechanism was developed to bring together these States' Foreign and Defence Ministries for regular meetings to discuss the Haiti mission. It was initially known as 2x4, then 2x7, and 2x9, as more countries were included. Its influence continued growing with regard to expressing regional political directives and preferences for the MINUSTAH mandate, and its priorities were eventually recognised by the UNSC through resolution 1840 (2008). This mechanism enabled Brazil to reinforce, within the UNSC, the central points it wanted to see reflected in the mandate of the mission and create a group to support the presence of the United Nations in Haiti from the perspective of developing countries<sup>18</sup>. It meant the construction of a dialogue with UNSC members by a specific group of troop-contributing countries that used their participation in MINUSTAH to shape the international treatment of Haiti.

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14 Prantl (2006); Whitfield (2007).

15 Official Letter 134 (*Ofício*), dated 5 March 1970, from the Mission to the United Nations to the Secretariat of State, Itamaraty Historical Archives, Brasília.

16 See DPKO Policy Directive – Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), 2007; Lepin (2015), pp. 66-80. The group of friends of Haiti acting in New York is not to be mistaken for the Core Group to which operative paragraph 5 of resolution 1542 (2004) makes reference, chaired by the Secretary-General's Special Representative and comprising countries and international organisations in Haiti 'in order to facilitate the implementation of MINUSTAH's mandate, promote interaction with the Haitian authorities as partners, and enhance the effectiveness of the international community's response in Haiti'.

17 See: [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-07/haiti\\_12.php](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-07/haiti_12.php), accessed on 27 July 2017.

18 Souza Neto (2010b), pp. 42-43; Diamint (2007).

Brazil's long-standing participation in MINUSTAH also corroborated its perception that, in order to exercise political influence on the issue and not be seen as a mere troop contributor, it would have to act on different interlinked UN fora, which do not always have an obvious influence on peacekeeping operations. Although the UNSC is the most conspicuous forum to address peace missions, others have also proved to be relevant. In the case of Haiti, since the Brazilian argument has always been along the line that development should be the long-lasting foundation of stability, there was an effort to reactivate and engage in the ECOSOC *Ad hoc* Advisory Group on Haiti. This proved to be another forum where Brazil made an effort to shape the work of the United Nations in Haiti<sup>19</sup>.

More importantly with regard to MINUSTAH, there were coordinating actions led by Brazil, other Latin American countries and several developing countries from around the world at the UN General Assembly Fifth Committee. This is the body responsible for deliberating on whether to finance UN activities, and whose decisions enable substantial UNSC mandates to obtain (or not) the resources and personnel they need to be properly executed. Since the beginning, MINUSTAH fell victim to cost cutting attempts, both in general terms, as any other peace mission, but also specifically aimed at it, based on false arguments of excessive costs. For over a decade, it was necessary to form coalitions and present arguments to prevent MINUSTAH from being negatively affected by the United Nations' attempts to reduce costs. This lobbying work was particularly significant when the mission withdrawal process started. Brazil has always advocated that '[t]he drawdown of MINUSTAH troops should not be guided by financial imperatives, the need for additional resources in other peacekeeping missions or an arbitrary overall target for peacekeeping expenditures (...). Brazil will actively engage in the negotiations with a view to ensuring that key MINUSTAH objectives (...) are met with adequate financial resources'<sup>20</sup>.

## MINUSTAH's long survival

MINUSTAH fits in very well with a comment made by journalist Samuel Clemens (best known by his pseudonym Mark Twain): 'the report of my death was an exaggeration'. Since the beginning, the mission was under pressure for its military and police components to be kept in the country for a short period of time, and for the United Nations' presence to be restricted to supporting institution building – the common practice in the 1990s. This preference by some UNSC members arose both from their interest in reducing the costs of peacekeeping operations, and from their conviction that, since Haiti was in America, the US should directly bear the costs of supporting a neighbour in need. Furthermore, there was always an attempt to restrict the mandate of the mission to certain areas.

The history of MINUSTAH, however, was different. The mission remained in the country for over a decade, and not only did its mandate keep its original characteristics, but it also acquired new functions in the area of institution building and promotion of development. To some extent, a number of natural disasters, including countless hurricanes, and the deadly earthquake that shook the country in 2010, enabled MINUSTAH to maintain humanitarian aid responsibilities that relied on its military component<sup>21</sup>. However, the main merit derived from the work of Latin American countries, in particular those contributing with troops and police officers. They shaped the structure and the mandate of the mission so as to make it clear that it was a Latin American and Caribbean effort aimed at providing Haiti with long term stabilisation and development, rather than a US imperialist adventure. In the sphere of world and multilateral politics and within the Security Council, MINUSTAH consolidated and taught new lessons to Brazil. Firstly, that it is important, or even necessary, to participate in peacekeeping operations. For a country considered an 'emerging power', contributing to such missions represents an expression of its willingness and capacity to effectively contribute to global peace and security<sup>22</sup>.

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19 See: <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/content/ecosoc-ad-hoc-advisory-group-haiti>, accessed on 28 July 2017.

20 See: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/fifth/68/Statements/2r.PKOs/C5\\_68\\_2r\\_ST\\_2014\\_05\\_07\\_multi%20PKOs\\_Brazil.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/ga/fifth/68/Statements/2r.PKOs/C5_68_2r_ST_2014_05_07_multi%20PKOs_Brazil.pdf), accessed on 28 July 2017. Also see: Vargas & Uziel, *A política do financiamento das operações de manutenção da paz*. In press.

21 See: <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/04/world/haiti-disasters/index.html>, accessed on 2 August 2017; <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-gIKWI emTIsG-b-5810761.php>, accessed on 28 July 2017; and Souza Neto (2010b), pp. 51-55.

22 Uziel (2015a); Kenkel (2013b), pp. 85-110.

Secondly, sending troops is not enough, neither is commanding the mission. If a country such as Brazil wishes to benefit from participating in peace missions, it must be ready to contribute to the negotiation of mandates, participating in groups of friends or other similar bodies, and brokering the views of regional and extra-regional players. Thus, it can transfer to each particular peacekeeping operation its own vision – which tends to favour an interaction between security, political-institutional and social-economic factors. Beyond discussions in multilateral fora, it must be ready to make a real difference with post-conflict recovery support projects<sup>23</sup>.

Finally, a key lesson is that influence and coordinating capacity are transferable skills, although such transfer does not take place automatically. This means that Brazil's role in the case of MINUSTAH helped to raise its profile in peace and security issues as a whole. Needless to say, this growing importance did not derive from the mission alone, but the Haitian case qualified Brazil to express relevant opinions on other international crises and to be seen as an important interlocutor, which deserves to be heard and respected.

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<sup>23</sup> See 'Maintenance of international peace and security: the interdependence between security and development' (S/PRST/2011/4), available at: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2011/4](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2011/4), accessed on 2 August 2017; Valler Filho (2007).

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Gen. Floriano Peixoto, MINUSTAH Force Commander (on the left), visiting Cité Soleil after the 2010 earthquake, accompanied by Gen. Ken Keen, then Military Deputy Commander of the U.S. Southern Command.

Credit: Sophia Paris/UN Photo

## 2. The Brazilian military experience in Haiti

Lt. Gen. (R1) FLORIANO PEIXOTO Vieira Neto

### Context

Brazil's military presence in Haiti for 13 years may undoubtedly be described as an epic experience that fully achieved all the goals envisaged by its idealisers back in 2004. With deep strategic perception, those authorities foresaw the relevance of the engagement of Brazilian troops beyond national borders, but within relative geographical surroundings that enabled the continuity of operations over time and, in particular, the achievement of impacting results in favour of the battered Haitian reality at the time.

Many experts have studied the follow-up of Brazil's experience in Haiti according to different moments in its national reality. These studies have identified several stages in that process, which are summarised below: (i) 2004-2005: settling in, initial engagement, and reorganising the operational structure and training; (ii) 2005-2007: pacification; (iii) 2007-2009: consolidating the pacification; (iv) 2009/2010: earthquake; and (v) 2010/2017: post-earthquake recovery and return to normality.

It is fundamental to point out that Brazil's previous military experience in the Caribbean took place in 1965 and 1966 in the Dominican Republic, where we confirmed our role as a widely recognised international player, not only due to the military apparatus made available to the Organisation of American States (OAS) through the Brazilian Contingent of Inter-American Armed Force (*Destacamento Brasileiro da Força Armada Interamericana* – FAIBRAS,

in the Portuguese acronym)<sup>1</sup> to pacify the conflicts taking place in that country, but also due to the skilful way that troop commanders conducted the resolution of impasses, achieving the expected results without the bloodshed that seemed to take place among other forces. Due to this successful experience, Brazil gained wide acceptance among Caribbean countries and organisations, particularly CARICOM. This added considerable weight to the invitation issued by the UN in 2004 to create a military component to integrate the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

This concept was much strengthened by other more recent Brazilian participations in international efforts under the aegis of the United Nations (UN), both individually and in troops. As a result, Brazil became a synonym for quality, operational efficiency, respect and credibility, which also became trademarks for the reputation of Brazilian troops in peace operations.

This article aims at highlighting some aspects of Brazil's military presence in Haiti without providing statistical data that have already been published by the Ministry of Defence (MD) and our Single Forces. It enables us to confirm the substantial military achievements derived from the Brazilian presence in that country, supported by parliamentary will and the clear, consistent and precise guidelines offered by Brazilian diplomacy in view of the constraints established by the UN in support of Haiti. It is also important to note the huge diversity of articles and books written on the Brazilian experience in Haiti, with different perspectives and interpretations, which serve to highlight the fact that Brazil's engagement provided excellent food for thought in the field of international relations not only for the Brazilian Armed Forces, but also for academia, other agencies and intellectuals. Above all, there is a clear recognition that this experience cannot be abandoned; otherwise, the history of peace operations might have to be reviewed and rewritten in the future. The historical synthesis of Brazil's engagement in the multinational effort led by the UN to meet Haiti's emergency needs had its starting point in early 2004, when the Brazilian Army Commander established an intense dialogue with the US South Command with the aim of developing a situational awareness that could be presented to the Brazilian Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. This would be done within the limits of what could be achieved by the Brazilian Army in operational and logistical terms, at least with regard to land demands. The immediate effect of this *rapprochement* was a two-week inter-force reconnaissance mission to Haiti organised by the MD in March of the same year. The efforts of the officers participating in that mission resulted in a consistent Strategic Area Study (SAS) based on which the planning of a potential deployment of Brazilian troops began, in parallel with the efforts jointly undertaken at home with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) and the National Congress to analyse the situation and, if such deployment was deemed justified, approve it. This is, indeed, what eventually happened.

During the reconnaissance mission, the Brazilian team collected data that were vital for the MD to decide on the composition and value of the troops to be deployed, and considering what would happen next, the most appropriate deployment according to the demands of the new operational environment. Thus, the Brazilian group had the full support of the Multinational Interim Force (MIF), a rapid intervention troop with a mandate from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to produce an initial stabilisation effect. The MIF was formed by troops from Canada, Chile, France and the United States.

Some of the reconnaissance mission findings were consistently described in the SAS and deserve special attention, such as: the Multinational Force's determination to end its mission on 1 June; mixed feelings among the local population with regard to the stabilisation forces; deactivation of National Armed Forces; the Haitian National Police's lack of efficiency and capacity; situation of the country as a regional drug trafficking hub; local population's feeling of national pride; extreme friendliness towards Brazil among the local population; precariousness of local infrastructure; communication network limited to mobile telephony; decaying status of the hospital network; prevailing role of radio as a means for social communication; and security as the local population's main concern, among others.

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<sup>1</sup> With Decree no. 56.308 of 21 May 1965, the National Congress authorised the creation of FAIBRAS to integrate the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). In addition to the Commander – then Colonel Carlos de Meira Matos – and its Staff, the Brazilian Force was formed by a battalion from the Infantry School Regiment (I/R Es I) with 840 troops, and a Marine Unit of the Riachuelo Battalion, formed by a Reinforced Company, a Police Battalion and a Logistical Support Group, totalling 270 officers. On 27 May 1965, FAIBRAS completed its concentration in the Dominican capital, Santo Domingo. The IAPF was later commanded by another two Brazilian generals: Army General Hugo Panasco Alvim and Army General Álvaro da Silva Braga. As Sub-Commanders, the IAPF had US officers: Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer and Major General Robert A. Linvill.

It is worth pointing out that, at the initiative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the future Brazilian Brigade's planning team also studied FAIBRAS historical records, and thus the organisation of the military component became very similar to the structure deployed in the Dominican Republic. It is clear that, over successive troop rotations, the configuration eventually changed to adjust to the reality on the ground and to UNSC resolutions, which better defined the conditions for the deployment of 'blue berets' in Haiti.

Based on this introductory approach, we can affirm that the fundamental aspect of Brazil's rapid engagement in Haiti, above any other motive, was a desire to lend our national capabilities to support a strategic neighbouring country in a condition of absolute social, economic and security degradation. Brazil's presence in Haiti, therefore, was a State response to an international appeal led by the UN, which more widely materialised the will of the Brazilian people.

The prompt response to that call demonstrated, from the very beginning of the Haiti assistance process, Brazil's capacity to be present in that friendly country (despite the difficulties imposed by the deployment of military structure for expeditionary purposes), a deeper knowledge of the operational deployment area, and familiarisation with the UN directives for the new mission. This was all overcome, and the Brazilian contingent arrived in Haiti fully capable of facing reality and properly responding to a number of challenges, and often dramatic contingencies, until the end of the mission.

## Brazil's role

The chaotic reality faced by Brazilian troops when they arrived in the mission area corresponded to the final moments of a political reality distorted over many years, in which the Haitian State seemed depleted and replaced by an extremely weakened situation, characterised by extreme poverty and failing institutions. The country became the stage for criminal offences and transnational crime, which contaminated the order, eroded national credibility, stagnated progress and deeply inverted people's values.

This picture was replaced by a permanent police-like conflict without antagonist forces or clearly defined motivations, imposed on a population of eight million people dissatisfied and sceptical about a better future. Several elements led to this state of being: an inert, insensitive and hated government; an unprepared and corrupt police force; and the political situation, which clearly leaned towards maintaining the *status quo*, i.e. unprepared leaders with no democratic vocation. This was aggravated by the negligence shown by the government toward former military officers, who had been deactivated in 1994 with no compensatory measure for acquired rights, and no control over military weapons. The UN, which initially seemed to represent part of the solution for national problems, oscillated between apathy and discredit. This resulted from five previous missions in the country that yielded no concrete results towards the continuity of national life in a self-sustainable, stable and secure manner so as to attract international credibility to the social, economic and political construction projects in the country.

It was in this context that, on 29 May 2004, the first Brazilian troops landed in Port-au-Prince as an advance echelon for those that would arrive the following week, totalling 1,200 troops of the Brazilian Brigade<sup>2</sup>. UNSC resolution 1542<sup>3</sup> dated 30 April 2004 succinctly instituted the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and determined the use of troops under the aegis of Chapter VII<sup>4</sup> of the UN Charter, something unprecedented for Brazil, establishing the following priority tasks (mandate): maintaining a secure and stable environment; supporting the political process; and respecting human rights. Subsequent resolutions essentially maintained the same priorities, but with a higher level of descriptive detail in the body of the document. They incorporated recommendations aimed at building the country under the concept of reconstruction, and searching for a solution to the causes of conflict (peacebuilding), albeit in a modest way.

It is worth pointing out that the Brazilian Brigade's initial destination was to be the Haitian capital, but due to the delayed arrival of other international contingents integrating the mission, Brazilian troops had to spread to another seven bases around the country. This demanded a huge logistical and operational effort, considering that the

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2 The Brazilian Peace Force Brigade was commanded by Major General Américo Salvador de Oliveira and had 1,200 officers distributed as follows: 19<sup>th</sup> Motorised Infantry Battalion (including one Mechanised Cavalry Squadron), Marine Task Force and support troops.

3 For UNSC Resolution 1542, please visit: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1542\(2004\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1542(2004)).

4 Actions related to threats to peace, disruption of peace and acts of aggression.

original planning did not include this possibility, as ensured by the UN. The total number of MINUSTAH troops was to be reached only at the end of 2004. This improved the operational conditions for the second Brazilian contingent deployed in December.

Due to the time elapsed between the Brazilian contingent's arrival and the Transfer of Responsibility (TOR) from MIF troops (approximately 25 days), the Brazilian Brigade Staff had time to update its planning, including through the insertion of operational techniques that could meet the demands of the area of operations within the spectrum of asymmetrical operations. This work provided Brazilian 'blue berets' with a perfect situational awareness of the area of operations, which enabled them to replace the MIF with no operational discontinuity.

It is important to bear in mind that much of what was faced in terms of operational difficulties by the first contingents derived from multiple inter-related factors, including: lack of definition regarding the parties to the conflict or the opposing groups, according to the UN's understanding in the context of a typical mission for the establishment of a peace agreement; the existence of different hostile groups, including former military officers; the absence of a local and structured police component that might be able to offer some sort of effective contribution; and the country's incipient and precarious infrastructure, which fundamentally affected circulation, the arrival of external resources, and communications. The situation could not be characterised as an environment similar to a 'war among people' so common in other regions around the world at the time, but certainly a number of threats were spread among Haitian society, the real centre of gravity of the whole peace operation.

After the initial difficulties were fully overcome, the results achieved by the first Brazilian contingents contributed significantly to the pacification process to be completed years later through the occupation of conflicted areas such as Cité Soleil, Bel Air and Cité Militaire, which were important hideouts for criminal gangs and paramilitary groups within the most important urban centre and capital of the country, Port-au-Prince. In addition, those initial hurdles served as opportunities for operational and logistical doctrinal experiments that were eventually approved and materialised in future contingents, among which: adapting military material; deploying special forces; and improving troop resupply processes.

In addition to these benefits projected during other deployments, it is worth adding the credibility and respect shown to Brazilians, not only among the Haitian population and the UN, but also by the international community, and by international, governmental and non-governmental organisations and bodies, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders, among numerous other players devoted to the effort of pacifying and rebuilding Haiti. When interacting with this myriad of players, Brazilian commanders (at all levels) always showed great ability to support the understanding that the use of force beyond strictly necessary levels would bring more damage than benefits to the already distressed Haitian people and to the expected results, and that a peace process meant, above all, caring for the civilian population and meeting their basic needs. In the case of Haiti, it essentially translated as security. Any deviation from this perception might lead to unpredictable and disastrous consequences, as we have unfortunately seen in other UN missions around the world.

The continuing efforts of the Brazilian troops, already arranged in a more adequate configuration from the third contingent onwards (i.e. a Peace Force Battalion), brought positive impacts to the total pacification of the country, as the operational capacity applied to several tactical situations spread beyond the limits of Port-au-Prince as a guarantee of operational results. Just as relevant were the contributions to the complex Haitian electoral process and to the improvement of national infrastructure. The latter was carried out by engineering troops and included renovating and building roads and streets; digging wells; building various facilities; and preparing anchoring points in several ports along the Haitian coast. It is clear, therefore, that the participation of the Brazilian military component went beyond its mandate as it incorporated several security-related tasks which impacted positively on the well-being of the population and helped to rebuild the country.

This option of using non-military capabilities often failed to obtain support from the higher spheres of the UN, in particular the Security Council, but with the new concept of early peacebuilding in peacekeeping<sup>5</sup>, it gradually became more accepted and even encouraged, within a context of more centralised planning for UN civilian-military cooperation, and consequently within MINUSTAH.

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<sup>5</sup> More information available at: <http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/89534>.

Brazil's contribution to Haiti was also significant outside the military scope. Since the beginning, Brazil was present to support a friendly country, establishing direct partnerships outside the UN umbrella under the coordination of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some examples of this bilateral cooperation include several technical cooperation projects in the areas of: family farming; security; recovery of airport and road infrastructure; training in civil defence; environmental development and recovery; and health support. Brazil has also provided Haiti with experts in the conduction of electoral processes, and this initiative has echoed favourably within the UN and the international community.

Returning our focus to the military arm of Brazilian assistance, as the Haiti experience matured, it brought significant impacts on the professional legacy of the Land Forces, which became evident in the decision of all Military Commands to apply a contingent rotation system. This strategic decision translated into a great opportunity for different hierarchical levels to be immersed in a real, asymmetrical and relatively complex operational environment overseas, a benefit that was extended to approximately 37,000 officers over 13 years. Military leaderships, both senior and junior, successfully went through hard tests and diverse and professionally enriching experiences, providing the Army and, to a lesser extent, the other Armed Forces, with highly qualified and developed human resources – an invaluable asset. Evidently, this experience comprises a multiplying effect, as the lessons learned were incorporated and newly arriving troops replicated that learning throughout their military career, both in Brazil or in other international forces.

Indeed, the relevance of the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre (CCOPAB, in the Portuguese acronym)<sup>6</sup> grew significantly as a result of Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH. CCOPAB became an internationally recognised training centre certified by the UN for its excellent work in training individuals and troops to join UN missions. This has been confirmed, in practice, by its qualification as a UN inspection agency for the accreditation of peace forces, hosting of international events and several partnerships signed with similar centres around the world. Brazil, through its participation in MINUSTAH and the benefits derived from it, further consolidated the international community's recognition of its operational efficiency and its major vocation for peace efforts at all levels. Brazil is considered a role model in peace operations by many other countries, regardless of their geographical location or development level, thus confirming an absolute truth: Brazil responds exceptionally well to calls for peace operations.

## New reality imposed by the earthquake

The catastrophe that hit Haiti in 2010 was the greatest tragedy in the history of that country, and, according to experts, the most dramatic setback suffered by the UN since its foundation.

In this article, we do not aim to provide figures and other more specific data on that tragedy. However, some considerations should be made regarding the impact of the event on the mission's military component – the only one that was not operationally affected by the earthquake, despite the losses it suffered.

Until 12 January 2010, Haiti was the country that represented the most successful UN stabilisation operation. In fact, the country was ready to move forward in a self-sustainable way, as highlighted by some indicators: fully stabilised security situation; disbanding of all criminal gangs; professionalisation and growth of the Haitian National Police; maintenance of security control all over the country; functioning national institutions; increased national credibility; due electoral process; and human rights situation under full control, among others. Considering the resolution issued in October 2009<sup>7</sup> about the situation in the country, by January 2010 the tasks assigned to the MINUSTAH components had been mostly consolidated.

Unfortunately, that situation changed dramatically on 12 January at 4:45pm, and the country plummeted into an even more deteriorated situation than that found by MINUSTAH in 2004. As expected, the event led the country into an extremely serious crisis, even in the regions that were not directly affected by the earthquake, but which were impacted by uncontrolled migration flows towards them.

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<sup>6</sup> CCOPAB official website: <http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/pt/>.

<sup>7</sup> UNSC Resolution 1892 is available at: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1892\(2009\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1892(2009)).

From the very first moments after the earthquake, the military component and the Brazilian troops, who were the majority in the capital (the epicentre of the earthquake), immediately started providing basic support to the population, including rescuing victims in the streets, removing bodies from the wreckage and clearing streets for circulation in Port-au-Prince. The Brazilian contingent had not even accounted for its losses yet, but it was already fully engaged in efforts to mitigate the crisis, including by adapting the Brazilian Battalion base (BRABATT) to treat people in critical conditions. It is important to point out that a significant number of MINUSTAH leaders and officers, as well as Haitian government officials, died in the earthquake. The initiative shown by all levels of command, as well as the multifunctional vocation of Brazilian soldiers, enabled them to act in very different situations, many of which were outside the original remit of the mission and the training they received for it. What mattered at the time was providing prompt and timely assistance, as it might save lives in critical conditions, which indeed happened.

The Peace Force Engineering Company was engaged beyond the doctrinal limits of its deployment and remained as such for a considerable period of time after the earthquake, as its effects could still be felt. It is, therefore, very difficult to list all the tasks carried out by our engineers, but no action to rescue victims and minimise the effects of the earthquake took place without their participation. However, due to their impact on immediate actions, some tasks deserve to be mentioned, not only due to their urgency, but also due to public health concerns, such as, for example, removing bodies from the streets and wreckage and preparing sites for collective graves under the guidance of the International Red Cross.

The military contribution of Brazilian 'blue berets' was crucial for establishing immediate control of the situation and thus avoid chaos. The lives that were lost in that tragedy are, in the purest essence of justice, the absolute example of dedication and commitment, as all of them were lost in the course of duty.

The Brazilian willingness to send additional troops to Haiti was also extremely relevant, as it expanded the capacity to provide humanitarian relief in the immediate aftermath of the event – barely three weeks after the request made by the UN. Once again, Brazil took the lead in providing troops, and deployed a second fully self-sustainable battalion (BRABATT 2), which immediately increased the MINUSTAH military component's capabilities, as other reinforcements failed to arrive so promptly. This immediate deployment had a huge impact within the UN and the international community, as Brazil demonstrated its willingness and, above all, its ability to respond quickly to a call for help in those conditions.

The Brazilian solidarity went far beyond what could be expected from UN military troops. From the first days after the earthquake, Brazil launched a humanitarian relief campaign focused on Haiti, which was similar to the work of supporting a military mission overseas. In order to achieve that, Brazil deployed air and naval assets at a higher intensity than other contributing countries so as to transport those items that were vital to minimise the effects of the tragedy. Over a short period of time, Brazilian Navy ships NDCC Almirante Sabóia and NDCC Garcia D'Ávila were deployed to transport additional military assets to the Brazilian troops, as well as critical items to support the local crisis. During the first months after the earthquake, the Brazilian Air Force (FAB, in the Portuguese acronym) operated two C-130 flights a day for the same purpose. The FAB also provided considerable help by erecting a field hospital in the country, ready to operate within seven hours of its installation. The hospital expanded significantly the capacity to provide healthcare to the population, as the local network had been completely devastated by the earthquake, and the UN hospital prioritised MINUSTAH personnel. Additionally, Brazilian engineering companies that had been working in the Dominican Republic and in Haiti offered their assets, in particular trucks, to assist with the removal of debris from the capital and neighbouring cities, thus substantially increasing the mission's capabilities. These are some concrete examples of the undeniable solidarity that earned Brazil a special status and that contributed significantly to strengthen its credibility and respect in the international sphere.

It is important to point out that, despite the priority given to addressing the immediate consequences of the earthquake, the essential mission to provide security had to be maintained as it was established in the UN mandate. That front had to be continually served due to the mass escape of prisoners that might reorganise themselves and start committing crimes again, as expected. The extraordinary troops that arrived in Haiti were able to focus on humanitarian relief, thus allowing those that had been deployed earlier and had better knowledge of the operational area to continue focusing on security, whilst also helping with emergency assistance. As said earlier, the arrival of a new Brazilian Battalion doubled the contingent in the capital and enabled BRABATT to focus on its original duties, which resulted in the almost immediate arrest of the fugitives. During the time when both battalions were present in Haiti (between March 2010 and May 2013)<sup>8</sup>, the deployed Brazilian troops were similar to the Brazilian Brigade deployed at the beginning of the mission in 2004.

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8 Source used: 5<sup>th</sup> Deputy Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Army – Brasilia – DF.

Under this combination of security and humanitarian relief, it is fair to recognise the significant support provided by international troops deployed to Haiti, which practically doubled the existing military contingent and were coordinated by the Force Commander. Although we recognise the relevance of other contributions, the support provided by the United States and Canada was particularly important in view of the considerable number of troops deployed and the diversity of assistance options under the letter of intentions signed with MINUSTAH. Their exclusive focus was on humanitarian relief, leaving security under the responsibility of MINUSTAH. This partnership worked extremely well, with no problems affecting any of the parties, due to the high level of professionalism shown by all and the understanding of the particular aspects of their specific missions<sup>9</sup>. Thus, Brazilian troops had a unique opportunity to work side-by-side with other highly qualified and experienced contingents. This highlighted the high level of training, commitment and selflessness shown by Brazilian soldiers. These qualities, among several others, earned them respect within and without Brazil. This understanding was shared by many civilian and military authorities that witnessed the work of Brazilians in Haiti.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that the experience gained during those tragic events was not present only in the heart and minds of those involved in providing immediate relief, but it was also recorded in a number of reports, work plans and special planning documents derived from an in-depth study on the lessons learned, which were recorded in several workshops and disseminated within the UN system due to the unprecedented nature of the tragedy. The Brazilian troops, being the majority and being deployed to the epicentre of the earthquake, provided a huge contribution in that regard, confirming the analyses and recommendations of those studies. The planning and implementation of activities to mitigate the effects of the earthquake resulted in extremely useful knowledge for the future of peace operations and humanitarian relief actions.

We may conclude, therefore, that Brazil's participation in providing immediate relief to the consequences of the earthquake went far beyond what was sustained by the troops integrating the military component of MINUSTAH, and extended towards other areas, thus helping to relieve the suffering of the population. This is still true today, albeit to a lesser extent. Brazil consolidated its position as an important international partner, and the highest expression of this role was embodied in the work of the Armed Forces.

## Final considerations

It would sound pretentious to try to describe, in these few pages, how meaningful Brazil's 13 years in Haiti were, both for that country and for Brazil. Many books, articles and reports have addressed this from different perspectives and with a constructive view of the topic. The authors of these works deserve special recognition, as they have contributed to keeping this topic in the agenda of Brazil's international relations and as proof of the professionalism of Brazilian Armed Forces.

After the earthquake, Brazilian troops could shift their primary focus back to security so as to enable Haiti to return to a condition of normality, although much still needs to be done in that regard. However, the mission established in the Security Council's mandate has been faithfully fulfilled, and the normality of the electoral process, the professionalisation of the Haitian National Police and the functioning of national institutions, both public and private, serve as clear indicators of success, among many others.

For the Armed Forces, in particular the Brazilian Army, that was a memorable experience. That opportunity was extended to troops from all over the country in a relatively risky and highly volatile environment, operating in an international context under the aegis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, thus levelling their experience at national level. Several benefits can be identified as a result of that, among which: cultural and doctrinal exchange with other countries; significant learning in the area of logistics; quality testing of Brazilian military equipment; improving the joint military expeditionary capability; application, improvement and reformulation of the Brazilian military doctrine; opportunity to complete the training of junior and senior officers in a real-life situation; and the international projection of Brazil and its Armed Forces.

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<sup>9</sup> See: Center for Army Lessons Learned (2011). *Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti*. Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Challenges in the Geographic Combatant Commands. Newsletter no. 11-23, March. Available at: [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call\\_11-23.pdf#page=135](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_11-23.pdf#page=135).

Their effects will continue to multiply in the future through younger troops deployed for that purpose, and based on the written memory of all that happened in that complex, asymmetrical and often diffuse operational environment.

What one expects for the future is that the consolidated learning from this epic experience does not fade away, but that it may be applied to other Brazilian engagements in UN operations, thus avoiding the hiatus observed between previous missions. In addition, we expect the Armed Forces to maintain their international prestige, credibility and efficiency, and to remain up-to-date on the dynamism of current conflicts, which is just as relevant.

The Report<sup>10</sup> published by the UN High Level Independent Panel, which ended its activities in June 2015, presents studies and recommendations that may be considered a stimulus for the constant improvement of peace forces, and opens a door for new participation opportunities subject to the priorities of Brazilian diplomacy and the assent of Brazilian Defence. Brazil's engagement in this type of international assistance may continue to happen without prejudice to the capabilities left in the country. This understanding deserves to be considered separately from any temporary difficulties, so that any decision adopted by Brazil may correspond to what is expected of the country, both internally and externally. In other words, a State that is strong, stable, fully sovereign and in tune with the most relevant causes identified by the international community.

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<sup>10</sup> For the full report, please access: [http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO\\_Report\\_1\\_June\\_2015.pdf](http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf).



Credit: CCOPAB's Social Communications Team

# Preparation and performance at tactical-operational level

## 3. Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre: post-MINUSTAH history and perspectives

Col. Carlos Augusto RAMIRES Teixeira

## 4. The initial challenges for Brazilian Armed Forces' participation in MINUSTAH

Rear Admiral CARLOS CHAGAS Vianna Braga – Brazilian Marine Corps

## 5. Brazilian music at MINUSTAH – music as a diplomatic weapon

Dr Vinicius Mariano de Carvalho



Façade of the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre in Rio de Janeiro  
Credit: CCOPAB's Social Communications Team

## 3. Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre: post-MINUSTAH history and perspectives

Col. Carlos Augusto RAMIRES Teixeira

### Introduction

The UN Security Council's decision to end the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) on 15 October 2017<sup>1</sup> also establishes very emphatically the need to consolidate the several different processes implemented over these past thirteen years of Brazilian presence in that country. Of all the lessons learned during the mission, which was Brazil's longest participation with troops overseas, the establishment of national training standards for peace operations is worthy to be mentioned.

The Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre (CCOPAB, in the Portuguese acronym), also known as the Sergio Vieira de Mello Centre, resulted from demands arisen during the development of that multidimensional peacekeeping mission, as well as from the alignment of Brazil's national diplomatic thinking and the views of the Ministry of Defence with the new guidelines adopted by the UN Secretariat.

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<sup>1</sup> UNSC resolution 2350 of 17 April 2017 established the last extension of the MINUSTAH mandate until 15 October 2017.

In this context, and maintaining the flexibility of personnel, equipment, curricular and pedagogical adjustments, CCOPAB eventually became an international reference for the preparation of peace and humanitarian demining missions, thus extrapolating its merely tactical mission and becoming an instrument to spread this knowledge. Rather than raising concern about a potential negative impact, the end of MINUSTAH points to an even more auspicious future for CCOPAB, notably due to the international recognition of its training, the systematisation of its internal processes and the link established with agencies and offices at various levels within the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, national and international academic organisations, humanitarian organisations and United Nations agencies.

## Background

Training of Brazilian individuals and troops to participate in peace missions can be better and more clearly understood if we divide it in four phases: the first marks the beginning of Brazil's participation in such operations in 1947<sup>2</sup> and lasted until the 1990s, when the military, whether or not part of a contingent, carried out their own training.

The second started in 1992, when the then Ministry of the Army established the principles related to deploying personnel to work together with groups of international organisation military observers, appointing the Army General Staff (*Estado-Maior do Exército* – EME, in the Portuguese acronym) as the organisation responsible for individual training.

On 26 February 1996, the Chief of the Army General Staff decided to create the 'Brazilian Army Experts on Mission Course (*Estágio de Preparação de Militares do Exército Brasileiro para Missões de Paz* – EPMP, in the Portuguese acronym)' with the objective of training Land Force personnel to engage in Peace Force missions under the aegis of international organisations.

In 2001, the Brazilian Army Training and Evaluation Centre for Peace Missions (*Centro de Preparação e Avaliação para Missões de Paz do Exército Brasileiro* – CEPAB, in the Portuguese acronym) was created under the Planning and Management Section of the Brazilian Army's Land Operations Command (*Comando de Operações Terrestres* – COTER, in the Portuguese acronym), which is in charge of training Land Forces. CEPAB's mission was to guide and train all Army personnel appointed to integrate peace missions, thus relieving the Army General Staff from that responsibility. That moment marked the end of the second phase and the beginning of a new training cycle, which culminated in the creation of the Peacekeeping Training Centre (*Centro de Instrução de Operações de Paz* – CI Op Paz, in the Portuguese acronym). From 2002 onwards, the Army Experts on Mission Course was organised and conducted by the International Affairs Section of the Brazilian Army General Staff on a distance learning basis. The training was taken by volunteers among those selected by the Army Commander's Office as likely to be deployed in peace operations.

