

Brazil's experience in unstable settings

Assessing the participation of Brazilian experts in multilateral missions

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Brazil has accumulated experience in deploying civilian professionals to multilateral missions. These contributions, however, fall short of what the UN requires and do not match Brazil's capacities and ambitions. Certain institutions that have not participated in peace operations, including the federal police and the national public security force, could make important operational contributions. But such actors are seldom deployed owing to political constraints on the domestic front. The growing involvement of Brazilian professionals, including military police and election experts, in technical cooperation initiatives in unstable situations and post-conflict settings also creates new opportunities. Learning from these experiences will enhance Brazil's contributions to United Nations peacekeeping and special political missions.

Introduction

Brazil's ability to identify, recruit, prepare and deploy civilian experts to missions abroad is a case of unrealized potential. But there are impressive opportunities emerging for Brazil to expand its civilian capacity. First, there is increasing demand among United Nations (UN) member states for civilian experts to plan and implement recovery and reconstruction activities in a wide range of environments. Second, Brazil already has comparative advantages in areas that are regarded as a priority by the UN but which lack a sufficient supply of expertise. This scenario presents a window of opportunity for Brazil to become more actively involved in sectors aligned with its foreign policy (Muggah and Hamann 2012a).

Brazil nurtures a wider objective in promoting civilian expertise than merely improving the effectiveness of peace and political missions. Indeed, the country is increasingly involved in international missions that promote the transition to democracy, support macro-economic stability and seek conflict prevention and poverty reduction. Not only are these aspirations consistent with the Brazil's foreign policy, but they are intensifying as its influence and economy expand across Latin America and around the world (Muggah and Hamann 2012b).

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This *Strategic Note* finds that:

- Since at least the early 1990s Brazil has provided military police and civilian experts to UN missions around the world²;
- Brazil routinely emphasizes the interdependence of security and development and has a vested interest in playing an active role in building peace in fragile or post-conflict countries. But the country still lacks clear political, legal and administrative principles and administrative mechanisms to operationalize this ambition; and
- Brazil's experience in unstable countries such as Guinea Bissau, Haiti and Timor-Leste has proven that it is possible to build new opportunities to promote civilian expertise. Brazil can also draw on experiences of the armed forces, the police, the supreme court and others to inform future engagements.

There appears to be a growing appetite in Brazil for more civilian engagement in UN-led peace and political missions. The government apparatus, Brazilian specialists, and the wider elite are demonstrating a growing interest and willingness to become involved. Divided into five sections, this *Strategic Note* considers the ways in which these ambitions can be translated into reality.

Section 1 provides a brief overview of the experience of Brazil's uniformed professionals (armed forces and state police forces) in multilateral missions, highlighting the political process, the hierarchy, and financial issues. **Section 2** considers the experience of deploying Brazilian electoral experts to international missions. **Section 3** reviews the potential of other Brazilian institutions with valuable experience and expertise including the federal police and the national public security force,³ but which are currently not deployed to peacekeeping or special political missions. **Section 4** briefly considers the early stages of the reconstruction process in Timor-Leste, which was guided by the UN under the leadership of Sergio Vieira de Mello. Finally, section 5 considers a host of conclusions and recommendations for further debate.

The Brazilian experience with the armed forces and the police in multilateral missions

The first record Brazilian military participation in a multilateral mission dates back to 1933, during the period of the League of Nations (see Figure 1). One officer from the Navy was sent to Leticia, a region between Peru and Colombia (1933-1934). Brazilian engagement occurred once again in 1947, but this time within the framework of the UN. This particular mission entailed the deployment of three military officers (one from the Army, one from the Navy and one from the Air Force) to the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), located in Greece (Fontoura, 2005).

² According to Cap PMDF Carrera Melo Neto, the "state police forces" (*polícia militar*) are not regarded as "military" by the UN and therefore are not part of the military component of peacekeeping missions (these are composed only by members of the armed forces) (Melo Neto, 2011). Translator's note: the Portuguese term is 'polícia militar' and, although the literal translation would be 'military police', this police force is not associated with the armed forces, but falls under the jurisdiction of the state government (equivalent to the provincial level in some countries).


