



Rio's Pacification: Paradigm Shift or Paradigm Maintenance?

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Abstract

Much has been written on the character and outcomes of Rio de Janeiro's pacification program. This Working Paper considers the discord between understandings of the drivers of urban violence and methodological approaches to assessing the impacts of pacification. It finds that assessments focusing narrowly on 'violence' and 'victimization' indicators may not adequately capture real changes on the ground. This is because the underlying data tends to be 'macro-level' administrative data or community 'case studies'. A more robust assessment requires intermediate level analysis. The Working Paper considers the policy and practice of pacification and considers questions related to data coverage and quality.

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Introduction

Rio de Janeiro has been plagued by high levels of violence for decades. Crimes such as robbery, rape, fraud, and residential theft are at critical levels and homicide rates have reached levels similar to those of armed conflict. (WOLA 2011, OECD 2011, ICRC 2010) With 42 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants per year, Rio's homicide rate was among the world's highest in 2005. (OSAC 2013) Yet, this city average hides substantial intra-urban variations along ethnic, gender, age and socio-spatial lines. (Perlman 2004, Cardia 2000) Homicide rates are as high as 84 per 100,000 in the poorest areas of the municipality, while the richest areas display rates of 4.7 to 10. (Ramos and Musumeci 2005 as cited in Koonings and Kruijt 2007)

The unequal distribution of crime and violence throughout Rio's diverse socio-spatial spheres echoes contemporary thinking on urban violence. Socio-spatial segregation and urban duality are fundamentally intertwined with patterns of exclusion, insecurity and violence that characterise 'fragile cities'. (Muggah 2014, Muggah and Savage 2012, Koonings and Kruijt 2007, 2009, Cardia 2000, Bitencourt 2003)

Historically, intervention in Rio's favelas² was oriented towards repression and included coercive military invasions and short-lived community policing initiatives. (Skogan 2013, Cano 2012, WB 2012, Da Cunha and Mello 2011) Launched in 2008 under State Governor Sergio Cabral and Mayor Eduardo Paes, the current UPP program integrates repressive security interventions and progressive social development components. As the first enduring multi-sectoral effort, Rio's pacification³ effectively reduced armed violence stemming from drug gangs, militias and police. (WB 2012, Cano 2012)

As of 2012, Rio's overall homicide rate decreased to 10.9 per 100,000 per year, the lowest in 21 years. (Cano 2012, Knott 2012) Police killings declined from 1,330 in 2007 to 561 in 2011 and robberies leading to killings decreased by 23% between 2006 and 2010. (Muggah, 2012) Despite its visible success, citizens, scholars and the media are asking three basic questions: Whose security does pacification address? Does pacification 'securitize' development? Does pacification represent a paradigm shift?

Reviewing the pacification literature, this Working Paper exposes a mismatch between contemporary understandings of causes and drivers of urban violence and the methodological approaches applied to assess the success of pacification.

2 Favelas are '[...] highly consolidated invasions of public or private land with self-build developed by the poor on lands lacking infrastructure and without following any kind of plans'; squatter settlement (Xavier and Magalhães 2003 : 8).

3 Pacification is a normative category with no distinctions made based on respective stages in the process. All favelas with UPPs established between 2007 and 2011 are labelled as 'pacified', whether they also benefit from UPP Social or not.

Contemporary empirical accounts of changes in violence indicators associated with Rio's pacification are limited either to community case studies or the aggregate city level. This study generates new evidence on the merits and drawbacks of Rio's pacification by discussing:

How does pacification address and impact inequalities in violence indicators across Rio?

How does this relate to the drawbacks of pacification?

The Working Paper first analyses the targeting patterns with which UPPs were established across Rio's districts and the trends in violence indicators 2007-2011. It then interprets these patterns and trends in relation to the three fundamental debates surrounding pacification. The Working Paper finds that pacification represents an exercise of paradigm maintenance, where evidence is manipulated to distract attention away from deeper reforms of the police and criminal justice system.

Focusing on the case of Rio, the Working Paper explores the drivers of urban violence, introduces UPP and UPP Social as the main components of pacification, sketches the policy origins and drivers and draws together existing evidence of its merits and drawbacks. The Working Paper also examines the underlying methodology of pacification and considers its wider impacts. Finally, the Working Paper concludes with a number of reflections on future research priorities and recommendations for more just and inclusive outcomes.

Context and Concepts

The UPP's mission is to facilitate dialogue and partnerships between residents and state security institutions to strengthen local leadership.

Rio's urban violence situation cuts across political, institutional, economic and social categories. (Moser 2004, Winton 2004) The city's socio-spatial segregation of rich and poor and its characteristic urban fragmentation result from Brazil's inequality and its rapid urbanization in the latter half of the 20th century. (Martine and McGranahan 2010) Given limited absorption capacity of urban labour markets and government inability to provide housing, the poor settled in self-built accommodation in favelas. With neoliberal adjustment in the 1990s, unemployment and urban poverty rose and deepened the exclusion and marginalization of the poor. (Sanchez 2006, Koonings and Kruijt 2007, 2009) As areas where formal and informal governance intersect and the state fails to provide security, favelas opened the way for armed actors and violence brokers, who carve out alternative, extra-legal spheres of income and power.

Drug trading gangs proliferated when cocaine trafficking intensified in the 1980s and organized crime began to dominate social, economic and political life in favelas. (Koonings and Kruijt 2009, Perlman 2010, Cardia 2000, WB 2011, UNHABITAT 2007) Lack of respect for the enforcement apparatus, which is plagued by violence, poor training, inadequate capabilities, and corruption, foster a culture of impunity that acts to erode citizenship and promote crime. (Bitencourt 2003, Briceño-Léon 2005) Corruption, particularly in the criminal justice and police institutions, and the poor quality of public schools with high drop-out rates drive violence as corrupt officials and unemployed youths get involved in violence. (Koonings and Kruijt 2009, Power and Taylor 2013)


Rio's Pacification: UPP and UPP Social

Urban violence in Rio is sustained by the interaction of structural causes and the cumulative effects of various risk factors. Pacification addresses these multiple causes and drivers through interventions provided by its principal components UPP and UPP Social in collaboration with public agencies, private companies and NGOs. (Cano 2012, Da Cunha and Mello 2011, UPP 2013) The program combines a security (territorial consolidation, proximity policing, qualified repression, intelligence, monitoring) and development agenda (social welfare, education and employment programs, formal services, permanent state presence and tax collection). (Muggah 2012)