In 2004, the EPMP resumed its on-site training in Brasilia under the responsibility of CEPAB/COTER.

At that time, the Deputy Chief of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Subdivision of the Army General Staff intended to create a Peace Force Brigade based at the Training Unit Group (9<sup>th</sup> Motorised Infantry Brigade) with a Training Centre within its structure. The 57<sup>th</sup> Motorised Infantry Battalion – the Infantry School Regiment (REI, in the Portuguese acronym), was the initial unit selected to launch the initiative.

Still in 2004, even before the creation of the Peace Force Brigade, the Infantry School Regiment started its peace operation exercises, with an active role in training the 2<sup>nd</sup> Haiti Brigade Contingent, in cooperation with the Army Training Evaluation Centre (*Centro de Avaliação de Adestramento do Exército* – CAAdEx, in the Portuguese acronym).

In December of the same year, after the appointment of the 9<sup>th</sup> Motorised Infantry Brigade as the base for the Haiti Brigade – 3<sup>rd</sup> Contingent, having the Infantry School Regiment as the base for the Haiti Battalion, the 9<sup>th</sup> Brigade Commander determined the creation of a Training Centre focused on peace operation training.

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2 The conflict in the Balkans had, for the first time, Brazilian diplomats and military officers acting under the aegis of the UN as members of a peace negotiation process.

By February 2005, while still within the Infantry School Regiment's facilities, this new military organisation was in full operation, delivering training and controlling the preparation of the Haiti Battalion and the Haiti Brigade Administrative Base – 3<sup>rd</sup> Contingent.

From that moment onwards, there was a radical change in the way that the Army trained its troops for peace operations, at a time when these became more complex and multidimensional, with a substantial participation of civilians and police officers<sup>3</sup>. In the specific case of MINUSTAH, the use of force to accomplish the mission, the solid alignment with Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, and the additional difficulties imposed by its strict compliance with the rules of engagement added a significant challenge to the training of troops<sup>4</sup>.

The Brazilian initiative was fully in line with what was taking place within the UN. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 44/49 of 8 December 1989 on the 'Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All their Aspects' and the launch of the Brahimi Report<sup>5</sup> in 2000 encouraged all Member States to organise training programmes for civilians, military and police officers with a view to engaging them in peace operations.

A UNGA IV Committee meeting with the same name took place on 4 October 2005. On that occasion, the Military Counsellor at Brazil's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York delivered a speech. The meeting deepened discussions on that matter and stressed the future commitment of several Member States to specific training aspects for peace operations.

As a consequence of those events and in view of the growing international mobilisation towards creating structures that enabled the practice and dissemination of rules and procedures adopted in peace missions, the Brazilian Army, the most significant contributor within the Brazilian Armed Forces to that type of mission, officially created, through Army Commander Ordinance no. 090 of 23 February 2005, the Peacekeeping Training Centre (CI Op Paz). In 2005 and 2006, it operated as a unit within the Infantry School Regiment's facilities, and only evolved into a more structured Centre on 17 January 2007, when it moved to the area then occupied by CAAdEx, where it is still head-quartered.

After the creation of the CI Op Paz, the 3<sup>rd</sup> phase in the training of individuals and troops for peace missions started. CEPABE gradually transferred training and preparation activities to the new unit, whilst keeping some of its original responsibilities, including troop mobilisation; guidance on training, supervision and support to ongoing peace missions; planning of new peace missions; doctrinal proposals; and troop demobilisation.

At the end of 2006, CEPABE was removed from the Land Operations Command's Planned Positions Chart (*Quadro de Cargos Previstos* – QCP, in the Portuguese acronym) as a result of the creation of the Peace Missions Division and its subordination to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Section of that Sectoral Body (ODS, in the Portuguese acronym). Initially created as a virtual doctrinal training and supervision centre, the Peace Missions Division is currently the body that concentrates all planning, coordination, supervision and support efforts relative to Brazilian Army personnel and contingents operating in UN individual missions. It is supported by the Land Force Current Peace Missions Support Group (*Grupo de Acompanhamento e Apoio às Missões de Paz no âmbito da Força Terrestre* – GAAPAZ, in the Portuguese acronym).

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<sup>3</sup> So-called 'Third-Generation Peace Operations' started after the publication of the Brahimi Report (2000) and are characterised by multidimensional operations under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, prioritising the protection of civilians in UN Security Council mandates.

<sup>4</sup> For the first time ever, Brazilian troops would be deployed in peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

<sup>5</sup> The report resulted from a general review of peace operations led by Algerian Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, commissioned by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and prompted by failures recorded in such operations in the 1990s.

## Training for MINUSTAH

In February 2005, after the appointment of the Commander of the CI Op Paz and the Infantry School Regiment, the Haiti Battalion training and control activities effectively started. The CI Op Paz was officially created on 1 March 2005. Structural adaptations and changes in the new facility, which had served as the base for CAAdEx, enabled the creation of the first classrooms, training rooms and a video-conference room (the Haiti Room). It is worth noting that, at the time, the guiding principle was to establish a futuristic unit, with state-of-the-art technology and innovative features.

Still in 2005, the CI Op Paz and CAAdEx established full training procedures for the first contingent, including the Pre-Deployment Advanced Field Exercise (*Exercício Avançado de Operações de Paz* – EAOP, in the Portuguese acronym). For such, the first Standard Programme (SP) for training was established, fundamentally based on a review of the Brazilian experience in 1965, when the Brazilian Contingent of Inter-American Armed Force was deployed (*Destacamento Brasileiro da Força Armada Interamericana* – FAIBRAS, in the Portuguese acronym)<sup>6</sup>.

In 2006, the Peace Force Brigade was dissolved, and the CI Op Paz became a Military Organisation Directly Subordinate (OMDS, in the Portuguese acronym) to the 1<sup>st</sup> Army Division<sup>7</sup>.

During the first half of 2007, the CI Op Paz focused on instructions for the 7<sup>th</sup> Contingent. The first event held in the facilities of the new Centre was the Course for Commanders and Joint Staff (*Estágio de Preparação para o Comandante e o Estado-Maior Combinado* – EPCOEM, in the Portuguese acronym) of the Haiti Battalion, prior to the Advance Exercise for Commanders and Staff Officers. On that occasion, the Centre welcomed its first Navy and Air Force students. That is considered the first ever 'joint' training activity. In the second half of the same year, in addition to that preparatory course, the first version of the 'Course for Subunit Commanders and Platoon Leaders' (*Estágio de Preparação para Comandantes de Subunidade e Pelotão* – EPCOSUPEL, in the Portuguese acronym) was delivered to the 8<sup>th</sup> Contingent.

Using part of the new facilities, the Centre adopted a training curriculum focused on shooting training, land use and rules of engagement, besides the United Nations Standardised Generic Training Module (SGTM). In addition, the Centre participated in preparatory training and was responsible for developing the Pre-Deployment Advanced Field Exercise (EAOP) for the Peace Force Engineering Company.

In the second half of that year, the Brazilian Army Experts on Mission Course (EPMP) was created with a focus on personnel that would be deployed as Military Observers or Staff Officers. Between 2007 and 2009, civilians were able to take part in training programmes such as: the 'Course for Journalists in Conflict Areas (*Estágio para Jornalistas e Assessores de Imprensa em Áreas de Conflito* – EPJAIAC, in the Portuguese acronym)', the 'Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Course (IDDRC)' and the 'Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE)' Course, as well as through conferences, seminars, workshops and lectures at higher education institutions and international training centres.

In 2008, the training requirements for the Engineering Company were established. The Company was given the same treatment as the Haiti Battalion, and its staff participated in all the training delivered.

In the same year, the Centre received its first foreign student and the first State Police student. Thus, the CI Op Paz started fulfilling the mission established in the Ordinance that created the unit: 'support the preparation and training of military personnel from the Brazilian Navy, Brazilian Army and Brazilian Air Force, as well as civilians and police officers from Brazil and friendly countries, to engage in peacekeeping and humanitarian demining missions'.

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6 In 1965-1966, the UN created the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP). Brazil participated in that mission with an officer deployed to the office of the Representative. However, the most significant Brazilian participation took place under the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), which was created by the Organisation of American States (OAS) and successively commanded by Brazilian Army Generals Hugo Panasco Alvim and Álvaro da Silva Braga. Brazil deployed 1,200 military personnel through FAIBRAS (Brazilian Contingent of the IAPF) under the command of then Colonel Carlos de Meira Mattos.

7 Great Command of the Brazilian Army, head-quartered at the Deodoro district in Rio de Janeiro.

In November 2008, the CI Op Paz consolidated its name in the international sphere by hosting, together with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Senior Mission Leadership Course (SML)<sup>8</sup> for General Officers, police officers and civilians from several countries who were likely to occupy senior leadership positions in peace missions. Also in late 2008, the Land Operations Command appointed the CI Op Paz to carry out an on-site training programme for all Brazilian police officers appointed for peace operations.

Little by little, it became necessary to expand the staffing plans and to improve even further the quality of existing facilities and structures. This was achieved through the creation of the Integration Hall and the Sergio Vieira de Mello Cultural Centre, as well as the construction of new facilities to host students and teachers. The acquisition of a shooting simulator in 2008 contributed to the training on the rules of engagement, particularly with regard to internalising the concepts of gradual use of force and protecting civilians.

This moment was also marked by the first Brazilian participation in the Annual Assembly of the Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (ALCOPAZ, in the Spanish acronym)<sup>9</sup>, an organisation that brings together all Peacekeeping Centres in the region with the aim of sharing information on the courses developed and the lessons learned.

In December 2009, Brazil was awarded the first Certificate of Training Recognition<sup>10</sup> by the DPKO after having improved its Basic and Advanced Peace Operation Exercises and met the UN requirements regarding Pre-Deployment Training.

On 3 December 2008, the Army Commander approved Ordinance no. 949, which historically named the CI Op Paz as the Sergio Vieira de Mello Centre in honour and recognition of the achievements of the late Brazilian UN staff in the quest for world peace and his commitment to the UN system. In early 2009, the first foreign officer, Navy Commander Nuñez from Argentina, and the first State Police instructor, PMERJ Major Cândido, joined the CI Op Paz training cadre, which turned it into an international integrated centre.

## Creation and institutional evolution of CCOPAB

The fourth stage in the evolution of the training architecture of Brazilian troops started on 15 June 2010, when Ministerial Decree no. 952 of the Defence Ministry tasked the CI Op Paz with the training of military and civilian personnel from Brazil and friendly countries to be deployed in humanitarian demining and peace missions, and changed its name to Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre (CCOPAB).

It is important to highlight the strategic vision behind that appointment, as it denotes the understanding, among the highest ranks of Brazilian military decision makers, about the international importance of the Centre and its capacity to interact with other components integrating a peace mission.

On 10 September 2010, at a meeting conducted by the 5<sup>th</sup> Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, the distribution of roles among the Forces was established. That distribution still applies to this day.

In 2011, when the Brazilian Navy joined the United Nations Interim Mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as the leader of the Maritime Task Force (MTF)<sup>11</sup>, CCOPAB established a training programme for the crew of the Frigate

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8 Training conducted by the DPKO aimed at General Officers with potential to act as Force Commanders, usually delivered once a year with the objective of strengthening senior leadership capacity through training in effective planning and integrated UN peacekeeping operations. In Brazil, the course has been delivered twice: in 2008 and 2013.

9 The eleven Peace Operations Training Centres in Latin America are ALCOPAZ members: Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Chile and Mexico (currently in construction). The Observer Members are: Igarapé Institute (Brazil), Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI-USA), UN Training Centre of the German Armed Forces (Germany), Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute – Army War College (USA).

10 Process established according to the faithful observance of the teaching guidelines established by the Integrated Training Service (ITS), an organisation that formulates and assesses DPKO-DFS courses and evaluates different potentials of the requesting institution, such as the linguistic skills of teachers, the quality of facilities and the teaching methods.

11 The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force (MTF), created in October 2006, supports the Lebanese Navy in monitoring its territorial waters, securing the Lebanese coastline and preventing the unauthorised entry of arms or related materials by sea into Lebanon. It currently has seven vessels. The Brazilian Navy has led the MTF since February 2011.

that would be sent to the Middle East, consolidating its curriculum in the following year. In the same year, the Centre was awarded a Certificate of Training Recognition for its 'Experts on Mission Course (Military Observer)' by the Integrated Training Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (ITS/DPKO), and started the certification process for its 'Experts on Mission Course (Staff Officers)'.

In 2012, through an ordinance issued by the Brazilian Army Education and Culture Department (DECEX, in the Portuguese acronym), CCOPAB was recognised and accredited as a Teaching Institution, and started offering and delivering distance training activities.

In 2013, due to the need to adapt the curriculum as observed during the deployment of the mission in Haiti, a new structure was consolidated for a Preparatory Course for Military Translators and Interpreters (ETIMIL, in the Portuguese acronym), expanding the study load through distance learning activities.

In the same year, the first 'Logistics and Reimbursement in Peacekeeping Operations Course (*Estágio de Logística e Reembolso em Operações de Paz* – ELROP, in the Portuguese acronym) was planned and delivered, filling a gap on the reimbursement processes carried out by the United Nations, as well as the main Brazilian players involved in Armed Forces logistics.

That period was also marked by enhanced trainer exchanges among the several ALCOPAZ Peace Operation Centres, as well as the beginning of negotiations for Brazil to host the Annual Conference of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC)<sup>12</sup>.

CCOPAB activities included, among others: the implementation and consolidation of teaching and instruction management processes, integrating the Army Teaching System and the Brazilian Army Military Training System (*Sistema de Instrução Militar do Exército Brasileiro* – SIMEB, in the Portuguese acronym); the consolidated structuring of pedagogical and psycho-pedagogical coordination sections, contributing to the efficacy of the teaching-learning process; the updating of normative acts for the several courses provided by the Centre; the restructuring and adaptation of training programmes; the development of the Centre's Internal Rules and Regulations; the adaptation of educational documents to current norms; the updating of programmes and restructuring of the Experts on Mission Course (Military Observer, Staff Officer and UN Police Officer); and the academic integration with different higher education institutions.

Still in 2013, coinciding with the development of studies by the DPKO Integrated Training Service (ITS) on the assessment of troops and individuals in peacekeeping missions, CCOPAB created the Assessment Division, which originated from the Assessment Section of the existing Integrated Teaching Division. Thus, in 2014 it was possible to methodologically introduce peacekeeping assessment and certification processes, establishing performance parameters integrated with the guidelines issued in New York, and, at the same time, consistent with the protocols of the Army Teaching System.

Performance measurement and statistical data collection led to a quantitative and qualitative increase of the diagnostic standards of the Peace Force Battalion and the Engineering Company undergoing training, and served as an important rectification/ratification tool for the Command of these units in the final stages of training the Contingent. In this context, still in 2014, the Military Staff Officers Course was awarded a DPKO Recognition Certificate.

Due to the requirements established in the United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual, other innovations were introduced in the training of the Brazilian Battalion. Some examples include the training for Quick Reaction Force (QRF) using aircraft, and the extension of the Pre-Deployment Advanced Field Exercise from one to two weeks. In this exercise, a Data-Sheet System (SISFICHAS, in the Portuguese acronym) was introduced to produce data-sheets and devise scenarios, in addition to the Peacekeeping Operations Management System (*Sistema de Gestão das Operações de Paz* – SIGEPAZ, in the Portuguese acronym), for a more qualitative management of the results achieved on the ground during the exercises.

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<sup>12</sup> The IAPTC is an open and voluntary association of centres, institutions, and programmes dealing with peace operations research, education, and training. Their goals include promoting a better understanding of peacekeeping, its goals and objectives, as well as the methods employed in peacekeeping training.

During the same period, the 5<sup>th</sup> Deputy Chief of the Brazilian Army General Staff consulted CCOPAB on the possibility of establishing partnerships with some African countries in order to encourage bilateral relations. The Mobile Training Teams (MTT) project was developed as a result of that. The MTTs are usually composed of four military personnel that are expert in specific areas and fluent in English, and that are able to share their knowledge of standard UN material according to the needs of the requesting country<sup>13</sup>.

In 2015, Brazil provided a major contribution to the continuity of studies and the exchange of information on peacekeeping operations by hosting the 21<sup>st</sup> IAPTC Annual Conference in Brasilia. CCOPAB employed its own personnel to help to plan and host the Conference, and was recognised for the flawless and highly professional event. Their performance ultimately helped to consolidate the international perception about the Brazilian excellence in carrying out tasks related to training troops for peacekeeping operations, and significantly expanded the Centre's networking capacity.

Brazil's knowledge of the whole training process led to the production, between 2015 and 2016, of the Brazilian Battalion Peacekeeping Operations Training Manual and the review of the Peace Operations Manual, in partnership with the Brazilian Army General Staff and the Land Operations Command, notably to share theoretical and practical knowledge on the topic.

## Current structure and future projects

Currently, CCOPAB has a total of about 200 soldiers of the three Armed Forces. Their distribution is proportional to the participation of each of the Forces in peace operations since 1947. It also counts on the permanent cooperation of military officers from Argentina, Chile and France, and welcomes trainers and students from several other friendly countries for *ad hoc* activities. A significant part of CCOPAB's professional staff have been trained to teach in international peace operation courses. With regard to the teaching facilities, CCOPAB has four classrooms, including one at the Sergio Vieira de Mello Cultural Centre, and a total capacity to host up to 60 students at any one time. All the classrooms have modern teaching resources, including video-conferencing equipment (Haiti Room).

In the first half of 2017, the construction of the 'Delta Camp' began. It is based on containers and has four additional classrooms and enough facilities to redistribute various divisions. The space has been modelled to contain state-of-the-art technology and to apply it in the teaching-learning process, motivating the teaching cadre to seek excellence in their activities.

Today, CCOPAB regularly delivers the following courses and exercises:

- a. In the 'Troops' module:
  - 'Commanders and Joint Staff Course (EPCOEM)';
  - 'Military Translators and Interpreters Course (ETIMIL)';
  - 'Subunit Commanders and Platoon Leaders Course (EPCOSUPEL)';
  - 'Logistics and Reimbursement in PKO Course (ELROP)';
  - 'Protection of Civilians Course (EPC)';
  - 'Civilian-Military Coordination Course (CIMIC)';
  - 'Pre-Deployment Basic Field Exercise (EBOP)'; and
  - 'Pre-Deployment Advanced Field Exercise (EAOP)'.

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<sup>13</sup> Since its implantation, CCOPAB MTTs have sent teams to Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Colombia. An MTT was sent to Mexico in November 2017. This 'military diplomacy' relationship led to new requests directly and indirectly linked to the MTTs, such as the request for a Brazilian officer to advise on the consolidation of the Angola Peace Operations Centre, and the appointment of another Brazilian officer to teach at the Ethiopian Peace Operations Centre. Both officers belong to the CCOPAB teaching cadre.

All troop training courses are being adapted to the United Nations Peacekeeping Capabilities Readiness System (UNPCRS) module so as to meet future demands for Brazilian participation in peace operations<sup>14</sup>.

b. In the 'Individuals' module:

- 'Military Experts on Mission Course (EPMP)';
- 'Course for Journalists in Conflict Areas (EPJAIAC)';
- 'Training Course for Civilians Working in Unstable Settings (EPCAAI)';
- 'Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE) Course'; and
- 'UN DPKO Secondment Training (EPEC-DPKO).

c. In the 'Demining' module:

- 'Mine Action Course', which replaced the 'Humanitarian Demining Course', carried out until the first half of 2017.

As a result of the institutional growth and the soundness of the bases created since the CI Op Paz, some curricular adjustments and projects could be implemented, as we will see below.

With regard to the internal teaching architecture and its connection with the 'end product' of training courses, the current system encourages the daily monitoring of guidelines and other documents issued by the DPKO. Whether through the ongoing operations in which Brazil participates, or through contacts with Brazilian experts around the world, the Doctrine Division (DivDout, in the Portuguese acronym) strives to remain constantly up-to-date. Thus, this Division establishes a 'curricular policy', i.e. it determines which topics/instructions will be the focus of current operations and what level of attention should be given to cross-cutting themes<sup>15</sup>. Secondly, the Education and Training Division (DET, in the Portuguese acronym) establishes its planning for the execution of preparatory courses in line with that doctrinal guidance, trying to emphasise each reported topic in a proportionate manner. All training courses try to be as realistic as possible, aiming at recreating in detail what future peacekeepers will experience on the ground.

When carrying out the EAOP, in order to benefit from existing technology, a command and control software has been introduced to monitor incidents online. Using a command and control vehicle, and having access to the internet, the Direction of the Exercise (DirEx) team are able to monitor the evolution of all events, including through real imaging. In the same context, still at the EAOP, an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV level 1) was introduced as a command and control tool to support After Action Review (AAR).

As a lesson learned from these AARs, an opportunity was detected to improve the experience of Observers, Coordinators and Evaluators (OCA, in the Portuguese acronym), separately focusing on 'green approach' and 'blue approach' aspects so as to distinguish where troop commanders should put more emphasis in the training of their subordinates. In this context, the participation of CAAdEx during the 'conventional training' stage and their support during the EBOP and EAOP also proved vital, both with regard to applying tactics, techniques and procedures, and in their evaluation at the end of the exercises.

Due to the need to improve the use of the time available for on-site courses, a Distance Learning Section was created within the Education and Training Division with the mission of managing the work in this teaching mode and planning the structuring of personnel and material for the Section.

Similarly, aiming at meeting the demand envisaged in the Ordinance that created CCOPAB, a project was developed to create a Civilian Affairs Section to stimulate more integration with the civilian environment through technical agreements, and a future institutional destination for this segment within the structure of the Centre.

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14 UNPCRS – System that replaced the old United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), changing the way that Member States offered their operative capabilities for peacekeeping operations. Under the new system, after the first offer (level 1), the DPKO carries out a compulsory inspection visit to the units included in the offer so as to grant permission to proceed to other stages (level 2), which will ultimately lead to the signing of a memorandum of understanding (level 3). Currently, the Brazilian offers are at level 2.

15 Issues related to gender, sexual exploitation and abuse, international humanitarian law, protection of civilians and rules of engagement.

Another recently introduced novelty was the creation of the MEoM language stage<sup>16</sup>. This stage, so far conducted by the Personnel Studies Centre (*Centro de Estudos de Pessoal* – CEP, in the Portuguese acronym) and lasting for one month, is now under the responsibility of CCOPAB. It encourages the use of English, Spanish and French with a focus on peace mission technical terminology. In this regard, a project is also being developed for the creation of a ‘French Course for Peace Operations’ aiming at meeting the growing demand within the United Nations for French speaking personnel.

In order to improve communications with several Army command chain and external entities, including civilians, universities and UN agencies, the Planning and Coordination Division (DPC, in the Portuguese acronym) has been created. This new division’s mission is to develop institutional relations with all stakeholders interacting with CCOPAB, in addition to planning and coordinating all internal training programmes, training cooperation requests, the selection for overseas trips and the proper use of the internal teaching structure.

As the end of MINUSTAH approached, CCOPAB participated in the planning and delivery of the new modules required for participating in future peace missions – the UNPCRS. In addition to training an Infantry Battalion and an Engineering Company, both from the Army, the Centre also delivered preparatory courses for Units C-105, A-29 and H-60 of the Brazilian Air Force, and for a Level II Medical Unit (Joint Forces). All units were assessed by a UN team visiting Brazil and were raised to the second level of the system, which means they are ready to sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) and be selected for a peace mission in the future<sup>17</sup>.

In order to keep the focus on seeking excellence, the Centre has requested a DPKO Certificate of Recognition for its ‘CIMIC Preparatory Course’, which is now delivered in English. This constant commitment with international recognition motivates the cadres and encourages the ongoing review of internal processes, as well as the consolidation of new ones.

The whole training system adopted so far is in the process of being merged into a single product named ‘CCOPAB – Training Protocol’, which will facilitate any and all consultations on the existing model, both for troops and individuals, as a recognition of the importance of consolidating what has been learned and as a tribute to all that have helped to build this successful model.

Also with the aim of paying tribute to all troops that participated in the thirteen years of MINUSTAH, the Centre will reserve an area within the Sergio Vieira de Mello Cultural Centre to house part of the objects of the General Jaborandi Base<sup>18</sup> after its deactivation.

Finally, as an implemented project, due to the ever-growing contacts with academic research entities, CCOPAB has produced, through its command chain, agreements with several institutions that now form the Brazilian Research Network on Peace Operations (*Rede Brasileira de Pesquisa em Operações de Paz* – REBRAPAZ). Agreements have already been signed with the Igarapé Institute, PUC-Rio, USP and UNESP. The Estácio de Sá University (in Rio de Janeiro), UNICURITIBA and UFF are about to formalise similar agreements. The goal of REBRAPAZ is to stimulate research on this topic, making it available as a research area in universities, as well as facilitating closer contacts between national civilian organisations and academia with military entities.

Some performance indicators illustrate that the vision of the Unit – be internationally recognised for the excellence of its training of military, civilian and police officers for peacekeeping operations and humanitarian demining missions – is at a stage of full consolidation as a result of its constant growth: number of foreign visitors; number of foreign trainers and trainees in English language courses; and number of overseas missions visiting the Centre.

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16 The MEoM has three different stages: the first, through distance learning, provides basic knowledge on the UN system and peace operations; the second, through on-site learning, delivers instrumental knowledge of English, French and Spanish; and the third complements and consolidates the specific knowledge of future Military Observers, Staff Officers and UN Police Officers through on-site training and field exercises.

17 See footnote no. 14.

18 Brazilian base in Haiti, which includes officers from the Battalion, the Engineering Company and the Marine Task Force.

## Final considerations

The Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre arose from a national demand established when Brazil participated in the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti. After 13 years in that Caribbean country, it is possible to say that the Battalion and Engineering Company Peace Operation training modules are consolidated and ready to be adapted to meet new challenges. Such demand led to improvements in the quality of individual courses and the consequent certification by the United Nations, which accredited the Brazilian Centre to share its knowledge with other friendly countries.

Over the history of MINUSTAH, building on the teaching facilities and methodologies established by the CI Op Paz, CCOPAB developed its own institutional identity and obtained international recognition.

The doctrinal revalidation of several chapters of troop and police application handbooks in urban and rural settings and the testing of required innovations were clearly the greatest contributions of the Brazilian presence in Haiti. Thus, CCOPAB helped military from the three Single Forces and police officers from several states to grow within their institutions.

As a result of its integration with several governmental entities, think tanks, universities and UN agencies, CCOPAB has a very high potential to develop planning linked to peace operations, particularly those that require such multidisciplinary approach. By hosting major events, such as the IAPTC, seminars, symposia and workshops, both national and international, the Centre demonstrates its flexibility and natural inclination to address issues strategically, both within the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The launch of the UNPCRS modules marks a new stage in Brazilian training. The end of MINUSTAH is not a limiting factor for the continuity and strengthening of this process. Undoubtedly, new challenges will appear soon, but for each of them we already have a minimum level of expertise gained during these 13 years. This will enable us to assess and adapt our training modules. This is what happened during the stabilisation stage, in the support offered to the victims of catastrophes, in the support to the elections, and in the daily discovery of how to protect the Haitian population. With the same pioneering spirit of the CI Op Paz, CCOPAB sees this opportunity as a new turning point, sure of its importance and responsibility. *'Integração!'*<sup>19</sup>

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19 I.e. 'Integration' – the Unit's 'Battle Cry', which symbolises the synergy among its members from the three Single Forces.

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Cerimônia militar para marcar o início da MINUSTAH, realizada em 02 jun 2004.  
Crédito: Evan Schneider/Foto ONU

## 4. The initial challenges for Brazilian Armed Forces' participation in MINUSTAH

Rear Admiral CARLOS CHAGAS Vianna Braga – Brazilian Marine Corps

On the sunny morning of 22 May 2004, the first group of nine Brazilian officers (Navy and Army) landed in Port-au-Prince to integrate the Military Staff of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Three of them immediately joined military officers from other countries (such as France, US, Chile, Canada and Uruguay) in an Interim Staff activated on the same day with the aim of monitoring the arrival of contingents and, in particular, facilitate and expedite the transition with the Multinational Interim Force (MIF), which had been deployed since the crisis that led to the fall of President Aristide. Therefore, even before the UN mandate took effect, that moment marked the beginning of the effective and direct participation of Brazilian Armed Forces in MINUSTAH. Their engagement would last for 13 uninterrupted years until the mission came to an end in October 2017.

During all that time, the mission went through several stages with very distinct characteristics, alternating periods in which the intense use of force was necessary with others where the priority was humanitarian aid. This was particularly true after major natural disasters, such as the 2010 earthquake and the frequent hurricanes and storms that hit the country. A total of approximately 37,000 Brazilian troops integrated the mission. Thus, the Brazilian Armed Forces and their members performed with undeniable success the task of contributing to providing a secure and stable environment in that friendly country, while accumulating very relevant experiences for their institutional and personal growth. Haiti and MINUSTAH definitely marked forever the lives of a whole generation of Brazilian soldiers and marines!

The purpose of this short article is to succinctly present some of the main challenges encountered in the initial phase of the operation. Overcoming such challenges was vital to achieve success in MINUSTAH. This article is written from the perspective of the author, who played an active role in the joint planning process and integrated the mission during its first year, from the very beginning of the deployment<sup>1</sup>. That mission was undoubtedly the most important landmark in the history of Brazilian participation in UN peace operations.

## Joint planning and initial deployment

Even before the approval of the MINUSTAH mandate by the UN Security Council, the Armed Forces of countries such as Brazil had been preparing for their potential participation in the mission. Shortly after the preliminary political consultations about Brazil's interest in participating, an intense process of joint planning started under the coordination of the then Defence Staff (EMD, in the Portuguese acronym), which corresponds to the current Armed Forces Joint Staff (*Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas* – EMCFA, in the Portuguese acronym). The objective of that intense joint planning exercise was to organise a Brazilian contingent that could be deployed to join a future peace mission in Haiti, if it was confirmed. The joint planning would thus add to some ongoing initiatives of the Forces. The Navy, for instance, had already started a detailed planning process based on an initially fictitious operation plan developed in the early days of the Haitian crisis in 2004. The Albatross Operation Plan basically contemplated sending a Marine Air Ground Task Force (*Grupamento Operativo de Fuzileiros Navais* – GptOpFuzNav, in the Portuguese acronym) to work on a solution for the Haitian crisis under the aegis of the UN<sup>2</sup>.

Once the mandate was approved, and considering the short time available before it took effect, the planning and preparations entered a hectic stage. Thus, that integration work developed by the EMD enabled the consolidation of the structure of Brazil's future military contingent as well as the launch of all necessary arrangements to allow for its effective and timely deployment to Haiti. As a result, Brazil created and deployed to Haiti a Brigade with 1,200 officers basically composed of an Army Battalion and Administrative Base, and a Marine Task Force (GptOpFuzNav). Thus, the Brigade commanded by a Major General was deployed to Port-au-Prince and, for a considerable length of time, had full responsibility for the city. In addition, it supported operations in other regions of Haiti. Later, contingents from other countries were deployed to strengthen security in Port-au-Prince (Jordan and Sri Lanka), sharing that sector with Brazil<sup>3</sup>.

It is important to point out that such joint planning enabled Brazil to achieve a notable initial success. All contingent equipment and personnel were deployed to Haiti using only their Armed Forces transportation assets. Navy vessels and Air Force aircraft ensured full transport capacity, thus allowing Brazil to demonstrate, from the preliminary stages of the peace mission, its organisation, professionalism and capacity to project power.

According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the time elapsed between the approval of the mandate and the arrival of the first troops was one of the shortest in the history of that organisation. It is important to point out that such significant achievement resulted mainly from the Brazilian Armed Forces' mobilisation capacity, as the other contingents only began to arrive at least a month later. Chile was the exception: its troops were already in Haiti, since they integrated the MIF and remained in the country.

That initial joint planning stage left an important legacy in terms of the main lessons learned: the importance of properly understanding Haiti's peculiarities and conciliating the interests and possibilities of each of the forces to obtain the necessary synergy for a successful operation.

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1 The author served initially as the Navy representative in the joint planning for the preparation of Brazil's participation in Haiti from February to April 2004 under the coordination of the then Defence Staff (EMD) of the Defence Ministry in Brasília. He was later appointed to join the MINUSTAH Interim Staff as an Intelligence Officer, thus integrating the first group of Brazilian officers that landed in Port-au-Prince on 22 May 2004. With the effective start of the mandate, he became Aide to the first Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira. He remained in that position for over a year, until his return to Brazil in June 2005.

2 The article entitled '*O Grupamento de Fuzileiros Navais Haiti: o pouso do Albatroz*', written by Captain (MC) Marco Antonio Nepomuceno et al, published in issue 23 (2004) of the *Anfibio Journal*, describes in detail the arrangements within the Brazilian Navy and, in particular, the Marine Corps.

3 From the third contingent onwards, in June 2005, the Brigade was restructured (with no change in its personnel) so as to meet DPKO operational and administrative requirements, as well as enable the inclusion of an Engineering Company. As a result, the Brigade was reduced to what is known as a Robust Battalion, which, together with an Engineering Company, became part of the contingent.

## The first major challenges in Haiti

On the one hand, the rapid deployment of the Brazilian contingent allowed the UN to fulfil the schedule imposed by the US, releasing MIF forces to return to their countries of origin so as to engage in other missions. On the other, we observed that the UN was excessively slow in obtaining troops from other Member Countries.

As a consequence, MINUSTAH started with less than half the number of military personnel than the previous MIF, which it replaced, or the equivalent of 20 per cent of the 6,700 troops authorised in the mandate. Only five months later, in November 2004, the number of military personnel engaged in MINUSTAH surpassed MIF strength. The maximum number of troops authorised in the mandate was never achieved in the first year of the mission. In late May 2005, MINUSTAH had 6,200 military personnel. As a result, the Peacekeeping Force had to act with far fewer troops than planned at critical moments and for a considerable period of time.

That fact had severe impacts on the initial credibility of the mission, which was often seen by Haitians as not having sufficient means to fulfil its mandate. It also exerted considerable pressure on the Brazilian contingent, which, for a long time, was the only significant combat force on the ground. As a result, it engaged in several different tasks in Haiti, which represented one of the greatest challenges faced initially.

According to the mandate, during the first year, the list of the main tasks assigned to the MINUSTAH Military Force integrated by the Brazilian contingent was quite long:

- Provide security in the main cities and surrounding areas;
- Protect critical facilities;
- Provide security along the main roads;
- Prevent the engagement of armed groups in acts of violence;
- Protect access to humanitarian infrastructure;
- Support the Haitian National Police (PNH, in the French acronym) and the UN Police (UNPOL)<sup>4</sup> in controlling organised violence and civilian riots;
- Perform disarmament actions in coordination with UNPOL and the PNH;
- Monitor key border crossings;
- Provide protection to government and UN humanitarian facilities;
- Ensure security and freedom of movement for UN personnel and their affiliates;
- Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities; and
- Monitor the security and law enforcement environment, acting pre-emptively to prevent and stop the escalation of security threats.

As a direct consequence of the situation found on the ground and with the aim of performing the tasks above, the Military Force (MINUSTAH military component) was involved, from the very first moment, in a wide variety of activities, covering almost the whole spectrum of armed conflicts. These ranged from humanitarian aid operations to major military operations, including many warfighting features. All this took place simultaneously and in restricted geographical areas, which confirmed the concept of 'three block war'<sup>5</sup>.