³ The official name, in Portuguese, is *Força Nacional de Segurança Pública - FNSP*.



The first genuinely collective mission occurred in 1957, when Brazil dispatched a battalion to the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) (Middle-East).

After the Cold War, Brazil improved the organization of its participation in UN missions by creating a temporary inter-ministerial working group (1993), with representatives from the Ministry of External Relations, Ministry of Justice, armed forces and National Congress. Meanwhile, the deployment of Brazilian police to UN Missions began in the early 1990s. The first record of Brazilian police deployments occurred with the missions to Angola (in 1991, at the United Nations Angola Verification Mission or UNAVEM I) and Mozambique (in 1993, at the United Nations Operation in Mozambique or ONUMOZ). (Fontoura, 2005).

Figure 1. A Timeline of Brazilian Engagement in UN Peace Missions



Regardless of the setting, there is frequently an extensive political process entailed when the UN requests military support from any member country. Brazil is no exception. Indeed, the deployment of troops from the armed forces begins with a formal request for support from the UN to Brazil's Ministry of External Relations. After a political assessment of the nature of the demand, the Ministry proceeds by formally consulting the National Congress. Following parliamentary approval, a Presidential Directive authorizes the Ministry of Defense to set up an operation involving the armed forces (LC 97/99, with wording from LC 136/2010).

The process differs when it comes to processing UN requests for police. For example, during the 1993 sessions of the aforementioned working group, it was determined that in matters regarding the military police, the Inspectorate General of the Military Police and Military Firefighters of the Army (IGPM) would mediate between the Ministry of External Relations and federal states when it came to processing requests. Today, the IGPM is subordinate to the Land Operations Command (*Comando de Operações Terrestres - COTER*) of the Brazilian Army.⁴

As in many other countries, there is an ongoing process of preparing Brazilian candidates for deployment. Exams include aptitude tests based on the standards set by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Once approved, a police officer's personal profile is included in a database for a period of 18 months during which he/she may be sent on a mission.⁵ Crucially, unlike the deployment of military troops, the deployment of military observers, police and civilian

⁴ COTER also holds the national admission exams for peace operations that take place twice a year, in different states. The exams include aptitude tests based on the standards of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

⁵ The shortlisted military police officers participate in a distance-learning course provided by the Brazilian Peacekeeping Training Center (*Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil - CCOPAB*). Once accepted, they take part in a one-month "Preparatory Internship for Military and State Police Forces deployed in UN Peacekeeping Operations", implemented by CCOPAB since 2010.

experts does not require prior approval of the National Congress, since it does not require additional expenses.

It is also useful to take stock of the hierarchical nature of the process of deployment. Specifically, the Joint General Staff (*Estado-Maior Conjunto*) of the armed forces is in charge of planning the joint deployment of peacekeeping forces and advising the Ministry of Defense on the engagement of Brazilian troops in peacekeeping missions (LC 97/99, with wording from LC 136/2010). In the case of the state police forces, once the names are confirmed, they are submitted to the commander of the respective State police forces for approval. Then the data of the approved officers are sent to the Joint General Staff, which forwards the names to the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Defense then forwards the names to the Ministry of External Relations, which submits them to the Police Division of DPKO or to the personnel department of the mission. They conduct a telephone interview with the applicants before approving them for the mission. Once they arrive to mission, the officers undergo further tests (Aragão 2011).

The Brazilian government typically *finances* the deployment of military personnel. Costs are absorbed by the budget of the armed forces, with additional funds for purchasing the required materials approved by Congress. Any unused funds are returned to the Treasury. It is worth noting that the UN reimburses part of the value based on a grading system that varies per rank and per mission. For example, by October 2009 the UN had repaid Brazil some US\$ 127 million for the deployment of Brazilian troops in the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (Junior and Góes, 2010: 128). In the case of the state police forces, the officer's state of origin pays for his or her wages, while the UN is responsible for transportation and the monthly subsistence allowance (*MSA*): rates vary according to rank and mission.

