



FIRST HASOW INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

The Politics of Protection and the Future of Humanitarian Practices

The HASOW Project

The HASOW project (Humanitarian Action in Situations Other than War), initiated in 2011, is based at the Institute of International Relations at PUC-Rio and includes a partnership with researchers from across Latin America and the Caribbean. The main goal of the project is to empirically examine the changing dynamics of urban violence and associated transformations in humanitarian action in the so-called "other situations of violence." The HASOW initiative considers the ways in which humanitarian interventions are occurring in violent cities such as Ciudad Juarez, Medellin, Port-au-Prince and Rio de Janeiro.

The HASOW International Conference

The first HASOW international conference, held on 25 and 26 March 2013 at PUC-Rio, was supported by CNPq and FAPERJ. Its participants included doctors, lecturers and specialists in the topics relevant to the project. The objectives of the conference were to: (i) evaluate the many meanings and values that underpin the mechanisms of "protection" in the context of urban violence, (ii) understand protection practices developed by humanitarian agencies and communities and how these contribute to the constitution of the humanitarian space in urban areas; and (iii) analyze the normative and operational opportunities and dilemmas of humanitarian agencies when they operate in "non-war situations" and the implications for these scenarios, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean.





FIRST HASOW INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

The Politics of Protection and the Future of Humanitarian Practices

Panel 01 – “The Politics of Protection”

The concept of protection has evolved considerably since its formal emergence in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It has shifted from a concern with treating wounded and sick soldiers to addressing the vulnerabilities of all civilians living in vulnerable conditions. This shift presents a set of complex challenges for humanitarian actors. The opening panel considered the history and politics of civilian protection and implications for twenty-first century scholarship and practice.

Professor Paulo Esteves, HASOW’s Coordinator and the Director of the Institute of International Relations (IRI) of PUC-Rio, opened the panel by introducing both panelists, Dr. Michael Barnett, Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, and Dr. Monica Herz, an Associate Professor at IRI who has written extensively on Latin American security and Brazilian foreign policy.

Dr. Barnett opened his session by stating that nothing has really changed in humanitarianism since the late eighteenth century, except for the change in the number and mandates of humanitarian actors, itself a reflection of a much more complicated and diverse world. In order to explore his argument, Dr. Barnett addressed distinct humanitarianism stages. According to his research, humanitarianism proceeded in three stages since the eighteenth century.

The very first stage, “colonial humanitarianism”, was not associated with humanitarian imperatives. Rather, it was organized through missionaries whose purpose was to spread the word of God and to carry out civilizing missions. The second stage, termed “post-colonial humanitarianism”, began in earnest after World War II. It was increasingly centralized – through the UN system, for example – and involved predominantly European-based organizations with an increasing global presence. The humanitarian project during this period also expanded



beyond strict emergencies, and began to involve issues such as gender protection and re-building failed states. The second stage is characterized by the emergence of the “humanitarian club”: the founding and present members of the “club” are western NGOs focused on relief. There are specific rules on how an organization can become a member of the club and what constitutes humanitarianism.

Dr. Barnett described the third stage as “global humanitarianism”, which was for the first time de-territorialized and non-colonizing in approach. This is due in part to its globalized nature and because of the diversity of actors involved: different donor countries, NGOs from different parts of the world, private corporations and Diaspora communities have played an important role since they increasingly own the resources, the connections and the knowledge to do the job. There are several reasons which explain this diversity: first, globalization, including the spread of the media and technology; a greater sense of responsibility to protect human beings not only from governments, but also from people themselves; cultural proximity; disenchantment with the bureaucratized aid; political economy aid; and, finally, the geography of humanitarian disasters, which are increasingly moving towards coastal urban cities.

In light of these changes, Dr. Barnett argued that, in the third stage, humanitarian action is being driven not only by the vulnerability of the population, but also by the vulnerability of (prospective) customers of the world economy. In his view, the private sector will be increasingly present in humanitarian operations since it is where part of their customers resides. However, Dr. Barnett noted that although the humanitarian landscape as a whole is changing, the humanitarian club remains loyal to traditional humanitarian values.

Moreover, Dr. Barnett is convinced that today, most humanitarian action is actually being conducted by organizations that are outside the humanitarian club. In his closing remarks, Dr. Barnett emphasized that something is now wrong with humanitarianism and the humanitarian club. It is, in some ways, myopic and not capable of integrating, coordinating and mobilizing all of its members in an effective way. As a result, he argues that the club has to change its mentality and it must recognize that it is not working on its own. And, finally, he asked whether





humanitarianism could become a more democratized process with a less paternalistic identity and, as a result, more effective.

Dr. Herz began her talk by describing the rules on the use of violence – understood here as bodily harm – with which humanitarians need to deal specifically in urban violent situations (the original paper can be downloaded from HASOW website <http://hasow.org>). Dr. Herz argued that it is important to analyze the informal rules on violence in a specific community that are produced by an increase in the variety and complexity of actors, which now includes combatants, criminals, market forces and humanitarian organizations themselves.