Administratively bound to Military Police Battalions and coordinated by the Posto de Policiamento Comunitário - PPC (Community Policing Station), the *UPP's* mission is to facilitate dialogue and partnerships between residents and state security institutions to strengthen local leadership. (Cano 2012, UPP 2013) Administered by Rio's City Hall and coordinated by IPP in collaboration with UN-HABITAT, *UPP Social* in theory

consolidates and strengthens advances brought by pacification by facilitating, planning and coordinating service provision to reverse legacies of violence and exclusion. (UPP Social 2013) The pacification process can be divided into four successive, yet overlapping stages. (Figure 1) Based on a normative legal framework and progressing in an experimental fashion, the model and particularly its monitoring and evaluation agenda are yet to be consolidated. (Cano 2012, Cabral 2011)

Figure 1: Stages of pacification



Own illustration, based on Cabral 2011, UPP 2013, WB 2012 and Muggah (date unknown)

Rio's Historical Response to Violence: The Original Paradigm

Brazil's response to urban informality and violence has historically been sporadic interventions marked by abuse of police force and authority. (WB 2011, Da Cunha and Mello 2011, Cano 2012) The persistent failure of such 'mano dura' policies ('war against crime') led to more progressive community policing initiatives beginning in the 1990s. (Rodgers 2009) The PPC, DPO and GPAE initially yielded positive results, but lacked political commitment and support from governors, state secretaries of Security and Military Police. (WB 2012) Largely motivated by populist electoral politics, they were quickly discontinued. Failing to convert into official and consolidated practice and security policies, they reinforced negative police perceptions. (CESec 2011, Freeman 2012, WB 2012, Da Cunha and Mello 2011)

Origins and Drivers of Rio's Pacification

The UPP slogan '*veio para ficar*' (came to stay) resembles notions of a 'break with history' (WB 2012) in Rio's response to urban informality and violence. The emerging transformation from 'eradication' to 'integration' is facilitated by the interaction of economic and political incentives and gradual structural change. Favelas represent **untapped sources of political support** in elections and notions of 'democracy of the street' are heard frequently in debates about similar initiatives across the Latin American and Caribbean region. In 2011, 65% of UPP officers saw pacification as an electoral program. (CESeC 2011) Favelas also represent untapped markets for surplus **capital** absorption through real estate value and commercialization. (Freeman 2012) **International forces** additionally incentivize pacification, most notably Brazil's preparations to host the upcoming World Cup and Olympics and its aspirations to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. (Freeman 2012, Halais 2012, Muggah 2011)

The '**opening from above**' beginning in the 1980s created closer proximity between democratically-elected local politicians and citizens. An unprecedented **horizontal alignment** of political interests at different government levels was achieved through Brazil's Public Security Program PRONASCI launched in 2007. PRONASCI allocates federal funds to innovative public security initiatives at state and municipal levels. Its implementation period until 2012 sustained political commitment during the transition from the Lula to the Rousseff administration (Ruediger 2013; Muggah, date unknown) and broader urban renewal plans as part of Rio's preparations to host the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games in 2014 and 2016 renewed momentum. (Freeman 2012; WB 2012; Da Cunha and Mello 2011). Long-standing citizen concerns for public security (Leeds 2007, Ruediger 2013) and the rise of social movements advocating justice, inclusion and peace as priorities for the urban poor, such as Viva Rio and RCV, intensified policy **pressure from below**. Protests against corruption and flawed government priorities and demands for better services and policies have soared more recently. (Watts 2013)

Evaluating Rio's Pacification: Merits and Drawbacks

A substantial body of literature consisting of studies, evaluations and discussion papers has emerged, which inform the debate about Rio's pacification. The pacification literature broadly breaks down into three categories: perception surveys, impact studies and quantitative analyses of changes in socio-economic indicators. A sample of 1.200 household questionnaires distributed in Santa Marta and Cidade de Deus showed that 87% and 93% of respondents approved of pacification respectively. (FGV 2009, UPP 2013) They felt the general security and human rights situation had improved, as had the business climate. Yet, attention was drawn to

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persisting problems of murders, difficult community-police relationships and -in Santa Marta- increasing theft. (FGV 2009)

Some 93% of respondents in a sample of 600 telephone surveys in seven pacified communities judged their communities as 'safe' or 'very safe' owing to the UPP. (IBSP 2010) Three thirds felt more respected by non-favela residents and public officials. Overall, respondents rated police performance and their relationships with communities positively, welcoming the formalization of services. Roughly 70% feared traffickers and armed groups would return, believing the continuity of the program depended on government support. The surveys also identified urgent community needs, particularly for community health centres (46%), schools (32%) and leisure activities (15%).

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A survey covering 4.000 UPP beneficiaries in eight communities showed variations in citizen approval of the UPP between 92% (Batam) and 61% (Borel). More than half of the respondents assumed pacification would end after the Olympic Games in 2016. (Instituto Mapear 2010) Interviewing 359 police officers from the first nine UPPs, CESeC (2011) showed that while 63% of police officers considered their training adequate, training deficits were apparent in the areas of using non-lethal arms and reducing domestic violence. While conflict mediation and domestic violence reduction were perceived as primary police responsibilities, 94% of UPP officers considered it necessary to carry rifles in their day to day work. 70% preferred placements in other policing units, evidencing a clear lack of commitment to the UPP. This was echoed in high proportions of officers believing the UPPs' principal objectives were ensuring public safety for the World Cup and Olympic Games, reassuring the middle class or ensuring support during electoral campaigns. 56% of respondents noted negative police perceptions and only 5% regularly participated in community meetings.

While such perception surveys provide valuable insights into the opinions of beneficiaries and police officers, their results tend to suffer from generalization limitations as they focus on selected pacified communities or single stakeholders. More **comprehensive impact studies** use case-study approaches consisting of observations, focus groups, and key informant interviews with more than one stakeholder group. They may additionally include analyses of secondary data and control groups.

Based on a range of surveys, focus groups, interviews, and activities with 319 participants in Santa Marta, Morro dos Macacos (Rio) and Calabar (Salvador, Bahia as a control case), CECIP (2010) evidenced a positive impact of pacification on children able to move more freely in their communities. Yet, communities noted lack of adequate space for children to play; environmental hazards; dissatisfaction with the UPP-community relationship; as well as lack of social projects and programs for young children and teenagers and vocational training for adolescents to facilitate

social mobility. The research identified a clear need for support and training to build a culture of mutual dialogue as a remaining challenge to pacification.

Drawing on fieldwork in Santa Marta, Da Cunha and Mello (2011) identified a range of emerging conflicts among residents and between residents and government.

Gentrification resulting from urban regeneration, formalization of services and tax collection, particularly in favelas located in noble neighbourhoods, gradually 'drives out' poor households and small entrepreneurs unable to afford rising living costs.