There are a host of operational advantages generated by Brazil's participation in multilateral peace support activities. By participating in peacekeeping operations, for example, the armed forces can ensure that their troops are continuously active, albeit on a rotating schedule. Moreover, Brazilian officers can experiment with new tactics and technologies. Brazil also gains reputationally and organizationally from creating a "culture of peacekeeping operations" (Aguillar, undated).

Meanwhile, the state police forces involved in peacekeeping operations are often given the opportunity to perform civil duties during UN peacekeeping missions. One of the UNPOL tasks defined by the UN is to provide "ostensive" policing in local communities. What is more, DPKO guidelines stipulate that police officers must be in uniform to allow them to be identified by the parties in conflict, by other members of the mission and the local government and population. However, in Brazil, law enforcement is shared by two police institutions: the state police forces, that are responsible for active law enforcement, and the civil police which is responsible for investigative policing. The investigative civil police officers have so far been excluded from participating in peacekeeping missions (Melo Neto e Costa, 2010).

Brazil's experience with electoral experts in missions abroad

Brazil has only recently started sending electoral specialists to international political missions. The deployment of electoral experts was made possible by the abovementioned working group of 1993 which had been purposefully established to facilitate the deployment of police and civilian experts to UN missions. It was determined that staff from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) would be allowed to participate in UN electoral missions (Fontoura, 2005)⁶. In such UN missions,

⁶ There are two modalities in the Electoral Assistance Division of the United Nations, established in April 1992: (1) standard electoral



the deployed individual serves in the capacity of monitor or observer. While the monitors sign a temporary service provider's contract with the UN Secretariat, observers do not have a formal employment relationship and receive only a per diem and round trip transportation costs (salary, insurance and other legally required dues are the responsibility of their employer).

To fulfill requests by the UN and the Organization of the American States (OAS), the TSE has adapted its structure (due to restrictions in its staff organization) and began to mobilize staff and technicians along with State Electoral Courts, through the Office of the President and the TSE's human resources division. It then created internal regulations to regulate staff secondment.

The deployment of Brazilians to electoral missions occurs in response to a direct or indirect request - via the UN, OAS or the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights/Centre for Electoral Promotion and Assistance (IIHR/CAPEL) - from a country's electoral authorities. Subordinate to the General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Court, the International Relations Office receives and forwards the request to the President, who will designate a representative to participate in the observers' missions. In many cases, the participation is jointly coordinated by the Ministry of External Relations, who may also nominate participants.

Expenses for electoral observers may be paid by the TSE or by the country that requests the electoral experts. It was not possible to obtain information on the number of professionals in the database, nor whether there are experts who belong to international rosters (Kleebank 2011).⁷ Indeed, there is no recent record of reforms in the TSE addressing the growing demand for monitors and observers in this area.

Other institutions with relevant experience in relation to Brazil's civilian capacity

There are two Brazilian institutions that exhibit relevant experience for enhancing and expanding Brazil's civilian capacity - the national public security force (FNSP) and the federal police (DPF). Neither of these entities, however, is known to participate in multilateral missions. Nor is it the intention of this *Strategic Note* to advocate for the immediate deployment

assistance activities, which consist of small scale activities and technical assistance, upon request of the state and without the need for a specific UN General Assembly or UN Security Council mandate (coordination and support for international election observers, short-and long-term assistance to national electoral authorities, electoral administration and planning, voter registration, electoral budgets, review of electoral laws and regulations, training of electoral officers, logistics, civic education, bids for election materials, coordination of international assistance, electoral dispute resolution, electronic voting machines, election monitoring, producing reports on elections etc.); and (2) broader electoral missions that require a UNGA mandate to organize and hold elections or referendums (in this case, the UN takes on the role that would be played by the national authorities-the creation of a legal system, administrative measures and procedures, administration of the electoral process. Due to the high cost, these missions are normally conducted in post-conflict situations, in the absence of the institutional capacity to organize elections). See, for example, The Electoral Knowledge Network (2012).