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4 At the time, still known as Civilian Police (CIVPOL).

5 Concept according to which the military, in order to be able to fight and win in a modern battlefield, must be prepared to act on the whole conflict spectrum, as different intensity actions will be taking place simultaneously within a close range. The example given by the then Commandant of the US Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak, who coined the term, is that of a city where, in one block, service members would be providing humanitarian assistance, distributing food and medication; in another, they would be escorting and protecting a humanitarian aid convoy; and in a third one, they would be engaged in a large scale military operation against opposing forces. In sum, a very similar situation to what happened at the beginning of the Haiti mission.

Among the main activities developed by the Military Force, the following are to be noted:

- Day and night patrols (on foot, motorised and mechanised) – in all cities, patrols were part of the routine of all contingents. By April 2005, over 8,000 patrols had been carried out by the MINUSTAH Military Force.
- Humanitarian aid convoy escort and security – extreme poverty and the presence of armed groups posed a major threat to the distribution of humanitarian relief to the neediest. Thus, the Military Force was engaged in the protection of humanitarian aid convoys in the whole country.
- Close protection of authorities, including personal protection of the Prime Minister and security of the Presidential Palace, in addition to protecting senior visitors – during the first year of MINUSTAH, a high number of Heads of State and other authorities visited the Mission, including the Presidents of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Peru, the Prime Minister of Canada, and the US Secretary of State.
- Security of facilities considered to be sensitive by the Haitian Government or by MINUSTAH, including the port and the Provisional Electoral Council (PEC).
- Security for major events, such as the football match between Brazil and Haiti, and the Haitian Carnival.
- Roadblocks, strong points (*pontos fortes*) and checkpoints.
- Control, monitoring and protection of street protests – demonstrations are a tradition among Haitians. However, peaceful demonstrations can quickly lead to acts of violence. The Military Force monitored them closely and protected Haitians' right to freedom of expression in the main cities in Haiti.
- Humanitarian aid – the Military Force was actively engaged in distributing humanitarian aid, contributing to improving the population's living conditions.
- Joint operations with the PNH and UNPOL, including checkpoints and patrols.
- Humanitarian actions in emergencies – the Haitian civil defence systems are virtually non-existent. Therefore, the Military Force was engaged in the main emergencies, including fires and floods. The highlight in the first year of the mission was their work after Hurricane Jeanne, which flooded the city of Gonaïves. In the following years, their emergency and direct response to the several natural disasters that hit the country became one of the most significant aspects of the mission.
- Negotiations to avoid conflicts – the Military Force played an active role in negotiations with the main leaders of several movements so as to avoid conflicts during demonstrations and key commemorative dates.
- Recovery of public buildings illegally occupied by former military.
- Major military operations in urban areas against armed gangs operating in poorer neighbourhoods.
- Considering the range of tasks and activities listed above, one can understand that the performance of the Military Force faced intense challenges since the beginning of the mission. Although some of these challenges were created by the troops' own lack of experience in operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter<sup>6</sup>, most of them resulted from the situation in Haiti, the actions of other international players, or even the particularities of the United Nations System, such as its delay in obtaining and deploying troops.

The structure and particularities of the UN System, unknown to most officers until the beginning of the mission, also proved to be a major challenge. Firstly, the imperative need to operate in a multinational and inter-agency environment became very clear. In such an environment, in addition to the military contingents of the different countries subordinate to the Military Force, there were other armed and unarmed players who worked for the fulfilment of the mandate. The command relationships among these other players were not clearly defined. In addition to the Military Force, the United Nations Police and the Haitian National Police also participated in joint multinational operations, both with their own specific *modus operandi*.

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<sup>6</sup> Clearly, most contingents from the countries involved took too long to realise that the mission was actually a peace enforcement mission, rather than simply a peacekeeping one. This delay resulted in a behaviour among the troops sometimes described as timid, as they seemed reluctant to use force except for self-defence, thus displaying an excessively conservative interpretation of the rules of engagement.

MINUSTAH was led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), to whom two civilian structures were subordinate (one leading on administrative issues, and the other focused on humanitarian matters), in addition to the Military Force (led by the Force Commander). This internal structure also posed significant challenges due to the several peculiarities of the model. For example, all logistical aspects of the mission were coordinated by UN civilian officers, who were experts in those matters. Despite the fact that, within the concept of integrated mission, elements of the Military Force Staff were part of the structure and the process, it became clear from the first moment that their influence was very limited. The decision-making power with regard to logistics effectively belonged to the UN experts, who had completely different priorities from the Military Force, and whose main concern in relation to military matters seemed to be cutting costs. During the first year of the mission, there were constant disagreements between the Force Command and the Mission Administration. One of such conflicts, which took place right at the beginning, grew into a formal diplomatic claim made by Brazil before the UN, which resulted in the replacement of the then Head of Administration of the Mission.

Deficiencies in air support also compromised significantly the operations since the beginning of the mission. All aircraft were controlled by the civilian Head of Administration, including military aircraft. They were governed by strict civil aviation rules and were beyond the control of the Military Commander. As a result, they were unable to provide satisfactory air support to the ground forces. Such situation led to intense protests by the Force Commander, which eventually resulted in some changes to improve the support provided. Given its importance, this issue was also included in the report published by the Security Council after its visit in early 2005.

According to the UN rules in effect at the time, peace missions did not usually have intelligence services, strictly speaking. Thus, the mission was fully dependent on external sources, such as the intelligence services of some embassies, the Haitian National Police, the Haitian Government, and some agencies and institutions. The direct consequence of that was that the mission became extremely vulnerable to external agendas and rumours. A number of times, the Military Force was deployed based on reports about imminent situations that invariably failed to materialise. However, with no means to confirm the veracity of such reports, there was no solution other than deploying the troops. That situation negatively affected the troops, particularly during the most stressful moments. Later, in the following years, the situation was partially solved with the activation of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), which provided more credibility and integration in processing information.

The presence of armed groups and disarmament attempts also presented a major challenge: as a result of ongoing conflicts, different groups managed to obtain weapons legally or illegally. As the MINUSTAH mandate called for a wide Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process, the Military Force was engaged in those activities. DDR activities have been included in most UN peace missions, and therefore are not something new. However, the situation in Haiti presented some peculiarities that added to the overall complexity. Countries that have recently emerged from traditional conflicts often have opposing factions that, during a peace agreement, agree to disarm, leading to a clear DDR process. In the case of Haiti, however, this did not occur, as there were no formal groups involved in conflicts, nor was there a peace agreement to be implemented. Most of the weapons were small arms, and were distributed among the members of several groups, who would hide in communities and other densely populated or remote areas. Previous experiences had already demonstrated that, in these conditions, forced disarmament actions require an effective intelligence system, as they are difficult to implement and may cause severe bloodshed among the civilian population. The Military Force decided, therefore, to conduct *ad hoc* operations against clearly defined targets so as to minimise damages and casualties among civilians.

One of such armed groups consisted of the so-called former military. The Haitian Armed Forces were disbanded in 1994 by former President Aristide. That decision was unconstitutional and failed to include disarmament or reintegration initiatives. Part of the former military, with no other means of subsistence (no compensation or pensions were paid), started engaging in paramilitary activities and private security. Thus, at the beginning of the MINUSTAH mandate and 10 years after the extinction of the Armed Forces, the situation had only deteriorated – for several reasons, including the international community's and the UN's own inflexibility. As a result of a lack of political understanding, the Military Force was involved in several confrontational situations with that group, particularly when public buildings were occupied by these groups while claiming their interests. Acting in several regions of the country to encourage demobilisation, avoiding the emergence of national leaderships and using force, as necessary (such as in the evacuation of the former residence of former President Aristide in Tabarre, carried out by the GptOpFuzNav), the Military Force decisively contributed to maintaining the situation under control.

The existence of civilian armed groups with different agendas is not something new in the history of Haiti. Such groups proliferated over the years, mainly due to the absence of the State in many regions of the country. The *chimères*, by definition, were groups armed by former President Aristide, mainly composed of extremely young people whose political objective was to persecute Aristide's opponents. The gangs were armed groups that acted in the poorer areas with exclusively criminal purposes: robberies, drug trafficking, etc. Thus, at the beginning of the mission, it was difficult to characterise the groups only based on their stated goals, as they started to engage in all sorts of activities (political, criminal, etc.) according to their needs. Therefore, from December 2004 onwards, the Military Force started carrying out large-scale operations against these groups, achieving positive results in the first few years, including regaining control of key areas such as Bel Air and Cité Soleil. Their main concern during these operations was to avoid casualties among civilians. In these operations, the Brazilian contingent had to resort to intense and proportionate use of force to counter the actions of hostile groups.

Supporting the Haitian National Police (PNH) was also a role clearly established in the mandate. This apparently simple task proved to be a major problem. That police institution was indeed the only legal force in the country. When the Peace Force arrived in Haiti, the PNH faced severe problems, including corruption, lack of equipment, constant human rights abuses, political performance, extreme use of violence, destroyed facilities, deficient personnel and equipment, and utter lack of control. Due to these characteristics, the PNH was loathed by the majority of the population. In addition, since the beginning the PNH leadership made it clear that it would not submit to the Peace Force's *modus operandi*. In other words, according to their views, the PNH would continue operating as usual, and the support of the Peace Force would only be material and tactical, with no involvement in planning. Despite all the attempts to change that through high level meetings, the situation remained unchanged during practically the whole first year of the mission.

The conflicts between the mission and the PNH reached their climax in February 2005, on the anniversary of Aristide's fall, when some PNH units fired shots against a peaceful demonstration followed up closely by the Brazilian contingent troops and by local and international media correspondents. In addition to killing protesters, that situation presented a risk to the physical integrity of the troops, who found themselves in the PNH's line of fire. Despite the PNH leadership's claims that the protesters were armed, the presence of the media and MINUSTAH left no doubt that the PNH had deliberately attacked a peaceful demonstration. As a result of that incident, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Juan Gabriel Valdés, publicly condemned the actions of the PNH, and declared in an interview to the Miami Herald that, should a similar situation happen again, he would not hesitate to order MINUSTAH to fire back at the PNH. After that, *détente* attempts by the government and MINUSTAH contributed to mitigate the crisis and keep the relationship at acceptable levels. Actually, the situation only improved in mid-2005, when the PNH General Director was finally exonerated and replaced by a new Director who proved to be more willing to collaborate with the mission.

The activities of many humanitarian aid organisations in Haiti influenced the actions of the Military Force, whose presence, on the other hand, also had an impact on the work of such organisations. Historically, the relationship between military forces and humanitarian organisations has often led to conflict as a result of a lack of mutual understanding. In Haiti, the Military Force was used to provide security to the various activities developed by the agencies, including escorting many humanitarian aid convoys. Those activities took place without major problems, except when the requests exceeded the capabilities of the force. However, one aspect in particular initially led to strong disagreements and disputes: the direct provision of humanitarian aid (water, food, medication, healthcare, etc.) by Military Force contingents. A good part of those organisations and some humanitarian aid experts believe that the Military Force should not become directly involved in the provision of humanitarian aid, and should devote their time exclusively to security tasks. This thinking is based on a number of reasons, some of which are coherent and sensible (including the need for neutrality, impacts on the informal economy, etc.) in addition to other less noble motives, such as the maintenance of specific niches<sup>7</sup>. On the other hand, we understand that it is fundamental for the Military Force to participate directly in these actions so as to garner support from the population, particularly in a country like Haiti, where no promise of help was being fulfilled. As time went by, and with increased mutual understanding, many of those disagreements were solved. This enabled an atmosphere of better understanding and cooperation between these two sectors that were fundamental for the success of the mission (military and humanitarian).

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<sup>7</sup> Discussions on this topic are too long and complex to be addressed in this article.

As a lesson for the continuation of the mission (as well as for future peace missions), the importance of a deeper understanding of humanitarian issues and activities among our contingents became very clear. Thus, the Civilian-Military Coordination (CIMIC) structures created within the contingents proved to be of crucial importance.

Another major challenge in the humanitarian area derived from several environmental disasters that plagued the country in the first year of the mission, and that reoccurred in the following years. These situations demanded a major coordination effort from the contingents to provide emergency humanitarian aid while maintaining a minimum focus on security and stabilisation activities.

Lastly, the use of force represented a highly relevant and complex challenge. As mentioned above, before MINUSTAH, Brazil had no experience in the use of force in peace missions, which is an important characteristic of missions under Chapter VII. In Haiti, however, the presence of armed groups and, in particular, the need to confront them in order to fulfil the mandate forced the Brazilian contingent to quickly review its stance. Thus, after a short initial adaptation stage, the contingent, in particular during the first three years, had to resort to the (sometimes quite intense) use of force to ensure the fulfilment of the mandate and the credibility of the mission itself. Despite some debates and resistance, particularly in the diplomatic sphere, regarding Brazil's engagement in operations under Chapter VII involving the use of force, it is undeniable that the Brazilian troops in MINUSTAH covered the whole spectrum of military operations and, as the need arose, made intense use of force to defend its mandate, particularly in the first years of the mission. Such situation represented, in a very pragmatic manner, a clear paradigm shift regarding previous Brazilian participations in peace operations. These previous experiences took place under Chapter VI, and did not involve, in thesis, the use of force<sup>8</sup>. This paradigm shift naturally paves the way for new challenges and serves as a precedent for future Brazilian engagement in new missions under Chapter VII – which, by the way, has been a characteristic of almost all peace operation mandates in the recent past. In addition, the development of our capacity to act more competently on the whole spectrum of military operations, ranging from humanitarian relief activities to intense use of force, possibly represents one of the most important legacies in terms of learning, not only for future peace missions, but also for any other real-life operations in which our Armed Forces may be involved.

## Final considerations

MINUSTAH played a key role in the evolving process of Brazilian participation in peace operations. Actually, different aspects and events contributed to consolidating MINUSTAH as the most important landmark in this evolution so far. The success achieved by Brazil can be attributed to a number of factors, including the development of its Armed Forces' planning and joint action capacity, as well as an undeniable adaptability to overcome major challenges faced during the whole mission, particularly in its initial stages.

As a consequence of the lessons learned by the first contingents in the initial stages of the mission, the subsequent training of troops improved in all Forces, reaching ever higher levels of excellence. In addition, important permanent structures were created, such as the current Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre, under the Brazilian Army, and the School of Naval Peacekeeping (EsOpPazNav, in the Portuguese acronym), under the Brazilian Navy. These structures, in addition to preparing new contingents, started functioning as important organisations to promote the exchange of ideas and as real repositories of knowledge related to peace missions.

As a result of this whole process, Brazil and its Armed Forces are now much better prepared to take on new challenges when participating in future peace missions. The success achieved by Brazil in the early stages of MINUSTAH has been clearly recognised by the UN and the international community. As a direct consequence of this international recognition of Brazil's military competence, the UN decided to appoint a Brazilian General as Military Force Commander in the difficult United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), and a Brazilian Admiral to take the command of the Maritime Task Force of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a role that, so far, had been performed exclusively by NATO countries.

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<sup>8</sup> It is important to point out that this restriction to participating in operations under Chapter VII has always been linked to the deployment of troops, as these would be using force. In the case of military observers, Brazil has participated in a number of missions under Chapter VII, since military observers, by definition, are not involved in the use of force, nor are they armed. They are there simply to observe and report.

Finally, as we reached the end of MINUSTAH, Brazil's participation in new peace missions is already seen as a strong possibility. Therefore, there is no better time to remember and study the main challenges faced by Brazil in the early stages of its participation



Patrol in Port-au-Prince with MINUSTAH Force Commander, General Heleno.  
Credit: author's private collection



RABATT soldiers during civic-military event in Cité Soleil (Port-au-Prince, 2013).  
Credit: Vinicius Mariano de Carvalho

## 5. Brazilian music at MINUSTAH: music as a diplomatic weapon

Dr Vinicius Mariano de Carvalho

One of the most memorable images of Brazil's participation in World War II with the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB, in the Portuguese acronym), between 1943 and 1945, is not a combat or attack scene, but rather a soldier landing in Naples, Italy, balancing his 'A' barracks bag on his head and proudly carrying his guitar case. Several other photographs of the first Brazilian overseas military campaign since the Paraguayan War (1864-1870) show soldiers carrying their guitars, *cavaquinhos*, *pandeiros*, *agogos*, trumpets and other musical instruments. During recent studies, I found some BBC musical recordings of Brazilian soldiers in Italy<sup>1</sup>. Some of these recordings had already been circulating on the internet, while others were completely unknown and, for all that matters, had never been properly studied before. Their *sambas*, *marchas*, *emboladas* and ballads bore testimony to Brazil's musical diversity and the wealth of Brazilian music at the time, as well as the way that Brazilian soldiers lived and expressed their experience in the war. It also reflected the diversity found within FEB, which was formed by soldiers from all over the country. A similar situation was observed during the Paraguayan War. Little has been studied about that campaign, and we do not know much about what soldiers played and sang at the time. Another study coordinated by me revealed some musical manuscripts of pieces composed during the Paraguayan War by a bandmaster of the Pernambuco Fatherland Volunteer Corps (*Corpo de Voluntários da Pátria do Pernambuco*), Fellipe Neri de

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<sup>1</sup> This study is part of a wider project on the artistic production of Brazilian soldiers in the Italian Campaign, which covers music, literature and visual arts. Partial results of this study have been published in: Carvalho, V. M. de. *Até guerra acaba em samba: la producción musical de los soldados brasileños en la Segunda Guerra mundial*; in: Schulze, P. & Carvalho, V. M. de. *O olhar e os olhares de um artista brasileiro na Segunda Guerra mundial – o caderno de guerra' do pracinha Carlos Scliar*; in: Schollhammer, K. E. *Estudos Visuais e Literatura*. Rio de Janeiro: PUC-Rio. 2017; in: Carvalho, V. M. de. *O Brasil na Segunda Guerra sob o olhar de um pracinha. A Guerra em Surdina*, de Boris Schnaiderman; in: Jaeckel, V. & Cornelsen, E. *Memórias da Segunda Guerra Mundial na Literatura, Cinema e Artes*. Rio de Janeiro: Jaguaririca. 2017. For an overview of the project, I recommend visiting the IEAT – UFMG website. I developed my research as a visiting professor in that institution in 2016. See: <https://www.ufmg.br/ieat/2016/10/vinicius-mariano-de-carvalho/>

Barcelos. I was again happily surprised to discover examples of popular Brazilian music of those days: a *galope*, a *marcha*, and even a polka<sup>2</sup>.

My readers must be asking themselves what FEB and the Paraguayan War have to do with MINUSTAH. In fact, these were quite different campaigns. The former were war operations; the latter was a peace operation. The former were quite short; the latter is nearing its 13<sup>th</sup> anniversary. The former left a much higher number of casualties in the Brazilian Army; the latter led to some dramatic losses, but none resulting directly from combat.

Despite these many differences, and many others that we could point out, there is a common thread, which seems to be particular of Brazilian soldiers: the presence of live music played by soldiers and taken to another country as a valuable asset, to be cherished and practised by its own creators – the Brazilian soldiers themselves.

In this article, I reflect on the role of music for the Brazilian contingents in MINUSTAH. Obviously, this text is fully speculative, open to contributions, and lacks sufficient observational data for a deeper analysis. It results from my experience as a researcher of Brazilian military music and the role played by Brazil in Peace Operations. I will not make any categorical or definitive statement on the role of music among Brazilian troops in MINUSTAH. My goal is to refer to yet another resource used by Brazilian soldiers, besides their effectiveness and efficiency, both in combat and in the barracks.

I visited Haiti for the first time in 2013 during a MINUSTAH study and research trip. The study itself did not focus on music, but I could not help noticing its presence. In one of our many research activities, we visited one of the initiatives that made Brazilian troops so peculiar in that kind of mission. It was a Saturday, and a group of officers of the Brazilian Engineering Company (BRAENGCOY) went to an orphanage in Port-au-Prince to distribute a hearty soup to the resident children. That could have been nothing more than a mere act of solidarity. Getting there, delivering the soup, and returning to the base. After all, it was a day-off for the officers who volunteered to participate in that activity. I noticed that one of the corporals was carrying his guitar as he entered the vehicle. And I immediately remembered that image of our soldier landing in Naples. The picture I took does not do justice to the actual image, but I have included it here for the sake of illustration.

When we arrived at the orphanage, while some of the officers prepared to serve the soup, our corporal gathered some children in a room and, playing his guitar, sang and entertained them. He sang in Portuguese, and included here and there some words in Haitian Creole. He even did some full songs in that language, which I suspect he did not fully master. The scene was memorable. After a few minutes, my research colleagues and I found ourselves joining them, singing and playing with the children, who were already venturing some words in Portuguese, as we did some in Creole.

During the same trip, while I was accompanying a civil-social action (ACISO, in the Portuguese acronym) in Cité Soleil, music made its presence once again. On a corner, some soldiers had joined in a *pagode* group, with a *cavaquinho*, a guitar, an *atabaque*, a *pandeiro* and a tambourine. They performed the most recent hits of famous Brazilian *pagode* bands together with local children and adults alike. In the evening, a huge *capoeira* circle formed in the centre of the square opposite the Brazilian MINUSTAH base in the area, and *capoeira* litanies and refrains echoed for hours at the sound of *berimbaus* and *atabaques*, bringing together Brazilians and Haitians.

Finally, as the first chords of ‘*Ai se eu te pego*’, the Brazilian ear worm sung by Michel Teló, echoed through the sound system installed for the event, Haitians and Brazilian soldiers joined together in unison.

I am sure that many other visitors, and not least the Brazilian troops deployed in those 26 contingents, must have dozens of similar experiences, both as spectators and participants in those musical *ensembles*.

In these 13 years of mission with 26 contingents, soldiers from all over Brazil had the opportunity to spend six months in Haiti, and most Brazilian regions were represented there more than once. In this transposition, which was also cultural, they took along their local musical practices, in particular the songs that became hits in Brazil. Thus, they acted as true musical ambassadors of our country. It is still early to note the impact that this has had and will have on Haitian music, but undoubtedly such an active presence of these contingents in Haiti opened

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<sup>2</sup> This material will be published in 2018 with the title: ‘A Música Militar na Guerra da Tríplice Aliança – Notas documentais e Manuscritos Revelados’, with a text on military music in the Paraguayan War and a contemporary edition of the music manuscripts, as well as access to a contemporary recording of the restored pieces.

doors for Brazilian musical influences to go beyond the superficial contact I witnessed and described above. A future task for musicologists interested in Haitian music might be to study the impacts of such musical contacts in Haiti. It will certainly represent another positive legacy of Brazil's participation in the mission.

Soldiers are creative. And light-hearted. When it comes to music, this good humour and creativity become evident. In the *sambas* and *marchas* played by FEB soldiers, we can always find an ironic description of the hardships of life in the countryside, as if in a comical reading of a tragedy. For instance, the German MG-42 machine gun, which terrorised Brazilian troops during WWII, was nicknamed 'Lourdinha' in the tunes sung by some soldiers. The reason for that was because the MG-42's firing cadence reminded one of the soldiers of his very talkative girlfriend, whose name was Lourdinha. Even the FEB insignia and motto – a smoking snake – indicates this light and joking approach to the war experience.

As I wrote in the introduction to this article, I do not possess enough empirical material to justify this point in the songs written by our peace soldiers in Haiti, but I can easily speculate that *pagode*, *forró*, *sertanejo* and funk pieces must have been written to provide a humorous and ironic interpretation of their experience in MINUSTAH. Once again, finding such musical production is a task yet to be accomplished. Usually, that type of musical production is not widespread or recorded, as it reflects an immediate experience, often improvised and performed with the resources at hand. At FEB, many of the recordings survived thanks to BBC broadcasts, in which soldiers mimicked trumpets and trombones with their own voices, as they often lacked real instruments to play with.

Today, thanks to social media, in particular YouTube, we can find much of this musical production recorded and posted by the soldiers themselves on these platforms. They include, as I said, funk and *pagode* songs that ironically describe their service shifts, sentinel duties, cleaning rounds, etc. I have not yet identified YouTube videos related to the Haiti mission, but I am sure that many soldiers hold improvised music gems created during their deployment in MINUSTAH.

Another interesting aspect of this cultural exchange of Brazilian soldiers in campaigns is the incorporation of linguistic elements of other languages into Portuguese. In the *sambas* and *marchas* sung by WWII soldiers, fear became *paura*, German became *tedesco* and blonde became *bionda*. Similarly, Brazilian MINUSTAH veterans have already incorporated some Haitian Creole, and virtually all of them talk about a *bon bagay*. It will not be surprising if many other Haitian terms become part of barracks slang and, consequently, the lyrics created in that environment.

During my last research visit to MINUSTAH, in August 2017, I noticed another peculiar aspect of the role of music among the soldiers of BRABATT's Contingent 26, which was reflected in their military cadence calls. I realised that peacekeepers' experiences had inspired the officer who led the chants in their Military Physical Training (MPT) runs. Many of these songs indicated that their inspiration came from soldiers' pre-deployment preparatory work in Brazil, as they referred to events that took place before their arrival in Haiti. In any case, the chants 'improvised' by Sergeant Malheiros confirm many of the hypotheses I raised in this paper, as we can see in the examples below:

<i>Aqui em Caçapava</i>	(Here in Caçapava)
<i>Eu mal falava português</i>	(I could barely speak Portuguese)
<i>Mas lá em Porto Príncipe</i>	(But when I get to Port-au-Prince)
<i>Eu vou gastar o meu inglês</i>	(I will show off my English)

*Hello, good morning*  
*How are you*  
*I'm fine, thank you*

<i>Aqui no BRABATT</i>	(Here at BRABATT)
<i>Eu já falo até inglês</i>	(I can even speak English)
<i>Mas lá no Haiti</i>	(But when I get to Haiti)
<i>Eu vou testar o meu francês</i>	(I will try out my French)

<i>Bonjour</i>	(Good morning)
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<i>Comment allez-vous?</i>	(How are you?)
<i>Ça va bien</i>	(Very well)
<i>Merci beaucoup</i>	(Thank you)

We can notice the irony and humour, as well as the wordplays, as mentioned above, which result from interacting with other languages in the mission. Another tune that also mixed different languages and referred to the mission's pre-deployment stage went as follows:

<i>Repetez après moi</i>	(Repeat after me)
<i>O BRABATT26 está treinando</i>	(BRABATT26 is training)
<i>Preparando pra embarcar</i>	(Getting ready to embark)

The troops' operational reality was also described in the tunes sung by Sergeant Malheiros. In the melodious monotony of the cadences – where pace is the most relevant factor, combined with their content, which must necessarily be motivational – finding the right word and the right level of familiarity for soldiers is critical to the art of poetry. We can see this masterfully done in the following cadence call:

<i>Patrulha a pé, motorizada</i>	(Foot or motorised patrol)
<i>Check-point, escolta armada</i>	(Check-point, armed escort)
<i>Ações cívicas, humanitárias</i>	(Civilian and humanitarian actions)
<i>A tropa está bem preparada</i>	(The troops are well prepared)
<i>Manter estável o ambiente</i>	(Keeping a stable environment)
<i>A segurança, conte com a gente</i>	(For security, count on us)

Besides this motivational and ironic use, these tunes can also have an interesting training purpose, as while repeating the verses together, soldiers absorb procedures, values, goals and tactics, which are imparted and reinforced, as in the following BRABATT 26 example:

<i>Lá em Porto Príncipe</i>	(There in Port-au-Prince)
<i>Você vai me ver</i>	(You will see me)
<i>Armado e equipado</i>	(Armed and equipped)
<i>Comandando um GC</i>	(Commanding a CG)
<i>Em Cité Soleil</i>	(In Cité Soleil)
<i>Você vai me ver passar</i>	(You will see me pass)
<i>De carro de combate</i>	(In a combat vehicle)
<i>E a turba dissipar</i>	(To disperse the mob)
<i>No ar, no mar</i>	(In the air, on the sea)
<i>E no país inteiro</i>	(And all over the country)
<i>Transmito a garra e fibra</i>	(I transmit the vigour and the fibre)
<i>Do Soldado Brasileiro</i>	(Of Brazilian Soldiers)
<i>Pelo Brasil e pelo Haiti</i>	(For Brazil and for Haiti)
<i>Unidos pela Paz</i>	(United for Peace)
<i>Por isso estamos aqui</i>	(That is why we are here)

Or in this other one, where practically all operational procedures learned during the peace operation preparatory course are reviewed musically:

<i>Peacekeeper foi chamado</i>	(Peacekeepers have been called)
<i>Para mais uma missão</i>	(For yet another mission)
<i>Check aos pares, cobertura</i>	(Check in pairs, cover)
<i>Double Tap, tá na veia</i>	(Double tap, I got it)
<i>Peacekeeper tá na área</i>	(Peacekeepers are here)
<i>Acabou a brincadeira</i>	(Playtime is over)
<i>Capacete azul, colete</i>	(Blue helmets, vests)
<i>E com meu fuzil na mão</i>	(Rifle in my hand)
<i>Armamento de backup</i>	(Back-up armament)
<i>Estou pronto para ação</i>	(I'm ready for action)
<i>Inimigo à direita</i>	(Enemies to the right)
<i>À esquerda e retaguarda</i>	(To the left and the rearguard)
<i>Saio da visão de túnel</i>	(No more tunnel vision)
<i>Estou sempre na vanguarda</i>	(I am always in the vanguard)
<i>Mão forte, ou mão fraca</i>	(Strong or weak hand)
<i>Já domino a posição</i>	(I have taken this position)
<i>1, 2, 3 e sul</i>	(1, 2, 3, South)
<i>E até retenção</i>	(And even hold the place)
<i>Peacekeeper é um soldado</i>	(Peacekeepers are soldiers)
<i>Ele luta pela paz</i>	(They fight for peace)
<i>Agora eu vou contar</i>	(Now I'm going to tell you)
<i>Pra você o que ele faz</i>	(What they do)

Finally, the knowledge that the 26<sup>th</sup> Contingent would be the last one in Haiti, and that the end of the mission was near, did not fail to inspire the Sergeant in his cadence calls. This last one shows well how music can play a relevant memory role, as well as contribute to the construction of a symbolic meaning for the mission:

<i>Tá chegando o dia</i>	(The day is coming)
<i>Tá chegando a hora</i>	(The time is coming)
<i>O BRABATT vai partir</i>	(BRABATT is leaving)
<i>Peacekeeper vai embora</i>	(Peacekeepers are going away)
<i>13 anos de sucesso</i>	(13 years of success)
<i>Muito trabalho e ralação</i>	(Lots of work and hardship)
<i>Muitas pedras no caminho</i>	(Many hurdles along the way)
<i>Terremoto e furacão</i>	(Earthquake and hurricane)
<i>Alguns tombaram no caminho</i>	(Some fell along the way)
<i>No cumprimento da missão</i>	(Fulfilling their mission)

In a speculative text such as this one, full of conjectures on the music that may have arisen from these 13 years in Haiti, one thing that is definitely true is that Brazilian music was present in an intense and real way in Haiti, not only through recordings and discs, but also in live performances by Brazilian soldiers. The diplomatic role played by music is undeniable. Beyond the military engagement in its force apparatus; beyond the striking presence of different officers in the most traumatic human tragedies, such as the 2010 earthquake; beyond major formal diplomatic efforts; Brazil also had a different diplomatic role, performed with much sensibility by our soldiers, in a very clear example of cultural diplomacy. They simply sang, played their instruments, and practised *capoeira* with the local population.

This cultural diplomacy has a major impact. It strengthens ties of camaraderie, reaffirms soft power with no impositions, facilitates dialogue and understanding, and demonstrates that pacifying structures can be established and implemented spontaneously.

Some academical studies about Brazil's participation in peace operations – in Haiti, particularly – described and discussed common cultural traits found in Brazilian soldiers that put them in a privileged position to solve conflict situations, or even to avoid conflict. The so-called 'Brazilian way of engaging in peace operations' has always been related to a cultural aspect. Undoubtedly, music is one of the tools employed for this cultural advantage.

If we develop a systemic and doctrinal understanding of this – rather than seeing it as a mere source of good anecdotes – we will realise that peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement operations cannot neglect this element. It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to teach it to someone that lacks it in its essence and identity. Perhaps Brazil's 'secret weapon' for peace operations is carried by soldiers in their guitar cases. A weapon that, once employed, helps these soldiers to avoid conflict, introduce peace, filter the hardest experiences in combat, and translate the untranslatable to those that did not have the same experiences.

As I wrote in the beginning, this is an open text. Its main goal is not to provide details on the role of music within the Brazilian contingents in MINUSTAH, but rather to encourage all soldiers that were deployed to Haiti over the past 13 years to remember how music was always present during the mission, and how it is part of their memories of MINUSTAH. As a researcher, I would feel greatly rewarded to hear their experiences, music and testimonies. If that happens, perhaps we will not have to wait another 60 years to learn about Brazilian music in MINUSTAH, as in the case of the FEB campaign; or 150 years, as in the case of the War of the Triple Alliance.



Brazilian FEB soldier landing in Italy  
(Naples, 1944)  
Credit: Brazilian Army's Historical Archive



Credit: CCOPAB's Social Communications Team

# Fulfilling the mandate and international norms

## 6. The pacification of Bel Air

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## 8. Analysis of the Brazilian police's participation in MINUSTAH

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Brazilian soldiers of the 3rd Contingent of BRABATT perform military operations in the streets of Bel Air, Haiti (2005)  
Credit: BRABATT Collection

## 6. The pacification of Bel Air

Lt. Gen. André Luis NOVAES Miranda

### Generalities

The 3<sup>rd</sup> Contingent of the Peace Force Infantry Battalion – the Haiti Battalion – left for the area of operations with the difficult task of replacing the Haiti Brigade during the electoral period, at a time when violence escalated in Port-au-Prince. In mid-2005, the environment was uncertain, MINUSTAH and United Nations authorities in New York had doubts about whether it was safe to hold elections in 2005, and the Security Council was not sure about the extent of the mandate. On the ground, hostile forces conducted daily ambushes against Brazilian troops and the Haitian National Police (PNH, in the French acronym), attacked sensitive points, raped women, robbed, kidnapped and killed innocent civilians, while rival groups fought for power.

The Brazilian contingent's area of operations was very wide. At the time, it included the districts of Bel Air, Delmas 2, Solinô and Ticherry (for the sake of this article, we will refer to all of them as Bel Air), which were the physical base of the *chimères*<sup>1</sup> – armed groups linked to the Lavalas Family Party of former President Aristide – in addition to other hostile factions, which offered resistance to the legal forces (Interim Government and MINUSTAH). The area was considered vital for the success of MINUSTAH, as it was the stage of numerous criminal actions, and

<sup>1</sup> Chimère means 'chimera', the Greek mythology monster formed with parts of different animals. Its most benign allusion is linked to grassroots organisations, but actually they are gangs that lived in Haitian slums, such as Cité Soleil and Bel Air, 'maintaining order', raising money through illegal activities and ensuring 100 per cent support to former President Aristide. They are yet another incarnation of the many paramilitary groups that have existed in the history of Haiti, such as the Tonton Macoutes of President François Duvalier (GIRARD, 2010).

also due to its proximity to the city's political and economic centres, which were also within the Brazilian zone. As a result, violence in the country had international repercussions. At the time, Cité Soleil, another target for criminal activities, was not under Brazil's responsibility.