Combining fieldwork with residents, community leaders, NGO representatives, police officers, public officials and researchers in nine (soon to be) pacified favelas with secondary analyses of existing accounts, Freeman (2012) de-masks pacification as part of Rio's entrepreneurial city strategy centered around the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, where the 'state engineers the military conquest and control of territories, and the capture of assets by force, to create outlets for the expansion of private capital'. (Freeman 2012: 95)

An impact study conducted by WB (2012) revealed that UPP perceptions were influenced by the historical relationship favelas had with drug traffickers and the police before pacification. Generally, social interactions and community life had improved and symbolic representations of violence and power were gradually being substituted by such of peace and citizenship. Yet, success would ultimately depend on the extent to which the approach becomes institutionalized. The study concluded that sustainable integration of favelas requires employment creation to allow residents to afford rising living costs, thus replacing former illicit sources of income; and prioritization of UPP Social programs.

Cano's (2012) mixed methodology approach testified pacification success in terms of its impact on registered crime, proxied by reductions in homicide rates of around 60 per 100,000 inhabitants annually (particularly through reduced police killings), and somewhat smaller reductions in robberies, whereas non-lethal crime against persons and property crime rose. The study drew attention to a lack of participation in social activities, both on part of state representatives, as well as resident associations. The geographic limitation of UPPs to Rio's South Zone, Centre and Tijuca, which surround the Maracanã Stadium, where the international events in 2014 and 2016 are expected to take place; and problems in program development were identified as the principal challenges to the continuity and sustainability of pacification.

Interviewing a total of 150,000 residents in Rocinha and Complexo do Alemão, Neri (2011) revealed growing disparities in quality of life indicators across favelas as a result of pacification. The study concludes that for pacification to deliver on its social development and welfare goals, formalization of services and employment needs to be accompanied by policies to support small businesses and mobilize communities

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at large through UPP Social.

Quantitative analysis of changes in crime rates, estate prices and a range of other socio-economic indicators draw on **secondary data**, most of which compare and contrast pacification effects and outcomes in different (groups of) favelas.

Analysing changes in crime and real estate prices, Frischtak and Mandel (2012) estimate pacification and associated falling crime rates accounted for about 15% of price growth in Rio's formal property markets between 2008 and mid-2011.

Reviewing and monitoring changes in socioeconomic indicators of education, housing, health, safety, taxes, real estate value, income and labour in five pacified communities, FGV Projetos (2012) identified not only variations in the effect pacification had on different communities, but also systematic gaps in available data, which hinders effective monitoring and evaluation and compromises the planning and adaptation of future actions.

In summary, an emerging body of literature and studies with a variety of methodological approaches is generating evidence and knowledge about the merits and drawbacks of Rio's pacification. The wealth of studies available and the variety of their underlying methodologies reflect a broader challenge of the program itself: The lack of a clear and transparent monitoring and evaluation agenda and consolidated data bases. (WB 2012, Cabral 2011, FGV Projetos 2012) Moreover, quantitative accounts of changes in violence indicators associated with Rio's pacification are limited to particular community case studies or the aggregate city level. There is no quantitative account of how pacification addresses and impacts levels and inequalities in violence indicators across the city as a whole. This Working Paper fills this evidence gap.

Two critical observations necessitate and justify the principal research questions addressed here:

1. notions of exclusion, intra-urban inequality and fragmentation are at the heart of contemporary understandings of the causes and drivers of urban violence. (Winton 2004, Rolnik 1999)
2. albeit affecting the poor more than the middle class, urban violence has a city-wide impact. (Rolnik 1999, Cardia 2000)

These two fundamental recognitions are not adequately reflected in the methods and practices underlying the studies generating the findings that inform and drive Rio's pacification over the coming years. This Working Paper puts them at the heart of the analysis.

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Why Methods Matter

The variety of methodological approaches and conceptualisations underlying the studies and evaluations which inform Rio's pacification generated conflicting results and interpretations, making the lack of a clear and robust learning and evaluation agenda a critical bottleneck to the success of pacification. (WB 2012) Patchy evidence can easily be manipulated and hijacked to serve particular political interests. It compromises the capacity to identify critical challenges and problems, experiment with alternative responses, and adjust intervention tools and methods, which combine to limit the advocacy power of local policy-makers vis-a-vis those at the federal level. The consequences of this situation have begun to surface with the collapse of federal level fiscal support for PRONASCI and its associated funding for Rio's pacification. (Ruediger 2013, Skogan 2013)

The importance of evidence to inform Rio's pacification, the threats associated with the lack of a clear monitoring and evaluation agenda and the discord between contemporary understandings of the causes and consequences of violence versus the methods with which the success of pacification is assessed, justify and necessitate this Working Paper.

Methodology

This Working Paper seeks to generate new evidence on the merits and drawbacks of Rio's pacification by providing:

1. a quantitative account of how pacification addresses and impacts levels and inequalities in violence indicators in all districts across Rio; and
2. an interpretation of the associated results and findings in relation to the key debates surrounding pacification.

In order to facilitate (1), the Working Paper analyses both the targeting patterns with which UPPs were established across the city of Rio, as well as, the changes and trends in violence indicators over time by using simple descriptive statistics. (Sprinthall 2007) It draws on secondary data (from UPP and RCV) on UPPs established across Rio between 2008 and 2011 (UPP 2013) and on violence indicators disaggregated to the geographic level of Rio's 33 districts obtained for the years 2007 (shortly before pacification) to 2011 (latest available data) (RCV 2013).

Two different methodological approaches are applied to compare and scrutinize their associated results and interpretations, thus enhancing the validity of this Working Paper. Firstly, a *cross-sectional analysis* of all districts shows variations between the most and least violent districts. This is achieved by sorting districts according to their 2007 violence levels. Secondly, a *comparative analysis* compares and contrasts aggregate outcomes in pacified (those districts which had received one or more UPPs by the end of 2011, Table 1) and non-pacified districts (those districts which had not received any UPPs by the end of 2011, Table 2).

In order to facilitate (2), the findings obtained from (1) are interpreted in relation to three key drawbacks of pacification: misplaced accountability, securitization of development and the manipulation of evidence to sustain reigning paradigms.

Data Collection and Organization

Between 2007 and 2011, a total of 19 UPPs were established. As of 2014, there are currently some 40 UPPs spread out across the city. They cover one or more favelas and are located within or between different districts. Table 1 shows districts pacified between 2007 and 2011 and Table 2 contains districts which had not been pacified by the end of 2011, including all UPPs established to this date. UPPs marked with an asterisk cover more than one district. Assuming equal impacts on violence, they were included for both. UPPs marked with two asterisks were implemented after 2011.