⁷ The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that permitted Brazilians to be included in the list of UN electoral experts (MoU between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the United Nations for Electoral Assistance Cooperation) was signed in 2002 (MRE 2012).

of professionals from these organizations to multinational missions. However, if this was considered to be politically desirable, it is the case that this would require only minor change in legislation.

The FNSP was created in 2004 under the auspices of the National Security Office (SENASP/MJ) and contributes to greater cooperation between the federal government and the state police forces. There is a stand-by battalion, based in Luziania (Goiás) which enables rapid mobilization domestically. There is also a reserve of 11,500 security personnel in a database, all of whom have completed a specialized two-week training course.

Due to its judicial mandate and lack of training in ostensive policing, and the exigencies of the UN, the federal police has yet to deploy to a peacekeeping operation or special political missions. However, when it comes to bilateral technical missions the federal police is playing an increasingly active role, including in post-conflict countries such as in Guinea-Bissau (including in a project to restructure and modernize the country's security forces)⁸. According to the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), the federal police has also participated in training programs in Saint Lucia (support for the development of local training programs), Paraguay (development of procedures manuals for immigration inspection and control), Peru and Suriname (technical training to repress organized crime) and Kenya (environment). (ABC 2012).

The request for the international deployment of federal police agents is received by the Ministry of External Relations, who subsequently transfers it to the International Relations Division of the Federal Police Department (ARIN). At that point the request is then forwarded to the division that is best equipped to operationalize the cooperation request. When the federal police receives an urgent request - whether in relation to a major outbreak of criminality, a natural disaster or another crisis - they are typically able to respond swiftly. The head of each sector receives the request and designates the staff member(s) who will be deployed to other countries. Although the Federal Police Academy has a roster maintained by its own staff (so-called *Almanac*), it is usually not consulted in the case of international requests.

Once a request is made to the National Security Office, SENASP/MJ directly contacts the staff member to be deployed and checks if he/she is available. At this point, the SENASP/MJ also contacts the State's Secretary of Security or the General Commander of the state police forces, depending on the state legislation, to obtain authorization to release the staff member for deployment. Upon approval, plane tickets are purchased and when the staff member arrives to the airport, the first part of the per diem payment is deposited directly into his/her bank account. Only active staff members are allowed to be listed in the database as the mobilization capacity and speed would be compromised if the selection process included non-active members (Cruz, 2011).

The federal police missions are typically brief - a federal police agent is not entitled to spend more than 90 days outside of the country without proper authorization - and the DPF pays the wages. Payment for transportation and per diems varies: in some cases, the federal police itself covers the costs of wages; in other cases, the Ministry of Justice provides the funding; or the country that receives the mission may pay these expenses. In some cases the Brazilian Air Force will provide transportation for the police. To leave the country, ARIN must request authorization from the Ministry of Justice. Once the departure is authorized, the mission request containing the entry requirements for the country - vaccinations, visa, among others - is issued online (Souza Junior 2011).

8 See: www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/January/guinea-bissau_-unodc-to-build-a-police-academy.html and www.unodc.org/southerncone/en/frontpage/2011/04/14-onibus-brasileiros-chegam-a-guine-bissau-para-o-centro-de-formacao-das-forcas-de-seguranca-do-pais.html.



The fact is that the National Security Office has never actually deployed personnel to multilateral missions. Indeed, after the earthquake that struck Haiti in January 2010, 200 federal police professionals were mobilized at the request of former President Lula. However, when they were ready to be deployed the operation was canceled at the last minute by the Minister of Defense at the time, Nelson Jobim. The main impediments were neither logistical or technical but rather legal and political considerations. The most important concern was that the FNPS, legally speaking, was not a regular police force. Indeed, it was created as a “department” inside the Ministry of Justice and still requires clear mandate and legislation to be deployed to international missions. While the Ministry of Justice was able to mobilize the FNPS at the operational level, the Ministry of Defense did not authorize their deployment on legal grounds.