Dr. Herz analyzed four sets of rules on violence, drawing attention to how they interact and how they are changing: (i) international humanitarian law (IHL), which is rooted in nineteenth century distinctions and regulates the means and methods of waging war; (ii) humanitarianism; (iii) human rights law (HR), which stems from the liberal philosophy of rights and which limits the actions of modern states and creates the identity of a citizen with rights internationally guaranteed; and, finally (iv) rules associated with collective security regimes, i.e. the establishment of limitations on the use of violence by states, manifested in the UN Charter.

During the 1990s these sets of rules experienced changes, especially with regards to the expansion of the realms of social life they addressed. They have become intertwined, and gained an ever growing importance in international forums. In terms of their expansion, we can see that IHL became a greater theme as the so-called “new wars” spread, raising still more questions about distinctions in international law. Predictably, since the 1990s, humanitarian practices have also expanded in both scale and in the range of settings targeted. Humanitarian agencies became increasingly concerned with addressing the root causes of conflicts, not only with the treatment of victims in emergency situations. During this same period, human rights rules also moved towards the center of the agenda of the UN Security Council.

Thus, a growing number of actors became involved in the use of violence and in shaping changes on the rules governing the use of violence. This is an important development when it comes to the increasing role of militaries and police forces in humanitarian action. Dr. Herz contends that it is important to map





the real and potential tensions that these sets of rules generate and explore the possibility of unintentionally escalating the role of violence in the process of intervention, instead of diminishing it.

Discussion

Dr. Esteves posed some broad questions on how “global humanitarianism” emerged from the liberal project. Another question to Dr. Barnett referred to the risks of opening the “humanitarian club” to other actors that may not necessarily act in accordance with the humanitarian imperative or have the technical knowledge to act effectively in the field.

Dr. Barnett answered these questions saying that we should evaluate organizations based on their effectiveness and not on their moral imperatives. In this sense, Dr. Barnett noted that it is important to establish technical standards for working on the ground. However, the risk on doing that is to reinforce the hierarchy between those who have the technical knowledge and those who do not have access to this information.

Finally, Dr. Robert Muggah, the HASOW Coordinator and Research Director of the Igarapé Institute, asked Dr. Barnett about how the use of technology is speeding up changes in the humanitarian field and to Dr. Herz if she felt that those sets of rules were adequate to work being carried out in violent urban settings. Dr. Barnett observed that technology is transforming humanitarian action in very important ways by increasing participation, through, for example, the presence of the so-called “digital humanitarians”. Then, Dr. Herz said that it is not a matter of choosing the most adequate rules, but of exploring who produces these rules. This in turn leads us to the issue of democratic deficit: who produces the rules? How democratic is this process? Whose democracy is being referred to?

Panel 02 – “The politics of protection in situations other than war”

The frontiers of the “new” humanitarianism were tested during the civil conflicts of the 1990s, some of which highlighted the limitations of





the imperative to minimize human suffering without doing harm. Emergent forms of criminal violence in Latin America and the Caribbean present complex dilemmas for humanitarian agencies. The second panel interrogated what is “new” about humanitarian action in non-conflict settings. It considered what is different in practical terms when it comes to protecting civilians, addressing vulnerabilities, and negotiating legal and institutional structures. A key question animating the panel was whether there was anything new at all about humanitarian action in settings characterized by epidemic levels of urban violence but that appear to fall short of outright war.

Dr. Robert Muggah introduced the panel reminding the audience that cities are becoming very important spaces for humanitarian action and themes in international legal debates. Thus, when a city is labeled as a “fragile city”, this enables practices of intervention. He then asked how we should engage with so-called fragile cities, noting that many humanitarian agencies, as ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) and MSF (*Médecins Sans Frontières*), were reassessing their own practices. Dr. Muggah provided a global overview of the situation of urban violence, including patterns of rapid urbanization which are playing a critical role in driving insecurity.

For Dr. Muggah, the good news is that over the past decades, the frequency and intensity of war has declined. Even with challenging situations such as Syria, Mali, and Darfur, such armed conflicts result in some 55,000 violent deaths each year, much less than in the past. But Dr. Muggah also noted an increase of other forms of violent deaths. For example, there are an estimated 450.000 deaths a year due to intentional violence in so-called non-conflict zones. Put succinctly, there are more people dying outside of war zones than inside of them.

How are humanitarian agencies supposed to act in these non-war zones, or other situations of violence? What are the rules that apply in these situations—IHL or HR? What are the practical implications for humanitarian agencies that are now beginning to work in these areas? Dr. Muggah devoted the rest of his talk to discussing these questions and exploring options and opportunities for engagement. He noted that interventions in situations other than armed conflicts can generate major friction with some states due to concerns related to sovereignty, tourism, national pride and prestige.





