A Path Forged Over Time:
Brazil and the UN Missions (1947–2015)

Eduarda Passarelli Hamann
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A Path Forged Over Time:
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Eduarda Passarelli Hamann

Abstract

This article seeks to identify elements that represent Brazil’s path in the United Nations (UN) missions since its first participation in 1947. Its intent is to unveil the important legacy Brazil is leaving, not only for the country itself, but also for discussions on the future of UN operations. During periods of crisis, like the current one, identifying patterns of behavior is even more relevant, as recurrent aspects may guide decision-making once the fog of uncertainty dissipates.

With that in mind, this paper analyzes all of Brazil’s contributions to the UN missions, including peacekeeping missions, special political missions, and multinational forces. The main results brought to light in this article include the following:

- Between 1947 and 2015, Brazil deployed military and police in a total of 47 UN missions;
- Of the 71 peacekeeping missions authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 43 relied on Brazilians in the field, which is equivalent to 61%. Besides these, Brazil participated in three special political missions and one

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1 I greatly appreciate the subsidies granted by the 5th Sub-Office of the Brazilian Army General Staff (Estado-Maior do Exército). I am also grateful for the support I received from Renata Giannini, Maiara Folly and Pedro Maia, who bear no responsibility for the contents of this article. This is a revised and updated edition of Strategic Notes 19, published by the Igarapé Institute in October 2015.
A multinational force authorized by the Security Council;

- The number of missions with Brazilian participation has increased considerably in the past 15 years: in 2000, Brazil participated in three missions, and as of today the country is engaged in nine—which represents a 300% increase;

- Over 48,000 Brazilian military and police have been in the field under the UN’s blue flag. Of this total, 87% were deployed in the past 25 years;

- Only three moments stand out due to the involvement of significant numbers of Brazilian troops in the field: 1950s/1960s (Suez/UNEF I), 1990s (Angola/UNAVEM III) and 2000s/2010s (Haiti/MINUSTAH, along with Lebanon/UNIFIL);

- Brazil’s participation in UN missions seems to be motivated by both specific and general interests: when the country/region is a high priority for Brazilian foreign policy (specific interest), the UN mission attracts large numbers of Brazilian troops, and when the country/region is a low priority (general or global interest), it still attracts Brazil, but with a low and steady number of professionals in the field; and

- Despite the excessive caution in Brazil’s diplomatic discourse on the engagement in missions authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, data shows the participation of Brazilians in 74% of these missions.

The data above is evidence that the country’s profile, when it comes to international peace and security, has reached such a magnitude that it is no longer possible to turn back without major damage to the organization of the international system, or to the country’s own relative position in the global order. The federal government must understand the great role Brazil plays, so that this profile is maintained in years to come.
1. Introduction

Due to the types of existing data, there are at least two ways of analyzing Brazil’s engagement with UN missions. The first is a broader analysis that considers the historical series in its entirety, including all of Brazil’s contributions to uniformed personnel between 1947 and 2015. The second is more specific and highlights only the last 25 years. Besides the focus on the most recent period, this is also when the engagement of Brazil and the UN itself has become more dynamic. Both forms have been adopted in this research, not only for being complementary, but also for unveiling important data about past and current behavior patterns that may be reflected in the future.

The historical series data shows that between 1947 and 2015, Brazil sent military and/or police officers to 47 UN missions in about 30 countries and territories. Of these, 43 were peacekeeping missions (coordinated by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations – DPKO), three were special political missions (coordinated by the Department of Political Affairs – DPA), and one was a multinational force mission authorized by the Security Council. In total, Brazil authorized and funded the deployment of 48,689 Brazilian uniformed professionals (military and police) to work under the UN’s blue flag.

Brazil’s early participation overlaps with the very origins of the UN peacekeeping missions in the late 1940s. The country’s engagement was low during the military regime (1964–1985), with a handful of officers acting as observers and one notable exception: three contingent deployments in an Organization of American States (OAS) mission to the Dominican Republic. This period of low participation coincides with the height of the Cold War, when the freezing of the UN Security Council (UNSC) also curbed the authorization of new missions.