Between 2007 and 2011, a total of 19 UPPs were established. They cover one or more favelas and are located within or between different districts.

Table 1: Districts pacified by the end of 2011

DISTRICTS	UPPS	IMPLEMENTATION
Botafogo	UPP Dona Marta	19.12.2008
	UPP Tabajaras e Cabritos*	14.01.2010
Cidade de Deus	UPP Cidade de Deus*	16.02.2009
Copacabana	UPP Chapéu Mangueira	10.06.2009
	UPP Babilônia	10.06.2009
	UPP Pavão, Pavãozinho e Cantagalo*	23.12.2009
	UPP Tabajaras e Cabritos*	14.01.2010
Jacarapaguá	UPP Cidade de Deus*	16.02.2009
Lagoa	UPP Pavão, Pavãozinho e Cantagalo*	23.12.2009
	UPP Vidigal**	18.01.2012
	UPP Rocinha**	20.09.2012
Méier	UPP São João, Matriz e Quietto	31.01.2011
Portuária	UPP Providência	26.04.2010
	UPP Caju**	12.04.2013
Realengo	UPP Batan	18.02.2009
Rio Comprido	UPP Turano*	30.10.2010
	UPP Coroa, Fallet e Fogueteiro	25.02.2011
	UPP São Carlos	17.05.2011
Santa Teresa	UPP Escondidinho e Prazeres	25.02.2011
Tijuca	UPP Borel	07.06.2010
	UPP Formiga	01.06.2010
	UPP Salgueiro	17.09.2010
	UPP Turano*	30.10.2010
Vila Isabel	UPP Andaraí	28.07.2010
	UPP Macacos	30.11.2011
	UPP Mangueira	03.11.2011

Source: UPP 2013

Table 2: Districts not pacified by the end of 2011

DISTRICTS	UPPS	IMPLEMENTATION
Anchieta		
Bangu		
Barra da Tijuca		
Campo Grande		
Centro		
Complexo do Alemão	UPP Adeus, Baiana**	11.05.2012
	UPP Alemão, Pedra do Sapo**	30.05.2012
	UPP Nova Brasília**	18.04.2012
	UPP Fazendinha**	09.07.2012
Guaratiba		
Ilha de Paqueta		
Ilha do Governador		
Inhaúma		
Irajá		
Jacarezinho	UPP Jacarezinho**	16.01.2013
Madureira		
Maré		
Pavuna	UPP Fé, Sereno**	27.06.2012
	UPP Chatuba**	27.06.2012
	UPP Parque Proletário**	28.08.2012
	UPP Vila Cruzeiro**	28.08.2012
Ramos	UPP Manginhos**	16.01.2013
Rocinha		
Santa Cruz		
São Cristóvão	UPP Barreira**	12.04.2013
Vigário Geral		

The above tables illustrate pacification progress from 2007 to the present day, while the analytical exercises draw on different datasets, which were organized according to districts, number of UPPs and annual rates of violence 2007-2011 (see Appendix). Disaggregated violence data were drawn from RCV, who obtained them from SMSDC, ISP and SESEG. (RCV 2013)⁴

Indicators

Three indicators ('variables') were chosen as proxies to analyse the intensity and severity of violent outcomes.

Homicides by residence per 100,000 inhabitants:

'Unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person' (UNODC 2013) is the most widely discussed category of victimization and also the one for which most data is accessible in Brazil. (Zdun 2011, Muggah 2011) The homicide rates used in this study are calculated using death certificates of Rio residents, thus potentially including victimization of Rio residents outside Rio and excluding victimization of non-Rio residents within Rio. (RCV 2013)⁵ These caveats somewhat jeopardize the internal validity of the study.

Adolescent male homicides by residence per 100,000 inhabitants:

Adolescent males aged 15 to 24 represent the population group most severely affected by violence. (Perlman 2004, Cardia 2000) The indicator is likely to demonstrate greater variations in violence experienced in different districts. However, the same caveats hold as for homicides.

Aggression against vulnerable groups by residence per 10,000 inhabitants:

These are estimates based on children 0-12, women 20-59 and elderly people 60+ years admitted to hospital with serious injuries for unknown causes occurring in home environments. The fact that domestic violence is widely underreported renders the data unlikely to capture all cases. (RCV 2013, Zdun 2011) Data inconsistencies were apparent over time, hence why the data for the three vulnerable groups was aggregated by calculating their means in Excel.

⁴ RCV 2013. Citizen-led movement, which monitors quality of life indicators. Data available at: <http://www.riocomovamos.org.br/portal/indicadores.asp?cc=35&mn=7>

⁵ Given the lack of data on homicides by location of occurrence and the assumption that the great majority of homicides among Rio residents occur in Rio, the available data was used.

The reported levels of crime and violence at individual, community, police and state level may however have changed over the time period as a result of pacification.

Data Limitations

As indicated above, the data used in this Working Paper suffers from qualitative limitations. Since Brazil has no available central reporting system, primary crime data is collected by State Secretaries of Security, who decide on categorization, formatting and dissemination of information obtained from independently reporting military and civil police forces. This creates source variability problems and renders reporting mechanisms potentially inconsistent given that State Secretaries can make independent decisions concerning their crime recording mechanisms. (Zdun 2011, Soares 2007) No evidence was found for significant changes neither in crime reporting mechanisms at the federal state level nor in those for the public health indicators used here. Given consistency in RCV's indicator monitoring methodology over the observed time period, reporting mechanisms were assumed consistent.

The reported levels of crime and violence at individual, community, police and state level may however have changed over the time period as a result of pacification. Improvements in public security and police performance can increase the level of community trust in the police; remove disincentives for reporting (fear of mistreatment by police, fear of revenge by offenders), thus increasing reporting levels. (Soares 2007) Evidence suggests that some pacified communities experienced declines in anonymous reporting of drug trafficking activities through 'Disque Denúncia', while reporting levels in others increased. (Disque Denúncia 2010) While the data used here do not necessarily capture cases reported through this mechanism, the findings imply levels of reporting may differ between districts and across time.

Methodological Challenges and Limitations

As outlined above, the data analysed in this Working Paper is disaggregated to the level of districts, whereas UPPs are targeted at particular favelas, which represent much smaller geographical areas within those districts. This limits the accuracy with which this analysis measures the impact of UPPs in terms of changes in violence indicators, since Rio is known for its close proximity of neighbourhoods that display high variations in crime and other socio-economic indicators. (Muggah 2011, Koonings and Kruijt 2007, Perlman 2004, Cardia 2000) Two of the indicators are imperfect in capturing the effect of pacification, since they focus on victimization by place of residence of victims, rather than occurrence. In addition, it is debatable to which extent pacification addresses and impacts domestic violence or seeks to do so. While surveys suggest that conflict mediation and domestic violence were primary police responsibilities in pacified communities, UPP officers also noted a lack of training on addressing these problems. (CESec 2011)

The Working Paper could not control for differential stages in the pacification process across favelas and districts. While the dates of UPP implementation differed from case to case, as did the number of UPPs established per district, no operational distinction could be made. Additionally, four UPPs reach over more than one district. Assuming equal effects in both districts, they were included for both. This has implications for the number of UPPs 'assigned' to districts and should be cautioned in interpreting the targeting patterns of UPP implementation and the associated trends in violence indicators.

