

Mapping citizen security interventions in Latin America: reviewing the evidence

By Robert Muggah
and Katherine Aguirre¹

■ Executive summary

A combination of global, regional and local threats facing Latin Americans have given rise to an array of security responses. Some intervention strategies are heavy-handed and focused on restoring law and order, while others emphasise a wide array of preventive measures and are intended to support social cohesion. A wide range of these latter interventions – described here as citizen security interventions – are being pursued across Latin America at different levels of scale and by a variety of organisations. Citizen security entails the delivery of effective public safety measures in the context of broader democratic norms. This report considers how citizen security interventions have been operationalised across Latin America. It presents findings from a database that assembles more than 1,300 citizen security interventions across the region since the late 1990s and detects a dramatic increase in the frequency of such interventions. It also notes that a few countries account for the vast majority of interventions and that most of them occur at the national (as opposed to the regional or city) level.

Introduction

Over the past decades a combination of transnational and local threats confronting citizens have given rise to an array of security responses in Latin America. Some intervention strategies are heavy-handed and narrowly constructed around the restoration of law and order and the incarceration of the perpetrators of crime. Others are more voluntary in orientation and emphasise a wide array of preventive measures. A combination of approaches are often pursued in settings exhibiting high rates of drug- and gang-related violence, and where the real frequency of security incidents is relatively low and perceptions of insecurity are comparatively high.² Indeed, a wide range of citizen security interventions are being pursued across Latin America that combine federal, state and municipal authorities; military and police entities; private and non-governmental agencies; faith-based groups; and the media. At the same time, bilateral and multilateral donors have also become heavily invested in the citizen security agenda.

Citizen security entails the delivery of effective public safety measures in the context of broader democratic norms. This approach contrasts with national security and public order approaches to policing and crime control in that it privileges the interests and protection of the collective citizenry over the interests of the state. At its core the approach measures the success of public safety policies on the basis of the effective protection of citizens' rights against the predations of both criminals and abusive state officials. Security is thus defined using objective measures, but also within a broader subjective context of how citizens conceive of themselves and their rights and whether they feel they are being effectively protected by state actors. This stands in stark contrast to more traditional public security approaches in which state officials are the ultimate arbiters of valid types and adequate levels of safety, and the reasonableness of public safety policies.

This report discusses how citizen security interventions have been operationalised across Latin America. Following

¹ Thanks are also due to the Inter-American Development Bank, the Washington Office on Latin America, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank for data on citizen security interventions in Central and South America. Additional credit is due to the Department for International Development and the International Development Research Centre for assistance in developing the underlying data. The data featured in this report will be available in an online visualisation as of November 2013 at www.igarape.org.br.

² See, for example, FLACSO (2007), which reviewed perceptions of insecurity in more than 18 Latin American countries. Similarly, the Latinbarómetro has also undertaken similar assessments since the mid-1990s (Iglesias, 2012).

a major review of public and grey material sources, the authors constructed a database that assembles more than 1,300 interventions across the region since the late 1990s. This allows for a comprehensive review of their spread and distribution, budgets and funders, and basic characteristics. The report's findings are as follows:

- It is possible to detect a change in security promotion across Latin America over the past decade from harder measures to softer and more preventive approaches.
- Different entities – whether federal ministries, police and judicial departments, mayors' offices, international financial institutions, development agencies or civil society groups – understand citizen security differently.
- There has been a considerable expansion in citizen security interventions since the concept first emerged in the 1990s.
- There is a heavy concentration of interventions in Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua, which account for more than two-thirds of all registered interventions.
- The majority of all documented citizen security interventions are pursued at the national level (47%), with others undertaken at the city level (32%), the sub-state level (19%) and regionally (7%).
- While there are dense networks of co-operation among countries in the region, multilateral and bilateral development agencies account for more than 70% of actors supporting documented citizen security interventions.
- The most frequent thematic areas addressed by citizen security activities include common crime (more than half of all interventions), followed by projects focused on juvenile crime.
- The database also registers management improvements as the primary citizen security strategy pursued in the region, followed by preventive interventions.

The first section of the report considers the conceptual contours of citizen security. It also highlights the evolution of public security interventions from repressive security methods to more comprehensive citizen security approaches. The second section considers methods for mapping citizen security, including the sources, inclusion and exclusion criteria, and the challenges and limitations associated with the database developed in this study. The third section presents key trends and patterns emerging from the Citizen Security Interventions Database, which includes 18 countries of Latin America. The final concluding section highlights some implications for future citizen security efforts in the region and more widely.