Between 1947 and 2015, Brazil participated in 47 UN missions, deploying more than 48,000 military and police.
In the early 1990s, both the UNSC and Brazil resumed peacekeeping operations with more dynamism. Most of the missions began to receive multidimensional mandates, requiring greater engagement not only by the military, but also by the police and civilian experts. Pressured by the UN, Brazil began to deploy military police in Angola (1991), Mozambique (1993) and many other missions.

In the early 2000s, Brazilian peacekeeping mission contingents welcomed their first female personnel. The pioneer mission was deployed to Timor Leste (2003), and dozens of women had participated in another six missions by 2015. The maximum number of Brazilian women in the field was reached in March 2012, with 30 female military and police officers deployed across different missions. MINUSTAH set the record for a single mission in December 2015, with 26 women in the Brazilian contingent, which had a total of 983 troops.

Beginning in the 2000s, Brazil chose to send its nationals to a greater number of missions—a topic to be explored in the next section. In 2004 and thereafter, the number of military and police in the field also increased exponentially due to Brazil’s participation in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Although the peak occurred in 2010–2012, high numbers persist to this day.

Through a detailed analysis of Brazil’s deployment, this article emphasizes recurrent aspects that identify Brazilian behavior patterns in UN operations, both in the diplomatic discourse and, particularly, in the military practice. As macro trends, these elements go beyond the notions of time and, in a way, relate to state policies and not just government policies. These are the main research findings:

- Between 1947 and 2015, Brazil deployed military and police to a total of 47 UN missions;
- Of the 71 peacekeeping missions authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 43 relied on Brazilians in the field, which is equivalent to 61%. Besides these, Brazil participated in three special political missions and one multinational force authorized by the UNSC;
- The number of missions which included the participation of Brazilian military and police has increased considerably in the past 15 years: in 2000, Brazil participated in three missions, and as of today the country is present in nine, corresponding to a 300% increase;

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5 In total, there are/have been Brazilian women (military and police) in seven missions, deployed to six countries: MINUSTAH (Haiti), UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNMIL (Liberia), UNMISS (South Sudan), UNMISET/UNMIT (Timor Leste) and UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire).

6 DPKO (several years).
Since the first mission, over 48,000 Brazilian military and police have been deployed in the field under the UN's blue flag. Of this total, 87% have been deployed in the past 25 years;

Only three moments stand out due to the involvement of significant numbers of Brazilian troops in the field: 1950s/1960s (Suez/UNEF I), 1990s (Angola/UNAVEM III, along with Timor Leste and Mozambique missions, on a smaller scale) and 2000s/2010s (Haiti/MINUSTAH, along with Lebanon/UNIFIL);

Brazil's participation in UN missions seems to be motivated by both specific and general interests: priority missions for Brazilian foreign policy (related to specific interest) attract large numbers of Brazilian troops, while lower priority missions (related to general or global interest) attract a low, but steady, number of professionals in the field; and

Despite the excessive caution in Brazil's diplomatic discourse on the engagement in missions authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, data shows the participation of Brazilians in 74% of these missions.

Financial, political or ideological issues related to specific governments clearly impact the number of missions receiving Brazil's support and/or the number of military and police the country effectively deploys. However, the data shows patterns that remain relatively stable despite the federal government's partisan/political differences. As a result, the core elements of such patterns may guide Brazil's foreign policy in the near future and may be useful in discussing the future of peace operations.

2. Methodology

The methodology applied in this research involved a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis. Along with temporal and spatial aspects, this approach clearly shows the path forged by Brazil in UN operations.

Despite all efforts, there were methodological problems regarding the count of each mission component (military, police and civilian). Data from the DPKO, the main international source on the topic, only shows how many professionals were in the field each month. Therefore, to get the total number of Brazilians in each mission, it was necessary to resort to spreadsheets consolidated by the Ministry of Defense and the Brazilian Army General Staff (EME/EB) for counting the members of the three armed forces, and to use data from the Inspectorate of Military Police of the Land Operations Command (IGPM/COTER), also from the Army, to count the military police. The spreadsheets with military data do not identify the “veterans”, so some
professionals have been counted more than once\(^7\). When counting the military police, data was treated similarly so that the count remains equivalent to that of the armed forces members.

There is almost no record of Brazilian civilian experts in UN missions, and the only book that mentions this is outdated, published in 1999. For this reason, only the “uniformed personnel” (i.e., all armed forces members and police) were counted for this study.