This Working Paper is technical in its methodological underpinnings and draws on abstract secondary quantitative data suffering from severe limitations. While it does not directly capture perceptions and 'voices' of those most directly affected by policies, its ecological validity is comparatively high. Its findings and results are meaningful to key policy stakeholders, such as representatives from UPP Social contacted during the research process who showed interest in the findings and evidence generated in this Working Paper.

This Working Paper is designed to generate new evidence on how pacification in Rio has addressed and impacted levels and inequalities in violence between 2007 and 2011 and what ramifications these targeting and impact patterns have for the merits and drawbacks of the program. Its unique interest is to inform pacification in Rio, while its external validity is low and associated results cannot be generalised. The operational decisions and methodological procedures used to construct the analytical framework for this Working Paper are explained and illustrated in depth, thus providing sufficient information for the analysis to be repeated. The reliability and (internal) validity are judged adequate, given this Working Paper tests two distinct methodological designs and three different violence indicators in order to scrutinize its findings and interpretations.

Analysis

How does pacification address and impact levels and inequalities in violence?

The following section describes and discusses 1) the targeting patterns with which UPPs were established across Rio's districts and 2) the changes and trends in violence indicators associated with pacification. Cross-sectional (ranking districts according to levels of violence) and comparative (comparing pacified and non-pacified districts) analyses will be compared and contrasted. In summary, while pacification as implemented between 2007 and 2011 has not explicitly addressed inequalities in violence, it reduced disparities in violence indicators across districts.

The cross-sectional analysis (See Figures 2 and 3 below and Appendix for more), in which districts were compared and contrasted solely based on the levels of violence indicators, showed that pacification did not specifically target the districts which displayed the highest levels of violence as proxied by all three violence indicators examined in this Working Paper. On average, the ten least violent districts received more UPPs than the ten most violent districts.

Figure 2: Homicide rates, 2007-2011





Figure 3: Adolescent male homicide rates, 2007-2011



While the numbers of UPPs mentioned suffer from methodological biases, the associated findings and interpretations are still valid if controlling for these biases. Between 2007 and 2011, levels of violence were reduced significantly both in least and most violent districts, as were the disparities in all violence indicators, as evidenced by the consistent convergence in their violence rates. The time trend analysis of variance in the chosen indicators showed that variations in levels of homicides and adolescent homicides across all districts decreased between 2007 and 2011, while increasing slightly for aggression against vulnerable groups, which is most likely explained and justified by the poor data quality and inconsistent reporting characterizing the latter indicator.

The comparative analysis (See Figures 4 and 5 below and Appendix for more), where districts were grouped according to whether they had or had not been pacified between 2007 and 2011, confirmed these results:

Figure 4: Homicide rates, 2007-2011





Figure 6: Adolescent male homicide rates, 2007-2011



On average, the districts which received UPPs displayed lower levels of violence than those that did not receive any UPPs - for homicide rates and adolescent homicide rates. Aggression against vulnerable groups was marginally higher in pacified districts than in non-pacified districts. Over the course of the intervention, the levels of violence decreased in both pacified and non-pacified districts and disparities in the indicators were reduced. The fact that levels of violence declined in both pacified (more so) and non-pacified districts (less so) suggests that interventions had effects in neighbouring districts, too. Existing evidence also indicates that rates of violence had been declining even before the onset of pacification. (Halais 2013) While this calls into question the magnitude of the impact UPPs had on changes in violence indicators, and therefore the internal validity of this Working Paper, the implications are not unique to this Working Paper and therefore do not significantly limit its validity and reliability.

How does this relate to the drawbacks and drivers of pacification?

The findings described above draw attention to some of the key drawbacks of pacification, as well as, the debates about the origins and policy drivers of pacification. They also echo broader debates on the security-development nexus, three of which are discussed in detail throughout the following paragraphs.

Misplaced Accountability

The fact that pacification 2007-2011 did not explicitly target the most violent – and therefore vulnerable districts – calls into question whose security the program addresses. The geographical targeting patterns underlying Rio's pacification provide a distinct answer to this question.

The UPPs established in Rio between 2007 and 2011 are primarily located in Rio's South Zone, Centre and Tijuca, located near the Maracanã Stadium, where the

international sporting events in 2014 and 2016 will take place. (Cano 2012, WB 2012, Muggah 2011) The targeting patterns characterizing pacification 2007-2011 draw attention to what is essentially a problem of a misplaced accountability towards external stakeholders, such as the International Olympic Committee and FIFA, rather than citizens and vulnerable citizens in particular. This confirms Freeman's (2012) argument that pacification is driven by neoliberal accumulation strategies aimed at marketing the Olympic Games, building the mega-event city and commercializing favelas.

This also calls into question the orientation of policing in Rio, which appears to be oriented towards protecting the state, rather than citizens. (Leeds 2007) Indeed, the inclusion of lethal violence as a selection criterion for UPP implementation has been recommended by other researchers. (Cano 2012) While this analysis is limited to the period 2007-2011 (19 UPPs), to this date, some 40 UPPs have been implemented. Their geographical coverage had been extended to more violent districts, such as Jacarezinho, Penha, São Cristóvão, Ramos and Complexo do Alemão. (UPP 2013, Muggah 2013) Nevertheless, the assumptions made about the orientation of pacification (2007-2011) are supported by a wealth of existing empirical evidence and therefore valid.

Securitization of Development

The pattern of misplaced accountability characterizing pacification between 2007 and 2011 shows the program does not address insecurity and vulnerability among those most in need. While this supports Caldeira's (2002) argument of an entrenched state disrespect for civil rights, particularly those of the poor and an ingrained bias of the Brazilian justice system, existing evidence also points to other motivations and incentives in implementing the range of pacification measures.

Frischtak and Mandel (2012) find that conditional on a UPP being installed nearby, house and apartment sales prices increased by an average of 5-10%. They estimate pacification accounted for about 15% of price growth in Rio's formal property markets between 2008 and mid-2011, which they attribute to associated declines in crime and violence and label as 'positive externalities' of pacification. In February 2012, a survey in 17 pacified communities carried out by a citywide retailer employer club found a 26% increase in retail sales in local stores. (UPP 2013) While these figures provide evidence for the 'favelas as untapped markets' thesis, the economic effects of urban regularization and formalization of services also brought attention to the drawbacks of pacification.