This article will only review the actions undertaken by Army troops to pacify Bel Air.

## Operational environment

Bel Air is a middle and lower class neighbourhood, with a few slums spread here and there. Many of the blocks are composed of brick houses near the street, some of which with more than one storey, intertwined with irregular buildings connected by alleys, corridors and tunnels. The hilly landscape adds complexity to the operations, due to the limited field of vision and fire, restricted movements in access roads and difficult coordination and control of these movements. For hostile forces, the landscape presents immeasurable advantages, as they know the area well, including all the roofs where to place observers and snipers, and can easily move around and hide people, material and facilities.

Still at the time of the first contingent, on 30 September 2004 – the anniversary of the *coup* that removed Aristide from power in 1991 – partisans of the former President, well established for many years in Cité Soleil, launched a number of protests in the capital that caused over 10 deaths and the beheading of three police officers. The movement was dubbed 'Operation Baghdad', alluding to how people used to be killed in Iraq. During this operation in Bel Air, numerous cars and houses were burned, people were assaulted and expelled from their homes, and many fled voluntarily, literally leaving the neighbourhood in the hands of *chimère* gangs. The PNH reacted and Bel Air was taken by an atmosphere of insecurity and mutual accusations. The Lavalas started making almost daily demonstrations, which usually ended in violence<sup>2</sup>.

From that moment onwards, no private or public transport vehicles were allowed to cross the neighbourhood, several ditches were dug to prevent or stop the police or MINUSTAH from entering the area, burnt cars were used to build barricades, local shops had to close down, and the region became a sort of sanctuary for illicit activities, particularly hiding people, weapons, ammunition and stolen vehicles, as well as holding hostages in captivity. Hence, the *chimères* secured another area for their activities next to Cité Soleil: Bel Air.

As Bel Air is situated in the heart of Port-au-Prince, these hostile forces spread their influence over virtually the whole city. From their hideouts, these groups spread fear to the area around the National Palace (*Palácio Nacional*), where shootings could be heard day and night; the commercial centre, where a market was burnt to the ground in 2005, leaving many dead; the port area; and even residential districts farther away. It was impossible to dissociate the *chimères* from a certain political resistance on behalf of former President Aristide. However, they growingly showed economic motivations, leading kidnappings, thefts and robberies, in addition to murders and other acts of violence<sup>3</sup>.

Brazilian forces fought these illicit acts for many months, achieving relative success in early 2005. After a mass prison break in March, and with the electoral period approaching, the situation got worse in May, and reached unbearable levels in June. From that moment, patrols had to engage in combat to enter the district. The PNH had to rely on Brazilian armoured escort to access the area. Bel Air was once again in the hands of hostile forces, and the atmosphere of insecurity spread to other neighbourhoods and all over the country. This situation jeopardised the whole mission, and the Security Council required more time to decide on extending the mandate in June and increasing the number of troops, in an attempt to guarantee the 2005 elections, as envisaged in the existing mandate. The Lavalas and the *chimères* announced that there would be no elections without Aristide, and threatened to kill anyone who got an electoral identity card.

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<sup>2</sup> Girard (2010).

<sup>3</sup> Girard (2010); Kawaguti (2006).

# Support and decision to use force

Some time was necessary for the Brazilian troops to properly understand what it meant to act under the aegis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Brazil was relatively experienced in peace operations, but almost always acting under Chapter VI, except for the Army Police Platoon deployed to Timor-Leste. In those missions, force was only authorised for self-defence purposes.

The normative basis established in Chapter VII of the Charter, in which the MINUSTAH mandate was based, derived from UNSC resolution 1542, which assigned to the forces the mission of ensuring security and stabilisation in the country, providing operational support to the PNH, and protecting civilians under threat, among others<sup>4</sup>. In addition, the Brahimi Report defined 'hostile forces' (or 'spoilers') and demanded that peace operations protected civilians<sup>5</sup>. Finally, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) ensured freedom of movement to the troops all over Haiti<sup>6</sup>.

Within this framework, the Haiti Battalion had no other choice than using necessary and proportionate force to clear roads and streets blocked by hostile forces, as well as acting against armed groups that harmed civilians in the area under its responsibility. It also had to provide a timely response to several armed actions against its own forces (111 of which recorded in the daily reports sent to the MINUSTAH Command referring only to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Contingent).

Thus, whenever the bases of these groups were identified, the troops, usually acting together with the PNH, organised operations to dismantle them and arrest the criminals, employing adequate and proportionate force whenever any resistance was posed to their progression. As time went by, this proved to be no longer necessary, as these people preferred to flee rather than confronting the troops.

## The operations

The actions of the Battalion were planned and conducted according to the doctrine adopted for operations against irregular forces in urban environments. Interestingly, the experience amassed by Brazil through its Infantry School Regiment (REI, in the Portuguese acronym) in the 1965 peace mission to the Dominican Republic (FAIBRAS, in the Portuguese acronym) was again applied by the same unit and on the same island, exactly 40 years later.

Considering the landscape, the location and the activities of hostile forces, the Haiti Battalion divided its sector by its subunits, thus creating sub-sectors. These sub-sectors changed as the situation evolved. In each sub-sector, a combat base was established, where a subunit was deployed and operated from, launching platoons to patrol bases (strong points), or sending patrols directly to the targets. Authority was delegated to lower ranks, particularly sub-sector and strong point commanders. This significantly expedited decision-making on the ground, and enabled a more effective use of the troops.

The steps taken by previous contingents played a key role for the success of these operations, including the deployment of a company to the back of the National Palace, a central location in the city, and, in particular, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Contingent's decision to occupy the National Fort (*Forte Nacional*), in the heart of Bel Air. These two positions became combat bases for the two most central sub-sectors in the city. The occupation of the Fort aimed at bringing other MINUSTAH sectors to the area, including Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Civil Affairs, as well as the PNH. This was not accomplished at the time, but the Fort served mainly as a base for actions against the *chimères* in the neighbourhood. Between December 2004 and June 2005, 68 attacks were perpetrated against Brazilian troops in Bel Air. In 48 of them, the troops responded with fire<sup>7</sup>. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Contingent's performance can be divided in two strategic stages: in the first, their goal was to ensure security within the zone of action, whereas in the second, they aimed at stabilisation. In the first stage, major combat operations and the establishment of the first strong points were predominant. In the second, the focus was on small operations, a permanent presence in the area and police-like operations, supplemented by unilateral civic-social actions (ACISO, in the Portuguese acronym), in addition to other activities in coordination and cooperation with police forces (PNH and UNPOL) and civilian agencies.

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4 UN (2004).

5 UN (2000).

6 UN (2004).

7 Kawaguti (2006).

During the security stage, the goal was to perform operations in Bel Air to achieve decisive results, reducing the power of combat of hostile forces, dismantling organised groups and clearing streets and roads in the area. The main tactics adopted to achieve those goals included sieges, attacks against known bases and search operations in the encircled areas. The objective was fully achieved. In the first actions, the *chimères* offered strong resistance, particularly when the siege was being established. This led to intense shootings, always in areas with a high human presence. Based on previously collected intelligence, these actions were able to eliminate those groups one after the other. The Battalion sector had already been divided among the subunits, and the company commanders had been given freedom to act. However, the problem could not be solved until they established a permanent presence in the heart of those areas.

Thus, after achieving the first results, with an excellent repercussion within MINUSTAH and the local media, the next goal was to achieve more lasting success. From the National Fort, it was possible to observe that, as the troops left the area after the operations, some *chimères* returned to their hideouts, sharing the control of the district with legal forces. In direct actions, the strategy was working, but the combat base (in this case, the National Fort) was still far from the problems, which prevented the forces from gaining full control. However, with regard to the first area to be pacified, around the Tiremasse and Mariela streets, this distance was no more than 500 metres. That was when commanders had the idea of establishing Strong Points (*Pontos Fortes* – SPs).

SPs allow troops to establish security in all directions, defend themselves from hostile forces, and, from those points, project power and fulfil other missions. In practice, they were established in buildings, preferably the same formerly used by gangs to exercise their control over the neighbourhood. The place chosen for the deployment of the first SP was a three-storey building in Mariela Street, which used to house a chemist's shop and later served as a base for *chimères'* illegal activities. It was located in the heart of the first area to be controlled, and was named Strong Point no. 1.

Another major operational advantage of establishing the SPs was the launch of platoons on the ground, with a limited area of influence, with a radius of approximately 200 metres, for which the Lieutenant Commander had freedom of action and daily responsibility. It enabled troops to act quickly, using their initiative and opportunities in foot, motorised, mechanised and mixed patrols, establishing observation points (OPs), employing hunters, carrying out impromptu or fixed road blocks, establishing smaller SPs, searching areas, registering the population and any other applicable actions. Whenever UNPOL and PNH units were available, joint patrols were carried out with these forces. Last but not least, the Lieutenant should seek the cooperation of the population.

The pacification of Bel Air owes much of its success to the effectiveness of the platoons deployed in the SPs, which served as patrolling bases. The Battalion selected seven SPs. The one in Mariela Street was permanent, whereas the others were occupied on specific days and times. Their location took into account the areas with the most hostile force activities. Two or three SPs were occupied at all times.

Due to the lack of security, the SPs were protected by sandbags, concrete and other barriers, and all night-combat support means were used.

The SPs had full logistical support, including the minimum requirements for the troops to operate from these places, such as bathrooms, beds, generators, freezers and other facilities. From that moment onwards, the contingent held several SPs, in addition to the main base at the Tabarre University, and two combat bases (at the National Palace and the National Fort). Logistics became more complex and difficult, the troop comfort levels were reduced, but security was heightened, and the mandate was fulfilled in that regard, which justified all the efforts and sacrifice. Once security had been achieved, the second strategic stage – stabilisation – could begin, with no fixed ending time. The goal was to stabilise Bel Air through military operations, effective PNH control, and the effective participation of several civilian bodies, including the UN, governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and even the private sector.

The idea was to maintain a permanent presence in the neighbourhood through the permanent occupation of the Mariela Street SP and the alternate occupation of other SPs, in addition to the observation points; carry out surgical siege and search operations in hostile forces' hideouts; employ PNH officers in 100 per cent of our patrols and in urban road blocks and checkpoints; employ a psychological operation vehicle with loudspeakers, extending its use to the city centre and peripheral neighbourhoods, asking for the population's support; establish a permanent connection with the Port-au-Prince City Hall to coordinate waste collection, initially with our specific security support, and other essential services; launch specific discussions with the government to open a

healthcare centre in Bel Air; and put together a schedule for civilian visits to the neighbourhoods with the aim of establishing and/or resuming business as usual.

The Battalion also provided personal security to the Prime Minister of Haiti. This task employed a total of 10 officers on a daily basis during the six months in which the Battalion stayed in the country. In addition to this daily, important and highly visible mission, the Battalion was also employed to provide security to Brazilian and other countries' authorities visiting Haiti, ensure road traffic control, and engage in other typical missions of the Army Police. An efficient tactical communication system was created to ensure the command and control of the operations. Three repeaters were installed within the Battalion's zone of action, and a high number of portable and vehicle radio devices enabled several echelons to be connected 24-7. Smaller and less powerful pieces of equipment established links with the lower echelons, enabling squadrons within the same combat groups to remain connected with observation points, logistical and command facilities. Relying on analogical yet highly effective equipment, Communications were a highlight of the operations.

The Battalion also had an engineering platoon. It provided support to combat actions, cleared several thoroughfares, closed ditches and removed carcasses and barricades, often under fire from hostile forces. It also fortified many positions, such as strong points, combat base sentry boxes and observation points, and blocked roads by building different obstacles. During the several operations, it also acted on ACISO, collecting waste and debris from the streets, and thus earning the support of the population. As a logistical support tool, it carried out several works on the bases, helped to purify water, initially operated the laundry, loaded and unloaded aircraft and containers, improved traffic conditions on several roads and streets, in addition to a wide range of small works and facilities.

## Actions developed and results achieved

The results achieved in Bel Air could not have been any better. In just six months, against all expectations, over 200 elements of the hostile forces that operated in the neighbourhood were removed.

Opposing groups were dismantled, initially through major siege and search operations, in which these hostile forces suffered many losses and started fearing the Brazilian troops. Operation Iron Fist, which took place in Cité Soleil on 6 July 2005, was led by Brazil and resulted in the killing of Dread Wilmé, an important leader of the hostile forces. It also had a significant influence on the conditions that enabled a change of stage in Bel Air. After that, the Battalion occupied seven strong points in the heart of all areas of influence of several armed groups. In approximately two months of intense work in Bel Air, the Battalion reached a security level that enabled it to change its strategic approach and shift its focus to the full stabilisation and pacification of the district.

In early August, as the combat power of hostile forces had been significantly reduced, an unforeseen event surprised the Battalion: groups of civilians armed with machetes and knives, sometimes supported by the PNH, started attacking the formerly powerful gangs, reducing even further their numbers. The Haiti Battalion was forced, then, to protect the *chimères* from the enraged population and from the police, avoiding massacres such as the one in Martissant, where the PNH killed 10 people, and which led to the arrest of important members of the corporation and significantly weakened the political position of the Interim Government and MINUSTAH itself. It was necessary to gain full control of the PNH in Bel Air. For that purpose, the Battalion Command proposed opening a Police Station in the National Fort, as per the original intention of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Contingent. The Police Station opened on 12 August, and from there it was possible to control all police actions in the neighbourhood. This was done jointly with our troops and UNPOL. The PNH, which in June could only enter the area under heavy armoured escort provided by Brazilian troops, could now benefit from the pacification, patrol the neighbourhood on foot, and talk with the population, who up to that moment was seen by them as enemies, and vice versa<sup>8</sup>.

It then became clear that it was necessary to gather support from other institutions to ensure that the population fully trusted MINUSTAH and to eliminate any remaining resistance to the work of the troops. In mid-August, the neighbourhood offered relative security, but it still lacked the presence of the government, including policing, electricity, running water, sanitation, waste collection, schools, healthcare centres, public transport and other services. It was decided, then, to start involving government, UN, and NGO civilians through invitations and scheduled visits.

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<sup>8</sup> During a ceremony held on Peace Square (*Place de la Paix*) in Bel Air (Delmas 2) on 18 September 2005, PNH officers were spontaneously applauded by the local population.

There was also an awareness-raising initiative within MINUSTAH to demonstrate that, while Cité Soleil still lacked security and had numerous projects paralysed as a result, Bel Air, an important symbol for the mission, presented some degree of success and had only three projects in the same conditions. Thus, in parallel with military presence and regular operations, there was a gradual return of civilians, which clearly drove the neighbourhood back to normality. It is worth noting the work of Viva Rio, a Brazilian NGO that led some of these initiatives.

The Battalion encouraged contacts between the companies and civilian leaderships at all levels, bringing down the last existing barriers between the population and the troops. Community meetings became more regular, and several competitions, including football, basketball, cross-country and street running, music, painting and other cultural and sports activities, served to bring the population and the troops even closer together. DDR activities found a place in Bel Air, with the first practical results observed in November. The City Hall got involved in some of these activities. Several NGOs and UN agencies started operating in Bel Air, creating jobs and improving the quality of living. Bel Air, which only had three civilian projects in July 2005, counted 25 in November of the same year, all in full operation, in addition to the still timid return of Haitian public powers. Along the same lines, MINUSTAH decided to implement its first Quick Impact Project (QIP) in the neighbourhood under the responsibility of the Brazilian Battalion.

At that point, the population had full confidence in the troops, and partial trust in their local police force. Thus, they became more cooperative, sharing information on hostile forces and multiplying successful operations, which now took place practically with no shootings. That was the end of the Bel Air hostile forces.

With that steady pace, the last *chimère* leaders abandoned the region and took shelter in other areas of the city, thus turning Bel Air into a safe neighbourhood, ready to return to its normality. The remaining members of the resistance, under constant pressure from the troops, laid down their weapons to the DDR and were voluntarily taken to other areas to be reinserted into society.

Despite the pacification of the neighbourhood, there was not enough time to move forward with the elections scheduled for the second half of 2005. However, as normality returned to the capital's political and economic centre, and practically to the whole country (except for Cité Soleil), the elections were rescheduled for early 2006. Logistical arrangements to register voters started, with registration posts at the National Fort and in Mariela Street, among other places in the neighbourhood.

## Conclusions

There are several ways to assess the work of the Haiti Battalion. General Heleno, then Force Commander, said that its achievements would make history in the context of peace missions. General Lugani, General Heleno's Deputy Commander, said that the work had shifted the direction of MINUSTAH as a whole, including the civilian sectors, conferring optimism and trust to the mission. Other civilian and military authorities, both Haitian and foreign, made similar statements. However, what we seek at the moment is to understand the causes for the pacification of Bel Air, which may serve as lessons and good practices for other troops, and may help to improve the pacification doctrine and use of troops against irregular forces.

In early 2005, the preparation of the troops, carried out at the Infantry School Regiment (REI), a base unit of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Contingent, with the support of the recently created Peacekeeping Training Centre (*Centro de Instrução de Operações de Paz – CI Op Paz*, in the Portuguese acronym), enabled them to conduct any sort of operation in urban environments, including the riskiest and most dangerous ones, as in the case of Operation Iron Fist. That was a decisive factor.

The doctrine proved to be effective in operations, in particular regarding the functioning of a tactical operation centre within the Battalion; the method adopted to study situations; the use of small units in operations against irregular forces in urban environments; and the several tactics, techniques and procedures to deploy troops on foot and armoured vehicles in urban environments, especially for patrolling purposes, among other aspects. This doctrine became a reference for the other contingents, and was relayed to all of them by the CI Op Paz. It also served as a basis for the subsequent pacification of Cité Soleil in 2007, and for the stabilisation of the whole country. This knowledge is encoded in this unit, currently known as the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre (CCOPAB, in the Portuguese acronym), in instruction notes and in the experience of its trainers and monitors. Indeed, it can benefit other missions and even stronger law and order enforcement operations. The centralised planning and decentralised execution of these actions, with many decisions taken at lower

levels, through sub-sector captains and strong point lieutenants and sergeants, made the operations more agile, which prevented the reorganisation of hostile forces after each raid. In these operations, the combination of foot patrols minutely searching the ground with the shock and fire power of armoured vehicles, together with officers positioned in domineering points, armed with rifles and sniper scopes, granted higher levels of combat power and security to the troops.

Siege and search operations led to decisive victories against hostile forces, including the arrest of gang members, seizure of their equipment, and reduction of their combat power. As a result, security conditions for the troops' permanent presence were heightened.

The occupation of strong points by infantry platoons in critical areas, from where patrols were launched, was a constant feature of the Battalion's permanent presence in the zone of action, and enabled the full control of the ground and the population, establishing permanent links between Haitian citizens and Brazilian soldiers. This attitude shift, which was observed after security was achieved and attracted the presence of civilian agencies, was vital to ensure that security conditions could be expanded and that the first signs of development could return to districts formerly dominated by hostile forces.

Lastly, the support of the population, which derived from all these factors, enabled the effective elimination of the final points of hostile resistance.

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Brazilian troops preparing to act in MINUSTAH  
Credit: CCOPAB's Social Communications Team

## 7. Brazil in Haiti, a success story: an analysis of the Brazilian mission in Haiti

Col. Marcos Venicio MENDONÇA

### Introduction

The first United Nations (UN) mission was established in October 1947. At the time, Brazil sent three officers to Greece – one from each Force – to integrate the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB). The Committee was created to monitor the situation of refugees on the border between Greece and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, countries that were believed to be interfering in the Greek civil war.

Several factors have led the UN and other international organisations to interfere more intensely so as to solve disputes. Brazil's participation in these interventions has been almost constant.

Brazil has pacified its own border disputes and is a huge country, which discourages any military action from its neighbours. As a result, it experiences relative peace in the Southern Cone. That is why it is so important for Brazil to send contingents and individual officers to peace missions: to ensure its position in the international sphere as a protagonist for major decisions; and, through the military expression of its national power, to aspire for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, should it be expanded.

The success of Brazil's participation in several past and present missions, whether with troops or individuals, has raised international confidence in the country to a level seldom reached by others. As a result, Brazil was invited to lead the military component of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), when it was established in 2004.

The mission was established by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) through resolution 1542, which aimed at immediately restoring order in Haiti, which had been compromised after a period of insurgence that led to the deposition of then President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

The mission's initial objectives were: stabilise the country, pacify and disarm rebel and guerrilla groups, promote free elections, and support the reconstruction of Haiti's institutional and economic development. For the first time since 1994, we were leading the military component of a UN peace mission. The capital, Port-au-Prince, was dominated by gangs. In 200 years of history, only one president had reached the end of his term – the same president that had just been ousted. Several social problems affected the poorest country in the world. Haiti had disbanded its Armed Forces, and thousands of former soldiers took their weapons home. They used these weapons to wreak all sorts of havoc and inflict misery on the population, who were already haunted by memories of the *Tonton Macoutes* (the feared political police of the 'Doc Dynasty')<sup>1</sup>.

We accepted the challenge and deployed contingents which, in the end, totalled 35,000 troops. We fought gangs, earthquakes and hurricanes. We improved our logistics and training. After 13 years, the Brazilian military component is now leaving Haiti, and the country will be under the care of a new mission<sup>2</sup>.

## The participation of Brazilian military in MINUSTAH

Brazil was asked by the UN to take the command of the military component of MINUSTAH (Force Commander) and to deploy troops to form the contingent. In its initial stage, MINUSTAH was formed by 6,700 authorised troops from the following contributing countries: Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chad, Chile, Croatia, France, Jordan, Nepal, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Turkey and Uruguay.

The Brazilian Contingent (CONTBRAS, in the Portuguese acronym) arrived in Haiti with 958 Army soldiers, organised in a Brigade Command, with its Staff and an Infantry Battalion, in addition to a Marine Task Force, with 234 officers, which also included an Infantry Battalion. CONTBRAS I's total headcount was 1,202 officers. Actually, from the third contingent onwards, the Brigade Command and its Staff were deactivated, and CONTBRAS received a Peace Force Engineering Company. It was at that point that MINUSTAH started fighting local gangs, initially in Bel Air.

From the third contingent onwards, CONTBRAS was formed by the Peace Force Infantry Battalion (BRABATT), including the Marine Unit, and the Peace Force Engineering Company (BRAENGCOY), with a total of 1,216 troops – 832 in BRABATT, 234 in the Marine Group, and 150 in BRAENGCOY. BRAENGCOY, in fact, kept the same number of troops until 2008, when it was raised to 250.

Between 2005 and 2007, when MINUSTAH decided to pacify Port-au-Prince and fight armed groups, a number of intense and constant conflicts with Haitian gangs took place. Every day, the mission gained ground and conquered areas and regions. This approach was a calculated risk, but if it failed to work, it could significantly jeopardise the success of the much-desired stabilisation of Haiti, and the mission itself.

The power of these gangs, their structures, motivation and relations with the political power, particularly in Cité Soleil, had serious impacts on Haiti's socio-economic structure and on the daily lives of the population.

The pacification of Haiti and other aspects linked to legal, criminal and human rights issues, with the necessary limits to the use of force, offered extremely important lessons and led to the improvement of how the Brazilian Army is deployed, including in Law and Order Enforcement actions. We can say without a doubt that the pacification of Haiti changed the face of the Brazilian Army.

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<sup>1</sup> Period started in 1957, when François Duvalier (Papa Doc) wins the elections and creates a violent paramilitary organisation – the *Tonton Macoutes*. In 1971, Papa Doc appoints his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc) as president for life. Baby Doc maintains his father's violent regime and continues leading Haiti to extreme situations. 1986 sees the end of the Doc Dynasty, when Baby Doc is overthrown by a popular rebellion, and flees Haiti to seek exile in a luxurious estate in the French Mediterranean coast. He returns to Haiti in 2011, and in 2013, activists try to prosecute him for abuses committed during his presidency.

<sup>2</sup> UNSC Resolution 2350 of 13 April 2017 established the last extension of MINUSTAH until 15 October 2017, as well as the creation of the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). The new mission will be formed by up to seven police units, with 980 staff and 295 individual officers. The initial length of the mission is six months, from 16 October 2017 to 15 April 2018.

The pacification of Greater Port-au-Prince can be divided in five different stages, with occasional overlaps:

- 1<sup>st</sup> Stage (2005): pacifying Bel Air (3<sup>rd</sup> CONTBRAS);
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Stage (2006): pacifying Cité Militaire (5<sup>th</sup> CONTBRAS);
- 3<sup>rd</sup> Stage (2007 to 2014): pacifying Cité Soleil (6<sup>th</sup> to 22<sup>nd</sup> CONTBRAS);
- 4<sup>th</sup> Stage (2007 to 2010): maintaining stability and security within the CONTBRAS area, and suppressing gang activities within the area under the responsibility of BRABATT;
- 5<sup>th</sup> Stage (2010 to 2014): rebuilding the security environment deteriorated as a result of the 2010 earthquake, with a focus on Cité Soleil.

In addition to pacifying several regions in Haiti, the mission had been fulfilling well the other objectives of the mandate. Since 2006, free and general elections have been held in the country, with wide popular participation, and full movement of people has been restored all over Haiti.

On 11 January 2010, a little over four and a half years after the beginning of the mission, it had reached a surprising level of success, and several results had already been achieved:

- Pacifying Bel Air, Cité Militaire and Cité Soleil;
- Arresting gang leaders;
- Addressing the issues related to the former military;
- Seizing large quantities of weapons, ammunition and drugs;
- Gaining people's trust;
- Creating a favourable environment for the work of humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs);
- Gradually resuming essential public services; and
- Resuming commercial activities and business as usual.

However, contrary to what many believed, a lot was still to happen. On 12 January 2010, at 19:53 (7:53pm, Brasilia time), a 7.3-magnitude earthquake hit Haiti, starting approximately 10 km below sea-level, and with its epicentre at 25 km from Port-au-Prince. The Dominican Republic, the East of Jamaica, Puerto Rico and the Bahamas could also feel the tremor. The first news reports read as follows:

- Camp Charlie was affected and lost contact with the other bases;
- At 21:21 (9:21pm), it was reported that Strong Point (*Ponto Forte*) 22 had been razed to the ground, and 12 soldiers were buried under the wreckage;
- The National Fort collapsed, and three military officers were buried under the wreckage;
- Hotel Christopher, one of the venues used by the UN, was completely destroyed, and four Army officers were missing;
- Base Tebo was completely destroyed, but left no victims; and
- The death of 2<sup>nd</sup> Sergeant Davi Ramos de Lima, of the 5<sup>th</sup> Light Infantry Battalion, was confirmed.

The earthquake took the lives of 200,000 Haitians. MINUSTAH, UN agencies and NGOs also reported 85 dead and 15 missing persons. UN authorities also fell victim to the disaster, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Mr. Hédi Annabi; his main deputy, Mr. Luiz Carlos da Costa; and the UN Police Commander, Mr. Doug Coates. Brazil lost 18 valuable military officers. These losses will never be forgotten, and caused national commotion.

The catastrophe affected the already fragile Haitian economy, severely damaging the country's infrastructure. The UNSC, through resolution 1908 of 19 January 2010, endorsed the United Nations Secretary-General's recommendation and increased the number of military troops in MINUSTAH so as to support the immediate reconstruction of the country and ensure its security.

This altered the composition of the CONTBRAS troops, which had remained unchanged until the 11<sup>th</sup> Contingent. As of the 12<sup>th</sup> Contingent, it would have two Peace Force Infantry Battalions: 1,040 officers in the first Battalion (796 from the Army, 234 from the Marine Corps, and 10 Navy Officers) and 809 in the second, in addition to an Engineering Company (250 officers since the 8<sup>th</sup> Contingent), totalling 2,099 military officers.

In 2011, new presidential elections took place, and the mission evolved to complete its original mandate, ensuring a stable environment, promoting the political process within normality, strengthening Haiti's government institutions and its legal and regulatory structure, in addition to implementing rules for the protection of human rights. Following the country's stabilisation and its reconstruction after the earthquake, the UNSC reduced the number of troops in MINUSTAH. Brazilian troops were reduced again to a single battalion, with 1,200 and 250 officers in BRABATT and BRAENGCY, respectively. In June 2015, there was another reduction, bringing BRABATT down to 850 officers, and BRAENGCY to 120.

The Brazilian contingent's performance in Greater Port-au-Prince was so successful that it changed the face of the city. Prior to that, the city was dominated by waste, poverty, darkness and blocked roads and streets. At the beginning of the mission, gangs were heavily armed and prevented the UN from acting. Well protected in their hideouts, they greeted UN representatives with bullets. Only through the continued work of the Brazilian contingent between 2005 and 2007 was peace able to return to the Haitian capital.

Amazed at how the Haitian population responded to Brazilian soldiers' gestures of friendship and appreciation, the international community dubbed the Brazilian approach in Port-au-Prince as Brazilian soft power<sup>3</sup>. Others named it the 'Brazilian way of peacekeeping'. As the population developed trust in MINUSTAH, the Brazilian flag started opening doors all over Port-au-Prince. Little by little, the country changed, starting from Port-au-Prince, the area under the responsibility of the Brazilian Battalion.

Much was lost in the earthquake, but Haiti had got used to living in peace and order, and seeking new work opportunities. Today, the country's reconstruction happens at a much faster pace. This success has raised Brazil to a level of credibility rarely found among countries engaged in peace missions, which led the UNSC to decide, in April 2017, to definitively end MINUSTAH on 15 October 2017.

## Reasons for the success of the Haiti mission

There are many different reasons for the success of the United Nations Mission in Haiti, and in particular the success of the Brazilian military component's participation and performance under that mission. I am entirely to blame for inadvertently omitting any such causes from this study. However, some of them are more visible, palpable and specific, and are characteristic of Brazilian soldiers. We can therefore list the following success factors:

- **Strong ethnic-social identification** – Haiti's African descent, with a consequent history of slavery shared by the Haitian population and Brazilian soldiers, in addition to the extreme poverty found in that country, has similarities with some regions of Brazil, and our soldiers realise that. All this is added to the difficulties of daily life, as Haitians have to work hard to put food on their table, often through informal labour, or earning very little in a formal job, in addition to the strong political manipulation and exploitation to which the people are constantly submitted.
- **Similar public security problems** – the presence of armed groups exercising their power over certain areas or regions, where the heavy violence of armed gangs exposes all to a high number of injured and dead bodies. These characteristics of Port-au-Prince did not shock Brazilian soldiers, who naturally knew how to deal with these problems with aplomb. Like Haitians, our soldiers are also used to impunity and to solving their own problems where the public powers are lacking or inefficient.

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<sup>3</sup> Defined by the international community as the way in which Brazilian soldiers act in critical situations with regard to the population. It expresses one of the key characteristics of Brazilian soldiers' personality (more affable and flexible than soldiers from other countries). This expression was first used by Edmond Mullet, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Haiti, during a meeting in New York in 2011. What other country has ever taken one of its most prized social communication assets – its national football team – to a conflict zone in order to promote peace?

- **Troops' operational capacity** – defined as the capacity to fulfil tasks well and carry out what has been planned, together with a strong interest in fulfilling the mission with the least possible collateral damage. It can also be expressed as the capacity to carry out continuous and repetitive actions over long periods of time. The trilogy that expresses the routine of Brazilian soldiers demonstrates well this characteristic: service – patrol – rest.

- **Staff planning methodology** – Brazilian officers are used to working in teams and in multicultural/multidisciplinary environments. This is also one of the characteristics of our officers in individual missions. It is a strong competence to analyse problems and understand the 'CORE' of a mission, linked to a capacity to produce and convey clear and precise orders at all levels.

- **Employment of DOPAZ** (Special Forces Section – *Destacamento de Operações de Paz*, in the Portuguese acronym) **and DOP** (sometimes referred to as DOAI – Psychological Operations Section) as BRABATT manoeuvring elements – these were used as combat power multipliers; as elements of informant networking and search for information; as a means to earn people's support and change the image of MINUSTAH (from occupation force to humanitarian aid force); and to disseminate operational techniques among the troops.

- **BRABATT's and BRAENGCOPY's high prompt response capacity** – this capacity can be expressed in the following characteristics: structure and training focused on using aircraft; prompt response capacity whether on aircraft and/or armoured vehicles; confinement that ensured the permanent availability of considerable troops at the commanders' disposal; and constant state of preparedness.

- **Brazilians soldiers' flexibility** – this aspect was identified in the improvement of equipment and materials (running boards, shoulder straps, jackets, etc.), in the capacity to plan and transmit orders anywhere and in any conditions, and in the adaptability to adverse situations.

- **Good Command and Control structure** – this includes a variety of state-of-the-art communication systems. The abundance of command and control means and equipment, as well as the use of social networks, were clear characteristics in all Brazilian contingents, which enabled commanders to control their troops anywhere on the ground and ensure that officers could remain in touch with their families.

- **Adequate support with means and materials** – vehicles of different types, sufficient supplies and spare parts, and appropriate logistical support to the troops' operational needs were factors that enabled the troops to remain operational at all times.

- **Use of mass in critical actions** – the employment of more troops than what is required by the threat level, using subunits as a basic element, and the concentration of large troops in a small area were factors that ensured tactical success in the actions of our contingents.

- **Proper use of operational intelligence** – the use of ground surveillance methods, unmanned aircraft and area surveillance, as well as the search for intelligence through informants and collaborators, provided CONTBRAS with up-to-date information on the operational environment.

- **Constant search for the support of public opinion**, in Brazil, in Haiti and/or within the international community – this was possible due to the systematic use of a social communications officer from the Army Social Communications Centre (CComSEx, in the Portuguese acronym) to coordinate social communication actions, by the joint action of CComSEx and the Ministry of Defence's Communications Office (AsCom/MD) to publicise the mission, and by the development of media interest in peace missions through institutional messages.

- **Training focused on worst case scenario** – independently of the situation in Haiti, whether at peace or in conflict, our military officers were trained to deal with the worst possible outcomes. Their training is based on all necessary tasks involved in peacekeeping operations. Thus, operational techniques and shooting practice, for all potential situations, have priority in their training.

- **Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre (CCOPAB, in the Portuguese acronym) as a centre of excellence and knowledge multiplier** – this is an important vector for the dissemination of knowledge in training troops, as it is constantly aligned with the latest developments in troop evaluation

and specific training, being internationally recognised as a reference in its area of activity.

- **Training methodology** – CONTBRAS training is governed by specific guidelines that establish, in general terms, how it is to be carried out, and are based on a standard programme developed to meet the requirements of key tactical activities within UN peace missions. In addition, it is divided in different levels according to a training-of-trainers methodology. It is systematised as part of a continuous cycle.

- **Notable support of Brazilian engineering to the reconstruction of the country** – with an impressive supply of resources, experienced and highly capable personnel, and actions aimed at supporting Haitian infrastructure and assisting the population, BRAENGCOPY has shown the world and the UN the excellence of Brazilian military engineers. Among the various works developed by the Brazilian Engineering Company, the following are to be noted: destroying explosives (over 3,000 kg); clearing ditches (over 20,000 metres); digging wells (64 units); producing asphalt (over 24,000 m<sup>3</sup>); and removing debris/wreckage (over 24,000 m<sup>3</sup>).