The UN DPKO website, since November 1990, has made available disaggregated numbers. There are more than 4,000 pieces of data identifying the participation of Brazilians, integrated in 505 documents. The interruptions are so few that they do not affect the overview.

The analyzed data was classified into two categories, detailed in the next two sections and summarized below:

1. Data that shows Brazil’s pursuit of regular participation in UN missions, engaging in both specific interest missions and general/global interest missions; and
2. Data that relates to the debate concerning the UN’s and Brazil’s engagement in missions governed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\(^8\)

In addition to these aspects, other elements were also evident from the analysis of Brazil’s history over the past 70 years, but these were not included in this article for lack of space and because they require more research. Examples include scant engagement with women from 2003, with greater emphasis in 2012 and 2015, as well as logistics, doctrinal and training efforts to resume the engagement of troops after a nearly 20-year gap between UNAVEM III (1995–1997) and MINUSTAH (2004–present).\(^9\) It could also be useful to discuss how the 1990s and 2010s financial crises did not affect Brazil’s commitment to deploy troops overseas. These are ideas for future research that would greatly contribute to advancing the debate.

The following section brings a quantitative analysis, with qualitative features, of aspects that translate as Brazil’s efforts to ensure the pursuit of its specific interests and actively promote general interest initiatives, contributing to the generation of global public goods. The final section of the article concerns Brazil’s participation in missions under Chapter VII and its implications for Brazilian foreign policy.

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7 Interviews with Army military personnel indicate that there are several veterans, but the number is unknown. In the case of police, of the 423 professionals with UN experience, 55 participated in two or three different missions (Brazilian Army 2016).

8 Chapter VII of the UN Charter approaches the collective action of all the organization’s members in situations threatening peace, breach of the peace and acts of aggression. Among the instruments that may be authorized are sanctions, embargoes and controversial missions that authorize the use of force regardless of the consent of the warring parties. The latter is a source of controversy for a large number of Member States, including Brazil.

9 According to Aguilar (2015), there are many benefits to participating in UN missions, such as (1) maintaining part of the effective personnel well trained in a conflict environment, (2) updating equipment, (3) receiving, at the individual level, extra financial support once deployed, (4) improving the military doctrine through the coexistence with troops from different countries, among others.
3. Ensuring Specific Interests and Promoting General Interests

There is strong evidence that Brazil has regularly contributed with a low number of military personnel and police to a high number of missions that are not in Brazil’s foreign policy core, especially since 2000. This indicates Brazil’s motivation could be the desire to contribute to multilateralism and to the production of global public goods. At the same time, the data also indicates that the UN missions in regions or areas that were priorities for Brazil’s foreign policy relied on the deployment of significant numbers of troops. Therefore, we can clearly see at least two types of motivation for Brazil’s participation in UN missions (“general/global interests” and “specific interests”), which are explored in this section.

Between 1947 and 2015, 71 peacekeeping missions were authorized by the UNSC. The past 25 years were more intense than the preceding 42 years, due to the polarization of the international system during the Cold War, represented in the UNSC. In the early 1990s, however, the number of new approved missions increased exponentially. Between 1988 and 1994, for example, the Council approved 20 new missions.

Brazil participated with military personnel and police in 43 peacekeeping operations, equivalent to 61% of the total. Beginning in 1990, and even more so in this century, the country’s participation was more active, with Brazilians deployed in 25 new missions.

The graph below shows all UN peacekeeping missions in which Brazil participated between 1947 and 2015.

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10 “Significant number” here means the use of at least one battalion (600–1,000 military).
11 UN/DPKO (2015a).
12 UN/DPKO (2015b).
13 It was not possible to gather official information about the number of Brazilian civilian experts authorized and deployed by the federal government to peacekeeping missions and/or special political missions.
Graph 1. Brazilian uniformed personnel in UN peacekeeping missions (1947–2015)

Research and design: Igarapé Institute.
Note: The vertical lines indicate the month/year of the beginning of Brazil’s participation, which usually coincides with the start of the mission. Only missions coordinated by DPKO were accounted for—therefore, UNIOGBIS (Guinea Bissau), UNMIN (Nepal), UNOWA (Senegal) and INTERFET (Timor Leste) were left out.
This graph shows that the country has been engaged in a large number of missions simultaneously since the late 1990s. From the sizes of the circles, proportional to the size of the Brazilian contingent, one can also see that only a few missions received high numbers of Brazilians. We have interpreted these two aspects as motivated by general interests and specific interests, respectively, and they are analyzed below.