Elena Lucchi, an international consultant working on issues of humanitarian action, discussed challenges and dilemmas associated with violence in urban settings for humanitarian organizations. She agreed that cities are becoming a new scenario of conflict, particularly because they combine power, means of communication and transportation, large populations and opportunities. According to Lucchi, those characteristics are also some of the reasons that animate fighting. She also acknowledged that there is nothing new in the way violence takes form in urban settings. However, she believes that urban violence is hard to categorize since it overlaps different forms of violence, such as domestic violence, economic violence, physical violence, etc. According to her, relief agencies are more comfortable working in traditional conflict zones (rural areas).

Still, Lucchi believes that aid agencies should be working in these other situations of violence, since they can respond to the consequences of violence and to the daily suffering of civilians. As noted by earlier speakers, the humanitarian consequences of many criminally violent urban settings are comparable to those of more traditional wars. And since urban populations are extremely vulnerable to violence, there is a need to guarantee their access to health care, social services, physical and legal protection. Even so, there are also operational challenges to this kind of work, such as defining and identifying vulnerable populations at risk and identifying victims of violence. Another important question raised by Lucchi is how to address long term structural problems coexisting with temporarily critical problems, or bridging the so-called relief-development gap.

Dr. Ronak Patel, from the Harvard Medical School, remarked that there is something new about the urban environment. He observed a kind of paralysis among humanitarians, where solutions are at the same time new and old. He acknowledged that there are legal challenges in this context. On the other hand, a case-by-case approach, according to him, is too slow, but it might be the only way possible to deal with realities on the ground. While invoking IHL may be appropriate, state consent is nevertheless required for humanitarian action to be legitimate and effective.





According to Dr. Patel there is a need to identify new environments and the specific problems they generate for humanitarian action. In this context, it is important to operationalize interventions, being able to identify diseases and provide care, for example. The problem raised by Dr. Patel is that ungoverned cities can damage this strategy if, for example, people feel at risk to seek care. In this context, it is also important for humanitarian actors to provide safety their own staff, and to deal with the problem of fear among the population – many people in cities feel afraid, and change their daily routine because of violence. Dr. Patel stressed that, in order to move forward, it is important to support community-based interventions, generate more data on patterns of violence and resilience, and devote more attention to local realities and capacities.

Professor João Nogueira started his presentation on the concept of *Fragile Cities*. According to Dr. Nogueira, the social science literature has not done a good job when it comes to violent cities. The discipline of International Relations has almost completely ignored the subject, drawing only exceptionally from geography's and sociology's insights. By comparison, the discussion on failed and fragile states is more developed in the International Relations literature. Dr. Nogueira asked how the concept of fragile states has contributed to the framing of the concept of fragile cities or failed cities. He also explored how one might transpose concepts and practices of peacebuilding and statebuilding to the level of the city.

According to Dr. Nogueira, cities have been a concern of the humanitarian aid sector for some time. Indeed, cities were always framed as spaces of conflict. Even so, they were not the security referent. Rather, they were treated within the wider "statist" perspective. Dr. Nogueira detected a change in the scale of how one should try to understand violence, due to new and emerging forms of violence affecting populations around the world.

To conceptualize cities as "fragile" makes them the focus of attention and of possible intervention. He noted that urban violence is one of the most pressing challenges of the twenty first century. Due to the high speed of urbanization in China and African countries, we can expect more tension. In addition, cities are very open



and vulnerable to transnational crime. According to Dr. Nogueira, cities are more and more defined as ungoverned spaces.

Discussion

A number of general questions emerged in response to the presentations. For example, where is the politics of violence taking place? How is it possible to separate external and internal interventions? What are the normative sources of protection that justify interventions in fragile cities? Is it possible to solve this problem of intervention in a democratic way when we know that the meaning of security is not the same for local populations and interveners?

According to Dr. Muggah and Dr. Nogueira, when we deal with urban violence and organized crime, the frontiers between organized crime and certain political actors are blurred in some way. Dr. Nogueira then asked: how can we address urban violence as a political issue, and not only as a police matter? He said that violence sometimes is not only means to an end, even though the solutions and the responses are highly politically addressed. In addition, the idea of responsibility to protect somehow reverses the discourse of fragility. When the discourse of statebuilding was at its peak, people believed that the process needed to be led from the outside, by the international community. Some of the consequences would then be the internalization of norms on the good governance, for example. On the other hand, the literature on “fragility” suggests how both the international community and the state in question should deal with fragility. It proposes an agenda of ownership and resilience. This is how the idea of responsibility to protect reverses the discourse of fragility to a certain extent.

Dr. Muggah also reminded the audience of the importance of concepts. According to him, they have an extraordinary influence in shaping the behavior of actors in the international community. Even in government reports, it is important to notice how concepts are used. It is also important to notice how they have been resisted. Dr. Muggah gave the example of the concept of “failure”, and how it was resisted within the United Nations. Another example is the use of the





concept of fragility and how it opens up the possibility for intervention, which, in some ways, upset many actors.