- **Emphasis on humanitarian actions** – it would be impossible to dissociate operational activities from the humanitarian activities developed largely at the Brazilian contingents' own initiative in Haiti. Not only did such activities provide support to the population, but they also offered soldiers a better understanding of the Haitian population's needs.

- **Efficiency of logistical support** – An effective performance in logistics, transport and maintenance was vital to ensure the operational efficiency of CONTBRAS. In addition, it was necessary to adapt/create, within our structure, military organisations derived from the need to optimise specific logistical activities according to CONTBRAS's needs, such as the Army's Logistical Support Base. This major logistical unit played a key role in providing logistical support to CONTBRAS military operations, and will be even more important upon its return to Brazil, as it will be in charge of maintaining all the material of Peace Force military organisations.

- **Specific financial resources** – the resources to mobilise, prepare, deploy and demobilise troops were part of a specific federal budget subhead, which removed this burden from the Force and provided the necessary resources to ensure the proper training of contingents and the constant renewal of materials. In addition, it provided better comfort to the troops, as the contingents did not have to rely on resources from the United Nations.

- **Demobilisation of Troops** – carried out to ensure that military officers would return home in good physical, mental and psychological conditions, and free from any of the congenital pathologies found in the area of operations. Among other factors, this activity turns the process more reliable, helping to attract a higher number of volunteers to the mission. It is applied for all officers returning from peace missions.

- **MINUSTAH's precise and competent performance** in coordinating the activities of all contingents – undoubtedly, the Mission Command (in particular, its military and civilian components) knew how to conduct the activities of all contingents with a high level of precision. both in the political and military spheres. This helped Haitian institutions and provided the necessary support to the operations, through complex planning exercises, coordination of military and police components, and training and preparation of the Haitian National Police (PNH, in the French acronym).

## Conclusion

MINUSTAH comes to an end in October 2017, after having its military component led by Brazil since the beginning, 13 years earlier. The Brazilian participation numbers are impressive. Brazil provided 11 Force Commanders, 26 Contingents, 33 Infantry Battalions, 24 Engineering Companies, and a total of 35,000 Brazilian Army officers. We lost 24 officers and two civilians (Zilda Arns and Luiz Carlos da Costa) in the mission. Of these, 18 perished at the 2010 earthquake, one was electrocuted on a roof, one fell from a vehicle and fractured his skull, two committed suicide, and two died of a heart attack. We also had one officer injured in combat. In total, 15 UN blue helmets lost their lives as a result of different adverse actions. Brazil did not lose any military officer in action.

It is also worth pointing out that, in the 13 years of MINUSTAH, no Brazilian officer was ever accused of sexual exploitation or abuse of minors, neither was any of our military officers repatriated by the UN due to misconduct. Whoever visits Port-au-Prince will find well-lit streets, small shops open, big department stores, high quality supermarkets, incipient public cleaning services, traffic wardens, and a city that is trying to go back to normal. There is still a lot of waste in the streets and canals that cross the city, as well as a lot of poverty and litter around the 'Venezuela Market'. But no single neighbourhood is controlled by gangs. There is no area in the city where public power representatives cannot circulate freely.

In Cité Soleil, a thriving street market has brought new colour to its usually arid landscape. Visitors will also find children speaking Portuguese, and calling out loud the names of former BRABATT commanders. A new generation is growing up without having had contact with violence. This in itself would be enough to assess the success of the mission, particularly regarding the part of the mandate that refers to promoting a secure and stable environment.

Years ago, the street corners in Port-au-Prince immediately drew the attention of anyone visiting the city. Crowds of unemployed people occupied the street corners in search of any opportunity to make some money. The city was full of 'zombies', who erred day and night, and slept wherever they could find some shelter. Today, these same street corners have changed. Haitians no longer concentrate around them as hordes of distraught people. They move around at the same pace as their fragile and incipient economy.

Memories of the 2010 earthquake are still present, but not everywhere. Haiti is reinventing itself, and Port-au-Prince lives in peace and security.

Haiti is finding its true vocation, as its Caribbean neighbours did years ago: tourism. Less than an hour from the centre of Port-au-Prince, towards the country's northern coast, high-level resorts are taking the space once filled with earthquake wreckage.

Politically, the country is finding its path, although it still needs some guidance. As in the case of other former European colonies in America, the political component does not evolve at the same pace as the economic and social ones. However, it is already possible to hold free elections without the interference of armed groups.

These socio-economic improvements, the possibility of free elections, and free circulation around Port-au-Prince have only been possible thanks to MINUSTAH, which managed to provide a secure and stable environment all over the country. Finally, we recognise that the world as a whole has been developing slowly, as expected for such a diverse and complex humanity, with such different evolutionary levels. However, one factor must be taken into account: despite all the criticism against the United Nations, the fact that its actions are questioned, and that it mistakenly tries, in our opinion, to impose a Western view of the world on all countries around the globe, since its foundation, the UN has tried to improve the conditions of living for the most vulnerable populations. It employs different means for that, including political and non-governmental actions.

But it is by coordinating its political and military work that the initiatives related to the most vulnerable groups become more effective. Bringing together political (SRSG) and military (Force Commander) elements, whether or not through a single individual, has ensured to all missions the peace and calm they need to achieve the objectives established in their respective mandates.

We dare say that, without its military arm, the UN would be meaningless. This is the main contradiction found in this important multidimensional organisation. It relies on force to promote peace. This contradiction is evident in the case of Haiti, where Brazil was able to exercise its peaceful vocation and solve conflicts through diplomacy largely thanks to its military arm.

After this mission, our country has been raised to the condition of a key player in peacekeeping operations maintained by the UN around the planet. This was not due to its diplomacy, or the fact that it is the eighth (or seventh) world economy, but rather it resulted from the military expression of its national power, its high-level soldiers and their impeccable discipline – something very rare among many troops engaged in UN missions. Our troops fulfil their mission and try to solve any problems they find in a balanced way, with the least possible collateral damage.

Thus, after all these considerations, we can easily say that the UN Peace Mission in Haiti was extremely successful. And that a key factor for this success was the work carried out by our country, and in particular our men and women in uniform, who, whether on the ground, or providing all necessary support in the rearguard, gave their best to fulfil their mission in the best way possible. Based on all this, we can definitely say that Brazil in Haiti is a success story.

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Joint training involving Pakistan's FPU and the Haitian National Police in Gonaïves, Haiti. Brazilian UNPOL participates in coordinating the training, together with UNPOLs from France and the US.

Credit: BMRS Major Marco Morais's private collection

## 8. Analysis of the Brazilian police's participation in MINUSTAH<sup>1</sup>

PMDF Major Sergio CARRERA NETO and BMRS Major Marco MORAIS

Over the 13 years of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Brazil contributed not only with members of its Armed Forces to the mission's military component<sup>2</sup>, but also integrated the police component of that same UN Peace Operation, the United Nations Police – UNPOL.

The first mandate established for MINUSTAH, through resolution 1542 of the UN Security Council, was wide in its tasks and covered critical sectors of society directly linked to policing activities, among which<sup>3</sup>:

'(...) Assisting in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police; assisting with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes; assisting with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti; protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence (...)'.

<sup>1</sup> **Translator's note:** the Brazilian Military Police (*Polícia Militar* – PM, in the Portuguese acronym) is a type of preventive state police force. It is responsible for maintaining public order across the country, and is therefore similar to the *gendarmérie* in France. Deployed solely to act as a crime deterrent, PM units do not conduct criminal investigations. Detective work, forensics and prosecutions are undertaken by the Brazilian Civil Police. In this text, we have opted not to use the term Military Police so as to avoid any confusion with the Armed Forces Police or the Army Police, which are effectively composed of military officers.

<sup>2</sup> Brazil deployed an Infantry Battalion, an Army Engineering Company and a Brazilian Navy Marine Corps in collective missions. It also had officers from all three Armed Forces integrating MINUSTAH's Military Staff in individual missions.

<sup>3</sup> UN. MINUSTAH Mandate. Available at: <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/mandate.shtml>>. Accessed on 20 August 2017.

It was clear that the mandate established specific public security objectives for Haiti, many of which under the competence, in virtually all countries, of police institutions<sup>4</sup>.

In view of the lack of a specific agenda for the use of police officers in peace operations, Brazil had always contributed with a small number of officers for the 11 UN peace missions with police components in which it took part since the 1990s (Carrera Neto, 2015). The same was true for MINUSTAH. On 18 September 2014, the first three Brazilian police officers joined the UN police component in Haiti (Carrera Neto, 2015) with a more direct focus on stabilisation activities<sup>5</sup>. With the objective of trying to clarify the activities performed by Brazilian police officers in the mission, and aiming at providing a better understanding of the Brazilian police engagement, we will try to divide the 13 years of our presence in MINUSTAH in distinct stages: (1) Stabilisation (2004-2006); (2) Joint Operations and Structuring (2007-2009); (3) Earthquake: Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and Humanitarian Actions (2010-2012); and (4) Human Resources and Development (2013-2017).

## The four stages of MINUSTAH and the role of the police

### **Stage 1 – Stabilisation (2004-2007)**

The stabilisation stage in Haiti took place approximately between 2004 and 2007. The participation of the military component was very strong, with police support particularly in high risk areas, such as the districts of Bel Air and Cité Militaire, employing regular patrols and different operations to occupy the areas.

Brazilian police officers were entrusted with managing the deployment of UN police officers (UNPOL) at the MINUSTAH Direction of Police Operations (*Diretoria de Operações Policiais* – DIROPS, in the Portuguese acronym), a support office within UNPOL's administrative and operational structure, whose head had a direct link with the Operations Pillar Director and the Police Commissioner<sup>5</sup>. The importance of DIROPS for the development of UNPOL operational activities could be measured by the fact that it was the only UNPOL unit operating from the MINUSTAH Headquarters at Hotel Christopher (Morais, 2015). Its core mission was to seek to improve UNPOL's cooperation with the Haitian National Police (PNH, in the French acronym), the military component and the UN Civilian Security. This stage was marked by individual military and UNPOL activities, and operational procedures that disagreed with SOFA<sup>6</sup> provisions and other norms. As it lacked an executive mandate, neither international police nor military officers had legitimacy to act in the absence of the PNH.

The participation of PNH officers in police operations was quite rare at the time, as that police institution was still in its initial consolidation phase, following Haiti's internal conflicts. Confrontations with gangs were frequent, and consequently the actual participation of international police officers was required in many circumstances, turning the UN police and military activities into executive operations (i.e. including arrests, detentions and even questionings). Although operations were jointly planned, on many occasions the PNH did not participate in them, or abandoned them while they were happening.

During this stage, Brazilian police officers worked essentially in the operational area, either in joint patrols with the PNH, or in planning and executing police operations on the ground. In the first and second contingents, a Brazilian police officer was appointed as the Liaison Officer between UNPOL and the Brazilian Battalion (BRABATT), with a view to facilitating communications between the military contingents and the mission headquarters<sup>7</sup>.

As time went by, the MINUSTAH police sector adapted its performance to the PNH's restructuring and reform needs. The strategy used to achieve these objectives was to gradually create an organisational structure within UNPOL that 'mirrored' the PNH, so that each Haitian police unit would have a matching UNPOL unit (co-location), with officers specialised in the most diverse areas of police activity (Morais 2015:148).

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4 It is worth pointing out that the Haitian Armed Forces did not exist during MINUSTAH.

5 The highest police authority in MINUSTAH and any other UN mission that included a police component.

6 Status of Force Agreement.

7 As the MINUSTAH organisational structure did not provide for this position, the Liaison Officer role was extinguished between 2005 and 2006.

From an operational perspective, the activities of UN police officers during the stabilisation stage also included:

'The works involved training PNH personnel, engaging in overt policing activities, capturing criminals, and training the Traffic Police, including in planning the installation of traffic lights and pedestrian crossings. All may carry light weapons and make arrests, as the Haitian Government is not yet ready to ensure domestic law and order. It is an exceptional situation, with few precedents in the history of the United Nations' (Fontoura 2009:61).

## **Stage 2 – Joint Operations and Structuring (2007-2009)**

In the first half of 2007, the activities carried out by UNPOL and by international troops always tried to involve the PNH. This was, however, the main difficulty even in the early stages of planning operations, and particularly during their execution on the ground. Numerous joint operations (UNPOL, military and PNH) were cancelled during this period for reasons that ranged from the PNH simply failing to attend at the agreed time and place for the meeting point, with no advance warning, to their attendance with fewer officers than planned, thus hindering or even cancelling the operation. Another problem was the language barrier. Very few military battalions had enough troops that were fluent in French or Haitian Creole (Haiti's official languages), or even English. This represented an obstacle to communication, which at times was considered a risk variable for real operational situations<sup>9</sup>.

In the same year, there was an iconic case in which a military battalion arrested more than ten Haitians and kept them in their facilities for questioning. This fact remained unknown to the PNH and the MINUSTAH High Command until a judicial notification was issued by a Haitian court. The Haitian Judiciary challenged:

'(...) the legality of MINUSTAH actions and arrests without the presence of the PNH. From that moment onwards, a joint operation protocol signed by the Police Commissioner and the Force Commander guided the *modus operandi* of operational activities and ensured its full compliance. There was a significant change in the way that activities were conducted, with operations necessarily including members of the PNH'<sup>9</sup>.

Thus, since 2007, DIROPS took on a very relevant role in police operations, as one of its divisions was in charge of planning, producing operational orders, controlling and commanding not only the purely police operations, but also all joint operations under MINUSTAH (UNPOL, PNH and international military officers)<sup>10</sup>.

The procedure adopted for each operation included a preparatory meeting at the UNPOL headquarters (PNH Coordination Unit), with representatives from all DIROPS subunits, the PNH Commissioner<sup>11</sup> or his Operations Officer, as well as the Operations Officer of the international military battalion in charge of the area where the operation would take place<sup>12</sup>.

It is worth pointing out that: 'Independently of the objective of the operation, UNPOL was responsible for the general coordination of all joint police operations and for providing support to the PNH, whereas the military troops were in charge of cordoning off the area and providing security to police officers on the ground'<sup>13</sup>.

Brazil was inserted in this context. Many operations were planned, coordinated, executed and commanded by Brazilian police officers all over Haiti. DIROPS always had a Brazilian police officer in its cadre, with positive results,

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8 The official language of the military component (Staff) was English, while the police component (individual missions) was bilingual. French was spoken by about 75 per cent of UNPOL, while the others resorted to English. Notably, most UNPOL officers in senior positions were bilingual. For the police contingents (Formed Police Unit – FPU) and the military contingents, only the highest rank officers were required to be fluent in the official languages (English for the military, and French or English for the police officers), but, in practice, this was rare in both contingents.

9 Melo Neto (2015).

10 The Direction of Operations had three distinct sections: (i) the UNPOL SWAT Unit, which focused on training and operations with the PNH Special Operations Unit; (ii) the UNPOL Crowd Control Unit, which was in charge of coordinating missions and training for the UNPOL Formed Police Unit (FPU) and joint missions with the PNH Crowd Control Units, known as 'Intervention and Order Maintenance Corps'; and (iii) the UNPOL/PNH Coordination Unit, which had the role of coordinating all joint police operations (UNPOL, PNH and international military officers) in Haiti. See: Morais (2015), p.151; and Carrera Neto (2015).

11 *Commissariat* is the name given to the Haitian National Police Stations.

12 Each Military Battalion had an area of responsibility in the Haitian capital. BRABATT, for example, was in charge of the area that included the Cité Soleil slums. Thus, whenever a joint operation was carried out in the area, the BRABATT Operations Officer would be invited to the meeting.

13 Morais (2015), p.155.

in particular due to their flexibility and ability to access different multicultural and operational environments, and especially due to their experience in a public security reality that was not that far from the one they found in Haiti.

Three years after the arrival of MINUSTAH in Haiti, Cité Soleil was no longer the main concern for UNPOL with regard to criminality, although it remained so for other stakeholders, for political or media reasons. Even though special attention was given to that district, particularly after the second half of 2007, the problems had migrated to other areas, such as Martissant and Carrefour (in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area). Occasionally, conflict situations would arise in the second largest Haitian city, Gonaïves, in the central region of the country, a place of huge historical and political importance.

In 2009, the UN mandates started determining the gradual withdrawal of the police component, which would start in 2010, and was expected to end in 2011. However, an unexpected catastrophe had a huge impact on the mission's administrative and operational planning.

### **Stage 3 – Earthquake: Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Actions (2010-2012);**

The seismic tremors that hit Port-au-Prince, in particular, and other Haitian regions on 12 January 2010 completely changed the focus of the mission. Up to that moment, the focus had been the PNH's organisational and educational strengthening, developed by UNPOL through the institutional Reform Plan and funded by the Canadian Government. This was interrupted by an unprecedented natural tragedy that made around 220,000 victims.

Following the catastrophe, a new mandate was published by the UN Security Council: instead of demobilising and reducing the number of police and military troops, the mission had its personnel doubled for the post-earthquake period<sup>14</sup> and included a humanitarian element, with the suspension of all ongoing projects and processes. According to Carrera Neto (2015):

'(...) for approximately 18 months, UNPOL focused on the critical situation, particularly in the capital, the most affected and most densely populated area, where hundreds of families migrated from the countryside in the hope of getting donations and support from international organisations. Overt patrolling, searching and arresting criminals (many of whom had escaped when part of the prisons collapsed), rescuing activities, and monitoring and controlling the approximately 400 IDP camps became the core of UNPOL activities.'

The work of Brazilian police officers was quite intense. They actively engaged in rescuing and saving earthquake victims, providing assistance and support in humanitarian actions, escorting authorities and convoys, and participating in search and arrest operations focused on missing fugitives and armaments. In addition, patrolling activities in IDP camps increased the number of joint operations. This work was developed by DIROPS, which had its name changed to JOPU (Joint Operations and Planning Unit) in 2011, in coordination with PNH elite troops (SWAT PNH) and riot control troops. It was at this time that a new UNPOL unit was created – the IDP Camp Unit – to maintain and manage UNPOL personnel in all IDP camps in Haiti. The IDP Camp Unit had an investigation and intelligence cell, which was responsible for investigating all crimes committed in the camps and recording all information available about such crimes. The biggest of these camps, known as 'Jean Marie Vincent', included seven IDP camps in pre-determined areas in the region of Cité Soleil. In total, about 48,000 people lived in tents and field barracks, and had access to a structure that included a cholera hospital, run by the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as shared sanitation facilities. The second largest camp was located in the centre of Port-au-Prince, and was known as Champ de Mars. The third largest one was named Cathedral. The main crimes repressed by the police in these places included homicides, thefts (particularly of money and mobile phones), robberies, domestic violence, violence against women and children - as well as sexual crimes (paedophilia and rapes)<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> Numerous troops from other countries were deployed to support MINUSTAH, in particular from the US.

<sup>15</sup> UNPOLICEBRASIL. Available at: <http://unpolicebrasil.blogspot.com.br/2011/05/minustah-tcel-issa-completa-duas.html>. Accessed on 2 September 2017.

## **Stage 4 – Human Resources and Development (2013-2017)**

Once some level of normality was restored, institutional strengthening activities resumed in 2013<sup>16</sup> with the implementation of the 2012-2016 PNH Development Plan. The priorities included strengthening the critical role of the PNH in Haiti's public security system; Haiti's domestic security and stability; and the professional training, reform and accountability of the police for the promotion of national security. The goal was to transform the PNH into a professional institution that would deliver services to the Haitian population in line with human rights and democratic principles, so as to allow the police functions provided by UNPOL to gradually be reabsorbed by the PNH.

The Development Pillar became the most important priority, and Brazil provided excellent police contributions to the Strategic Planning and Development Section (SPSD) with regard to planning the database (HSMART System), delivering training and implementing the PNH Development Plan.

In addition, in 2011, in parallel with the activities performed by the Operations Pillar<sup>17</sup> (DIROPS had its name changed to Joint Operations and Planning Unit – JOPU), which had a Brazilian police officer in its cadre until the end of MINUSTAH, the mission started employing Brazilians in areas other than operation, such as, for example, the National Police Academy, the Community Police Unit, the Human Resources Development Section, basic training (UNPOL, FPU, prison officers, civilian and police officers), and continued education programmes aimed at UNPOL officers, in addition to leading on the protection of authorities, among others<sup>18</sup>.

The considerable increase in the number of Brazilian military officers in MINUSTAH from 16 April 2014 onwards, with the arrival of 22 police officers in Port-au-Prince, enabled, for the first time, the deployment of six Brazilian police officers to areas outside the capital, spread over four different provinces in the cities of Cap Haitien, Jacmel, Les Cayes and Port de Paix<sup>19</sup>.

## The Brazilian police contingent – background, ranks and gender

The present section will draw a brief quantitative analysis of the Brazilian police contingent in MINUSTAH, based on yet unpublished data on the background of police officers (which Federative Unit they come from), their rank (position and seniority), and their gender.

Between 2004 and 2017, a total of 53 Brazilian police officers from nine different federative units integrated MINUSTAH. Within this universe, the Federal District Police (PMDF, in the Portuguese acronym) contributed with the highest number of officers – 18, or 34 per cent of the total. The Rio Grande do Sul State Brigade (BMRS, in the Portuguese acronym) and the Rio de Janeiro State Police (PMERJ, in the Portuguese acronym) came second, with five police officers each, or 9 per cent of the total. It is important to point out that, due to financial constraints, since January 2014 no PMDF officer has been authorised to participate in any UN peace mission. In other words, that corporation might have contributed with even more officers, considering that they did not send any officer in the last three years of the mission.

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
16 In 2013 and 2014, many housing programmes funded by international donors removed displaced persons to their new homes, and as a result many camps were closed.

17 On the occasion, DIROPS had its name changed to Joint Operations and Planning Unit – JOPU, and always had a Brazilian police officer in its cadre until the end of MINUSTAH.

18 It is very common, during a one-year mandate, for a police officer to work in at least two or three different units.

19 Previously, only one Brazilian officer had been deployed, upon request, to serve as the commander of a province in the south of the country. Decisions on deployment and stay in the capital took into account the size of the contingent and their seniority (Contingent Commander and Deputy Commander).


**Chart 1.** Number of Police Officers from each Federative Unit (or state), and percentage of the total (2004-2017)



Sources: Authors' and Eduarda Hamann's personal files.

The rank of Captain was the most common in MINUSTAH, with a total of 27 officers, followed by Police Majors and First Lieutenants, with nine officers each, which accounted for 17 per cent of the total. Still regarding ranks, it is worth noting that MINUSTAH had only one enlisted grade officer (a Sub-Lieutenant of the Rio de Janeiro State Police), one Lieutenant Colonel of the Bahia State Police, and one Colonel of the Federal District Police.

**Chart 2.** Number of Police Officers (PM, in the Portuguese acronym) by Rank (in absolute numbers and percentage of the total)



Sources: Authors' and Eduarda Hamann's personal files.

With regard to the gender of the 53 police officers participating in MINUSTAH, only two were women (both PMDF), which represents 3.8 per cent of the Brazilian police personnel in MINUSTAH. Both these officers stayed in MINUSTAH for 18 months. PMDF Captain Virgínia Sousa Lima<sup>20</sup> was in her second UN mission:

'After her arrival in Port-au-Prince in December 2012, she was deployed to the West Department in the Gender Mobile Team (GBT) at the IDPs (5) in the region of Port-au-Prince, the Haitian capital. The GBT is formed only by female UNPOL officers of various nationalities, who are responsible for monitoring and mentoring the Haitian National Police (PNH) in relation to sexual crimes or domestic violence, which are among the most serious crimes in the country. Every day, Captain Virgínia has to deal with critical situations involving rapes and violence against women (including children). She has to take immediate action with the Gender Focal Points (6) established in the region, as well as in the hospitals that already have the structure to provide special treatment for these types of violence. Given her aplomb and professionalism, she has stood out and has been appointed by the command of the mission to represent MINUSTAH in international events related to the 'Protection of Civilians', one of the most important topics within the UN in the past few years. She works on a sensitive issue with a vulnerable population in extreme poverty'.

Some of the activities performed by PMDF Captain Daniela Natália are described below:

'PMDF Captain Natália was initially deployed to the Public Order and Security Section of the Central Administrative Police Department (DCPA, in the Portuguese acronym), helping to monitor and follow up activities in PNH joint actions on traffic control, UNPOL and FPU. After a few weeks, she was transferred to the FPU Coordination Unit, which is subordinated to the Operations Centre operationally responsible for deploying the 11 FPUs in the country (as well as a SWAT team) to monitor and coordinate police and joint operations (with the Haitian National Police – PNH, UNPOL and MINUSTAH Military Forces); supervising the compliance of service orders; and delivering basic quick response training, among other activities. She plays a very important role in coordinating the only FPU formed only by female police officers (from Bangladesh), developing a very relevant work'<sup>21</sup>.

It is worth adding that the topic of gender is still very incipient in Brazilian public security, and that it directly affects the country's contribution to UN missions.

## Conclusion

In these 13 years of MINUSTAH, Brazil did not provide as much police support as some of its less diplomatically proactive South American neighbours. It was also lower than the actual capacity of our police institutions. On 30 June 2017, for example, MINUSTAH had 4,757 uniformed staff<sup>22</sup>, 2,288 of whom were international UNPOL officers<sup>23</sup> from 87 different countries. Brazil only had seven police officers in the group, representing 2.3 per cent of the total number of UNPOL officers.

This situation did not prevent the 53 police officers that served in Haiti from representing well our country, their states and their police forces, with unmistakable dedication and professionalism, as observed by other countries and police institutions represented in MINUSTAH.

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20 Between the second half of 2013 and June 2014, she was transferred to the Human Resources Development Section. She obtained her bilingual licence (English and French) in China, and ran over 500 processes to recruit police officers of other nationalities in Haiti and in Colombia, in addition to her training and administrative management responsibilities. For further information, please visit <https://missaodepaz.com/2013/03/05/policiais-militares-femininas-em-missoes-de-paz-20122013/>. Accessed on 15 September 2017.

21 In the last year of the mission, Captain Natália became Head of Operations and Head of the Unit. She was accredited as an FPU recruiter in NY, and participated in recruitment processes in Pakistan and Jordan. See the 'Peace Mission' website. Available at: <https://missaodepaz.com/2013/03/05/policiais-militares-femininas-em-missoes-de-paz-20122013/>. Accessed on 15 September 2017.

22 Source: MINUSTAH website. Available at: [www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts.shtml) Accessed on 20 August 2017.

23 Source: MINUSTAH website. Available at: [www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml#MINUST](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml#MINUST) Accessed on 20 August 2017.

Brazilian police officers were present in all UNPOL areas of work in the mission, whether in the capital, Port-au-Prince, or in other important cities in the Haitian countryside. They played an important role in the operational area integrating DIROPS since its creation in 2004 until the end of the mission in 2017, commanding and coordinating joint police operations, as well as SWAT and PNH Crowd Control Units training programmes. We also supported the training of new PNH cadres, with Brazilian police officers acting in several sectors of the Haitian National Police Academy, including as instructors. One of our officers is a survivor of the earthquake that hit the country on 12 January 2010. He played a key role in rescuing thousands of UN Staff, civilians and Brazilian military officers from the wreckage in the UN headquarters on that tragic afternoon.

The participation of Brazilian police officers in police operations in IDP camps in the wake of the earthquake (fighting crimes against property and crimes against human life and dignity that plagued a population that was already helpless due to the tragedy) and the participation of our female police officers in fighting gender crimes helped the country resume pre-earthquake security levels.

Finally, the contribution of our police officers with their expertise at the end of the mission for the improvement of the Haitian National Police's management tools and human resources contributed significantly to the achievement of the goals set in the mandate, and to ensuring that MINUSTAH could end its activities on 15 October 2017 on the same note as our valuable police officers: a sense of mission accomplished!

Our history in Haiti is not over yet. With the end of MINUSTAH, all Brazilian military officers returned home, but the new mission starting on 16 October 2017 – the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) – will open a new stage for UN actions in the country, and will be formed by international police officers and civilians. It has already been determined by the Security Council that the police component of the mission shall have 289 UNPOL and seven FPUs, and that it should still count on the presence of Brazilian police officers<sup>24</sup>.

The Brazilian police engagement is not yet part of our country's foreign policy agenda. Little by little, however, we can note some *ad hoc* actions aimed at improving and expanding our involvement at all levels of police work under the UN. Such increased participation is possible, and political and diplomatic involvement is fundamental for the creation of a specific positive agenda for Brazilian police officers to gain more space within the UN System.

Currently, the measurement of the positive aspects and improvement needs, as well as the roles and positions performed by these professionals, is only reported on websites, books and other publications, without any type of compilation or follow-up work carried out by official Brazilian entities (at federal, state or municipal level) during or after the mission. More optimistically, the importance of the Brazilian police component in UN peace missions is expected to be ever more valued. This would naturally take place in individual missions, as we observe in developed countries, rather than collective missions (FPU). The end of MINUSTAH provides Brazil with an excellent opportunity for reflection, including about a more effective engagement with the over 15 UN police missions currently under way. Certainly, nowadays, many individual actions (diplomatic, military and police) have enabled a better understanding and awareness of the importance of giving due attention to discussing this topic.

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<sup>24</sup> With the end of the mission, two Brazilian police officers will migrate from MINUSTAH to MINUJUSTH. One of them has been asked by the UN to stay in MINUJUSTH. Several other police officers are applying for secondment positions in the new mission. After nine years without applying French tests, the Army introduced a requirement for candidates willing to take the test: they would have to prove their fluency in English first. This sounds contradictory due to the urgent demand for French-speaking police officers at the UN, and is not supported by the SOPs for selecting police officers for UN individual missions. This measure should be reviewed. Thus, police officers who are fluent in French, but not in English, were not able to participate in the recruitment process for UN missions run by the Army. Only two candidates managed to prove their skills in both languages. It is worth pointing out that there is a very high demand for French-speaking police officers to integrate UN peace missions. Leadership and director positions must be filled by bilingual officers through a competitive recruitment process.

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Gender focal point shares knowledge with BRABATT's 26th Contingent officers.  
Credit: Sgt Rambo of BRAENGCOY 26

## 9. Brazil's incorporating a gender perspective in MINUSTAH

Dr Renata Avelar Giannini and IVANA MARA Ferreira da Costa

The participation of Brazilian military officers in the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was fundamental for the dissemination of resolution 1325 of the United Nations Security Council in Brazil. That resolution focuses on promoting the participation of women in international peace and security actions. While lacking formal planning, a number of factors contributed to the incorporation of a gender perspective by the Brazilian battalions integrating MINUSTAH, including: the establishment of strong points (*pontos fortes*) early in the mission; involvement with Quick Impact Projects (QIPs); the earthquake, the change in the mandate and the establishment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps; and the engagement with the mission's Gender Unit.

This article reviews the incorporation of a gender perspective by the Brazilian battalion over five stages of MINUSTAH: (i) Deployment; (ii) Pacification; (iii) Consolidation; (iv) Post-earthquake; and (v) Troops reduction and withdrawal. Besides identifying the different factors that enabled the inclusion of a gender perspective by Brazilian troops in each of these stages, this analysis also concludes that the Brazilian participation in this mission helped to disseminate resolution 1325 in Brazil, particularly within the Armed Forces. In addition, despite the reduced number of Brazilian military women in MINUSTAH, there was an increase in their participation, particularly in the last two stages, as well as an attempt to promote more contact between them and the local population. The main findings of our research include:

- During the first three stages of MINUSTAH, there was no explicit concern by the Brazilian contingent with the inclusion of a gender perspective in their actions. In spite of that, the consolidation of the strong points strategy favoured the adoption of different actions to tackle the differentiated impact of violence on civilians, including women. In this process, the actions of the Brazilian battalion had a positive impact with regard to the understanding that unstable situations – such as urban violence in Haiti – affected distinct gender groups differently;

- The intensification of civilian-military cooperation actions (CIMIC) and the establishment of QIPs from the third stage onwards led to a closer contact with the local population, which benefited women in particular. Indeed, specific actions were planned jointly with the MINUSTAH Gender Unit with the objective of promoting the rights of women and reducing gender-based violence;
- With the earthquake and the establishment of IDP camps, sexual violence grew in Haiti, with repercussions on the media. Specific issues related to the protection of women and girls were included in the mandate of the mission, and the military contingents, including the Brazilian ones, extended their patrols to these camps. In this context, there was a dissemination of a wider understanding of the incorporation of a gender perspective, which also had repercussions in Brazil;
- The engagement with the Gender Unit was not uniform over the five stages. However, it clearly played a key role in promoting a better understanding of the importance of a gender perspective in military components. An example of this was the requirement – requested by that Unit – that different battalions appointed a gender focal point with specific training and attributions for that role;
- Since Brazil still lacks women in ground combat roles in the Army, there was an attempt to promote a gender perspective across the board in the actions developed by the battalion. Although it depended on the personality/initiative of each commander, there was an effort, in particular during the last two stages, to favour contacts between the local population and the few Brazilian female military officers, particularly doctors, translators, dentists and nurses;
- Finally, it is also important to note the vital role of training centres as a way of disseminating the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda in Brazil and in other South American troop contributing countries.

This article is divided into five sections. The first one draws a brief history of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda, the situation of Haitian women and the inclusion of a gender perspective in the Brazilian military contingents. The second one focuses on actions developed by Brazilian military officers that benefited Haitian women in the first stages of MINUSTAH. The third section addresses the impact of the earthquake on the inclusion of a gender perspective in the next stages. The fourth section focuses on the role played by the MINUSTAH Gender Unit for the promotion of this perspective, while the fifth one highlights the role of the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre (CCOPAB, in the Portuguese acronym) in training the troops, particularly with regard to gender issues.

## Historical and conceptual contextualisation

The United Nations (UN) WPS Agenda, launched in 2000 through resolution 1325, highlights the key role of gender equality for the promotion of sustainable peace. In addition to this resolution, seven others aim at fostering: (1) gender mainstreaming in all UN actions; and (2) gender balance, i.e. the participation of men and women in actions related to international peace and security<sup>1</sup>.

Since then, a number of actions and processes have been launched by the UN and its Member States aiming at the effective implementation of the Agenda. For instance, Gender Units were created in New York, in the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and in several UN missions around the world. In addition, gender and protection advisers were deployed to the ground and specific training modules were created for the military and police components. Meanwhile, the Member States started designing and launching their National Action Plans (NAPs) to implement the WPS agenda.

Despite the progress achieved, some challenges remain. To a great extent, the implementation of the Agenda relies on individual States' political will and capacity. This was no different in the case of MINUSTAH. Just as in other places around the world, Haitian women have an unequal social, political and economic status compared with men<sup>2</sup>. The high levels of all sorts of violence, including femicide, result from this context of inequality in which they live<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> The resolutions are: 1820 (2008); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2009); 1960 (2010); 2016 (2013); 2122 (2013) and 2245 (2015). See on: [http:// www. peacewomen.org/why-WPS/solutions/resolutions](http://www.peacewomen.org/why-WPS/solutions/resolutions).

<sup>2</sup> Charles (1995); Bell (2001).

<sup>3</sup> See Homicide Monitor, available at: [homicide.igarape.org.br](http://homicide.igarape.org.br).