**Specific interests: number of Brazilians in the field**

Specific interests are present in any foreign policy in order to promote—or at least protect—values, principles, and concepts relevant to the core of national interests. In Brazil’s case, after analyzing the number of military and police the country has deployed to all UN missions, it is clear that the core national interest revolves around three priorities: (1) Haiti; (2) Lusophone countries (Angola, Mozambique, Timor Leste and, to a lesser extent, Guinea-Bissau); and (3) Lebanon.

This is evident from the quantitative analysis: between 1947 and 2015, Brazil deployed 48,689 military and police to 47 UN missions.\(^\text{14}\) Of this total, 42,142 (87%) were deployed in the last 25 years - 32,904 (78%) of which were at the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 5,804 (14%) participated in missions in Lusophone countries,\(^\text{15}\) and 2,505 (6%) were at the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL).\(^\text{16}\) The remaining 2% (929 professionals) participated in 26 operations over 25 years. This shows that a small number of Brazilians were sent to non-priority missions, i.e., missions that are not of specific interest—explored in the next item. Graph 2 below illustrates this ratio.

**Graph 2.** Distribution of Brazilians across UN missions (Nov. 1990–Dec. 2015) (total: 42,142 military and police)

\(^{14}\) The figures include the DPKO missions, the DPA missions and the multinational force authorized by the Security Council (INTERFET).

\(^{15}\) Between 1989 and 2015, there were 13 UN missions in Portuguese-speaking countries: one in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), five in Angola (UNAVEM I, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, MONUA and UNMA), six in Timor Leste (UNAMET, INTERFET, UNTAET, UNMISET, UNOTIL and UNMIT) and one in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS). Except for the last one, all missions were/are coordinated by the DPKO.

\(^{16}\) Although UNIFIL started in 1978, Brazil only began participating in 2011.
The data shows that throughout Brazil’s history in UN operations, only three regions have received significant support from Brazilian troops, as demonstrated by deployment in chronological order in UNAVEM III (1995–1997), MINUSTAH (2004–present) and UNIFIL (2011–present). At a different level, also in terms of quantities of troops, three other missions stand out, all in Timor Leste: INTERFET, UNMISET and UNTAET. All other UN missions received Brazilians through individual deployments (that is, as staff officers or observers). This is a behavior pattern that clearly shows troop deployment (from platoons to battalions) only to missions of specific interest to Brazil’s foreign policy.

It is worth noting that MINUSTAH and UNIFIL, which are the most recent engagements with Brazilian troops, also have Brazilian generals in prominent positions, such as Force Commander (MINUSTAH, since 2004) and commander of Maritime Task Force (UNIFIL, since 2011).

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17 Brazil deployed an infantry battalion (approx. 800), an engineering company (200), two advanced health units (40 doctors and assistants) and about 40 staff officers. A small number of police and military observers was included as well (Brazilian Army 2015).

18 The point outside of the curve is UNEF I (1957–1967), which can be considered sui generis and seems to have earned so much support from Brazil solely because it was the first UN peacekeeping mission.

19 INTERFET is not a peacekeeping mission, so it was not included in the DPKO calculation. However, since it was authorized by the Security Council with a mandate under Chapter VII, it was included in the current analysis as a “UN mission,” - not as a “peacekeeping mission” or a “mission coordinated by the DPKO.” INTERFET received a platoon from the Army police (50 military). UNTAET had military observers, staff officers and an Army police platoon (50 initially, then 70). The military personnel in UNTAET were incorporated into UNMISET and, in 2004, the actual troop count went from 70 to 125 individuals (a company) (Brazil 2015).

20 Brazil was the first country in the global south to assume command of the naval force.
Another way to view the impact of the three priority areas is through Graph 3, below. This timeline illustrates all Brazilian participation in UN peacekeeping missions between 1990 and 2015. Highlights in light-blue reflect Brazil’s engagement in UNAVEM III (1995–1997), MINUSTAH (2004–present, with two battalions between 2010 and 2012, over the immediate post-earthquake period), and UNIFIL (2011–present).