Section 1: the evolution of security responses in Latin America

For more than two decades Latin America has experienced some of the highest rates of violence in the world. A wide range of violence types are manifest across the region, ranging from organised and petty crime to armed conflict, state-led violence, and gender-based and domestic violence. The region also features a variety of public-led responses to violence – whether pursued aggressively through military and police institutions or through more preventive strategies supported by health, education, recreation and judicial bodies. Indeed, large countries such as Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, together with other countries in the Andean and Central American region, are veritable laboratories of experimentation and in some cases innovation in terms of issues of safety and security. It is in this context that the concept of citizen security emerged.

The state's heavy hand

Before the massive expansion in citizen security, however, governments in Central and South America launched a wave of public security responses that emphasised the responsibility of states to provide national security and public order. Known as *mano dura*, interventions in the 1990s and early 2000s were premised on a more assertive approach to advancing security and justice by focusing on deterring actual and would-be proponents of crime. The underlying rationale was that more penalties and tougher sanctions would dissuade criminals and reduce criminality (see Apel & Nagin, 2011). States thus called for a heavy punitive response that emphasised policing, stricter laws, harsher sentencing and more incarceration. This progressively militarised approach contributed to the criminalisation and social stigmatisation of entire categories of the population, including youth associated with gangs, as El Salvador's "anti-gang laws" attest. A corresponding challenge, however, was that the criminal and justice systems in many of these countries were not able to cope with these increased demands. More problematically, there was also evidence of the collusion of public and private security forces with the criminal groups they were intended to confront. Cases emerged of police protecting criminals, setting them free, or effectively "regulating" crime in collusion with political and economic elites.

There were and continue to be widespread criticisms of *mano dura* policies as practised in Central and South American countries. On the one hand, these policies are castigated on rights-based grounds for in some cases advocating norms and practices that run contrary to basic human rights standards, such as the rights of the child.³ Not only did they contribute to the stigmatisation of vulnerable groups, but they in some cases perpetuated and reproduced violent behaviour owing to an increase in the size of prison populations, which were described as "crime

³ The protections for children and youth established by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 40) are codified into most legislation in Latin American countries. Concerns have emerged, however, that youth and children are increasingly implicated in violent crime without access to legal recourse.

colleges". Conditions in most of Latin America's prisons are deplorable, with few opportunities for rehabilitation. What is more, zero tolerance strategies were criticised for incentivising ever-more-violent crimes: as one scholar has noted, "if the punishment for theft is on a par with that for murder, a criminal may find it a safer bet to kill the person he robs rather than run the risk of being identified by that person later" (see Iglesias, 2012: 4). A related concern was that repressive approaches in fact strengthened the solidarity of gangs and deepened their associations with organised crime groups (see Iglesias, 2012; Cruz & Carranza, 2006; Cruz, 2004).

A further consequence of *mano dura* activities has been their impact on undermining the legitimacy of state entities, and in particular the military, police and related auxiliaries. In some cases both military and police forces are deployed to ensure public security, often at the urging of elite and middle-class citizens (FLACSO, 2007). The presence of soldiers on the streets generates both symbolic and practical outcomes, while also yielding contradictions. Indeed, while welcomed in some quarters, the historical tradition of the role of militaries in Latin America's domestic arena is a complex one. The emphasis of military entities – including military police and auxiliaries – on "social cleansing" and in some cases the excessive and arbitrary use of force – while diminished since the 1990s, still persists in a number of post-conflict countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala (IACHR, 2009). There are also real concerns about whether the military is adequately prepared – in terms of doctrine and practice – to assume law-and-order functions and co-ordinate its activities with police forces, however effective or ineffective they may be considered to be.

Accompanying *mano dura* across Central and South America has been a progressive privatisation of security provision. Globally, the private security business is booming and estimated to be worth \$100-165 billion annually (Small Arms Survey, 2011). The number of private security personnel across Latin America outnumbers police officers by a ratio of at least 1.8:1, and this rises further in some countries such as Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras and Mexico. Given the lack of transparency in the industry, it is difficult to determine exact numbers with precision: there are roughly 470,000 registered private security personnel in Brazil and at least 450,000 in Mexico.⁴ And it is primarily the middle and upper classes that are in a position to hire private security guards or pay for related protection: the poor tend to organise in neighbourhood watch associations and vigilante groups. In Central America many resort to more informal options to ensure security in under-serviced areas, including the hiring of gangs, while in Rio de Janeiro self-defence groups known as *milicias* operate as extortion rackets imposing a broad

array of harsh local controls and limitations in areas where they operate (Muggah & Mulli, 2012).