According to Elena Lucchi, humanitarians do not usually think of prevention, since they have a mandate to alleviate already existent suffering and have difficulty to talk about violence. They need to operate in an independent and neutral way, even though it might be unrealistic since they operate in highly politicized environments.

According to Dr. Patel, it is not so much that urban violence is different, but that it creates new vulnerabilities. For him, what has changed is the way in which violence affects people. In an urban context, it means that people can have medical assistance, for example, close to their houses, but violence could prevent them from seeking care. Thus, it is important to evaluate how violence can affect urban life in fragile neighborhoods, and how it can prevent people from having access to basic services, such as health care. Since it is difficult to generalize those types of situations, Dr. Patel believes that it is very hard for humanitarian agencies to develop a single uniform approach to acting in those violent situations. He therefore suggests a case by case approach, for it might be the only way to give a proper response to each specific case, although Dr. Patel acknowledges that without a systematic approach improvements will not happen fast.

Panel 03 – “Urban Violence Trends and Emerging Humanitarian Responses”

There has been growing attention to the expansion of violence across Latin America and the Caribbean over the past decade. Much of this violence appears to be driven by a combination of factors, including systemic inequality and impunity, but also drug trafficking and arms availability. This panel considered the intensity and organization of urban violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. It focused on mapping out the scale and magnitude of violence in selected settings of countries in Central America and the Caribbean, but also the dynamics of organized armed actors. It asked whether and how relief agencies are acting and some of the political and practical dilemmas they face.





Dr. Carlos Vilalta, from CIDE, started the first panel of the second day presenting an analysis of residential displacement of victims in Mexico. Dr. Vilalta analyzed the costs and consequences of fear of crime in Mexico, concluding that many people change homes, routines, and life styles. In his view, the decision to move is one of the worst effects of crime or fear of crime in Mexico, since it is economically onerous; and because it indicates state fragility or failure. He found out that, recently, the situation in Mexico is worse than normally thought. In two years (2009 and 2010), 817,000 families have been displaced in Mexico because of fear of crime (3,2 million individuals).

According to Dr. Vilalta, this phenomenon is unevenly distributed within Mexico, with three main “hotspots”: two northern states, Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua, and Cancun. He also concluded that those who move are usually younger people, from small-sized households, better educated, who have low trust in the police, suffered direct or indirect victimization, and lived in a “War on Crime” affected zone. However, those who did not leave have also reacted to the threat of violence, installing doors, fences, taking joint actions with their neighbors, procuring insurance, installing alarms, etc. He concluded that it is important to fight crime, but it is also important to fight the fear of crime.

Ms. Athena Kolbe, from University of Michigan, presented her research about gang violence in Haiti. According to Ms. Kolbe, it is impossible to talk about violence in Haiti without talking about gangs. She made a distinction between “insurgents” - those who started the war - and “gangs” - isolated groups, who lead their neighborhoods. Other important groups to take into account, according to her, are private security and militias (sponsored by the government). Ms. Kolbe focused on urban gangs, showing how their membership has changed over the years: after 2004, membership in gangs increased; after 2007, it decreased, and then it increased again in 2010 after the earthquake. She interviewed hundreds of residents and members of gangs.

According to Ms. Kolbe, Haitians themselves do not see gangs in the same way that international practitioners do: Haitians see gangs more as politically oriented groups rather than as “outlaw” groups. Gang members define themselves as part of a chain command, wearing distinct symbols. Ms. Kolbe and





some gang members have reviewed the literature of war and the Geneva Convention, and reached interesting conclusions: 1) there was a disagreement about whether gang member should be considered combatants. Some followed chains of command, others were loosely organized; 2) accepting the designation of combatant is complicated. They do not think they are organized in the same way as the army, since they do not bear arms all the time. In addition, they are not organized exclusively to commit crimes; 3) many gang members said they are unarmed most of the time, so the attack of the army against them could not be considered a just war.

According to Ms. Kolbe, the gang problem worsened after the earthquake, since the displaced people lost the protection of gangs from their neighborhood and were submitted to other gangs from other places.

Mr. Steve Vigil, from TAGSPES, presented his research on El Salvador. He explained that, in March 2012, a truce was announced between the main gangs in El Salvador: MS13 and 18th street. As a result, thirty gang leaders were transferred from maximum-security prisons. Those gangs were originated in Los Angeles – created by Salvadorian refugees in the 1940s and in the 1970s. Mr. Vigil, nevertheless, argued that we need to move beyond traditional narratives when we talk about gang truce. The main narrative states that the “Mara” is responsible for all the violence, as if El Salvador was not violent before the gangs. He agreed that the Maras are violent actors, but not necessarily the only violent ones. He cited some examples to make his point, arguing that the country has a history of state sponsored massacres, and there was a civil war that started in the late 1970s. Then, in 1992, there were peace accords that put an end to the civil war, but it was an incomplete peace process and there was no reconciliation between conflicting parties.