**Graph 3.** Evolution of Brazilian participation in UN peacekeeping missions (1990–2015)

The graph above also suggests that the foreign policy for peace operations has elements of a state policy, not only government policy, as troop deployment happened in three different administrations: President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (UNAVEM III), President Lula (MINUSTAH), and President Dilma Rousseff (UNIFIL).
**General interests: number of missions with Brazil's participation**

The quantitative analysis of Brazil's path in UN missions reveals an important fact, which can be interpreted as the value the country gives to multilateralism. This feature began in the 1940s, gained momentum in the 1990s and had even greater projection since the 2000s. In the past 20 years, Brazil's participation has not only become more diverse, but also developed more logistical and operational complexity.

Graph 1 above shows that Brazil participates in many missions at the same time and in countries or regions that are not necessarily relevant to Brazil's specific interests. This demonstrates Brazil's willingness to participate in missions serving the general interest of the international community, as determined by the Security Council. This argument is well represented in Graph 4 below, showing Brazil's participation in the past 25 years, with "pictures" every five years.
Graph 4. UN missions with Brazilian uniformed personnel

- **1990**: 27 Brazilian uniformed personnel
- **1995**: 1,143 Brazilian uniformed personnel
- **2000**: 95 Brazilian uniformed personnel
- **2005**: 1,720 Brazilian uniformed personnel
- **2010**: 2,267 Brazilian uniformed personnel
- **2015**: 1,235 Brazilian uniformed personnel

Research and design: Igarapé Institute.
For comparative analysis, take the years 2000 and 2015 as examples. In 2000, Brazil had military and police in three UN peacekeeping missions: Guatemala (MINUGUA), Timor Leste (UNTAET), and former Yugoslavia (UNMOP). The first two were deployed in regions of special interest to Brazil’s foreign policy. In December 2015, there were Brazilian uniformed personnel in nine UN peacekeeping missions: Cyprus (UNFICYP), Ivory Coast (UNOCI), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Lebanon (UNIFIL), Liberia (UNMIL), the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Western Sahara (MINURSO), Sudan (UNISFA), and South Sudan (UNMISS).21 Of the nine current missions, only two (MINUSTAH and UNIFIL) seem to be primarily motivated by specific interests, whereas most deployments (seven missions, or 78%) are related to general interests.

This same data shows that, in a period of 15 years the number of missions with Brazilian participation grew exponentially: from three in 2000 to nine in 2015, which is a 300% increase. In 2000, there was Brazilian representation in 19% of UN peacekeeping missions, and this percentage increased to 56% by 2015.22

As mentioned in the previous section, the qualitative analysis of new missions which include Brazilian participation, especially those missions motivated by general interest, indicates that most of them, if not all, receive Brazilians in individual deployments. This represents a great domestic effort, requiring close coordination among numerous actors and on several fronts, especially political, diplomatic, logistical and financial. As a result, despite the small contingents deployed, the engagement in a relatively high number of missions shows Brazil’s interest in participating in the international system’s division of labor and in contributing to the production of global public goods, with the maintenance of peace and international security being one of the most important.

This is the second behavior pattern unveiled by this research, i.e., the evidence of deployment and maintenance of nationals in UN missions even when there are no specific interests. There are numerous costs behind this strategy, and the country, for at least 15 years, seemed willing to assume these costs.

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22 The total missions under DPKO in Dec. 2000 is the same as in Dec. 2015 (16 missions).
4. Brazil and the UN Missions Under Chapter VII - a review?

This section analyzes other data that became evident during the research: regular participation of Brazilians in UN missions under Chapter VII of the Charter, i.e., mandates authorizing the use of force, including in highly unstable contexts.

Brazil’s foreign policy for international interventions (which includes peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions) has been marked by positions that resist the use of force by the UN. Quite specifically, Brazil’s position has been to prevent the UN from getting involved in missions under Chapter VII: in fact, the country has even advocated the delegation of such missions to multinational forces or to regional and sub-regional organizations.23

Brazil’s position against the use of force has remained intact even in situations of serious human rights violations, as evidenced in the country’s discourse at the Security Council in the cases of Kosovo (1998–1999), Darfur (2004–2005), and Libya (2011).24 Brazil did not agree with military intervention in these three contexts, despite having been in favor of international intervention in Rwanda years before (1993–1994).25

On the one hand, the elements supporting this position tend to foster sovereignty, conflict prevention, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, core aspects of Brazilian foreign policy. On the other hand, this position is also justified by Brazil’s efforts to control abuses by the UNSC decision-makers, seeking more responsible solutions.