Mello and Da Cunha (2011) showed these processes provoke new conflicts between favela residents and the state, and that rising living costs associated with pacification distort household expenditures of the urban poor. Neri (2011) agrees that in order

Conditional on a UPP being installed nearby, house and apartment sales prices increased by an average of 5-10%.

UPP beneficiaries caution that the success of the program will depend on the social programs it makes way for.

for the 'choque de ordem' (shock of order, regularization etc.) to transform into 'progresso' (progress, welfare and development), small businesses need better financial assistance and community mobilization through UPP Social needs to be strengthened. Similarly, WB (2012) acknowledged, that the UPP Social needs to receive just as much attention and resources as the UPP, for the success of pacification to materialize and last. UPP beneficiaries also caution that the success of the program will depend on the social programs it makes way for, while complaining about lack of participation, communication and democracy in the pacification process and recognizing that just police is not sufficient to reverse legacies of violence and exclusion. (Freeman 2012) Surveys in Rocinha and Complexo do Alemão showed that coverage rates of Brazil's Conditional Cash Transfer Program 'Bolsa Familia' was as low as 5.61% and 12.66% respectively. (FGV Projetos 2011) These drawbacks present compelling evidence for the argument that pacification represents an exercise of 'securitization of development'. Firstly, it does not target the most vulnerable populations and secondly, its unexpected consequences and impoverishment effects are not addressed sufficiently. This supports Wacquant's (2008) observation of a shift from 'penalization' to 'militarization of urban marginality' in Brazil and Freeman's (2012) argument for the persistence of the neoliberal governance paradigm, whereby public security policy in the pacification program is crafted by and for particular private interests.

Manipulation of Evidence

The evidence gap identified in the literature review and the fact that the ways in which the pacification successes and impacts are studied do not adequately reflect contemporary understandings of the drivers and impact of urban violence points more broadly to a problem identified by many pacification researchers: the lack of a clear, transparent and robust evaluation agenda, which makes it easy to manipulate evidence of its merits and drawbacks. This points to the overarching question whether pacification represents a paradigm shift or an exercise of paradigm maintenance in

- responding to urban violence and poverty in marginal settings; and
- more broadly in reforming the police and criminal justice system and orienting them towards more democratic values and practices.

Compared to Rio's sporadic violent military invasions and failed community policing programs initiated over the past decade(s), pacification takes a much more progressive and sustainable stance on urban informality and violence. Indeed, the program is frequently conceptualized as a paradigm shift, and a 'break with history'. (WB 2012, Cano 2012, Ruediger 2013) However, the program shows inconsistencies. While military invasion and occupation are essential to the program (Freeman

2012, Wacquant 2008) and performative violence by police officers continues (Larkins 2013), the scope and impact of UPP Social and other public services in promoting social and economic development in pacified favelas remain limited. The latter jeopardizes the program's acclaimed security-development continuum and comprehensiveness. The problem of misplaced accountability reaffirms that the security and development intervention is oriented towards protecting the state, rather than citizens. Similarly, the lack of commitment on part of UPP officers (CESeC 2011) casts doubts about fundamental change in the state's assumption of responsibility to provide security and development to favela residents. Demolitions and displacement of families and communities are also part of the pacification policy mix, in which residents are subject to misuse of state authority. (Freeman 2012)

If Rio's pacification were to succeed and expand over the coming years, UPPs would only cover a fraction of Rio's estimated 600 favelas.

The large investments needed to finance the continuation of the program and expand the number of UPPs to 100 by 2016 (Freeman 2012), the demise of PRONASCI (Ruediger 2013, Skogan 2013) and the impact of Rio's recent protests (Muggah 2013) combine to threaten Rio's pacification. Additionally, if it were to succeed and expand over the coming years, UPPs would only cover a fraction of Rio's estimated 600 favelas. The program also does not address broader security problems and much-needed democratic institutional reform of the police and criminal justice system. (Soares 2007, Caldeira 2003, Macaulay 2002, Pinheiro 2002)

The previous paragraphs have illustrated how the lack of a clear, transparent and robust evaluation agenda leads to a situation in which patchy evidence generated by a wealth of studies with various underlying methodological conceptualisations and approaches can easily be manipulated to serve particular political interests and reigning paradigms. By compromising the learning and evaluation capacity of local policy-makers, it limits their advocacy power vis-a-vis federal government. Patchy evidence is used at the level of federal government to resist paradigmatic changes by reducing funds and distracting attention away from broader security problems and much-needed institutional reform of the police and criminal justice system. (Ruediger 2013, Sokgan 2013) While these could reverse the legacies of police violence and impunity, they proved too politically risky for each of the post-authoritarian governments to this day. (Leeds 2007, Soares 2007) Those present critical impediments for pacification to become consolidated police practice and security policy, fully supported by all levels of government, and therefore a true paradigm shift.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Pacification represents an exercise of paradigm maintenance, rather than a shift, whereby evidence is manipulated to serve political interests, resist paradigmatic changes and distract attention away from deeper much-needed reforms at the federal government level.

This Working Paper analysed the targeting patterns with which UPPs were established across Rio's districts and the associated trends in levels and inequalities in three violence indicators between 2007 and 2011. It found that while pacification did not explicitly address inequalities in levels of violence, violence rates of districts converged. Interpreting these patterns and trends in relation to the three fundamental debates surrounding pacification, the Working Paper identified misplaced accountability (evidenced by flawed conceptual underpinnings of security), securitization of development (evidenced by strong financial incentives versus weakness of social development components) and the manipulation of evidence (evidenced by a picture of contradictory evidence for successes and failures of pacification due to lack of a clear monitoring and evaluation agenda) as three key drawbacks of pacification. It argued that pacification represents an exercise of paradigm maintenance, rather than a shift, whereby evidence is manipulated to serve political interests, resist paradigmatic changes and distract attention away from deeper much-needed reforms at the federal government level.

This Working Paper drew on data from 2007 and 2011, thus limiting the validity of its results and interpretations beyond 2011. It also did not account for variations across districts resulting from differential stages in the pacification process. Given a lack of data disaggregated to the geographical level of particular favelas and the fact that data reflect violence by residence rather than occurrence, the accuracy of its findings and interpretations are jeopardized. Further research which accommodates these aspects could add knowledge about how pacification progressed with regard to its targeting and impact patterns beyond 2011 and would generate more accurate evidence to inform policy development and innovation over the coming years.