Other civilian experts

The experience of Brazilian civilian deployment is comparatively novel. Indeed, there are comparatively few experiences from which to draw enduring lessons. A possible opening for the deployment of Brazilian civilian experts appears to have just recently occurred with the United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor Leste (UNTAET), under the political leadership of the late Sergio Vieira de Mello, particularly after the election of Xanana Gusmao in 2002. There, Brazil has contributed civilian experts in areas such as health, education, agriculture, justice administration, as well as election experts, including electoral judges, computer technicians, observers and consultants from the TSE (Seintenfus, undated). While there are admittedly few instances of civilian deployment, the UNTAET experience demonstrates Brazil’s ability to mobilize and deploy civilian expertise to unstable contexts. The impact of these efforts still need to be evaluated.

Conclusions and recommendations

There is a growing interest in UN circles to expand and enhance civilian capacities from southern settings in multilateral peace and political missions. In 2011, the UN once again called on Brazil and other emerging powers countries to contribute civilian expertise in the world’s trouble spots. To maintain and extend its position in the UN and more widely, Brazil must show that it knows how to exert its comparative advantages and is capable of taking on responsibilities of global public concern.

There is little doubt that precedents exist for Brazil to increase its civilian face in international operations. In political and strategic terms, Brazil places a clear emphasis on the interdependence between security and development and routinely highlights the importance of poverty reduction as a strategy for conflict prevention.⁹ For Brazil, and other countries, development interventions are critical for building stable peace in fragile states. In practice, however, the Brazilian government has yet to establish a rationale or predictable strategy that clearly connects these two issues.

More positively, Brazil has experience deploying hundreds of civilian experts bilaterally and to a more limited extent in multilateral operations. Brazilian specialists have worked in a wide variety of post-conflict situations, including Guinea-

⁹ See Minister Patriota’s speech on the occasion of Brazil’s Presidency of the Security Council (Feb. 2011) and President Dilma Rousseff’s speech at the opening of the 66th Session of the General Assembly (Sept. 2011).

Bissau, Haiti and Timor Leste. The original justification for such technical cooperation activities is to promote sustainable development. However, in many cases professionals work in very unstable circumstances. Their experiences need to be evaluated and may well play an important role in institutionalizing Brazil's civilian capacity.

When military, police and civilian experts return from a mission in conflict and post-conflict settings, they also come back with experiences that enrich the practices of the institutions to which they belong. These types of missions provide an opportunity to improve skills and enhance the techniques that have been developed and applied domestically, as is widely acknowledged in the case of the armed forces in Haiti. Thus Brazil's civilian capacity is of great interest to the Brazilian state, as well as to the government institutions that employ civilian experts, and last but not least, Brazilian society as a whole that will benefit directly or indirectly from the services provided.

Glossary

ABC - Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (*Brazilian Cooperation Agency*)

ARIN - Assessoria de Relações Internacionais (*International Relations Division*)

CCOPAB - Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil (*Brazilian Peacekeeping Training Center*)

COTER - Comando de Operações Terrestres (*Army Land Operations Command*)

DPF - Departamento de Polícia Federal (*Federal Police Department*)

DPKO - United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

FNSP - Força Nacional de Segurança Pública (*National Public Security Force*)

IGPM - Inspetoria Geral das Polícias Militares e dos Corpos de Bombeiros Militares (*Inspector General of the Military Police and Military Firefighters*)

IIHR/CAPEL - Inter-American Institute of Human Rights/Centre for Electoral Promotion and Assistance

LC - Lei Complementar (*Complementary Law (to the Constitution)*)

MINUSTAH - United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MoU - Memorandum of Understanding

MRE - Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil (*Ministry of External Relations*)

MSA - Monthly Subsistence Allowance

OAS - Organization of the American States

ONUMOZ - United Nations Operation in Mozambique

PMDF - Polícia Militar do Distrito Federal (*Military Police of the Federal District*)

SENASP/MJ - Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública, Ministério da Justiça (*National Security Office, Ministry of Justice*)

TSE - Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (*Superior Electoral Court*)

UN - United Nations

UNAVEM - United Nations Angola Verification Mission

UNEF I - United Nations Emergency Force

UNSCOB - United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans

UNTAET - United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste



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