Mr. Vigil reminded the audience that, at the same time, following the Los Angeles Riots, the State of California decided to start deporting “illegal aliens”. This became US federal policy in 1996, and thousands of gang affiliated young men from the US began to arrive in El Salvador and other countries of Central America and the Caribbean at that time. Some of them were child soldiers in the El Salvadorian war. Today, El Salvador and Honduras are considered the most violent countries in the world.





According to Mr. Vigil, after the truce, the number of deaths declined. He argued that the truce offered challenges and possibilities, and many local actors worked with NGOs to try to reduce violence. According to him, it is already possible to see some changes in the country: before, gang members were seen as monsters, and now people realize they are part of the society. For Mr. Vigil, the next main challenge is to put every part of the conflict at the negotiating table, which is not happening yet. It is also necessary to change the discourse and treat violence as a public health issue, dealing with traumas and investing in reconciliation.

Dr. Javier Navarro, from Médecins Sans Frontières, gave the last presentation of the panel, focusing on Honduras. He opened his presentation talking about the concept of space for medical and humanitarian action. According to Dr. Navarro, the same intervention criteria are used in every place of the world, including in Honduras, where the issue of violence is highly politicized.

In Honduras, for every death, there are seven people wounded, and in the last six years, the number of victims of external injuries has doubled in the main hospitals, but the numbers of doctors has actually decreased. Many doctors fled the country because of the violence, and the number of doctors in Honduras last year was half of that of 2000.

Today, some medical-humanitarian issues of concern in the country, according to Dr. Navarro, are: the lack of conditioned access to emergency medical services, the lack of conditioned access to rehabilitation services following exposure to violence, attacks or threats to medical-humanitarian actors, forced internal and/or international displacement, stigmatization and discrimination. In addition, more and more people say violence is the main reason to leave the country.

Discussion

The main question asked to Dr. Javier after the presentations was what are the advantages of relabeling these situations as humanitarian? Do they constitute emergency situations? The new definition of emergency seems broader than the definition MSF used in the past. What has been governments'





response to MSF intervention? Dr. Vilalta was asked why there was so little research conducted on those affected by violence and whether an intervention in Mexico would be worthwhile.

Dr. Javier answered that the definition of crisis is open to discussion. He explained that MSF builds capacities through the provision of services, but this is not the main goal of the organization; it is a “collateral benefit”. The main goal, he said, is to care for people. Therefore, the intervention has to be done with the collaboration of governments, and he does not see much resistance coming from governments. In his view, by remaining independent, international organizations can have better access to people in need.

Dr. Vilalta said that a more important question would be if it is politically viable to call for an intervention in Mexico. In 2007, there was a discussion about bringing blue helmets into the cities, but he thinks it is very unlikely that the situation in Mexico will become a target of humanitarian action.

Ms. Kolbe argued that war is a legal construct. In the case of Haiti, the main issue is whether the situation in the country can be characterized as war. There is also the question of the involvement of other actors, like peacekeepers and NGOs. Ms. Kolbe said that since peacekeepers brought cholera to Haiti, people do not want the UN involvement there anymore. Another problem is the lack of understanding by international actors of local players and local dynamics. Thus, even when those actors want to help, they can cause some negative impacts.

Mr. Vigil said that, in El Salvador, there is a better coordination between humanitarian actors and the government. He said he does not know if there is an advantage to label the situation as a humanitarian situation, since it raises other questions, such as the coordination on the ground.

Panel 04 – “The politics of pacification and humanitarian engagement”

Since 2008, the government of Rio de Janeiro has managed an innovative policing project called ‘Pacifying Police Units’ (UPP). The UPPs are credited with massive reductions in murder rates and the





improvement of the security situation throughout the city. Thus, the fourth panel attempted to evaluate this policy and its many intended and unintended consequences. The question which guided this panel was whether and how the current form of intervention is different from previous attempts to cope with violence in Rio. The panel also explored the main effects and political dilemmas of pacification policies in Rio, including in relation to security and improvements in civilian wellbeing. A final question asked was whether UPPs are “exporting” or “importing” strategies, taking into account the ongoing MINUSTAH operation in Haiti.

Prof. Carolina Moulin, researcher of the HASOW Project and Coordinator of the Graduate Program at IRI PUC-Rio, began the panel screening the documentary made by Brazilian newspaper EXTRA about the military action in *Morro do Alemão* at *Vila Cruzeiro* Community in Rio de Janeiro in 2010.

Then, Captain Carlos Chagas, who took part in the 2010 operation and also in the documentary, started his presentation by proposing a discussion about the contemporary role of military forces in situations other than wars with special attention to Brazilian forces’ performance. He presented the Brazilian action in *Morro do Alemão* as an exceptional situation, but also affirmed that armed forces have begun to have a growing importance in those types of situation.

Based on the Human Security concept, Cap. Chagas argued that armed forces operations can be characterized according to four criteria: (1) whether they are domestic or international; (2) whether they are kinetic or not; (3) whether they are exceptional or routine operations; (4) and whether they constitute a humanitarian action or a pacification operation.