The continuing public debate about the merits and drawbacks of pacification and the increasing civil society pressure for sound public policy shown in Rio's current protest movement create vital momentum for policy change towards more sustainable, just and inclusive outcomes. In order to address the fundamental flaws of pacification and reap its potential security and development benefits, three key policy recommendations are made. They are critical to ensure pacification becomes a consolidated practice and policy, thus facilitating the paradigm shift needed to reconstitute the social contract between the state and citizens - and the state and Rio's urban poor in particular. (Ruediger 2013, Wacquant 2008)

Put Human Security of Citizens at the Heart of Pacification

The misplaced external accountability should be turned around by putting equality and the human security of citizens, and vulnerable citizens in particular, at the heart of pacification. UPP implementation should be targeted at the most violent regions so as to primarily redress inequalities in violence indicators to restore solidarity as the conceptual underpinnings of human security. This could re-orient pacification towards protecting the interests, needs and economic, social and political rights of citizens, and in particular the poor, vulnerable and excluded, rather than serving the interests of state and international elites.

Strengthen Development Components of Pacification

Programs and policies should be implemented to confront the impoverishment effects and conflicts generated by urban regularization. Provision of micro-credits to small businesses, of Conditional Cash Transfers to families, and of social, educational and vocational programs for young people should be prioritized. UPP Social should be strengthened to facilitate community mobilization and mutual dialogue. Such is critical to identify local needs and challenges, thus facilitating upward social mobility, integrating favelas and creating the civil society participation critically needed for policy success. (Freeman 2012, WB 2012, Ruediger and Riccio 2009)

Implement a clear and transparent Monitoring and Evaluation Agenda

Adequate databases and monitoring mechanisms should be put in place to gather systematic and continuous information about the effectiveness of the various elements of pacification, in order to improve its performance. (Ruediger 2013) Such monitoring systems designed to promote program implementation could strengthen the learning, planning and leadership capacity of local policy makers and enhance their advocacy power vis-à-vis the federal government to strengthen cooperation between different levels of government. Clear and transparent monitoring and evaluation will help to overcome what UN-HABITAT (2003) labelled the 'governance trap called decentralization', whereby bureaucratic structures hijack and manipulate patchy evidence to resist paradigmatic changes. A clear monitoring and evaluation agenda would enhance Rio's autonomy in addressing public security and demonstrate the need for broader much-needed institutional reforms of the police and criminal justice system which could reverse the legacies of violence, impunity and corruption. (Ruediger 2013, Pinheiro 2002, Wacquant 2008)

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Abbreviations

BOPE	Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (Special Police Operations Battalion)
BPChoque	Batalhão de Polícia de Choque (Police Shock Battalion)
CESeC	Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania (Center for Studies of Security and Citizenship)
CPP	Coordenadoria de Polícia Pacificadora (Pacifying Police Coordination)
DPO	Destacamento do Policiamento Ostensivo (Ostensive Policing Command)
GPAE	Grupeamento de Polícia em Áreas Especiais (Special Area Police Group)
IPP	Instituto Pereira Passos (Rio's Municipal Planning Institute)
ISP	Instituto de Segurança Pública (Public Security Institute)
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
PPC	Posto de Policiamento Comunitário (Community Policing Station)
PRONASCI	Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania (National Program for Public Security with Citizenship)
RCV	Rio Como Vamos
SESEG	Secretaria Estadual de Segurança Pública (State Secretary for Public Health)
SMSDC	Secretaria Municipal da Saude e Defesa Civil (Municipal Secretary for Health and Civil Defense)
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
UN	United Nations
UNHABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Program
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UPP	Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Units)

Appendix

Cross-sectional Analysis

Table 3: 10 Districts with highest homicide rates in 2007, 2007-2011

DISTRICTS	UPPS	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Pavuna	0	55.9	44.7	50.4	52.7	31.4
Rio Comprido	3	50.5	42.9	37.5	34.2	7.6
Anchieta	0	49.1	52.5	40.0	47.4	22.6
Jacarezinho	0	48.7	32.5	21.6	44.9	49.9
Cidade de Deus	1	47.6	73.1	50.4	21.9	27.2
Vigário Geral	0	46.6	31.6	30.8	27.9	19.7
Portuária	1	44.1	42.2	35.7	32.9	38.8
Realengo	1	43.4	35.0	28.6	26.8	32.3
São Cristóvão	0	42.2	37.5	31.3	38.9	25.8
Complexo do Alemão	0	41.4	28.2	13.3	15.9	15.8
Total	6	46.9	42.0	33.9	34.3	27.1

Table 4: 10 Districts with lowest homicide rates in 2007, 2007-2011

DISTRICTS	UPPS	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Lagoa	1	5.5	7.3	6.7	6.6	4.2
Barra da Tijuca	0	8.5	7.2	10.5	7.0	6.3
Botafogo	2	8.5	3.9	9.0	8.3	4.2
Copacabana	4	13.3	11.5	6.3	5.6	9.3
Tijuca	4	17.4	13.0	10.7	7.7	7.1
Jacarepaguá	1	18.4	12.9	16.4	14.8	12.2
Vila Isabel	3	21.6	14.6	11.3	9.5	5.3
Ilha do Governador	0	21.7	13.0	13.0	12.2	8.9
Centro	0	24.9	10.0	22.4	29.2	24.2
Rocinha	0	25.1	22.2	13.3	26.0	7.2
Total	15	16.5	11.6	12.0	12.7	8.9

Table 5: 10 Districts with highest adolescent male homicide rates, 2007-2011

DISTRICTS	UPPS	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Pavuna	0	337.5	319.1	233.8	303.0	171.3
Jacarezinho	0	306.1	187.3	126.1	177.8	176.8
Rio Comprido	3	299.6	288.6	308.6	209.5	0.0*
Portuária	1	268.7	323.9	176.1	141.9	94.1
Irajá	0	223.3	139.6	141.0	202.3	117.9
Cidade de Deus	1	222.2	323.8	228.9	123.0	122.3
Vigário Geral	0	221.9	92.2	118.5	95.5	71.2
Madureira	0	219.2	189.4	156.8	129.5	118.0
Complexo do Alemão	0	214.6	185.2	85.0	79.9	47.7
Ramos	0	212.7	188.6	152.4	80.6	62.3
Total	5	252.6	223.8	172.7	154.3	109.1