At times of conflict and/or high levels of violence and instability, women face a number of challenges. In addition to the public face of violence, there is also a domestic aspect. Both result from a pre-conflict continuum of violence that tends to be underestimated<sup>4</sup>. An increase in domestic violence is observed in societies affected by conflict and high levels of urban violence<sup>5</sup>. Domestic violence eventually feeds on the public dynamics of violence, such as the construction of violent masculinities in gangs and paramilitary groups, or even the normalisation and naturalisation of violence<sup>6</sup>.

In Haiti, the high levels of violence against women are combined with the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war<sup>7</sup>. There are records from the 1990s of this type of violence against feminist activists<sup>8</sup>. Since then, women's fight against systematised violence has been present in the country. Legislation on this matter is still recent, and the Ministry of Women's Affairs, created in 1994, lacks prioritisation.

High levels of sexual violence were also observed in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake (2010)<sup>9</sup>. Massive sexual assaults in IDP camps attracted international media attention<sup>10</sup>. As a consequence, MINUSTAH, including its military component, became more involved in the matter, especially after this topic was added to the mandate of the mission. Examples of concrete actions include better internal planning in the camps (location of bathrooms and lighting), patrols by the military component, and the implementation of a mobile Gender Unit by the United Nations Police (UNPOL).

Finally, sexual exploitation and abuse cases (SEA) are an important component of this agenda. MINUSTAH ended with a record of 75 official SEA cases (between 2008 and 2015)<sup>11</sup>. In the cases involving military officers, their countries of origin are responsible for investigating and punishing those involved. It is important to note that there were no official cases involving Brazilian military officers in this mission. Although this does not mean that no Brazilian was involved in any case, we would like to highlight two aspects that probably led to this positive outcome: (i) Brazil's policy of not allowing military officers to leave the base, even at weekends (except during their leave period); and (ii) the training received in Brazil, both at CCOPAB and under the Brazilian military doctrine.

## From arrival at the mission until pacification (2004-2007): the creation of 'Strong Points' (*Pontos Fortes*) and the attention given to gender-based violence

Both the literature on the Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH and interviews with Brazilian military officers that integrated the first contingents indicate that there was no specific concern with the incorporation of a gender perspective in the early stages of the mission. *'Our focus was effectively on stabilising the country. There was no specific concern with women. In addition, and considering the context faced by the first Brazilian contingents, no female military officers were present in the beginning. Brazil still lacks female officers with proper training for the roles performed at the time'*<sup>12</sup>.

The situation faced by those contingents was extremely insecure. Large areas of the city were dominated by gangs and paramilitary groups. In that context, we highlight an initiative carried out by the Brazilian contingents, which led to the creation of multi-task centres that contributed to the inclusion of a gender perspective in delivering services to local women, although this was not a specific goal. The Strong Points were used with the objective of establishing security by positioning troops in specific points, some for a set period of time, and others

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4 Wood (2014).

5 Esquivel and Kaufmann (2016).

6 Moura and Taylor (2015).

7 National Coalition for Haitian Refugees and Human Rights Watch (1994); and OAS (2009).

8 National Coalition for Haitian Refugees and Human Rights Watch (1994); and OAS (2009).

9 Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (2011).

10 See, for example, CNN (2012). Haitian living in fear 'Under the tent'. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/18/world/americas/cnnheroes-haiti-rape/index.html>.

11 The analysis only considers cases between 2008 and 2015, and does not include previous years. See Snyder (2017).

12 Interview with Brazilian military officer of the first Brazilian contingent on 28 August 2017.

permanently<sup>13</sup>. While at the beginning these points focused mainly on security, they started serving also as a base for operations, including for UNPOL and the Haitian National Police (PNH, in the French acronym). In view of the mandate, this interaction proved essential for sharing responsibility for law and order with local authorities. In addition, some of these centres evolved to become integrated centres with the presence of UN agencies and programmes, as well as units of the mission itself<sup>14</sup>.

On one hand, these points were vital for the stabilisation of the operational environment based on a constant presence of officers. On the other, they contributed to improving relations between the mission and the local population in view of the trust generated by their permanent presence and their new ways of working. The delivery of services and humanitarian assistance to the population in these places was highlighted in interviews as an important factor to gain the trust of the population, also contributing to improving the operational effectiveness of the mission through information gathered from locals.

From the standpoint of a gender perspective, the strong points and the multi-task centres that evolved from them served hundreds of women who were victims of domestic violence, in addition to helping many Haitian women during childbirth.

*'Indeed, from this point of view, the Brazilian contingent incorporated an element of attention to women victims of violence through the immediate treatment and attention they received at these points. We also delivered many babies. This aspect – childbirth – even became part of the training for soldiers and senior officers. It is the soldier who decides who should have access to the base. Soldiers were trained to allow women in labour to enter'*<sup>15</sup>.

As an example of a strong point, we may cite the National Fort, which served as a base for Brazilian military officers, but also hosted a police station specialised in sexual violence victims. The police station was formed by a PNH special unit focused on this issue, and by UNPOL officers with the mandate of supporting the Haitian Police.

## The impact of the earthquake on the promotion of a gender perspective

During the consolidation stage (2008-2009), there was an increase in the number of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) implemented by Brazil. In some of them, the main beneficiaries were women. At the time, there were plans to withdraw troops from Haiti, and the mission was preparing for its final withdrawal. Although the interaction between the military contingent and the Gender Unit was relatively limited, more attention seemed to be given to women's issues, including through the delivery of specific induction training courses. However, based on what was observed in interviews with military officers of the first contingents, there was no specific concern within the Brazilian battalion with the situation of local women or the insertion of women in military contingents.

This situation changed after the earthquake. Three key factors may explain this change: (i) cases of sexual violence in IDP camps; (ii) changes in the mission mandate; and (iii) greater interaction with the MINUSTAH Gender Unit. Firstly, it is important to note that the January 2010 earthquake left 1.3 million homeless people in the country, mostly in the capital<sup>16</sup>, who went on to live in dozens of camps of internally displaced persons. Not only did the earthquake shatter the country's structures, but also the whole of society, as well as the political and assistance systems. Leaders died, data was lost with the collapse of buildings, prisoners escaped, and the security and stability situation deteriorated significantly. In this context, several cases of systematic sexual violence emerged<sup>17</sup>. The majority of them took place in IDP camps, which had precarious facilities, little lighting and limited policing.

At the time, Haiti made international media headlines, and once again for negative reasons. While sexual violence also attracted the right degree of attention, the reported cases were not isolated incidents. They happened in the light of an utterly unstable situation which plagued the country in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. As

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13 For further information on strong points, see Chapter 6 of this publication.

14 Information obtained through an interview with a Brazilian military officer of the third Brazilian contingent on 28 August 2017.

15 Interview with a Brazilian military officer of the fifth Brazilian contingent on 5 September 2017.

16 Government of the Republic of Haiti (2010).

17 Madre (2011).

mentioned earlier, sexual violence in unstable situations is part of a continuum of violence, i.e. some conditions existing prior to the disaster contributed to increasing even further the levels of violence against women in Haiti. The basis of violence against women is gender inequality, and it was no different after the earthquake. The apparently lower status of women in society represents the main vector for gender-based violence, including sexual violence. At the same time, we cannot deny the fact that the operational environment changed considerably with the earthquake, and the context became extremely unstable. This offered an opportunity for acts of violence against women. It was in this context that the MINUSTAH military component started patrolling the camps, involving in particular the Brazilian contingent.

In addition to the IDP camps, it is important to point out that, at the same time, the mission mandate changed to include the protection of women<sup>18</sup>, which favoured the planning of specific actions for their protection<sup>19</sup>. The assistance provided by several countries, including Brazil, to Haiti grew exponentially, both through QIPs and through direct actions by the Brazilian battalion, which included the delivery of humanitarian aid and the provision of medical and dental services to the population. In interviews carried out in 2011 and 2012 with members of the Brazilian battalions who were present in Haiti immediately after the earthquake, the intention to send more women to perform these activities was highlighted. This indeed happened, subject to the security situation and the particular actions to be performed<sup>20</sup>. The objective was to favour contacts between Brazilian military women and potential victims of gender-based violence. In other words, the absence of Brazilian military women to perform patrols was felt. In order to provide a temporary solution for this situation, Brazilian resorted to Haitian female translators for external actions, or even to Brazilian female officers serving in the battalion<sup>21</sup>.

The third change factor at the time refers to a greater engagement between the military component, in particular Brazilian officers, and the MINUSTAH Gender Unit. As a direct consequence of such engagement, there were several activities focused on women, such as lectures on motherhood, breastfeeding and domestic violence, among others<sup>22</sup>. Thus, this closer interaction with the Gender Unit, together with the situation of Haitian women, which became evident in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, generated a higher level of awareness about the UN WPS Agenda, resolution 1325, and, consequently, the importance of including a gender approach in peace and security matters.

The data below demonstrate that no Brazilian military women participated in the mission up to 2007, when the pacification stage ended. After that, the participation of women grew considerably, although, in relative terms, it remained significantly lower than men's and the 10 per cent target set by the UN Secretary-General. In December 2015, the highest number of Brazilian female military officers was reported in Haiti: 26 women in a contingent of 983 officers, or the equivalent of 2.63 per cent<sup>23</sup>. The last Brazilian contingent in Haiti had 2 per cent of women, or 19 out of 950.

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18 See Resolution 2070 (2012), which requires all players on the ground to strengthen their efforts to end gender-based violence, including sexual violence in Haiti. In addition, Resolution 2012 (2011) requires the development of a civilian protection plan that should address specific threats to women and children.


19 Gianinni (2013 and 2015).

20 Interviews carried out in January 2011 and September 2012 for a doctoral study. See Giannini (2013).

21 Ibid.

22 Gianinni (2012).

23 Data obtained from the DPKO website. See: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/>.

**Table 1.** Brazilian military women in MINUSTAH – 2007-2017 (%)

Source: Ministry of Defence (2007-2008) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2009-2017)

## The influence of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda and the Gender Unit

Resolution 1325 and those that followed consolidated gender equality as a norm in actions related to international peace and security. In other words, gender equality started being seen as a key ingredient for sustainable peace. In this context, from 2002 onwards, a number of structures and processes were created at the UN headquarters in New York to facilitate the implementation of the Agenda, with immediate consequences for mission structures on the ground. In MINUSTAH, the Gender Unit became the main division in charge of promoting gender balance and gender mainstreaming in all actions developed by the mission. To some extent, the Conduct and Discipline Team also had the responsibility of incorporating a gender perspective, particularly in cases of sexual exploitation and abuse.

Over the years, with the growing importance of this topic in international politics and within the United Nations, the work carried out by the Gender Unit was also recognised. This enabled a higher level of influence on the actions of the mission, including the behaviour of its military component. In addition to leading on gender equality with regard to the mission, the Unit also aimed at eradicating gender-based violence in Haiti, in addition to supporting female political candidates with the goal of increasing Haitian women's participation in politics. In order to reach that goal, it offered support to the Haitian Ministry of Women's Affairs and coordinated several actions with representatives from civil society, UN agencies and other bodies of the mission, such as the military component.

After the earthquake, interactions between this Unit and the military component intensified, as previously mentioned. The following actions were observed in the following years: requirement to appoint gender focal points for each battalion; implementation of Quick Impact Projects and civilian-military actions focused on gender equality, women's rights and ending domestic violence; and more structured training on these topics.

Actually, as observed during our field work in Haiti, after 2011 all MINUSTAH contingents started appointing gender focal points<sup>24</sup>. In 2013, the gender focal points showed a more judicious and open performance, including weekly meetings with Unit 9 (U-9), responsible for civil military actions. These meetings became more frequent, and actions became better organised and focused. Courses and training programmes within the contingent and the MINUSTAH headquarters were systematised. The Conduct and Discipline Team also organised monthly training initiatives for the troops in order to reinforce the rules and punishment for officers that broke the codes of conduct embraced by the UN.

In 2016, the Women Work Committee was created with military women representing all units of the MINUSTAH military component. The goal was to improve the role played by these women, as well as contribute to the work

<sup>24</sup> Gianinni (2013 and 2011).

already developed by the U-9 cell, responsible for gender/child protection and civilian-military coordination. These two groups played a key role in developing activities involving military and civilian women in MINUSTAH with the goal of raising awareness on topics linked to the WPS Agenda.

In this context, the Brazilian contingents benefited from an environment in which gender equality became an important work norm. Little by little, Brazilian troops started incorporating this perspective in a more conscious manner. The actions carried out by the Brazilian contingent in the final stages – i.e. after the earthquake and during the withdrawal of troops– were largely influenced by the work of the mission itself, and consequently also had an impact in Brazil.

It became necessary to structure the Brazilian work in this area. Building on the interaction between civil society, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 2014 onwards Brazil started developing its own strategic thinking on WPS. This led to the creation and launch of a National Action Plan to implement the WPS agenda in the country. While this NAP resulted from an intergovernmental initiative including civil society in Brasilia, we may say that the work of Brazilian military in MINUSTAH helped to make some sectors more permeable to the agenda, in particular Foreign Affairs and Defence.



Civilian-Military Cooperation Activity (CIMIC) involving Brazilian military women and the Haitian population. Credit: Jorge Cardoso, Ministry of Defence's archives

## Maximising gender perspective training and mainstreaming

Pre-deployment training is the first and often the only contact that Brazilian military officers have with the WPS Agenda. *'Indeed, in the basic training delivered to Brazilian military officers, there is nothing besides humanitarian law and civilian protection. More specifically, regarding women, peace, security and gender, we have observed that military officers only have contact with these subjects when preparing for peacekeeping operations'*<sup>25</sup>.

Therefore, the creation of CCOPAB in 2010 was certainly a landmark in this evolution, as it systematised and standardised the training. In addition to structuring the minimum modules required by the UN, which was already done in the old Peacekeeping Training Centre (*Centro de Instrução de Operações de Paz – CI Op Paz*, in the Portuguese acronym), it also started systematising the work doctrine of Brazilian troops with regard to the WPS agenda. In particular, the courses on the following topics deserve special attention: implementation of women, peace and security policies; gender issues within the area of the mission; sexual exploitation and abuse; civilian protection; child protection; and respecting diversity. As previously mentioned, the training also covers specific operational issues, such as the strong points, which were included in the modules focused on pacification and consolidation (in part).

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<sup>25</sup> Interview with the Commander of the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre (CCOPAB) on 5 September 2017.

It is important to highlight the cooperation of this Centre with civilian institutions, such as universities, UN agencies and civil society. While CCOPAB still lacks consolidated training on this topic, representatives from these institutions are regularly invited to improve and deliver the modules related to the WPS agenda. Another point worth noting is the use of scenarios linked to this topic, adapted to the specific missions where Brazilian military officers participate, such as Haiti.

In addition to contributing to the training, the constant presence of these civilian institutions also helped to collect data and manage research on several aspects of the agenda, as well as disseminate the content of UN resolutions on WPS within the military environment. Together, these initiatives contribute to promoting a better understanding that this is a key topic for the training of Brazilian troops deployed to peace missions, including in Haiti. Integrating this perspective into Brazilian military doctrine will thus contribute to its adoption in any other mission to which Brazil may contribute troops.

## Final considerations

We can see that there was significant progress over the 13 years of the mission with regard to the inclusion of a gender perspective by the Brazilian contingent in several aspects. There was an increase in the number of female military officers, growing from 0 in 2004 to 19 at the end of the mission in 2017 (around 2 per cent of the total). Regarding concrete actions, we observed the implementation of initiatives led by the Brazilian contingent with the goal of supporting women, such as lectures on breastfeeding, domestic violence, or even QIPs that had women as their main beneficiaries.

Concerning pre-deployment training, we have observed that it improved, extending invitations to civilian professionals to deliver and improve the modules on gender, including sexual exploitation and abuse; women, peace and security; and sexual violence in conflicts. Finally, it is worth pointing out that, in general, and thanks to the participation of Brazilians in MINUSTAH, our country has become more permeable to gender norms in issues related to international peace and security. The launch of the Brazilian NAP in March 2017 is an example of this.

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Credit: Audrey Goillot/UN Photo

# National stakeholders: Military Criminal Justice System and Chamber of Deputies

10. Military criminal diagnosis of Brazilian peacekeepers in Haiti

Dr Najla Nassif Palma

11. The Chamber of Deputies' Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defence and MINUSTAH: from initial resistance to abdication

Giovanni Okado



Military Prosecutor and Federal Military Auditing Judge and other civilian authorities visiting Brazilian troops in MINUSTAH. Port-au-Prince (2013).

Credit: Dr Najla Nassif Palma's private collection

## 10. Military criminal diagnosis of Brazilian peacekeepers in Haiti

Dr Najla Nassif Palma

'*Ansam pou lapè*'. This was the message of unity for peace coined in Creole that inspired and guided the Herculean task of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) over these 13 years of work on the ground.

Haiti is a country of African traditions in the heart of the Americas. It was the first independent nation in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the only country in the world born of a successful slave rebellion<sup>1</sup>. However, it is an unstable State, plagued by natural catastrophes, and with a history of economic, political and social instability. The battered Haitian people placed their hope for a better life on peacekeepers, often seeing them as the only chance of getting back on the path of stabilisation.

It is exactly due to such strong trust found among local populations in unstable and vulnerable settings devastated by conflict that members of peace missions must present irreproachable posture and behaviour. When participating in a United Nations (UN) peace mission overseas, not only do military officers represent their country, but also the whole international community in a global effort to maintain peace, and consequently support the development of critical regions around the globe.

<sup>1</sup> See <https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haiti>.

Thus, when peacekeepers behave in a way that theoretically breaks the criminal law of their country, the host country or international norms, it is important to provide quick, independent and impartial legal response, which should, in fact, include a substantial investigation and, if necessary, lead to criminal proceedings and a trial. As jurisdiction is a matter of sovereignty, even when States provide troops to UN peace missions, they preserve their jurisdiction over any crimes committed by their military officers deployed on the ground. This means that any criminal conducts of Brazilian peacekeepers in Haiti are under Brazil's exclusive jurisdiction, and usually fall under the competence of the Federal Military Justice System<sup>2</sup>.

Brazil had a very expressive engagement in MINUSTAH, having commanded the mission from beginning to end, and deployed 30,383 Army officers, 6,295 Navy officers, and 347 Air Force officers between 2004 and 2017<sup>3</sup>. Knowing and analysing the existing data on the Haiti mission available in the national military legal system has proved to be a useful and important self-evaluation tool to identify good practices and correct any misconduct with a focus on future Brazilian engagement in new horizons.

In this article, we will present a diagnosis with comments on the criminal responsibility of Brazilian peacekeepers from the perspective of the information available at the Military Prosecution Service (MPM, in the Portuguese acronym) and the Federal Military Justice System (JMU, in the Portuguese acronym). This diagnosis will be followed by a future vision of peace mission work according to Brazilian military criminal law practitioners.

## Brazilian peacekeepers in Haiti from the perspective of the Military Criminal Justice System

Of a total of 37,449<sup>4</sup> Brazilian peacekeepers in Haiti, only 52 investigations were carried out by the Brazilian Military Justice System, 50 of which were Military Criminal Investigations (IPM, in the Portuguese acronym), and two were Arrests in *Flagrante Delicto* (APF, in the Portuguese acronym).

In Brazil, the Military Justice System is formed by the Military Prosecution Service, the Federal Military Justice System, and the Federal Public Defenders Office (for defendants who lack the resources to hire private civilian lawyers).

The Military Prosecution Service is an independent institution exclusively formed by civilian experts in Military Law. It is responsible for supervising the enforcement of military laws, leading on criminal cases involving military crimes, or when there is evidence of criminal action.

The Federal Military Justice System is a mixed civilian and military institution that is part of the wider Brazilian Justice System and is responsible for trying military crimes. Defence is provided by civilian lawyers hired by the defendants, or, should they lack the means to do so, Civilian Public Defenders.

The table below presents an overview of the records of the Military Prosecution Service and the Federal Military Justice System:

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<sup>2</sup> According to Article 51 (b) of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Haiti Concerning the Status of the United Nations Operation in Haiti, military members of the military component of MINUSTAH shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating States in respect of any criminal offences which may be committed by them in Haiti.

<sup>3</sup> Data extracted from the Brazilian Open Data Portal. See: <http://dados.gov.br/dataset/atividades-em-missao-de-paz-no-haiti>.

<sup>4</sup> See Footnote 1

YEAR	INVESTIGATIONS Military Criminal Investigations (IPM) or Arrests in Flagrante Delicto (APF)	CHARGES / NO CHARGES	CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS	NATURE OF THE CONDUCT UNDER INVESTIGATION (Crime, in thesis, against...)	RESULT
2004	no records		-		
2005	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Navy)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
Total:	5 IPM		-		
2006	IPM (Navy)	Formal charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Navy)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
Total:	3 IPM		-		
2007	IPM (Army)	Formal charges	Proceedings	Person (involuntary bodily harm)	Acquitted
	IPM (Army)	Formal charges	Proceedings	Person (bodily harm)	Acquitted
	IPM (Army)	Formal charges	Proceedings	Person (involuntary bodily harm)	Acquitted
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	Formal charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Navy)	Formal charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Navy)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
Total:	8 IPM		-		
2008	APF (Army)	Formal charges	-	Authority and Discipline	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Navy)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Navy)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
Total:	4 IPM and APF		-		
2009	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Person	Dismissed
Total:	3 IPM		-		
2010	APF (Army)	Formal charges	Proceedings	Authority and Discipline (Opposing Sentinel's Order)	Convicted
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Navy)	Formal charges	Proceedings	Property (Theft)	Acquitted
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
Total:	4 IPM and APF		-		
2011	IPM (Army)	Formal charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Military Service and Duty	Declined Competence
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
Total:	11 IPM		-		
2012	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Property	Dismissed
Total:	4 IPM		-		
2013	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	Formal charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	Formal charges	-	Property	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	Formal charges	-	Property	Dismissed
Total:	5 IPM		-		
2014	no records		-		
2015	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	Formal charges	-	Person	Dismissed
Total:	2 IPM		-		

2016	IPM (Army)	No charges	-	Person	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	Formal charges	-	Authority and Discipline	Dismissed
	IPM (Army)	Formal charges	-	Person	Dismissed
Total:	3 IPM		-		
2017	no records		-		
General Total:	52 Inquiries		-		

From the analysis of the data collected, it is possible to draw some relevant conclusions. The number of investigations initiated over this 13-year mission corresponds to a negligible percentage (0.14 per cent) of the number of troops deployed on the ground.

Such numerical disproportion might indicate that some criminal conduct investigations were not initiated, or at least formalised, through IPMs or APFs. However, there are enough indicators that allow a more positive reading of the data.

Peacekeepers were simultaneously overseen by several investigative entities under the UN System, in addition to the Military Judiciary Police of the Brazilian Peace Force Battalion (BRABATT), which is responsible for investigating any offences. Thus, it is very difficult to believe that serious acts may have been intentionally omitted from the international community<sup>5</sup>.

While research indicates that, as a rule, inquiries were led by the military contingent legal advisers, we must not forget that the investigation of military crimes by the Military Judiciary Police is not institutionalised within the Brazilian Armed Forces<sup>6</sup>. The Brazilian Military Code of Criminal Procedure does not require a structure specialised in criminal investigation<sup>7</sup>, which poses additional challenges for the measures taken for investigating misconducts by military officers in the mission. Those appointed as Military Criminal Investigations Officers<sup>8</sup> are experienced in criminal investigation techniques, in addition to having to investigate crimes sometimes committed in vulnerable and unstable settings.

The existence of other investigation instruments, such as inquiries, may also lead to doubts when deciding how to formalise an investigation, particularly if the fact to be investigated does not present clear evidence of a criminal act. The cases in which a Military Judiciary Police authority, due to their inexperience, might hesitate to install an IPM to investigate facts more deeply include: deaths that seem to have occurred by natural causes; apparent suicides; accidents that may have caused injuries and that seem to have been caused by the victims' exclusive fault; and disciplinary transgressions that are not easily distinguished from proper military crimes<sup>9</sup>.

This study does not comprehend an analysis of inquiries that may have been installed by the MINUSTAH military contingents. It focuses on investigations carried out through Military Criminal Investigations and Arrests in *Flagrante Delicto*, which are necessarily submitted to the Brazilian Military Justice System.

About 90 per cent of the investigations installed resulted in military criminal investigations being dismissed, i.e. they did not lead to criminal proceedings. Within this universe, 76 per cent were inquiries with no charges pressed, in which the investigations did not point to someone responsible for the misconduct. The remaining 24 per cent of

5 For further information on the indicators that enable a more positive reading of the low number of cases in the Federal Military Justice System related to the conduct of Brazilian military officers in the Haitian peacekeeping mission, please see: Palma (2015).

6 With regard to the challenges presented by the non-institutionalisation of Military Judiciary Police activities in the Armed Forces, please see: Gorrilhas et al (2016).

7 See Articles 7 and 8 of the Military Code of Criminal Procedure.

8 Military Criminal Investigations Officers correspond to Chief Police Officers in the Common Justice system who have a Law Degree. They work full time at the Judiciary Police Department, and are supported by specialised staff in the exercise of their criminal investigation functions.

9 Military crimes are typified in Article 9 of the Military Criminal Code. Despite some doctrinal divergences, in general it is possible to say that military crimes are divided as: (a) crimes that are not properly military but are treated as military crimes due to legal circumstances (e.g. theft, rape or embezzlement committed by a military officer against another military officer, or at a venue under military administration, or by a military officer in service against a civilian); and (b) proper military crimes that are related to the particularities of military life (desertion, abandonment of position, insubordination, violence against a subordinate or superior, disrespect of a superior, refusal to obey, excessive rigour, opposing a sentinel's order, etc.). According to Brazilian legislation, a civilian may commit a military crime if they violate military property, if they commit a crime against a military officer inside military quarters, or a crime of military nature against a military officer, even if not at a military venue.

the dismissed inquiries referred to investigations where, although there was evidence of responsibility, at the end of the investigation no criminal conduct was confirmed.

Still within the universe of dismissed investigations, with regard to the nature of the facts, we observed that 57 per cent investigated crimes against property (misplacement, loss or theft of armaments, ammunition, magazines, rucksacks, money, etc.); 39 per cent may have been crimes against persons (bodily harm, assault, homicide); and 4 per cent may have been crimes against military authority and discipline (abuse of power, excessive rigour and disrespect of a superior). There is no record in the military criminal system of any open investigation on suspected sexual exploitation or abuse.

Most of the cases where no responsibility could be ascertained referred to crimes against property, in particular the loss or misplacement of assets belonging to the Armed Forces. Many of them took place during patrols or operations, which highlights the additional challenges of investigations in vulnerable environments. Five inquiries were installed to investigate deaths of military officers in the mission, but all of them were dismissed. They were caused by accidents, natural death or the exclusive fault of the victim.

Of the investigations that led to criminal proceedings – about 10 per cent of all investigations installed in the mission – we have the following outlook: 5 proceedings were initiated, four of which for crimes that were not properly military<sup>10</sup> (2 for involuntary bodily harm, one for light bodily harm, and one for theft), and one for a proper military crime (opposing a sentinel's order). Only the last one resulted in a conviction.

It was also possible to deduce that, in relative terms, the percentage of investigations initiated and carried out by the Army in MINUSTAH was equivalent to those conducted by the Navy in the same mission, taking into account the number of facts and the number of deployed troops. Of a total of 52 investigations, 44 were conducted by the Army, which deployed 30,383 officers (0.14 per cent), and eight were conducted by the Navy, which deployed 6,295 officers (0.13 per cent).

Of all the investigations installed, one resulted in the Federal Military Justice System declining competence to other judiciary bodies.

With regard to procedural aspects, the study also revealed interesting circumstances. The investigations installed by the Army and the Navy were directly submitted to the Federal Military Justice System in Brasilia (11<sup>th</sup> Military Judiciary Circuit)<sup>11</sup>. At least in the beginning of the mission, data related to legal aspects of the mission as a whole did not seem to be centralised. As the mission progressed, there seemed to be indicative elements of a greater concern with concentrating data.

The overlap of investigative fora was also observed during the study. In some inquiries, for example, detailed investigation was carried out by the BRABATT forensic team, occasionally relying on information provided or shared by the Police contingent, which was led by Guatemala, under the guidance of the mission's Force Provost Marshal.

Another important finding of the study was the speed with which Brazilian military justice practitioners dealt with the inquiries. Upon receiving information on the facts, Prosecutors and Judges<sup>12</sup> expressed their views without the need for additional investigation or evidence, thus expediting the proceedings. This approach is in line with the requests of the UN Secretary-General<sup>13</sup> to the States contributing with military contingents.

Very few investigations involved civilian victims. One of them, however, deserves to be noted as it illustrates important findings.

In November 2011, the Cité Soleil Peace Tribune, in Port-au-Prince, reported a complaint filed by civilians. They claimed that they had been victims of humiliating attacks by Brazilian military officers who arrived at Fort Dimanche, in the Village Democrates district, in the early hours of the morning. These serious facts were reported by local, regional and international media, and three investigations were launched: an inquiry led by the 1<sup>st</sup> Peace

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<sup>10</sup> See Footnote 9.

<sup>11</sup> According to the provisions of Article 91 of the Military Code of Criminal Procedure, military crimes committed overseas shall be processed, as a rule, by the Federal Capital Auditor, observing the provisions of the following article.

<sup>12</sup> Title given to federal civilian judges serving in the Federal Military Justice System.

<sup>13</sup> For further information on the requests made by the UN Secretary-General to States regarding their handling of reports of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, please see: Palma (2016).

Force Battalion Commander; a summary investigation (fact finding team) determined by the MINUSTAH Deputy Secretary; and a military criminal investigation requested by the Military Prosecution Service.

Considering the gravity of the facts and the challenges of the investigations, a member of the Military Prosecution Service was appointed to travel to Haiti to follow up the developments. In the end, once all evidence was collected, and considering the findings of the three investigations, the case was dismissed as it failed to provide evidence of the participation of Brazilian military officers in the attacks against Haitian civilians.

This episode illustrates the overlapping of investigation spheres and highlights the mobility and celerity of Military Justice practitioners.

Regarding the conduct of criminal proceedings under the Federal Military Justice System, the Federal Military Auditors in Brasilia (11<sup>th</sup> Military Judiciary Circuit) are responsible for the proceedings and trial of facts occurred overseas<sup>14</sup>. It was necessary to hear witnesses through letters rogatory sent to the cities where these officers were deployed, which might have delayed the process during the judicial stage.

Therefore, we can conclude that it is necessary for prosecutors and judges to work more closely together with Brazilian peacekeeping contingents.

## A vision of the future

In order to facilitate greater cooperation between system practitioners, an inter-agency approach might prove to be an efficient strategy. As an example, we can note the development of 'Peace Mission Talks' involving the Military Prosecution Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence since November 2015<sup>15</sup>. These resulted from the need to discuss the requests made by the UN Secretary-General to the States for more commitment, transparency and celerity in investigations, proceedings and trials of conducts considered as sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers. A joint work plan has been discussed and needs to be implemented.

In addition to its repressive work, i.e. the prosecution of any military officers that may have committed crimes under a peace mission, the Military Prosecution Service has also developed important preventative work. From 2010 onwards, lectures on International Law and the challenges of criminal investigation in unstable contexts have been delivered to future Brazilian peacekeepers at the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre (CCOPAB, in the Portuguese acronym). However, it is necessary to institutionalising the activities of the Military Judicial Police within the Armed Forces is also an important issue.

Currently, the UN Secretary-General has asked States, depending on the size of their military contingents in peace missions, to appoint a National Investigation Officer, particularly with regard to sexual exploitation and abuse cases. These Officers must present proof of their qualification to exercise such functions. A Rapid Response Team has also been created within the UN to quickly and efficiently support investigations on sexual crimes, and States have been called upon to provide officers to integrate its cadre.

In this context, the development of a specific capacity building programme focused on investigations in vulnerable settings and unstable areas for the Armed Forces, with the participation of members of the Military Prosecution Service and the Federal Military Justice System, might be an interesting initiative. After all, the Brazilian Military Criminal Justice System is the repository of investigations conducted by military contingents in peace missions. Furthering discussions on professionalising and institutionalising the activities of the Military Judiciary Police within the Armed Forces is also an important issue.

An integrated database for the Armed Forces and the MPM would also facilitate institutional integration,

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14 See Footnote 11.

15 For further information on 'MPM-MRE-MD Talks on Peace Missions', please read the following news items published on the Military Prosecution Service website: <http://www.mpm.mp.br/mpm-discute-com-md-e-mre-conduta-de-militares-nas-missoes-de-paz/>; <http://www.mpm.mp.br/plano-de-trabalho-conjunto-sobre-a-conduta-de-militares-nas-missoes-de-paz/>; <http://www.mpm.mp.br/formacao-de-contingentes-e-tema-de-encontro-entre-o-mpm-e-o-centro-conjunto-de-operacoes-de-paz/>.

information flow, external control of police activities, and the treatment of statistical data regarding investigations in peace missions.

The continued training of members of the MPM and the Military Justice System on issues related to peace missions, in addition to their increased participation in discussions on this topic, would contribute to developing an institutional culture about these issues.

As Brazil does not provide only military troops for peace missions, it is very important to promote studies on Brazil's extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases of crimes committed by non-military personnel, and in cases of individual missions in which officers are in direct contact with the UN.

In view of the legislative deficit experienced by the Military Criminal Justice System, it is recommended that all Brazilian institutions involved in peace missions should unite to sensitise parliamentarians on the need and urgency of implementing legislative changes to align the national military criminal law to the norms indicated by the UN and required under international commitments undertaken by Brazil. Some studies are being developed to suggest the inclusion of some criminal conducts and the amendment of others already envisaged in the Military Criminal Code. Considering the unconditional extraterritoriality of the Brazilian Military Criminal Law, and the increasing participation of military officers in overseas missions, it is also necessary to promote studies on how to best operationalise the deployment of members of the MPM and the Military Justice System on the ground.

Finally, the institutional provision of members of the Military Prosecution Service and the Military Justice System as civilian experts on investigative missions, or the strengthening of the institutions linked to the justice system, would materialise Brazil's institutional commitment with this matter.

The few records of investigations on allegedly criminal conducts in relation to MINUSTAH reinforce the good discipline of Brazilian contingents, as widely recognised by the international community. Nonetheless, the Brazilian Military Criminal Justice System needs to move forward with the early adjustment of strategies that improve criminal investigation procedures in peace missions. It is necessary to mobilise and promote a joint effort of all Brazilian institutions involved in this topic so that, in parallel with the good military behaviour and discipline shown on the ground, we may also preventatively provide good normative and procedural examples. Brazil must be fully equipped to provide a firm, transparent and rapid response to any case of criminal conduct in peace missions.

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Brazilian parliamentarians visit Haiti to assess MINUSTAH (2012).  
Credit: CREDN 2012

# 11. The Chamber of Deputies' Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defence and MINUSTAH: from initial resistance to abdication

Giovanni Hideki Chinaglia Okado

## Introduction

The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has come to an end after 13 years. It is necessary to take stock of the actions carried out under the mission and the role played by national and international stakeholders. An important national actor in this regard is the National Congress. What role did it play from the establishment of the mission until its end? Was there a systematic follow-up of the activities developed under the mission? What was the role of the Chamber of Deputies (CD), specifically through its Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defence (*Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional* – CREDN, in the Portuguese acronym), in matters related to MINUSTAH?