According to him, humanitarian assistance can occur in the domestic sphere, as is the case of operations in the North and Northeast regions of Brazil, to provide health care and/or access to water. International humanitarian assistance is more common in International Relations debates and recently Brazil has increased its participation as is the case of MINUSTAH and other contemporary Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). Related to recent PKOs, Cap. Chagas noted the influence that armed forces can have in humanitarian spaces such as Haiti.





Pacification operations are increasingly visible in the international sphere through the growing participation of armed forces in humanitarian assistance. Domestically, he observed that these operations are generally exceptional, as was the case of *Morro do Alemão*. These operations are generally seen as answers to crises, and the participation of the armed forces is justified by the necessity to secure the whole operation as well as to support police teams. The military presence increases the capacity and the power of dissuasion of the pacification operations.

All these categories, according to Chagas, are linked to debates about the presence of state authority in a certain territory, as well as debates about the fragility of the state. As the state lost the monopoly of the use of force in territories such as the *favelas*, an exceptional action in the Schmittian sense becomes necessary. Consequently, it is also necessary to be attentive to the relevance of a permanent occupation of these territories, through the installation of other state institutions alongside the police - which would allow the recovery of the monopoly of use of force as well as its stabilization. **For example, the concept of ownership is hardly thought in the rationale of war operations, as a solution, the coordination of many unities of commands would be necessary.**

Comentado [POS1]: Não entendi

After that, Colonel Robson's presentation dealt with the UPPs expansion in Rio de Janeiro and their outcomes. He emphasized the challenges caused by the approximation of the police with communities in *favelas*, particularly in light of the double ideological constitution of the Military Police in Brazil (MP).

According to Coronel Robson, UPP operations imply a change in the military police model, which was traditionally based on war practices and drug traffic control. The MP has been traditionally influenced both by military and police institutions, which has created an internal conflict. In this sense, UPP operations have called for a reflection about the role of military police in Brazil and its relation with communities.

Since the 1990s, the military police in Rio has acted based on a perception and a representation of the city of Rio de Janeiro as if it has been going through a cold war and an arms race. In 2000, this perception intensified and a perception of war *de facto* started to frame police actions in Rio. In this period, many civilian and police lives were lost, with very high murder rates. With the UPPs, the idea of a police





closer to the community began to gain strength and many of the previous representations started to be deconstructed. As the UPP is viewed as an exceptional practice, the construction of peace and of community policing practices started to be seen as real possibilities.

Because of that, the military aspects of UPPs have decreased and the police has been attempting to build better relations with the society by creating bonds of trust. UPPs have four phases: operational, occupation, stabilization, and implementation. The success of the operation, in this sense, depends not only on the police, but also on local leaders.

In the end, Colonel Robson presented some data related to the outcomes of the UPPs. The conclusion is that the UPPs have caused a decline in the number of homicides, the substitution of lethal armament for less lethal weapons, and less fire arms shots.

Next, Professor Ignacio Cano presented a less positive assessment of the UPPs. In his opinion, UPPs are based on a policy that gives up on winning the fight against crime and that focuses exclusively on the war on drugs. In spite of the fact that these operations are based on closer ties between the police and the population, there is nowadays an average of 18 policemen to each civilian in the *favelas*, when the international pattern is about 3 police guards per individual.

Comentado [POS2]: É isso mesmo?

Comentado [PS3]: Números corretos?

Based on his research and its qualitative outputs, Prof. Cano shows that the decrease in murder rates in the *favelas* was accompanied by an increase in non-lethal aggressions and threats in the city of Rio de Janeiro. In addition, there is an increase in the number of cases of domestic violence, sexual violence, and theft in the same *favelas* with UPP. It means that the UPPs are related to the decrease in the number of homicides and lethal armed violence, but it is also related to the increase in the rate of non-lethal crimes. These conclusions, for him, point to the need for new methodologies to measure the effects of the UPPs.

The possible causes presented by Cano for this phenomenon were: (1) enlargement of reporting and denouncement of violence to the police; (2) and the absence of a rigid authority in the *favelas* which has created a vacuum in social control. He observed that the number of homicides





does not decrease with the increase in the number of police guards. At the same time, the number of homicides in the surrounding areas has also decreased, with an increase of non-lethal violence data. Despite these positive effects, an expansion of the UPPs to the whole area of the city/or the state of the Rio de Janeiro is impossible; in this sense some areas are benefited with short term policies which have to do with the organization of mega events like the World Cup and the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.

The perspective of the *favela* residents is that the drug traffic is not over, but that there is an increase in the feeling of security, which can be related to an increase in the number of human rights violations denounced. Nevertheless, the fear of non-lethal crimes persists, as does the social heritage of the drugs traffic dynamics, manifested in the truculent authority of the police, which in some ways has replaced the former truculent authority of the drug dealers.

Moreover, some other aspects observed in Cano's research are: the lack of social projects in the UPPs actions – they have been seen only as military operations –; a huge variation in the evaluation of these operations by the police and the population – what can also be related to the age group of the residents. There is also low motivation among police guards that participate in the UPPs when compared to other police operations in Rio.