Table 6: 10 Districts with lowest adolescent male homicide rates, 2007-2011

DISTRICTS	UPPS	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Lagoa	1	10.9	44.5	22.5	21.1	10.5
Barra da Tijuca	0	19.6	24.9	5.0	4.7	14.1
Centro	0	41.4	42.2	85.2	120.2	79.7
Copacabana	4	48.1	122.6	24.8	46.6	11.6
Botafogo	2	51.4	15.0	45.4	49.8	14.2
Rocinha	0	59.3	75.6	106.9	71.8	0.0
Jacarepaguá	1	76.3	41.2	48.6	39.1	30.3
Guaratiba	0	121.7	82.7	198.4	98.2	29.3
Vila Isabel	3	123.9	92.7	34.0	16.0	15.9
Tijuca	4	126.9	83.2	37.3	0.0	17.5
Total	15	67.9	62.5	60.8	52.0	24.8


Table 7: 10 Districts with highest rates of aggression against vulnerable groups, 2007-2011

DISTRICTS	UPPS	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Cidade de Deus	1	36.8	34.8	29.5	31.6	28.4
Vila Isabel	3	32.9	20.3	25.6	11.5	12.3
Rocinha	0	32.3	20.8	28.9	20.7	25.3
Centro	0	30.3	58.1	90.8	80.5	41.5
Rio Comprido	3	29.7	22.2	25.4	17.7	15.7
São Cristóvão	0	25.4	23.5	28.0	25.3	23.6
Anchieta	0	25.1	10.9	6.7	10.4	15.5
Campo Grande	0	24.8	7.1	12.7	10.2	12.5
Complexo do Alemão	0	24.8	22.3	23.9	13.1	13.7
Jacarepaguá	1	24.3	17.3	16.7	16.5	20.3
Total	8	28.6	23.7	28.8	23.8	20.9

Table 8: 10 Districts with lowest rates of aggression against vulnerable groups, 2007-2011

DISTRICTS	UPPS	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Barra da Tijuca	0	7.3	6.5	8.2	7.4	10.1
Lagoa	1	9.3	6.3	11.5	12.0	9.8
Botafogo	2	10.5	8.9	10.3	8.5	8.0
Tijuca	4	10.6	9.2	8.6	7.6	9.2
Copacabana	4	10.7	8.1	10.1	9.5	9.9
Ramos	0	14.6	9.8	11.4	13.8	22.8
Ilha do Governador	0	16.0	10.8	10.7	13.1	12.9
Irajá	0	16.6	10.5	10.1	8.3	14.6
Pavuna	0	16.6	6.8	7.9	7.0	13.0
Bangu	0	17.0	5.9	6.5	7.4	14.0
Total	11	12.9	8.3	9.5	9.5	12.4

Figure 6: Aggression against vulnerable groups, 2007-2011



Comparative Analysis

Table 9: Variances in violence indicators, 2007-2011

		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Homicides	VAR	180.3	214	171.5	156.7	112.9
	MAX	55.9	73.1	50.4	52.7	49.9
	MIN	5.5	3.9	6.3	5.6	4.2
Adolescent Male Homicides	VAR	7023.7	7812.1	5332.1	5542.4	1986.8
	MAX	337.5	323.9	308.6	303	176.8
	MIN	10.9	15	5	4.7	10.5
Aggression against vulnerable groups	VAR	49.1	104	228.5	240	54.2
	MAX	36.8	58.1	90.8	80.5	41.5
	MIN	7.3	5.8	6.1	6.4	3.7


Table 10: Violence indicators in districts pacified by 2011

		Homicides		Adolescent male homicides		Violent aggression	
DISTRICTS	UPPS	2007	2011	2007	2011	2007	2011
Botafogo	2	8.5	4.2	51.4	14.2	24.8	12.5
Cidade de Deus	1	47.6	27.2	222.2	122.3	30.3	41.5
Copacabana	4	13.3	9.3	48.1	11.6	25.1	15.5
Jacarepaguá	1	18.4	12.2	76.3	30.3	36.8	28.4
Lagoa	1	5.5	4.2	10.9	10.5	24.8	13.7
Méier	1	29.8	17.8	143.3	65.4	10.7	9.9
Portuária	1	44.1	38.8	268.7	94.1	21	10.4
Realengo	1	43.4	32.3	205.3	78.0	18.9	10.6
Rio Comprido	3	50.5	7.6	299.6	0.0	7.3	10.1
Santa Teresa	1	30.0	19.4	135.4	65.2	16	12.9
Tijuca	4	17.4	7.1	126.9	17.5	17	14
Vila Isabel	3	21.6	5.3	123.9	15.9	10.5	8
Total	23	27.5	15.4	142.7	43.7	20.3	15.6

Table 11: Violence indicators in districts non-pacified by 2011

		Homicides		Adolescent male homicides		Violent aggression	
DISTRICTS	UPPS	2007	2011	2007	2011	2007	2011
Anchieta	0	49.1	22.6	204.2	131.1	25.1	15.5
Bangu	0	35.1	21.4	160.6	62.9	17	14
Barra da Tijuca	0	8.5	6.3	19.6	14.1	7.3	10.1
Campo Grande	0	36.4	23.9	136.6	65.8	10.5	8
Centro	0	24.9	24.2	41.4	79.7	24.8	12.5
Complexo do Alemão	0	41.4	15.8	214.6	47.7	30.3	41.5
Guaratiba	0	33.2	17.0	121.7	29.3	36.8	28.4
Ilha do Governador	0	21.7	8.9	135.8	56.0	10.7	9.9
Inhaúma	0	26.7	19.2	192.6	61.8	21	10.4
Irajá	0	38.3	19.6	223.3	117.9	18.9	10.6
Jacarezinho	0	48.7	49.9	306.1	176.8	16	12.9
Madureira	0	40.4	27.3	219.2	118.0	21.4	23.2
Maré	0	29.2	19.2	193.8	67.9	16.6	14.6
Pavuna	0	55.9	31.4	337.5	171.3	24.3	20.3
Penha	0	41.3	12.9	200.3	44.1	17.3	16.6
Ramos	0	33.4	18.2	212.7	62.3	9.3	9.8
Rocinha	0	25.1	7.2	59.3	0.0	21	15.8
Santa Cruz	0	39.7	27.0	178.7	84.5	17.4	3.7
São Cristóvão	0	42.2	25.8	205.4	84.8	19.2	14.8
Vigário Geral	0	46.6	19.7	221.9	71.2	16.6	13
Total	0	35.9	20.9	179.2	77.4	19.1	15.3

Figure 7: Aggression against vulnerable groups, 2007-2011



The Humanitarian Action in Situations other than War (HASOW) project is based at the International Relations Institute of the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI-PUC) with support from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The aim of HASOW is to comprehensively assess the dynamics of urban violence and the changing face of humanitarian action. Administered between 2011 and 2013, HASOW focuses on the dynamics of organized violence in urban settings, including Rio de Janeiro, Ciudad Juarez, Medellin and Port-au-Prince.

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