With specific regard to peacekeeping operations, Brazil’s position also favors sovereignty and non-intervention—represented in this case by the three peacekeeping principles: impartiality, consent and non-use of force, except for self-defense or to fulfill the mandate.

This position became a little more flexible in the early 2000s—the beginning of a highly significant decade for these discussions in Brazil due to the evolution in the Brazilian diplomacy discourse and, above all, thanks to a new military practice in the field. Both aspects are still being consolidated and are analyzed below.

In 2004, Brazil’s diplomatic discourse included elements of protection of civilians (PoC) in

24 These three emblematic episodes took place when Brazil carried out mandates as a non-permanent UNSC member.
25 Brazil was on the UNSC when the Rwanda crisis escalated (1993–1994) and started defending the use of force to stop the genocide. See Hamann (2012), Hermann (2011) and Britto (2012).
peacekeeping contexts, arguing that peacekeepers were responsible for implementing PoC strategies. In 2009, the country became more vocal on issues of legality and accountability, suggesting that the Chapter VII tools should be used only with high specificity and monitoring. Lastly, in 2011, after the UNSC’s controversial authorization regarding the mission in Libya, Brazil forged the phrase “responsibility while protecting” (RwP).

RwP has not yet been echoed in peacekeeping debates, but its principles and values reflect concepts of the international law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law, both long established in the peacekeeping arena. RwP brings a long-term element to the discussion and especially the awareness that the irresponsible use of force can undermine peace sustainability, due to the possibility of causing more instability than it intended to avoid or more deaths than it intended to prevent—these are extremely useful elements to debates on peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII.

This sophisticated concept of responsible use of force also suggests that the Brazilian government itself should review the meaning of UN missions under Chapter VII. If they cannot be avoided, as the diplomatic discourse suggests, how can one ensure clear and reasonable mandates, and their efficient and effective implementation?

If developments in the diplomatic reasoning are not enough to propel this review, the analysis of data on Brazil’s participation in the field should do so, as shown below.

Three UN missions in which Brazil participated are worth mentioning in this section, as they represent paradigm shifts in relation to the official diplomatic discourse, which is generally opposed to missions under Chapter VII. They are the following: (1) INTERFET (Timor Leste); (2) MINUSTAH (Haiti); and (3) MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of Congo). These missions are/were governed by Chapter VII, in whole or in part, and have/had Brazilian support in the field.

26 See the following speeches by Brazil in UN Security Council meetings: Ambassador Valle, at meeting #4990 (Jun. 14, 2004), Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenberg, at meeting #5209 (Jun. 21, 2005), Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, at meeting #6066 (Jan. 14, 2009), and Ambassador Regina Maria Cordeiro Dunlop, at meeting #6216 (Nov. 11, 2009).
27 See the speech of Ambassador Regina Maria Cordeiro Dunlop, at UNSC meeting #6151 (Jun. 26, 2009).
28 For the full speech, see Brazil (2011a). See also Brazil (2011b).
INTERFET was not a “peacekeeping mission,” but it was authorized by the Security Council to support the stabilization process in Timor Leste. Despite its short duration (September–October 1999), this operation was the first Brazilian paradigm shift regarding troop deployment to missions under Chapter VII. For the first time, the country deployed troops to a mission under Chapter VII—in this case, a platoon of the Army police (Polícia do Exército). However, those Brazilian military did not receive authorization to use force in the field, except for self-defense. After INTERFET, two other missions in Timor Leste, still under Chapter VII, had Brazil’s support as well, and the presence of Brazilians increased from a platoon (first with 50, then with 70 military) to a company (about 125 military).

Having started in June 2004, MINUSTAH represents the second paradigm shift, when Brazil used a battalion (about 800 military) for the first time in a mission partly governed by Chapter VII. More than that, the Brazilian battalion received authorization from the UN and from Brazil itself to use force at the tactical level. And so it did, especially between 2005 and 2007, during the process that led to the pacification in some hotspots of the Haitian capital, especially Bel Air and Cité Soleil.