To conclude, Prof. Cano affirmed that there is a tension between the UPPs conceived as a project of moral regulation and a project of protection and pacification. Thus, the challenge today is to replace the arbitrary and violent model for a modern and passive model. The future of these operations after the mega events of 2016 and the relationship of the UPPs with other institutions such as the civil police and agencies that formulate more socially directed policies must also be discussed. Besides that, other organized violent actors also must be considered in the future of the UPPs, such as militias.

The final presentation was by Professor Maira Siman. Her presentation was based on her PhD project, in which she aims to understand the Brazilian involvement in MINUSTAH through the historical representation of the state as something that is constructed through a process that excludes the individuals. Her



intention is to understand the links between the humanitarian action of Brazil in Haiti and the Pacification Operations in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro.

Through the analysis of past contexts that are part of the conceptual constitution of the idea of pacification in Brazilian history, Prof. Siman intends to understand the construction of the Brazilian state as a “self” based on the discourse of pacification and, consequently, on the exclusion of the “other” in this state in process.

This analysis led Prof. Siman to the nineteenth century – regency period in the Brazilian history (1831-1840) – in which the discourse of pacification meets the context of local revolutions and separatists movements. In this period, it is also possible to analyze the constitution of the Brazilian armed forces and the relevance of the heroic figure of Duque de Caxias. The armed forces’ actions in pacification began to be viewed as administrative and military operations to contain anarchy and disorder, and to civilize the population. In this sense, the contestator was represented as rude and savage, and the pacification was justified by their inclusion and domestication which was achieved by altering their behavioral patterns.

Another historical context that is related to the constitution of the imaginary of Brazilian pacification is linked to the image of Marshal Rondon and the pacification of native indigenous population. In this sense, the natives composed an “other excluded Brazil” which also needed to be included and domesticated by “civilized Brazil”. This inclusion was mainly permitted by the construction of telegraph communication and the assimilation of these populations.

Both moments allowed the constitution of pacification as a practice of domestication, subjugation, and conquest, which disguise violent practices that are considered inherent to the construction of the Brazilian State. Then, Prof. Maira argued that the politics of pacification can be seen as foreign policies not exclusively in the geographical sense, but also in the social and behavioral sense – in relation to the “other”. These discourses are important because they express significant aspects of our understanding of the Brazilian State.

Discussion





The discussion after all the presentations concerned themes such as the difficulty of expanding the policies of UPPs to other metropolitan areas, such as the city of Niteroi, and also the necessity of establishing partnerships between the military police and the civil police. The geographical concentration of the UPPs shows the many limits that constrain the success of these operations, as well as the political decisions of coordination that sometimes are influenced by other areas. Another limiting factor pointed out was the double ideology of the military police.

The use of a military and warlike vocabulary in the UPP plans was also discussed, in spite of the efforts to surmount it presented by Col. Robson. It was argued that talking about the phases of implementation of the UPP in terms of “occupation” and “stabilization” seemed to reveal the military heritage of military police in Brazil. Similarly, the very use of armored tanks in these operations shows a huge limitation in the effort to “demilitarize” the police and the UPPs.

There was also a discussion about the military officials’ perspective of the role of humanitarian organizations in Rio de Janeiro. In addition, the participation of armed forces in humanitarian actions and their relation to the constitution of the humanitarian space was discussed, in particular when it comes to the necessity or not of using the armed forces to “open” these spaces. It was argued that the military forces are relevant to the humanitarian action, but that it has a similar effect in the constitution of its operational space. However, other claims defended the essentiality of the armed forces when it comes to the opening of spaces to the humanitarian action through stabilization and pacification.

Comentado [PS4]: Não entendi

Panel 05 – “The local politics of the humanitarian engagement in Rio de Janeiro”

In most cases, the priorities and practices of humanitarian action are determined from above, by outsiders. However, interventions in settings characterized by other situations of violence require a new form of negotiation with local actors. Thus, this panel addressed the politics of the humanitarian project in Rio de Janeiro from a beneficiary perspective. It asked how local authorities, humanitarians and community members themselves understand the meaning of





protection. What were the ways in which humanitarian actors – both international and national – negotiated access and protection with local public and private authorities? In what ways did these various forms of mediation constitute and reproduce legitimacy?

Professor Paulo Esteves, HASOW's Coordinator and the Director of the Institute of International Relations (IRI) of PUC-Rio, opened the panel by introducing the three panelists: Dr. Jailson de Souza e Silva, who is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Education, Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF) and the Director of the *Observatório de Favelas*; the aforementioned Dr. Carolina Moulin; and Adriano Campolina, who is Affiliate Director of *ActionAid* in Brazil.

Dr. Silva opened his session by stating that in order to study practices of protection in *favelas* it is important to, first, analyze a set of representations both of the *favelas* and of the people that live in these spaces. In other words, it is critical to re-think the prevailing narratives on *favelas* and on people who live in these spaces, which represent them through what he calls the “paradigm of absence”, in order to construct public policies that are able to guarantee people's basic rights.