These are some of the questions guiding this article. It is an exploratory reflection that would benefit from further future development. The central argument that we aim to develop is that the polarisation of the National Congress as a whole, and the CREDN in particular, was only present in the first few years of MINUSTAH, while the remaining period was marked by a withdrawal of the Legislature on this topic.

This article is structured in three parts. In the first one, the goal is to draw some general considerations on society's interests in national defence issues, including peace missions, and the institutional competences of the National Congress. In the second, the goal is to assess the polarisation of discussions on the deployment of Brazilian troops to MINUSTAH. And finally, the last part presents an analysis of the work of the CREDN with regard to MINUSTAH.

## Society, Legislature and National Defence: brief comments

'Defence does not attract votes'<sup>1</sup> is a widely accepted aphorism in political and academic circles. It is also our starting point to examine the role played by the National Congress in national defence topics. If the Federal Legislature is seen as a resonance chamber of society, this aphorism implies a paradox: how can Brazilian citizens trust the Armed Forces so much as our main instrument of national defence, but at the same time be so detached from this topic when it comes to elections or following up parliamentary work?

The Armed Forces have maintained the recent trend of leading indexes of confidence in Brazilian institutions, such as the Brazilian Justice Confidence Index (ICJBrasil, in the Portuguese acronym), produced by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV, in the Portuguese acronym)<sup>2</sup>. There is still little empirical research to justify this level of trust, but the answers provided by respondents during the survey are not at all homogeneous. Cerrati, Moraes and Filho (2015) argue that, among other reasons, socio-economic and regional elements affect confidence in the military<sup>3</sup>. At least two factors might explain the current high levels of confidence: the first one is the military focus on fulfilling their mission ('Mission Given, Mission Accomplished'), performing any role assigned to them; the second is the identification of civic, ethical and professional values in military officers, particularly in the context of a national political-institutional crisis<sup>4</sup>. The following section will focus on the first factor.

In the absence of wars, military performance is increasingly geared towards subsidiary roles, which are more relevant to society than their core functions. One of these roles is the delivery of healthcare and social assistance services to isolated communities – in particular, in the North of Brazil – and law and order enforcement in places that have exhausted the funds available for public security. Their successful performance in these roles may generate a double – and contradictory – effect: raising society's confidence levels in the Armed Forces, and inducing the mistaken perception that these subsidiary roles might, in fact, be core functions. In other words, Brazilian citizens trust the Armed Forces for what they are doing, and not for what they ought to be doing.

Some data from the Social Perception System of Indicators (SIPS, in the Portuguese acronym) – National Defence demonstrate this paradox, also present in the Legislature, as we will see in the next section. Brazilian citizens believe that the main threat against their survival is organised crime (54.2 per cent). This is a much higher result than the threat of war against foreign powers (34.7 per cent) or neighbouring countries (33.0 per cent), which respectively rank 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> in the threat perception survey<sup>5</sup>. Indeed, according to society, the main role of the Armed Forces is fighting crime together with police forces (58.1 per cent), followed by defending the country in the event of a war (55.4 per cent). With regard to peace missions, a little over one third of the respondents include them as a military function. However, nearly 80.0 per cent of the total are favourable to the Brazilian participation in such missions<sup>6</sup>. More than a lack of interest, the apparent reason for society's detachment from national defence is their clear lack of understanding of the issue. Peace missions, however, constitute an exception to this misunderstanding.

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1 Oliveira (2005); Rocha (2010).

2 In the last ICJBrasil survey, the Brazilian population's confidence index in the Armed Forces reached 59 per cent.

3 The authors have used data from the Social Perception System of Indicators (SIPS) – National Defence, of the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), and observed that some empirical data present variations. For example, citizens above the age of 45 have more confidence in the Armed Forces than those under 45, and while confidence levels reach 55 per cent in the North region, it is only 43.2 per cent in the Central West region (IPEA, 2012).

4 Despite its importance, it is not this article's goal to comment on the distancing between society and the Armed Forces, due to the reminiscences of the military regime, a topic widely covered in the literature about civilian-military relations, as observed by Oliveira (2005), and Oliveira and Soares (2000), among others.

5 IPEA (2011).

6 IPEA (2011 and 2012).

The National Congress mirrors society's low interest in national defence. As an institution, it devotes little attention to these matters, which remain subject to improvisation and individual initiatives of parliamentarians<sup>7</sup>, with rare repercussions on public opinion<sup>8</sup>. Madruga (2015) demonstrates that, in the Chamber of Deputies, on average only 1.8 per cent of all ordinary bills of law submitted between 1999 and 2007 dealt with national defence; this number dropped to 1.4 per cent between 2008 and 2014. Still according to the same author, the annual average of ordinary bills contemplating these matters between 1999 and 2007 was 31.3 in the Chamber of Deputies, and only 1.3 in the Federal Senate (SF, in the Portuguese acronym). Between 2008 and 2014, the average results dropped to 21.2 in the CD, and saw a slight increase to 1.6 in the SF. This minute interest leads to the understanding that the Legislature has waived its prerogatives regarding national defence, and that practically the whole defence agenda is led by the Executive Branch of Power<sup>9</sup>.

In order to better understand this argument, it is important to recall the constitutional roles of legislators with regard to defence, as well summarised by Amorim Neto (2010, pp. 441-442):

1. with the sanction of the President of the Republic, establish and modify Armed Forces troops (Article 48, III);
2. decide conclusively on international treaties, agreements or acts which result in charges or commitments that go against the national property (Article 49, I);
3. authorise the President of the Republic to declare war, to make peace and to permit foreign forces to pass through the national territory or remain therein temporarily, with the exception of the cases provided by a supplementary law (Article 49, II);
4. approve a state of defence and federal intervention, authorise a state of siege or suspend any of these measures (Article 49, IV);
5. approve initiatives of the Executive Power referring to nuclear activities (Article 49, XIV).

In addition, it is important to note that it is the competence of the National Congress, as established in Law no. 2953 of 17 November 1956, to authorise the deployment of Brazilian troops overseas. This deployment may derive from commitments undertaken by Brazil before international organisations or military and diplomatic understandings, among other motivations<sup>10</sup>. Regarding the Chamber of Deputies' Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defence, whose work is the focus of this article, it is important to point out that the following topics are under its competence, according to the Chamber of Deputies Internal Regulations<sup>11</sup>:

Article 32 – The following are the Permanent Committees and their respective themes or areas of activity:  
 XV – Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defence:

(...)

6. national defence policy; strategic studies and activities of intelligence and counter-intelligence;
7. Armed and Auxiliary Forces; military public administration; military service and alternative civilian service; passage of foreign forces and their stay in the national territory; deployment of troops overseas;
8. matters relating to border areas and areas considered vital for national defence;
9. military law and national defence legislation; maritime, aeronautical and space law;
10. international disputes; declarations of war; conditions of armistice or peace; civilian and military appropriation in cases of imminent threat or during times of war; [...]

7 The current Brazilian Minister of Defence, Raul Jungmann, was responsible for the creation of the National Defence Parliamentary Front in 2008, in the context of designing the first version of the National Defence Strategy.

8 Oliveira (2005); Rocha (2010).

9 Amorim Neto (2010); Madruga (2015).

10 Brasil (1956).

11 Brasil (2017), pp. 28-29.

Based on the considerations above, it is possible to note that there is a role for the National Congress in peace missions, in particular MINUSTAH. On one hand, society is interested in this topic, albeit incipiently. On the other, the Legislature has an institutional competence to deal with this matter, especially with regard to approving the deployment of Brazilian troops overseas. Initially, we observed a polarised debate on the Brazilian participation in the mission and the resistance of legislators to approve the deployment of Brazilian military officers to Haiti, which will be discussed in the next section.

## Why not MINUSTAH? The resistance of the Chamber of Deputies

The decision to deploy Brazilian military officers and to take the command of United Nations troops in MINUSTAH did not run smoothly at the CD. There were heated discussions between parliamentarians in favour of and those against Executive Message 205 of 6 May 2004 (MSC 205/2004), which submitted the Exposition of Motives of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence (EMI 121 MRE/MD) to the appreciation of the National Congress. That document addressed the deployment of a Brazilian military contingent to the mission. In essence, the justification to adopt the decision was based on the 'Brazilian tradition to prioritise multilateral conflict resolutions'<sup>12</sup> and on the constitutional principles that govern international relations, such as defending peace.

The Committee on Constitution, Justice and Citizenship (*Comissão de Constituição e Justiça e de Cidadania* – CCJC, in the Portuguese acronym) and the CREDN had divergent views about MSC 205/2004. The former recommended its approval, while the latter voted for its dismissal. The CCJC's justification was largely based on Brazil's intention to secure a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by improving the Brazilian Army's capabilities<sup>13</sup>. The negative opinion was based on the following aspects: Haiti was not included in Brazil's 'geopolitical sphere of influence'<sup>14</sup>; MINUSTAH focused on promoting public security; the situation of Brazilian troops was precarious and might be aggravated with their deployment to Haiti; and the early deployment of Brazilian troops to Haiti before parliamentary approval would not be a sensible decision. Despite these different opinions, the rapporteur, Deputy José Thomaz Nonô, recognised the value of the argument of securing a permanent seat in the UNSC.

During the legislative session in which MSC 205/2004 was appreciated, the two opposing views were structured around their respective arguments. On one hand, the parliamentarians in favour of deploying Brazilian troops to MINUSTAH highlighted the importance of a permanent seat in the UNSC; successful previous experiences (Angola, Mozambique and Timor-Leste); the Brazilian tradition as a mediator and a neutral power; investments made in the Armed Forces and in valuing the military; and international solidarity to avoid a 'bloodbath' in Haiti. On the other hand, those opposing the deployment questioned Brazil's subservience to US interests; Brazil's interference in a zone of US influence; the connivance with a *coup d'état* in Haiti; the opening of a dangerous precedent for the use of Armed Forces for public security; the early deployment of Brazilian troops without the consent of the Congress; and an interventionist attitude contrary to Brazil's diplomatic traditions<sup>15</sup>.

One of the most eloquent voices against the deployment was that of Deputy Fernando Gabeira, who even suggested rejecting MSC 205/2004 as a response to the Executive's outrageous request to deploy Brazilian military troops without parliamentary consent, or its attempt to impose an agenda that would run contrary to Brazil's national interests. However, it is worth pointing out that, concomitantly with the decision to deploy Brazilian troops to Haiti, another request was being reviewed by Congress regarding the deployment of troops to Timor-Leste. In this second case, there was no intense opposition in Congress, and the same CREDN that opposed

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12 Brasil (2004), p. 21093.

13 In the words of the rapporteur, Deputy Beto Albuquerque: 'Brazil does intend to apply for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (...). The global effort for peace, for re-democratisation efforts and for human rights in the international sphere undoubtedly represents a stepping stone for us to join the UN Security Council and earn that organisation's reciprocity, so as to improve the organisational capacity of our Armed Forces'. (Brasil, 2004, p. 22032).

14 Another argument against it was the expulsion of US journalist Larry Rother of The New York Times for having written an article alleging that the Brazilian population might be concerned with former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's drinking habits. Also see: Brasil (2004), p. 22031.

15 An objection presented by the deputies against the approval of MSC 205/2004 was the phone call from then French President Jacques Chirac to then Brazilian President Lula, in which the former invited the latter to contribute with troops to MINUSTAH and take the military command of the mission. However, Eugenio Diniz (2006) managed to prove the opposite, i.e. that in fact Brazil had expressed its interest in deploying troops a little before that phone call. Also see: Brasil (2004).

MINUSTAH was in favour of the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). In the words of the rapporteur, Deputy José Thomaz Nonô: '[the] approval of the deployment of troops to Timor-Leste was something fully understandable. Timor-Leste, a Portuguese speaking country, an enclave nearly on the doorstep of Australia, knocked on our doors'<sup>16</sup>.

With regard to another important peacekeeping mission for Brazil, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), we note that discussions were not as polarised as in the case of MINUSTAH. In this instance, both the CCJC and the CREDN were favourable to MSC 671/2010, which determined the deployment of Brazilian troops to Lebanon. The respective rapporteurs of both committees, Deputies Luiz Carlos Haully and José Genoíno, recommended the approval of the matter due to its coherence with the principles that govern Brazil's international relations<sup>17</sup>.

In the case of MSC 205/2004, the rapporteurs' different opinions were reflected in the general vote, and demonstrated an unusual behaviour of the Legislature in matters of national defence. Amorim Neto (2010) observed that, between 1999 and 2010, the bills of law referring to national defence had an average approval rate of 98.2 per cent in the Chamber of Deputies. For the author, this wide consensus could have two meanings: the first is a convergence of opinions between the Executive Branch of Power and Brazil's political parties, while the second is the lack of a clear position within Congress, or its lack of interest. The result of the vote on the proposition above was 69.1 per cent in favour and 30.6 per cent against, which demonstrated some level of distance from the position of the Executive, as well as parliamentarians' individual opinions and interest in the deployment of Brazilian troops to Haiti.

Notwithstanding the initial divergence, this level of polarisation was not observed in the 2006-2017 period. In fact, after the first two years, this matter was less present in the discussions of the National Congress. At the time, for example, two different propositions called for the withdrawal of Brazilian troops from Haiti (INC 3980/2004 and INC 6999/2005), but there was little debate on the process of ending MINUSTAH and the next steps after it. This will be discussed in the next section, which analyses the performance of the CREDN.

## Did the CREDN waive its prerogatives regarding Haiti?

The Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defence (CREDN, in the Portuguese acronym) played a very timid and reactive role with regard to MINUSTAH<sup>18</sup>. The annual average number of propositions<sup>19</sup> presented by the Committee or its members on this matter represented 2.3 per cent of the total number of propositions on other issues between 2004 and 2017. Only in the year when MINUSTAH was created did this number reach 10.0 per cent, while no proposition was presented in 2006, 2013 and 2015. The Committee played a more active role in the context of creating the mission, thus reflecting the polarised debate among parliamentarians. However, it gradually devoted less and less attention to MINUSTAH. Some important events, such as the enactment of the National Defence Strategy (END, in the Portuguese acronym) in 2008 and the earthquake that hit Haiti in 2010, did not impact on the behaviour of the CREDN. The chart below illustrates this.

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
16 Brasil (2004), p. 21935.

17 Brasil (2010).

18 This calculation includes budget amendment propositions that also referred to MINUSTAH, the arrival of Haitian immigrants in Brazil, and sports activities, such as the friendly match between Brazil and Haiti.

19 According to the Chamber of Deputies Internal Regulations, Article 100: 'a proposition is any matter submitted to the deliberation of the Chamber', and may consist of 'constitutional amendment proposals, bills of law, amendments, indications, requests, appeals, opinions and proposals for inspection and control'. (Brasil, 2017, p. 47).

**Chart 1.** Propositions on MINUSTAH as a proportion of all propositions submitted to the CREDN, 2004-2017



Source: produced by the author based on data available on the Chamber of Deputies website.

The total number of propositions reviewed by the CREDN referring to MINUSTAH in the period of the analysis was approximately 70, of which half were submitted by committee members, and the other half were presented by other deputies or by the Executive. The most substantive propositions, including the withdrawal of Brazilian troops from Haiti, were submitted by deputies who did not integrate the CREDN. Committee members usually restricted their initiatives to the presentation of requests, which totalled 87.4 per cent of all propositions submitted by them<sup>20</sup>.

All years had several requests for clarification regarding the deployment of Brazilian troops to Haiti, the political-institutional situation in the country, and the need to maintain military officers in MINUSTAH. Usually, these propositions requested public hearings with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and/or Defence and the MINUSTAH Force Commander (always a Brazilian General), or referred to the creation of a Parliamentary Committee to monitor the Haiti mission *in loco*. Notwithstanding the frequent propositions, these activities rarely took place.

Seven specific public hearings were held about the mission: one with the Minister of Foreign Affairs (2004), two with the Minister of Defence (2009 and 2011), three with MINUSTAH Force Commanders (2004, 2005 and 2007 – the last one in the presence of two commanders: the former one, General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro, and the incumbent, General José Elito Siqueira Carvalho), and one to take stock of ten years of the mission, with the presence of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Labour and Employment, and NGO Conectas Human Rights (2014). In addition to these hearings, another two were held in 2008 with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence to address the rise in food prices and its implications for Haiti. With regard to parliamentary committees, only two were created: the first one, created in 2004, aimed at understanding the Haitian situation and the initial activities performed by Brazilian troops; and the second, in 2012, meant to follow up the change in the mission's military command and assess the actions developed until then<sup>21</sup>. It is worth noting that these committees did not produce any report that might actually enable monitoring the activities.

In 2005, several discussions arose regarding potential violations of human rights committed by MINUSTAH troops against the Haitian population. Deputy Nilson Mourão, a member of the CREDN, submitted a proposition (REQ 160/2005) to invite the Minister of Foreign Affairs to provide explanations on the accusations presented by North American non-governmental organisations about the participation or omission of MINUSTAH forces in massacres occurred in Haiti. In 2008 and 2014, most of the propositions about Haiti dealt with the rising prices of food products and their impact on the country, as well as the intense Haitian migration flows towards Brazil. In the context of these flows, several human rights violations were observed, as well as precarious conditions for the survival of immigrants, opposing reactions to their presence in the country, etc. The exception to these matters

<sup>20</sup> All statistics have been based on information available on the Chamber of Deputies website.

<sup>21</sup> This information is available in the CREDN Activity Reports between 2004 and 2016. An external committee was created in 2004, but not much information was available about it, except for some parliamentarians' adding their participation in this committee to their CVs.

was a public hearing to assess the ten years of Brazilian presence in Haiti. However, it is important to point out that this hearing, just as the previous ones, did not generate any sort of substantive proposition, but simply a shorthand record of the remarks made by speakers and deputies.

Another two propositions reviewed by the CREDN are worth mentioning, although they were not presented by committee members. The first one is Information Proposition (INC) 3980/2004 presented by Deputy Alceu Collares, who suggested the withdrawal of Brazilian troops from Haiti, claiming, among other factors, that they lacked sufficient resources to perform their duties. In addition, that proposition referred to an article written by Roberto Mangabeira Unger, who described the Brazilian Government's decision to deploy troops to Haiti as unwise, and argued that the basic reason for doing so was the 'desire to score some brownie points with the Americans'. The second proposition, INC 6999/2005, submitted by Deputy Babá, also suggested the withdrawal of troops from Haiti, but on the grounds that Brazil was submitting to US imperialist policy, that our presence in Haiti derived from an illegal situation (a *coup d'état*), that human rights violations had been reported to the Organisation of American States' Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (OAS-IACHR), etc.

The low number of propositions reviewed by the CREDN, most of which containing requests for clarification rather than substantive matters, brings to light a discussion on whether the CREDN waived its prerogatives regarding Haiti. For example, in the public hearing held in 2007 in the presence of the former and incumbent MINUSTAH Force Commanders, General Augusto Heleno was quite emphatic in his description of some of the obstacles hindering the missions, such as: 'a lack of development projects. This is the struggle of all Force Commanders. Since the first week, the perception was clear: no projects to change Haitians' conditions of living; We will be there for 20 years, and never manage to leave, otherwise the situation will just go back to what it was before'<sup>22</sup>. Should we not expect that, in view of this diagnosis, the CREDN would make some substantive proposition in favour of MINUSTAH? Our reading is that the deputies only considered a military solution for Haiti, and failed to propose long-term solutions. In the beginning, still in 2004, when there was a need to deliberate on the deployment of troops, there was an intense debate. As the situation went back to normal, with clear progress towards pacification (2004-2007), parliamentarians refrained from proposing other solutions or reflecting on a possible withdrawal from Haiti.

In this regard, it is quite conspicuous that no public hearing was held to discuss the end of MINUSTAH and any further implications, such as, for example, the fate of the military contingent once they left Haiti. At first glance, it seems that the National Congress, and the CREDN in particular, will await a deliberation of the Executive Branch of Power on this matter, and rather than engaging in discussions on the future of these Brazilian officers, will simply review the Executive's decision. Consequently, we conclude that an important actor in the decision-making process related to peace missions might be waiving its prerogatives of a more active role in the process.

## Final considerations

This article has presented an exploratory reflection on the role of the Chamber of Deputies, through its CREDN, regarding Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH. The Committee's initial resistance to deploy Brazilian troops to Haiti was followed by a phase of omission. The CREDN deputies were much more reactive than proactive in their deliberations relative to MINUSTAH, reviewing propositions submitted by the Executive Branch of Power or by other deputies, rather than developing their own initiatives. Notwithstanding the relative distance between society and national defence matters, we have observed that peace missions attract the interest of Brazilian citizens. Such interest remains largely untapped by the Legislature. The low number of propositions related to MINUSTAH in comparison with the total number of national defence propositions indicates a potential still to be exploited by deputies, in particular those integrating the CREDN. The need for more substantial debate on non-military solutions for peace missions, as well as the deployment of troops overseas, is equally important, especially when we realise that Brazil's main success story in this area has generated so little discussion among parliamentarians. Finally, we must reflect more on the role of the National Congress regarding Brazil's participation in peace missions. This article is just a first step in that direction.

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<sup>22</sup> Câmara dos Deputados (2007), p. 14.

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# Academic analyses and experiences of Brazilian civil society

## 12. Brazil and MINUSTAH: lessons from academic literature

Dr Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Giovanna Kuele, Maiara Folly and Gustavo Macedo

## 13. Respect and honour for Haiti

Dr Rubem Cesar Fernandes



Experts and members of REBRAPAZ participate in the first REBRAPAZ Annual Seminar in June 2017 at CCOPAB.  
Credit: CCOPAB's Social Communications Team

## 12. Brazil and MINUSTAH: Lessons from academic literature

Dr Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Giovanna Kuele, Maiara Folly and Gustavo Macedo

### Introduction

In 2017, the United Nations (UN) announced the withdrawal of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Its closure, together with the peacekeeping operations in Liberia and the Ivory Coast, takes place in the context of reduced resources available for those missions, and amidst discussions about the need for the UN to develop a more effective approach to peace and security. For Brazil, the closure of MINUSTAH also marks the end of 13 years of participation in the Haiti peace operation – Brazil's most substantive contribution to peacekeeping operations so far.

Given the current turning point, in which both the UN and Brazil are reconsidering their roles in such missions, academic debates on this topic have intensified around Brazilian contributions to MINUSTAH, as well as on the country's potential future engagements. The main goal of this chapter is to contribute to the assessment of Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH, based on an analytical review of the Brazilian academic literature on this matter. In addition to identifying contributions and gaps, this chapter seeks to highlight some of the key lessons learned that might be relevant to Brazil's engagement in other UN missions.

This chapter revolves around the following questions: how do Brazilian researchers assess Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH? What processes did Brazil develop over this period, according to scholars, and how do these

processes differ from those adopted by other countries'? Finally, what impact may this learning have on Brazil's engagement in future UN missions?

The chapter is structured as follows. First, it offers a brief background on the discussions about the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, and subsequently identifies the main contributions and gaps in the academic literature on Brazil's role in MINUSTAH. The last section highlights the lessons learned and their relevance for Brazil's potential engagement in other UN missions.

## UN and peacekeeping: a turning point

Although UN peace operations have reached a turning point, discussions on the need to reconsider UN key approaches to armed conflicts are not new. In the post-Cold War era, and in particular in the new millennium, changes in the nature of conflicts, such as the growing role of non-state actors, transnational crime and terrorism, have led many scholars and practitioners to question the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Such discussions gained renewed urgency after 2014, when then Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon appointed a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO). In June 2016, the Panel delivered a report – known as the HIPPO Report – with concrete recommendations for the UN to raise the effectiveness of its peace missions (UN, 2016). That topic was debated not only in New York and in Geneva, but also in regional consultations, including in Brazil, as part of a set of three processes<sup>1</sup>, all of which aimed at increasing the efficiency, coherence and relevance of the UN peace and security architecture<sup>2</sup>.

Some contextual factors also helped to shape the debate on the effectiveness of peace missions. In 2017, the United States government, under President Donald Trump, started pressuring the UN to reduce its expenses, particularly with regard to peace operations<sup>3</sup>. In the end, the cuts implemented in 2017 were lower than the total sum initially announced (around US\$ 600 million of a total US\$ 8 billion per year). However, since the US is the greatest financial contributor to these missions, and as it may implement further cuts in the future, this guidance led to additional discussions on peacekeeping missions<sup>4</sup>. Shortly afterwards, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) announced the end of a number of missions, along with the reduction of others. MINUSTAH, whose end the DPKO had already considered on previous occasions, made the top of the list, with the deadline for troop withdrawal set for September 2017. After a transition stage, a predominantly police mission called United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) would start in October of the same year<sup>5</sup>.

Also in 2017, current Secretary-General António Guterres launched a number of efforts aimed at reforming the UN, including its peace and security architecture and the way this pillar interacts with the others, i.e. development and human rights<sup>6</sup>. The expected changes include creating stronger links between divisions such as the DPKO and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which is responsible for mediations and political missions. Such reforms also feed discussions on peace operations: how effective are the UN and its partner organisations, such as the African Union (AU), when dealing with armed conflicts? For the main Troop Contributing Countries and Police Contributing Countries (TCC and PCC, respectively), such changes and new sources of uncertainty also prompt further reflection on the practices and norms governing peace operations<sup>7</sup>.

In this context, academic debates on peace operations have addressed Brazil's performance in MINUSTAH and the path to be taken once the mission comes to an end. Other aspects are also relevant for the discussion, such as Brazil's political and economic situation, as well as a number of foreign policy, defence and strategic planning factors<sup>8</sup>. Finally, an important parameter for the discussions is the range of available operations and the type of mission that would be a best match for Brazil, and vice versa.

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1 The two other panels focused on correlated topics: implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, and Peace-Building Architecture

2 Hamann and Abdenur (2017).

3 Lynch (2017).

4 Caplan (2017).

5 UN (2017a).

6 UN (2017b).

7 UN (2017c).

8 De Vitta (2017).

In this article, we treat the analytical material (articles, books, theses, dissertations, etc.) produced by scholars from teaching and research institutions, both civilian and military, as academic contributions. The analysis focuses on publications by Brazilian researchers and/or in the scope of Brazilian universities, journals, and think tanks. Nonetheless, the authors recognise that there is a significant amount of material on MINUSTAH produced by researchers and institutions outside Brazil<sup>9</sup>, as well as a burgeoning literature on peace operations that is relevant for the analysis of Brazil's role in peacekeeping. Given the considerable amount of material available on this topic, this chapter is not aimed at providing an exhaustive review; instead, we have focused on publications that illustrate the trends and patterns identified during the over 13 years of Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH.

## Academic research and MINUSTAH

Brazil has already participated in 47 peace operations, deploying about 50,000 troops, police officers, and civilians. However, this engagement has not been constant over time. After participating in the first UN mission on the border between Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and the former Yugoslavia, from 1947 to 1948, Brazil remained absent from peace operations during its military regime, from 1964 to 1985. Its significant return took place with the missions to Angola (1991), Mozambique (1993) and Timor-Leste (1999). Besides, Brazil sent military observers to other missions in the 1990s, such as the one in the former Yugoslavia<sup>10</sup>.

For a long period, the Brazilian literature on peace operations was practically restricted to the internal production of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (also known as Itamaraty), in particular theses presented under the High Studies Course (CAE, in the Portuguese acronym), a requirement for progression in the diplomatic career. Occasionally, some of these theses were published and incorporated into academic literature on this matter – for instance, Cardoso (1998) and Fontoura (2005). Other examples are texts by Faganello (2013), who analysed peace operations in the 1990s from the perspective of human rights, and by Vicentini (1998), who studied NATO peace operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, since the 2000s, there has also been an increase in the number of publications and studies produced in military training and research institutions in Brazil, such as the Superior War College (*Escola Superior de Guerra* – ESG, in the Portuguese acronym), the Naval War College (*Escola de Guerra Naval* – EGN, in the Portuguese acronym), the Army Command and General Staff School (*Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército* – ECEME, in the Portuguese acronym), and the Air Force University (*Universidade da Força Aérea* – UNIFA, in the Portuguese acronym). Part of this development results from institutional cooperation and funding arrangements, especially those involving the Ministry of Defence and other partners.

Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH had a substantial impact on Brazilian academic production on this subject, and it coincided with the institutionalisation and expansion of International Relations and Defence Studies as academic fields of knowledge in the country. Since 2004, academic production on peace operations in Portuguese has grown significantly: according to the CAPES Journal Portal, the total production of books and articles grew from only 35 between 1990 and 2003 to 418 between 2004 and September 2017<sup>11</sup>. This phenomenon seems to follow a wider trend in global literature on peace and security, in which the number of articles on peace operations has risen substantially.

In addition to the significant increase in Brazilian literature, there has been a diversification (albeit limited) in methodological approaches, with a predominance of case studies and, to a lesser extent, comparative studies<sup>12</sup>. This increased production is observed not only among military officers and diplomats, but also academic and think tank researchers<sup>13</sup>. Also important is the growing number of women researching the Brazilian performance in peace operations, including MINUSTAH<sup>14</sup>.

Finally, from a geographical perspective, academic production on Brazil's role in peace operations between 1990 and the early 2000s was concentrated in higher education institutions in major urban centres, such as Brasilia and

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9 See, for example: Beauvoir (2017).

10 Fontoura (2005); Aguilar (2003).

11 Capes (2017a).

12 See Leonel Filho (2010).

13 See Abdenur & Call (2017).

14 See Hamann (2016).

Rio de Janeiro. Since then, this production has gained strength in the South-East region, in particular in the state of São Paulo, and to a lesser extent, Minas Gerais. Around 2010, according to the CAPES database of theses and dissertations, this topic was researched by International Relations departments in practically all academic centres of Brazil, in both private and public institutions<sup>15</sup>.

In order to boost the understanding of Brazil's engagement in MINUSTAH, two aspects of this literature are reviewed: (i) Brazil's role in MINUSTAH; and (ii) the impact of MINUSTAH in Brazil. After a synthesis of the topics and problems addressed in literature, we identify key gaps and opportunities in this literature.

## Brazil in MINUSTAH

### **a. Foreign Policy Explanations**

Part of the Brazilian foreign policy literature on MINUSTAH asks why Brazilian decision makers accepted the UN's invitation to lead the military component of the mission, especially considering that Brazil's relations with Haiti were not very strong before 2004. Shortly after the beginning of the Brazilian deployment, Sardenberg (2005) associated the decision to deploy troops to Brazil's wider commitment with multilateralism and democracy in the region. Others have attempted to explain Brazil's decision to take the military leadership of a mission based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, considering that the country had historically hesitated to deploy troops to such missions, preferring instead to contribute to missions based on Chapter VI, that is, which do not involve substantive use of force<sup>16</sup>.

Several authors draw a link between participating in peace operations and Brazil's historical ambition to expand its role in international security, including through its candidacy for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC)<sup>17</sup>. Some analysis emphasise the long history of Brazilian participation in UN peace operations, since the first mission in the Balkans, arguing that MINUSTAH represents continuity of strategic thinking and commitment to multilateralism<sup>18</sup>.

A number of analyses also place such participation within the broader attempt to expand Brazilian soft power in Latin America; to boost its prestige in the international arena<sup>19</sup>; to counter US geopolitical power; to strengthen Brazil's role in South-South Cooperation; and to consolidate a regional leadership position<sup>20</sup>. Other publications focus on the pragmatic interests that influenced the decision to deploy troops to MINUSTAH, including individual and institutional motivations within the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence<sup>21</sup>. From the perspective of the institutions involved in the decision-making process, a few studies have examined the interaction between foreign policy and defence, including through ministerial channels and *ad hoc* coordination efforts<sup>22</sup>. Seitenfus (2006) also notes that, in the case of Brazil, there was no major resistance by public opinion against the decision to lead the MINUSTAH military component<sup>23</sup>. However, in other countries this factor may influence the decision-making process.

This literature also highlights Brazil's role in normative discussions on humanitarian interventions, including with regard to the use of force and human rights. Some scholars argue that the Brazilian 'Responsibility while Protecting' (RwP) initiative represented an innovative effort to temper the application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle<sup>24</sup>. Others adopt a more critical approach and consider that the proposal lost momentum, limiting

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15 Capes (2017b).

16 Hirst & Nasser (2014).

17 Cervo & Bueno (2011); Vigevani & Cepaluni (2007).

18 Hamann (2016).

19 Fishel & Saenz (2007).

20 Valença & Carvalho (2014).

21 Bracey (2011); De Sá (2015).

22 Brigagão (2001).

23 In December 2006, however, thirty civil society entities sent a letter to the Lula administration requesting, among other priorities, the withdrawal of Brazilian troops from Haiti. And, in June 2007, social movements and the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB) sent a committee to Haiti to denounce the 'occupation' of the country. Source: Marcondes Neto, 2013.

24 Fonseca Jr. & Belli (2013).

Brazil's role as a 'normative player' within UN security debates<sup>25</sup>. In fact, there is no consensus in this academic literature on the use of the concept of 'non-indifference' to justify Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH. Therefore, the scholarly literature presents a complex picture of the different motivations that drove Brazil to join the mission, ranging from domestic factors to geopolitical variables, including conceptual efforts by several actors to justify the decision to take the military leadership of the mission, as well as to expand this contribution after the earthquake that devastated Haiti in 2010.

## **b. Brazil's Performance**

The main academic publications on Brazil's performance in MINUSTAH focus on the following topics: 1) the operational aspects of this participation; 2) the engagement in peacebuilding and initiatives focused on socio-economic development; and 3) the structuring of components (military, police and civilian) and training.

Some analyses of the operational aspects contextualise or compare Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH with previous periods through the study of descriptive statistics and data. Rezende (2012) suggests that, based on comparative percentages of other TCCs and PCCs, Brazil's engagement in peace operations was extremely low between 2001 and 2009, with the exception of MINUSTAH. Aguilar (2015) and Hamann (2016), on the other hand, examine the frequency of Brazilian presence in peace operations since 1947, pointing towards a considerable growth between 2000 and 2015, where MINUSTAH represents the apex of this trend.

There are still few substantive analyses of how Brazil has engaged in peacebuilding and development, as well as how this role differs from that of other countries<sup>26</sup>. Some scholars claim that having a general from a developing country as the military commander of a mission may represent a new paradigm in peacekeeping and peace-building operations<sup>27</sup>. Pinheiro (2015) highlights the role of Brazilians in the pacification of highly complex urban areas, highlighting direct confrontations with gangs, intensive patrolling (especially on foot), approaching techniques, and the establishment of checkpoints. Carrera (2015), on the other hand, notes the contribution of military police officers and analyses their participation since 2004. Some authors<sup>28</sup> stress cultural affinities and the way that Brazilians interact with the local population, but fail to provide a deeper analysis of how this practice differs from that of other countries. In the post-earthquake context, involvement in humanitarian actions was also considered important for the local population's views of Brazilian troops<sup>29</sup>.

In fact, Brazil's military performance, combined with the processes aimed at local development, is one of the most extensively studied topics in this literature. Marcondes Neto (2012) highlights the wide range of concrete tasks performed by Brazilian military officers, such as clearing roads and paving streets. However, there is no strong consensus on the impact of such initiatives. Hamann, Garbino and Folly (2017) analyse the implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) by Brazilian military officers and argue that such practices contribute to building trust in the mission among the local population, as well as serving as a bridge towards more lasting development in Haiti. Abdenur (2017), in turn, believes that there is a coordination gap between the development cooperation that Brazil offers Haiti and its participation in MINUSTAH, and draws comparisons with Brazil's role in Guinea-Bissau.