The third paradigm shift happened in MONUSCO, even though there was no deployment of Brazilian troops, only officers sent as staff officers. In April 2013, the UN invited Brazilian Army retired officer General Santos Cruz to act as Force Commander of this mission, which also included the command of the controversial Force Intervention Brigade (FIP). The Brazilian Ministry of External Relations was reluctant at first, as the country had expressed its reservations concerning the FIP. After some months, however, Brazil became more lenient and even deployed staff officers to support the Force Commander, for a period of two years (Sep. 2013–Oct. 2015).

Therefore, it seems to be some sort of gradual review of the country’s engagement with troops in UN missions under Chapter VII—Brazil’s position began as “refusal” and has reached “cautious participation.” It is surprising, however, that little or nothing is considered with regard to all other UN operations under Chapter VII that involved or still involve the participation of Brazilians deployed as individuals (staff officers or observers).

Data shows Brazil has been sending nationals to missions under this chapter for at least 25 years. Since 1990, when the DPKO began to keep track of Member States’ participation, of the 23 missions under Chapter VII authorized by the UNSC, 17 have had Brazilian support in the field. That is the vast majority, or 74% of the total. In other words, the Brazilian government has authorized and funded the deployment of military and police

personnel for 3/4 of all UN peacekeeping missions governed in whole or in part under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Brazil’s participation in these missions has been through individual contributions, except for the cases of Timor Leste and Haiti, as mentioned, where there have been troop contributions. It is another behavioral pattern that needs to be absorbed by the country’s official positions in the main international peace and security forums. It is surprising that Brazil condemns the missions under Chapter VII when its own nationals are contributing to their success, even if they do not use force when deployed.

The following table lists all UN peacekeeping missions (fully or partially) under Chapter VII, and provides details on Brazil’s participation in each one.
Table 1. UN peacekeeping missions under Chapter VII and Brazil’s participation (1992–2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>BRAZILIAN PERSONNEL?</th>
<th>IF YES, WHAT WAS THE PARTICIPATION LIKE?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>Jun 2004 - Dec 2006</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>MINUCI/UNO CI</td>
<td>Apr 2004 – present</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>89 military: in MINUCI, they acted as liaison officers and, in UNOCI, as military observers, liaison officers and staff officers. (53 Army, 23 Navy and 13 Air Force).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>Sep 1993 - Sep 1997</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>51 Brazilians acting as military observers (34 Army, 5 Navy and 12 Air Force).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>Apr 2013 – present</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>Sep 2007 – present</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>7 Brazilians acting as military observers (4 Army, 2 Navy and 1 Air Force).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>Apr 2014 – present</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>16 military acting as staff officers (11 Army and 5 Navy).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Nov 1999 - Jun 2010</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>May 2010 – present</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>31 military as a Force Commander and staff officers (Army only). Note: MONUSCO remains active, but there are no longer Brazilians: the military left in Oct. 2015, and the Brazilian Force Commander completed his mission in Dec. 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>Oct 1999 – Dec 2005</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM I</td>
<td>Apr 1992 - Mar 1993</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>Mar 1993 - Mar 1995</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>Mar 2005 - Jul 2011</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>160 Brazilians, 148 of which acting as military observers (129 Army, 8 Navy and 11 Air Force) and 12 police officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>Jul 2007 – present</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>3 military - with the end of UNMIS, the military who had not completed their mission time were temporarily relocated to UNAMID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan (Abyei)</td>
<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>Jun 2011 – present</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>19 staff officers (12 Army, 3 Navy and 4 Air Force).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Sudan</td>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>Jul 2011 – present</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>60 Brazilians: 43 military acting as staff officers (34 Army, 3 Navy and 6 Air Force) and 17 police officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Apr 2004 – present</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>32,904 Brazilians, 32,857 of which were military acting as troops and as staff officers (26,998 Army, 5,574 Navy and 285 Air Force), and 47 police officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
<td>INTERFET*</td>
<td>Sep 1999 - Oct 1999</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>51 military acting as troops (Army only).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>Oct 1999 – May 2002</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>401 Brazilians, 378 of which acting as military observers, staff officers and Army police (the latter increased from 51 to 70) (Army only), and 23 police officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>May 2002 – May 2005</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>503 Brazilians: 488 military (478 Army and 10 Navy), and 15 police officers. In 2004, the actual number of troops went from 70 to 125.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavia/Bosnia</td>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>Feb 1992 - Mar 1995</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>118 Brazilians, 96 of which acting as military observers (47 Army, 37 Navy and 12 Air Force), and 22 police officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former Yugoslavia/Croatia</td>
<td>UNCRPR</td>
<td>Mar 1995 – Jan 1996</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>3 Brazilians: 2 military observers (Army only), and 1 police officer.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*INTERFET is the only mission in this table that cannot be considered a “peacekeeping mission.” It was included because it was established by the Security Council under Chapter VII, and had Brazil’s participation.