The *favela*, according to these representations, is a chaotic, uncontrolled and non-governed space; in other words, the *favela* is not recognized as part of the city and its population is represented as potential criminals. Dr. Silva noted that the *favelas* are spaces which were ignored by the State Government, and the order there was established and is still maintained by privatized criminal groups.

In this sense, the establishments of the UPPs, according to Dr. Silva, can be viewed as a positive step towards guaranteeing public security to all of the *favela*'s residents who will no longer be submitted to the power of criminal groups. However, Dr. Silva argues that the UPP is not about including the *favela* in the city, but it is a form of policing the community – it is about changing the commander in chief. It is important to emphasize that protection, depending on how the term is used, may reproduce the same logic of the “paradigm of absence” in relation to the people that live in *favelas*.

In order not to reproduce this narrative, it is fundamental to acknowledge the people who live in *favelas* as rights-bearing citizens. In this way, the





UPP is seen as important because it regulates the space without ignoring people's rights. However this will only happen if: first, the paradigm of absence is broken; second, *favelas* are recognized as part of the city and their residents as citizens with rights; and, finally, by preventing the expulsion of *favelas'* people by market forces.

Dr. Carolina Moulin analyzed *Medecins Sans Frontieres* (MSF)'s actions in *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro, in particular the project in *Complexo do Alemão* from 2007 to 2009, which was not considered a success according to MSF's own evaluation. From this point of departure, Dr. Moulin questioned how the *favela* became a space in which humanitarian workers can act. In order to explore this aspect, she analyzed both the transformations in the humanitarian sector and the debates regarding how the concept of protection has been rethought.

Furthermore, Dr. Moulin emphasized the importance of understanding how the discussion on urbanization was incorporated by the humanitarian literature. In contrast with the sociological approach to urbanization, the humanitarian literature presents some characteristics that are important to point out: urbanization may be understood as *favelization*; that is, this process happens in its majority in the Global South and it is characterized by social inequality and the production of marginal spaces that promote a series of challenges to the stability of the order. In other words, the *favela* is represented as a space outside of the law and outside of the order (of the city). In sum, urbanization is understood as a process that produces uncontrolled and non-governed spaces that legitimate the entry and the action of humanitarian workers.

In the case of Rio de Janeiro and, specifically, in the MSF project in *Complexo do Alemão*, it was possible to explore how the idea of the universalization of the *global favela* may cause a series of tensions and dilemmas when work is carried out in specific settings. After a huge police operation in the *favela* in 2007, *Complexo do Alemão* was considered by MSF a humanitarian emergency setting. MSF, then, replicated a very successful project previously implemented in Haiti in the *favela* in Rio de Janeiro. However, it did not work the way it was envisioned due to many reasons that can be organized according to two main axis: first, the universality aspect that reproduced the idea of a *global favela*; second, the idea of different





temporalities operating in one setting that did not necessarily work well together; that is, for people who live in *favelas* time is thought of as *daily* time; time for the humanitarian workers is guided by *temporary emergencies*; and time for the police is guided by the *permanent emergencies*.

Adriano Campolina focused his presentation on the dilemmas and challenges experienced by *ActionAid*, as an organization that aims to guarantee people's basic rights and to promote citizenship in humanitarian settings. In this sense, it was important to emphasize that *ActionAid* cannot be characterized as an organization that responds to humanitarian crisis, but as an organization that fights against poverty and hunger.

Because of this, *ActionAid* does not consider the city of Rio de Janeiro a humanitarian context, but a setting characterized by violence and social exclusion. In this sense, the work in Rio de Janeiro must be carried out based on the perspective of human rights, acknowledging the people who are excluded of the category of subjects entitled to rights. Therefore, the work developed through partnerships between different actors – neighborhood associations, NGOs, state institutions – can be considered a critical step. In addition, he emphasized the relevance of the process of people's empowerment and of demanding the implementation of public policies. In sum, Campolina highlighted that none of these practices of humanitarian action can be successful without counting on people's participation.

In his concluding remarks, Campolina highlighted two challenges, noting that humanitarian action can cause serious harm depending on how it is done: first, how urban violence should be understood in the Brazilian context; and, second, how to construct communities constituted by individuals capable of demanding their own rights.

Discussion

The main topics of discussion were: first, the balance of forces between those involved in partnerships created to implement policies of protection, such as the partnership between NGOs and the State Government. Then, a





second point of discussion referred to the universality aspect of humanitarian action, specifically with regards to the case of *Complexo do Alemão*, where the MSF clinic turned out to be a space for treating drug dealers who were afraid of going to hospitals and thereby being caught by the police. Finally, a third aspect of discussion was how to represent people who live in *favelas* without reproducing the paradigm of absence but still recognizing that they need help and live in difficult conditions.

HASOW

HUMANITARIAN ACTION
IN SITUATIONS
OTHER THAN WAR