Lastly, it is important to note how the components (military, police and civilian) and the training of Brazilian officers deployed to Haiti have been studied. With regard to the makeup of the components, it is worth pointing out that Brazil was not the only country with an expressive participation in MINUSTAH: other Latin American countries were also involved as TCCs and PCCs. Marcondes Neto (2015) explores the 10 years of South American participation, while Braga (2010) and Kenkel (2013) argue that the cooperation between South American countries and MINUSTAH contributed to improving regional coordination in the areas of security and defence, while serving to strengthen Brazil's prominence in this area. With regard to the incorporation of a gender perspective, Giannini (2015) highlights some normative and practical advances achieved in Haiti, such as the appointment of gender focal points in all battalions, but claims that the presence of Brazilian military women and the roles played by them in peace operations remain limited.

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25 See: Responsibility while protecting: implementation and the future of responsibility to protect. (2015). Available at: <<http://globalpolicy.columbia.edu/research/responsibility-while-protecting-implementation-and-future-responsibility-protect>>; also see: Serbin & Pont (2015).

26 Call & De Coning (2017).

27 Abdenur (2017).

28 Braga (2010); Kenkel (2010).

29 Marcondes Neto (2013).

## MINUSTAH in Brazil

The impact of MINUSTAH in Brazil has only been explored to a limited extent. Notable exceptions are the studies on the effects of MINUSTAH on the national military justice and criminal system<sup>30</sup>. There are also few analyses that seek to clarify how Brazil's engagement in Haiti might have influenced the performance of Brazilian military officers in domestic pacification operations, particularly with regard to the creation of Pacifying Police Units (UPPs, in the Portuguese acronym) in the city of Rio de Janeiro. For Palma (2015), the initial success of the military performance in Haiti may have provided an opportunity to reopen the domestic debate on the use of Armed Forces to fight criminality in Brazil. Oliveira (2009) argues that the lessons learned from fighting gangs in Haiti may have served as a practical training experience for fighting drug traffic in Rio de Janeiro's slums. Similarly, Salgado (2015) argues that the permanent occupation of strategic and symbolic areas in Port-au-Prince, known as 'strong points' (*pontos fortes*), may have been replicated in Rio's communities. On the other hand, some scholars disagree with this direct association between UPPs and territorial control strategies adopted in Haiti<sup>31</sup>, arguing that the roots of the domestic pacification plan are in fact older than MINUSTAH.

Although international security experts have not explored in depth the impact of MINUSTAH in Brazil, part of the Brazilian literature on migration identifies Brazil's role in the peacekeeping mission as one of the factors that encouraged Haitians to migrate to Brazil after the 2010 earthquake. This view is supported by Patarra (2012), who sees Brazil's involvement in the military component of MINUSTAH as a key factor for the country's inclusion among priority destinations for Haitian migrants, which until then had focused on the US, Canada, and France<sup>32</sup>. For Fernandes (2014), the Brazilian presence in Haiti contributed towards spreading the image of Brazil as a country of opportunity and hope, as Haiti's high post-earthquake migration and Brazil's unprecedented use of two simultaneous battalions in a single peace operation coincided with a period of high domestic rates of economic growth in Brazil.

The empathy between Brazilians and Haitians resulting from the UN mission, together with the enactment of inclusive migration policies, may have contributed to making Brazil the Latin American country that has welcomed the most Haitians since 2004<sup>33</sup>. Deeper studies taking into account the perspectives of Haitian migrants themselves are necessary to confirm the relationship between the Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH and the rise of Haitian migration to Brazil. In any case, there is consensus in the Brazilian literature on migration that the Haitian presence in Brazil has introduced long-lasting changes. In addition to driving the review of Brazil's migration policy, Haitians have left significant marks in the districts and municipalities where they have settled, including cultural, culinary and linguistic aspects<sup>34</sup>.

Finally, Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH also led to increased interactions between civilians and military officers in the country. Besides strengthening exchanges and promoting higher levels of integration between foreign and defence policies, several activities were developed to support joint research by civilian and military institutions. Some notable examples include the partnership between the Igarapé Institute and the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre (CCOPAB, in the Portuguese acronym), the consolidation of the Brazilian Research Network on Peace Operations (*Rede Brasileira de Pesquisa em Operações de Paz* – REBRAPAZ, in the Portuguese acronym), and the memorandum of understanding between the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul and the Southern Military Command. It is also important to note the inclusion of civilians in post-graduation programmes at ECEME and the EGN, as well as research development support programmes in the areas of security and defence, by joint initiatives of the Ministry of Defence and the Coordination Agency for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (*Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior* – CAPES, in the Portuguese acronym), and the Pandiá Calógeras Institute and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq, in the Portuguese acronym).

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30 Palma (2015).

31 Waisbich & Pomeroy (2014).

32 Magalhães (2017).

33 Fernandes (2014).

34 Continguiaba (2014).

## Gaps in the literature

Despite this increased academic research on the Brazilian performance in peace operations, several gaps remain. In general, most academic studies on Brazil's participation in peace operations are more descriptive than analytical, and they often lack guiding research questions, clarity on the theoretical approach adopted, or a rigorous use of empirical methodologies. In addition, seldom do articles, theses or books on this topic provide a robust assessment of the Brazilian performance in MINUSTAH or in peace operations in general – or specific components of that role. Considering that discussions on the effectiveness of the missions and the role of TCCs and PCCs have deepened as a result of new budgetary pressures within the UN, this lack of studies applying a more rigorous evaluation methodology is striking.

More specifically with regard to Brazil's role, despite the increase in research on military performance, very few studies focus on civilians and police officers. In addition, few studies address the role of intelligence in the Brazilian participation in peace operations, such as the activities performed by Brazilians in the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) and their relationship with other components of the mission<sup>35</sup>. Another gap refers to the role played by Brazilians in the UN Peace and Security Architecture, especially under the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). It is also worth noting the lack of studies on the impact of Brazilian leadership in peace operations on the ground, in particular due to the record of Brazilians serving as Force Commanders, both during MINUSTAH's 13 years and in the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). Academic analyses of the training delivered to troops, police officers and civilians are equally scarce, despite significant advances from a practical perspective, including the creation of CCOPAB<sup>36</sup>.

With regard to gender, Brazilian scholarship has not developed its own research agenda on the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse, currently discussed both within the UN and in partner organisations. Along the same lines, considering that Brazil launched its first National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security<sup>37</sup> in 2017, it is crucial that researchers analyse the impact of new normative commitments on the inclusion and performance of women in peace operations. In general, very few efforts have been made to mainstream a gender perspective in studies on the Brazilian participation in peace operations.

Some methodological gaps have also been identified. Although a number of Brazilian researchers visited MINUSTAH and other missions, very few studies have drawn on extended and systematic fieldwork, including data collection on the ground, focal groups, oral history, archival research in Brazil and abroad, audio-visual material, and structured interviews. Analyses that take into account the perspectives of local populations (i.e. Haitians) or individuals from other nationalities integrating the peace mission are also rare. Regarding comparative studies, it would be necessary to deepen the analysis of Brazil's role in different missions, and also how Brazil compares with other TCCs and PCCs, both in Latin America and in other emerging powers, such as India and South Africa. Doctrines, practices, training models, and civilian-military relations are among the topics that should be addressed in future research in this area.

Finally, with few exceptions, there are still few analyses of the history and socio-economic context of the countries where Brazil has participated in peace operations. Both Seguy (2010) and Thomaz (2010) have adopted a critical view of the international community after the 2010 earthquake, arguing that hegemonic countries and the organisations linked to them imposed new power asymmetries on Haiti, or reinforced old hierarchies. However, there is a dearth of studies examining the links between peace missions and the Brazilian participation, as well as its local social and economic dimensions – before, during, and after peace missions. In order to fill this gap, it would be necessary to involve scholars from other areas, such as history, sociology and anthropology, in discussions on peace operations.

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35 Bonavita (2016); Cepik & Kuele (2016).

36 Vendramin (2015).

37 The full Brazilian PNA has been published by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: <<http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/1209-Plano-Nacional-de-Acao-sobre-mulheres-Paz-e-Seguranca.pdf>>.

## Lessons learned: towards future participation in peace missions

When studying Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH, researchers have identified some lessons from their academic analyses that might be relevant to future engagements in other peacekeeping operations. In general, such lessons cover three areas: the political aspect, the operational dimension, and the role of institutions.

Firstly, the considerable literature on decision-making suggests that these processes are aimed at balancing strategic, pragmatic and realistic factors with the principles and ideals (including humanitarian and human rights issues) that govern Brazil's international integration. It is necessary for the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other governmental agencies to coherently coordinate their efforts so as to ensure that decision-making processes take into account a wide range of aspects.

With regard to the operational dimension, analyses suggest that the main contributions provided by Brazil were intensive patrolling actions and the pacification of highly complex urban areas – including night operations, direct fight against illegal armed groups, and liaising with local communities. Another significant advantage – albeit one that is still incipient – is the emphasis on the need to balance security initiatives and development projects. This view seems to be coherent with Brazil's diplomatic tradition, which advocates that the international community should also address the social and economic roots of armed conflicts. In all these points, however, it would be useful to diversify the composition of troops, police officers and civilians, especially with regard to including more women (and the roles performed by them), and promoting an increased participation of Brazilian civilians. Along the same lines, the maintenance of a standard of excellence in the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse would represent a strong credential for any future Brazilian engagement.

Academic production and initiatives suggest that institutional cooperation – both in the domestic and international spheres – has strengthened several aspects of Brazil's role and should be expanded. The creation of networks and other institutional collaboration models encourage the exchange and production of knowledge on peace operations. The establishment of REBRAPAZ is the most recent example of this dialogue between different sectors of Brazilian society with an interest in this topic<sup>38</sup>. In addition to hosting several national and international joint events, the network has promoted the formalisation of memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between CCOPAB and civilian teaching institutions.

Besides, at regional level, stronger ties are emerging between peace operations training centres. The Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (ALCOPAZ, in the Spanish acronym)<sup>39</sup>, created in 2008, brings together training centres from nine Latin American countries<sup>40</sup> around the common goal of raising the regional understanding and the training levels of civilians and military officers on the strategic, operational and tactical doctrines promoted by the UN bodies responsible for peace operations. The topics of Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Protection of Civilians (PoC), for example, have been gaining growing importance in the ALCOPAZ agenda. MINUSTAH is considered the main empirical source for the development of military doctrines, as well as a fundamental regional experience for the engagement in multidimensional peace missions<sup>41</sup>. Currently, ALCOPAZ also benefits from the participation of civil society institutions from Member Countries and friendly countries in the capacity of invited members or observers. This experience demonstrates that this joint work is crucial not only to encourage knowledge production and information exchange, but also to ensure innovation in the discussions and practices that Brazil and other countries in the region develop under peace missions.

The expansion and diversification of institutional exchanges on peace operations, including with regard to training, indicate a higher degree of flexibility around the notion of sovereignty by traditional Latin American players. Institutions such as the South American School of Defence (*Escola Sul-Americana de Defesa* – ESUDE, in the Portuguese acronym)<sup>42</sup>, for example, started making efforts related to cooperation in peace operations, in the wider

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38 See: REBRAPAZ. Available at: <<https://rebrapaz.com>>.

39 See: ALCOPAZ. Available at: <<http://www.mindef.mil.gt/onu/alcopaz/index.html>>.

40 The nine Member Countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. See ALCOPAZ. Available at: <<http://www.mindef.mil.gt/onu/alcopaz/index.html>>.

41 See: CCOPAB. Available at: <<http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/>>.

42 See: ESUDE-CDS. Available at: <<http://esude-cds.unasursg.org>>.

context of promoting regional integration and South America's international projection in the area of international security. It is important for Brazil to incorporate the lessons learned through these exchanges in its work on the ground. Therefore, it is vital for the country to remain engaged in UN peace operations even after the end of the Haiti mission.

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Street soccer in Bel Air, promoted by Viva Rio, where a goalkeeper lives the drama of letting in a goal.  
Credit: Ernesto Carriço

## 13. Respect and honour for Haiti

Dr Rubem César Fernandes

Viva Rio arrived in Haiti in 2004 under the Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) programme of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). It was Desmond Molloy, and Irish military officer who headed the DDR at the time, who made the invitation. Desmond is a frank and open-minded person, and at the time he told me he was feeling a bit lost. According to him, Haiti did not fit the common pattern of engagement in peace operations. Strictly speaking, the country was not at war – but neither was it at peace. Desmond could not find relevant interlocutors with whom to negotiate demobilisation. And worst of all, he said, he often felt cheated by local partners. Haiti, in his conclusion, was difficult to understand. Someone in his team said that, instead of comparing Haiti with Sierra Leone or former Yugoslavia, he should think of Rio de Janeiro, with its slums and urban violence driven by local micro powers. That is why Desmond decided to invite Viva Rio to act as consultants. He sought suggestions on how to approach armed groups that controlled the poorer districts within Port-au-Prince's metropolitan area.

After a field study on the armed groups, which foreigners called 'gangs', but Haitians called 'bases', we presented a few proposals for approaching them. One of these proposals, described below, worked very well. We suggested organising a 'Vodou for Peace' ceremony on 14 August 2005 to celebrate the *Bois Caiman* festival. *Bois Caiman* (in Creole: *Bwa Kayiman*) was the site of a secret ceremony held in the woods in 1791. It served as a religious rite and a political meeting that led to the first slave victory against the French. It was presided over by Dutty Boukman, a priest and slave leader who became a hero in Haitian history. We justified the proposal based on the idea that, nowadays, in view of so much violence, where black people are the most common victims, real revolution means achieving peace.

Desmond liked the idea and agreed to cover the costs of the event (US\$ 3,000). It was organised by a Vodou priest associated with Hotel Oloffson, a beautiful 19<sup>th</sup> century Gothic gingerbread building, all made of wood and surrounded by majestic trees and a Vodou atmosphere, which at the time was still not open to visitation for civilians linked to MINUSTAH.

The budget included some unusual items, such as champagne and dancers, but Desmond honoured his pledge and managed to pay all that was due (despite being queried for six months by the United Nations Development Programme – UNDP). The ceremony would be very long – 48 hours of rituals. Reconstructing images of peace in such a tumultuous environment required no less than a symbolical recreation of the universe, so that it could be rebuilt in harmony. Catholic saints, African mysteries and Haitian entities would be welcomed and honoured, one after the other, until the sacred grounds (*Peristile*, in Creole) were filled with positive energy.

The risk of references to the historical insurrection and the length of the ceremony, which would continue for two days and two nights, attracting a high number of outraged Haitians from neighbouring areas, raised some safety concerns. In addition, we feared provocations from the Haitian National Police, which was still not involved in MINUSTAH. We therefore sought the support of the Brazilian Army, which deployed an armed platoon in full gear to protect the sacred area during the 48-hour-long ceremony. The platoon – a captain and a corporal leading half a dozen soldiers – managed to calm down the growing public, composed of Haitians and a few ‘white’ visitors from the DDR and the diplomatic corps.

To everyone’s surprise, when our officers arrived, they neared the circle and bowed in reverence, touching the ground and making the characteristic gestures of those versed in the mysteries of the *Orishas*. The captain was an *Umbanda* practitioner, and the corporal followed *Candomblé*. One was from Meier, the other from Nilópolis. They naturally were not much worried about threats from rival groups. Their concerns were more of a mystical nature, as they knew one is not supposed to enter someone else’s religious grounds without asking for permission. I wish I could write about all the details involving the disputes and connections that enriched the ceremony. The experience became even more meaningful thanks to the common language and the active participation of our soldiers in that legitimate and true *Bwa Kayiman* festival, which, this time, aimed at peace. An opposition TV channel, Tele Guiné, recorded the whole ceremony and repeatedly aired the images over the following weeks. I was concerned with potential consequences for the officers, who had been exposed to such a heterodox situation, but I later learned that, rather than being punished, they were praised for their respectful and creative approach to such an unexpected challenge.

This anecdote illustrates the first point I would like to stress: cultural affinity, which enables communication and understanding beyond words, must be valued in the doctrine of peace operations. I believe that the successes obtained by Brazilian Armed Forces in Haiti were, to a good extent, supported by a cultural substratum formed by the history that we share with Haitians in the South Atlantic.

In mid-2006, Viva Rio evolved to a second stage in Haiti. From consulting work, we would now have a constant presence in the country. The Norwegian Government, which already knew and supported us in Brazil, decided to fund our long-term stay in Bel Air and in some areas of Cité Soleil. Shortly after that, the Canadian Government doubled the Norwegian support. The name of the project summarised it very well: ‘Honour and Respect for Bel Air: security and development’. The clearly valuable underlying principle was that security and development should walk hand in hand and have an impact on the ground, which is where people live their daily lives.

Once again, we found our way into Bel Air through culture. It was January 2007, the month before Carnival, when bands take to the streets to show their music and get everyone in the mood to party. However, due to the conflicts, Bel Air had not celebrated Carnival since 2004. We were then instructed to support these Walking Bands, so that they could parade that year and reach the main stage in Champ de Mars. In exchange for that, the bands would sing about the projects developed by Viva Rio in Bel Air. We chose the topics of water, health and women, with a focus on young people attending schools in the area. We sponsored 18 Bel Air Walking Bands, which represented several bases in the region, investing US\$ 100 per band. In two months, from the parades in January to the actual Carnival in February, Viva Rio’s work was sung all over Greater Bel Air. As a result, we built a friendly image among young Carnival producers, including the wilder ones. Both Brazilians and Haitians are fluent in the Carnival language. This common language brought us closer together, kept our feet on the ground, and allowed us and our local partners to move freely among the crowd.

There, in the heart of Bel Air, an area classified as a ‘red zone’ by the UN, with restricted access for civilians linked to MINUSTAH, we found a good place to establish our headquarters in Haiti. We rented, for a very convenient price, an abandoned area of 25,000 m<sup>2</sup>, with a 15,000-m<sup>2</sup> building, and created a community centre with multiple activities for local residents. We named it *Kay Nou*, which in Creole means ‘Our/Your Home’. This cultural exchange led us to the heart of their territory, near our target group. Little by little, residents, NGOs and visiting authorities, whether representing the government or MINUSTAH, started identifying Viva Rio with the people of Bel Air.

Security never stopped being an issue. The owners of *Kay Nou*, from whom we rented that old shopping centre, did not dare visit us. More recently, in 2016, we managed to bring the already low rent down to zero, in exchange for continuing to occupy it and ensure its preservation. In the golden days of 2008 and 2009, we created a Community Civil Defence Brigade, which supported us and the local population against storms, hurricanes, epidemics and other disasters. The Community Brigade was trained by our military and had, at one point, 110 members – about half of whom were women. The most critical point, however, was guarding the Gates. *Kay Nou* is located in Grande Rue, a central artery of Port-au-Prince that had been taken by informality. It is very close to 'Croix des Bossales', or Cross of the Savages, a name inherited from the days of slave traffic, as that was the place where they were disembarked and sold. Today, 'Croix des Bossales' hosts the biggest street market in the country, and one of the biggest in the world, where one can buy anything (without paying taxes, naturally). Armed disputes for the control of the market are sources of conflict among neighbouring bases. Every now and again, the area is closed due to local 'wars'. In addition, next to one of the *Kay Nou* gates, Lavalas militants, who support former President Aristide, often gather to depart for political demonstrations around the city. It is indeed a hot spot.

When we arrived in 2008, the area was unkempt and was used as pasture for goats. A large skull adorned the façade of the main building, with the sayings 'Betray here, die here' (*Trayi la, mouri la*). In fact, we found fragments of human bones among the stones on the ground. The *de facto* owner was a tall strong man called Paul, who, in his soft voice, introduced himself as the leader of the local base. We were faced with a dilemma: how to deal with Paul and his base? How can a group of white people like us impose new control over that property? Professional armed security was not an option. It is true that we were bringing resources to the area and the surrounding community, and that counted in our favour. Paul understood the value of that. But what could we offer him? The answer came from our Human Safety Coordinator, Col. Ubiratan: we can train Paul and his team to provide (unarmed!) security in *Kay Nou*, and hire them as gatekeepers. And so we did, and that is how it still works today, under the name 'Control Service' (SK). Initially, it seemed to be a bizarre solution, but it resonated well among the local population. In nine years under our management, despite all the stress and shootings in the area, *Kay Nou* was never invaded or even threatened. Unfortunately, we lost Paul in 2014. As he was leaving a football match, he was murdered for political reasons by the order of a local politician, according to rumours. He was mourned with much commotion in *Kay Nou*, and his body was carried in procession around the city, beyond La Saline.

Security arrangements extrapolated our gates. During the 2007 Carnival, we were challenged by a conflict between two bases (Bel Air and Delmas 2), which resulted in six deaths. With the support of Robert Montignard, who had guided us in our sponsorship of the Walking Bands, we started a mediation exercise which resulted in the first peace agreement among rival bases in the region. Four parties intervened to enable such agreement: the Brazilian Army, through the Company stationed at the National Fort; Viva Rio, as a mediator; the bases in conflict; and the National Commission for Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (CNDDR), a Haitian government version of the UN DDR. The initiative was named 'Peace Drum' in a reference to the globes used in bingos, which are also known as 'drums', and which became a symbol for the negotiations. In short, it worked like this: (i) the military put pressure on the leaders in conflict; (ii) Viva Rio talked with the parties and proposed reconciliation measures, such as incentives for the community, including scholarships for children and young people, which were drawn in a public square using the 'Peace Drum'; (iii) under pressure from the Army and encouraged by the benefits of pacification, the leaders in conflict negotiated their agreement; and (iv) the agreement was formally celebrated by the CNDDR, a government body, in the presence of the leaders in conflict, other community leaders as witnesses, representatives from the Brazilian Army, the Haitian National Police (PNH, in the French acronym), the MINUSTAH DDR (later the 'Community Violence Reduction' team – CVR), and Viva Rio.

Six peace agreements were signed between 2007 and 2010. The first one involved 17 community base leaders, while the sixth was signed by over 100 community leaders. The scholarship draws took place every month, thanks to the progress in reducing deaths by armed violence. In the months when no death was recorded, in addition to the scholarships, a motorbike was drawn as a bonus prize for the community leaders who had signed the agreement. A local council brought together community leaders, Viva Rio, and Brazilian Army and PNH representatives to follow up progress on the projects and violence reduction. The meetings took place at *Kay Nou*. In addition, whether or not there had been violence, a street party with local artists was held every month under the flag of the Peace Drum.

I believe that the Peace Drum was consistent with the 'Strong Arm, Friendly Hand' doctrine. It combined strong repression of conflicting forces with paving the way to pacification through the formal adherence of community leaderships and the social benefits that, albeit modest, offered hope in a better future through the offer of scholarships.

That was the happiest period in the peace mission in Haiti, from 2007 to 2009, when the stabilisation of Bel Air, Cité Militaire and Cité Soleil was being completed, and social and economic initiatives took shape. In October 2009, Bill Clinton promoted an international conference at Hotel Karibe which attracted 600 businesspeople of different nationalities. The theme of the conference was 'How to invest and make money in Haiti'. Several Brazilian entrepreneurs attended the event. In Bel Air, with the support of BRABATT and the PNH, Viva Rio coordinated projects in the areas of water supply, waste collection, education, sports and culture. Progress was visible. We reached 2009 with a homicide rate of 16 per 100,000 people. A campaign for a 'Green Bel Air' (no longer red!) was undersigned by over 36,000 residents. The campaign was supported by Luiz Carlos da Costa, the Brazilian who was number 2 in the command of MINUSTAH at the time. Luiz Carlos headed the operational dimension of the most promising stage of the peace mission and of Haiti itself. René Préval was the President, and Michèle Pierre-Louis was Prime Minister (followed by Jean-Max Bellerive). The initiatives developed in Bel Air and Cité Soleil generated a new model for action on the ground, which was dubbed as 'Community Violence Reduction' (CVR). Under the leadership of William Gardner, a brilliant member of MINUSTAH, the CVR became a close partner of Viva Rio's and BRABATT's in the development of a new model for action among urban confrontations, which has been studied and replicated in other United Nations Peace Operations.

But suddenly, in one strike, the world collapsed – lives were lost, the city was destroyed, plans were ruined. Our history in Haiti can be divided between before and after 12 January 2010. Before, there was progress, a stable government, a sense of synergy. MINUSTAH was progressing to become the most successful peace mission ever sponsored by the UN. Heavyweight intellectuals speculated on the reasons for such success. After the earthquake, we were left with resilience, and our capacity to resist adversities. It was such a shock, boosted perhaps by a sense of absurdity in view of the previous positive environment, that in the first few days and weeks an extraordinary movement of solidarity arose. In the country and overseas, support actions and resources multiplied and reached Haiti as abundant rains of blessings. From January to March 2010, Haitians and citizens from all over the world showed their best. Emergency aid agencies came from every corner of the globe, with the agility and competence of professionals. We, Brazilians, who had been there for a few years, and even suffered deep losses, had, therefore, the advantage of knowledge. We knew the ground, and we had human and logistical resources already installed there. BRABATT doubled its capabilities, brought a second full contingent, expanded its engineering resources. It made a difference in the area of humanitarian aid not only due to the volume, but especially through their behaviour. Military hands and arms grew with a feeling of compassion. Viva Rio participated in multiple food distribution efforts, with the support of our military officers, but also MINUSTAH security and logistics teams. Our task was to organise an open field chaos, under pressure from many people, the majority of whom were women. I can testify that, due to their common sense and close relationship with the local population, distribution efforts led by BRABATT were more efficient and calmer. They also used loudspeakers that alternated useful information with *Kompa* chords (the Haitian merengue), which provided the tempo for the crowds to slowly move towards the food stocks.

*Kay Nou*, with its area of 25,000 m<sup>2</sup>, was turned overnight into a refugee camp. About 2,000 people sought shelter in our headquarters in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Managing this small village living in our own home became a full-time job over the next four months. We counted on the technical support of the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), who are experts in these efforts and support an average of four major disasters every year. They lodged with us in individual tents for the next six months. They also brought larger tents, made in Finland and of very good quality, which were big enough to house a family. *Kay Nou* became a different place after 500 of such tents were erected. They also had customised equipment to accommodate latrines on the ground. We dug over a thousand of them, not only in *Kay Nou*, but also in over 20 refugee camps that sprouted in Greater Bel Air. Thanks to the ingeniousness of Vilmar Fachini, a former Franciscan friar from Petrópolis, we had already built a bio-digester in *Kay Nou* to rationalise the treatment and use of human waste. It was then that we started disseminating bio-digester technology in Haiti, which proved to be very valuable for a country that lacked a sewage system. NCA staff provided mobile water tanks in the form of huge mattresses. We collected water in tankers and managed its protection and distribution, under the supervision of our rigid Norwegian partners. Our military officers brought water and also food. Our engineering teams dug wells everywhere, including *Kay Nou*. We became self-sufficient in water thanks to our well and the rainwater we collected. We obtained resources to put together a small fleet of trucks to transport water to neighbouring communities, together with the food that we received from the FAO. Cleaning latrines and transporting waste became a daily task. Later, our fleet grew to support the removal of the huge piles of debris that accumulated in the area. Collecting and transporting waste in the fields and streets of Bel Air became the main source of work and income for the local population, under a slightly unusual UNDP-sponsored scheme called 'Cash for Work'. We build a basic healthcare clinic, which also provided small emergency care and became a reference in the area. Several activities including education, *capoeira*, painting and dancing for children and young people took place in the morning and in the afternoon (it is worth noting that

schools did not work in 2010). We worked day and night, non-stop, seven days a week. We would not have resisted without our Community Brigades, and without the constant support of the Brazilian military. Thanks to the Brigades and our mediators, including the SK (the *Kay Nou* Gate Control Service), we managed to demobilise the *Kay Nou* Refugee Camp by the end of April. The demobilisation was voluntary, with some support and benefits, and based on the strong argument that *Kay Nou* had to be cleared so that it could once again serve the children and families in the area. *Kay Nou* was the first camp to be cleared after the earthquake, and it was done voluntarily.

After the first ninety days, the UN in New York approved, on 30 March, the huge sum of US\$ 11 billion in support of Haiti, and the reconstruction stage thus began. I regret to say that, while emergency assistance primed for the professionalism shown by international agencies, the same cannot be said of the reconstruction efforts. Once the pledge was made, the system slowed down. The question about who should be responsible for the US\$ 11 billion took months to be answered. Project design and evaluation procedures were just as long. Responsibility for managing the project selection processes changed three times in six months, and so suddenly that all institutional memory was lost whenever a new manager arrived. A good example to illustrate this is the fact that not until November 2011 – nearly two years after the earthquake – did they start demolishing compromised buildings and removing debris. I had personal experience of that, as Viva Rio submitted a proposal to collect debris in Bel Air in mid-August 2010, on the same day that the first tender for reconstruction projects was published. We only received an answer, together with all the other participants proposing to clean other central neighbourhoods, in late 2011. In addition to all these delays in such a desperate situation, the so-called provisional residential condos (built to shelter the now homeless people) were extremely precarious.

The mission still had to overcome three major challenges: re-establishing public security, stabilising national institutions, and recovering the economy. I believe that, despite immense difficulties, the first two were met successfully. Armed violence started growing again in 2011, especially in poorer neighbourhoods such as Bel Air, Cité Soleil and Martissant. It involved a younger generation who had not known the previous stabilisation process. They were more aggressive in their fight for the post-earthquake micro geopolitical map. Some new factions, such as the so-called '107', used extreme cruelty, which would be considered abusive even by old-school criminal leaders. The situation was finally controlled by BRABATT with the decisive support of the PNH. In fact, the Haitian police made significant institutional progress since the early days of MINUSTAH in 2004. Restructuring and valuing the police was one of the mission's key priorities. Some go as far as saying that it is its main institutional legacy. Viva Rio in Haiti works in close collaboration with the PNH on a programme called 'Approaching', in which the goal is to promote a closer relationship between police and communities in poorer neighbourhoods of the country's metropolitan areas. Anthropologist Pedro Braum leads this work today. His doctoral thesis, defended at the UFRJ National Museum, addressed exactly the process of creating community leaderships in Haiti, based on his experience in Bel Air. In fact, Pedro became a relevant source of social knowledge for BRABATT commands after the earthquake.

On another level, I believe we can also say that political stabilisation has been achieved. Despite difficulties and repeated delays, we have a new President and a new Congress elected and recognised by the population. Regarding the economy, some infrastructure works have begun, but the balance is still weak. Despite the considerable resources pledged in March 2010, project execution has proved lacking. If money was not short, and the technical competence of multilateral bodies is notorious, why then has economic performance been so poor? I do not think it is fair to blame Haiti's institutional shortcomings for that. This excuse is not convincing, as MINUSTAH and multilateral banks had enough mandate and powers to impose a consistent investment programme. Two reasons seem to be more convincing:

- International agencies are prepared to deal with emergency situations, on scales of hours or days, or else to execute structuring plans, which work on a longer time frame – decades, perhaps. But they do not know how to work over a few months. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in turn, are used to developing 12-to-36-month projects. They would like to engage in longer ventures, but rarely do funding sources provide them with a horizon above three years. Multilateral agencies, on the other hand, find it difficult to plan for less than five years. Preliminary procedures – including research, evaluation and compliance – take at least one year. Reconstructing after a catastrophe is compressed into a smaller scale. Exceptional needs demand quick results and visible progress. Multilateral bodies do not seem to be equipped to meet such demands. They are bad at dealing with short and medium-term projects and techniques. That is why they took so long to start removing the wreckage that blocked Haiti's southern and central cities for months;

- Property relations in Haiti are permeated by a traditional culture, in which families and communities share rights and duties in an informal and customary way. Micro interventions, such as building roads, for example, get stuck in multiple negotiations. Their progress depends on one's familiarity with the language and interests of local actors. It is difficult to conduct them without the mediation of professionals that are competent in local languages, and in legal and informal aspects. The same applies to complex processes such as rehabilitating wrecked buildings and reusing the land. A same house may have several resident 'owners' with no official deeds. A plot of land may be claimed by different people. Agreements are based on personal relations. Work relations are also complex. Despite the existence of labour laws, few employers apply them. Tax payment (or not) is equally variable. Dealing with the distresses caused by the earthquake required a myriad of micro negotiations that were hard for international technocrats to understand. This led to constant frustration. In Haiti, as in most countries in a similar situation, there is no shortage of intellectuals and technical staff that are able to act as mediators, as they are culturally bilingual, or even polyglot. The agencies involved in reconstruction would benefit from a more active engagement with the country's intelligentsia.

Viva Rio will remain in Haiti for a while – for a very long time, I hope. We have been charmed by the country's magic, and will be partners in the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). Our venues and activities will focus on continuity, with an inflection towards seeking more economical and sustainable solutions. Among them, one deserves to be mentioned as we conclude this text. The 'Black Pearls Football Academy' became a reference for children and adolescents in Haiti's poorer neighbourhoods. We participated in football events that mobilised hundreds of children, and which associated sport and citizenship. Street football is still very strong in Haiti, and we helped to qualify it. The Haitian National Police is a frequent partner along the line of 'approaching' communities. The most talented kids in the sub-12 and sub-16 categories are invited to train with the Black Pearls in Bon Repos, a suburb to the north of Port-au-Prince. Most of the time, these events are held in the Metropolitan Area, but they attract children from the North and the South of the country. They know that the Academy supports their dreams of growing through football. It is almost a sure line to access professional football in Haiti, which could even lead them to Brazil, if they are determined and talented enough. Through football, from the streets to the Bon Repos Academy, from Haiti to Brazil, bridges of dreams have been built. The work model developed in Haiti by technical staff from Zona da Mata de Minas Gerais, who arrived in the country in 2011, is today being replicated in the state of Rio de Janeiro, in the mountainous area of Paty dos Alferes. At age 16 and 17, the most talented and determined footballers are selected in Haiti to continue their training in Brazil, under the same methodology and values. As a result, Viva Rio had to become a professional team affiliated to the Rio de Janeiro State Football Federation, and we now compete in the senior, sub-20 and sub-17 categories. Thus, making due allowance, we have maintained the 'football diplomacy' launched in Haiti by the Brazilian National Team in 2004, and have created a permanent productive relationship link between Haiti and Brazil.

The work with the Black Pearls is supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Sport Cooperation Section, and, in particular, by the Brazilian Embassy and Consulate in Haiti. Actually, without the support of our diplomats, the work of Viva Rio overseas would not be possible. I would like to pay my respects and present my thanks to all our consular staff and to ambassadors Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto, Igor Kipman, José Luiz Machado e Costa, and Fernando de Mello Vidal, who supported us beyond any protocol limits, at every moment of our short journey.

Each journey, whether long or short, is unique. Individual journeys do not repeat, and cannot be compared. They need to be told. Historical interpretation is similar to literature, as facts, perceptions and versions are intertwined in a fascinating and unavoidable way. However, we learn from them, and gain experience. I believe that Haiti has prepared Viva Rio to engage in other peace missions. It has also taught us to work in foreign lands in close cooperation with the Brazilian Armed Forces. In fact, we are now in Goma, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with 'Swinging for Peace'. In that project, we count on the participation of *capoeira* fighters that we trained in São Gonçalo, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, and in Bel Air, in Haiti. Keeping our feet on the ground, as infantry officers, while letting our minds fly overseas.



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