Note: Data was compiled from February 1992 to December 2015.

Sources: Brazilian Army (2015 and 2016), DPKO (several), Fontoura (2005), Melo Neto (2015) and Morais (2015).
Evidence shows Brazilians in these missions fulfilled different roles, and only their engagement in MINUSTAH required the use of force beyond self-defense. However—and most importantly—the same data suggests an actual consent by the Brazilian government to missions of this nature, which seems to contradict the official diplomatic discourse. Such acquiescence is represented by the support, for at least 25 years, for the deployment and maintenance of over 1,500 Brazilians in the field, through wages, equipment purchased, passports and airline tickets issued, among other investments. It is essential that Brazil’s foreign policy somehow incorporate this behavior pattern to be consistent with a reality that has endured for over two decades. Diplomacy should acknowledge that Brazil has played a small role, but not negligible, in a high number of missions authorized under Chapter VII (74% of the total). There should be a reflection about what this means for Brazil’s position in multilateral arenas and for the design of its very path within UN missions.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

Brazil’s participation in UN missions was analyzed using thousands of pieces of data, organized in this article into two broad thematic categories. Firstly, Brazil was found to operate in UN missions, especially peacekeeping missions, motivated by specific interests (reflected in the number of Brazilian deployed in the field at any given time) and also general interests (equivalent to the number of missions with Brazilian participation). It was possible to identify that the intensity of Brazil’s support of the UN has varied according to specific interests (Brazil has only sent troops to missions in countries/regions that are high priorities for its foreign policy), but there is also evidence of concerns about general interests, such as participation in missions that produce global public goods.

Secondly, it is essential that there be a new reflection on the official position on the use of force in UN missions (fully or partially) under Chapter VII, especially those with Brazil’s support, due to a military praxis that has existed for 25 years. In the coming years, an increase in—or at least maintenance of—the number of missions authorized under Chapter VII should be expected. Therefore, it is essential that Brazil reflect on its own participation in missions under this Chapter, and also on the need for realigning discourse and practice to strengthen its position in international peace and security forums.

The article highlighted three behavior patterns that are seen across different governments, thus representing elements of state policies. They should, therefore, be considered in future decision-making processes:
• Participation with troops (collective missions) has occurred in only three priority areas: Haiti, Lusophone countries (especially in Angola and Timor Leste and, to a lesser extent, in Mozambique), and Lebanon. Other Brazilian contributions to peacekeeping missions, with rare exceptions, have occurred and still occur through deployment of individuals (staff officers, advisors and/or observers);

• Diversification in missions supported by Brazil is relevant and began in the 2000s. In December 2015, the country had uniformed personnel in nine of the 16 peacekeeping missions coordinated by the DPKO, which represents 56.3% of them;

Brazil has been sending its nationals (military and police) to UN missions under Chapter VII for at least 25 years. There has been Brazilian representation in 74% of these missions.

The analysis of Brazil’s path suggests that it is impossible to revert to the pre-1990s patterns without a high political cost. The data shows that in the past 25 years, and especially since the 2000s, Brazil has achieved a high international profile that cannot be reduced drastically without affecting the country’s current peace and security dynamics. Besides, this would fail to meet individual and global expectations regarding Brazil’s contributions, expectations built largely on the success of the country’s participation in peacekeeping over the past decades. As a consequence, Brazil’s reputation and its own soft power could also be affected.

The article as a whole presents Brazil’s path with its ups and downs, imperfections and inconsistencies, and with the belief that quantitative and qualitative analyses of past and present behaviors will enrich the debate and decision-making in the future.
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