The state's softer hand

It is also possible to detect a change in security promotion across Latin America over the past decade. Intensive reforms of security institutions and the judicial system, including the widespread move toward adversarial systems, have encouraged citizens' more proactive engagement in ensuring their own safety. Conventional justice and security sector reform and strengthening initiatives have been increasingly prominent across Latin America since the 1990s, particularly in the countries of Central America that emerged from protracted armed conflicts. As societies pursued democratic transitions and implemented peace accords, the emphasis was also on engendering less politicised and military-oriented entities and the promotion of more civilian accountability and oversight.

While the nature of police reforms has varied from the purging and refounding of units to the modernisation and professionalisation of forces, major restructuring processes swept across Central and South America over the past two decades, including in Argentina; Colombia's National Police; Chile's Investigative Police; El Salvadorian, Guatemalan and Nicaraguan military forces; and Venezuela, where successive efforts have been undertaken (FLACSO, 2007). In countries where multiple police services co-exist – including military, civil, judicial and other units – an effort has been made either to centralise police forces (as in Mexico) or decentralise certain functions to the municipal level (as in Brazil). In addition to police and judicial reforms, the region has experienced a veritable explosion of investments in citizen security. Indeed, policies and programmes invested in a combination of activities ranging from community policing and restorative justice to primary, secondary and tertiary prevention have expanded rapidly over the past decade. A high-water mark appears to have occurred in 2009, when more than a third of all citizen security interventions in the database were reported since the late 1990s.

While often overseen and co-ordinated by regional, national and municipal institutions, many of these interventions also received various kinds of multilateral and bilateral support. In the process, citizens have assumed a more proactive function in the administration of their security, including through participatory approaches, but also through non-governmental activism and the mobilisation of faith-based groups, the private sector, research institutions, and the conventional and social media. Major campaigns calling for the democratisation of security such as *Yo Soy 132* – a popular movement in Mexico – have also been accompanied by a revolution in the use of new media (Twitter and Facebook) and are encouraging real-time

⁴ The numbers registered are as follows: Bolivia (2002) 500; Brazil (2005) 570,000; Chile (2008) 45,000; Colombia (2005) 190,000; Costa Rica (2008) 19,500; the Dominican Republic (2008) 30,000; Ecuador (2005) 40,300; El Salvador (2008) 21,100; Guatemala (2008) 120,000; Honduras (2005) 60,000; Mexico (2005) 450,000; Nicaragua (2008) 19,700; Panama (2008) 30,000; and Peru (2005) 50,000. By way of comparison, the U.S. is estimated to have at least 2 million as of 2007. See Small Arms Survey (2011: 106); also see UNODC (2011: 2-3).

accountability. A growing array of interventions also seek to address risk or “environmental” factors giving rise to crime and violence, suggesting a shift from rhetoric to practice.


Conceptualising citizen security interventions

While difficult to measure with certainty, it is nevertheless possible to examine the growth and spread of citizen security interventions across Latin America since the late 1990s. A requirement of mapping such interventions is clarifying the definition of what is included and excluded. Indeed, citizen security has rapidly come to mean all things to all people. In the case of the U.S., for example, citizen or civilian security conflates a host of activities ranging from counternarcotics, border control and anti-gang measures together with community-oriented policing, reinsertion and rehabilitative work with at-risk youth, and strategies to promote more citizen engagement in proximity policing and urban renewal (see U.S. DoS, n.d.a). However, organisations such as the the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Organisation of American States (OAS) and World Bank have rather more strict criteria for what is included, since their mandates do not allow for their engagement in defence- and intelligence-related matters, much less the provision of military equipment and training (see Figure 1). Indeed, “drawing the lines” around citizen security is very challenging, given the competing ways it is operationalised.

The fact is that different entities – whether federal ministries, police and judicial departments, mayors’ offices, international financial institutions, development agencies or citizen action groups – understand citizen security differently. In some cases, as with many bilateral aid departments, there may be no designation or line item for citizen security at all. The U.S. and the European Union (EU) can draw on political and development modalities to provide assistance for security and justice promotion. As a result, U.S. spending on citizen security promotion in Colombia, Central America and Mexico appears to be vastly larger than all spending on softer citizen security activities combined (see Figure 2).


For international agencies such as the OAS or development banks, there are discrete line items for citizen security. While adopting broadly common definitions of citizen security interventions – institutional strengthening, preventive policing, judicial reform and youth rehabilitation can all be included – the devil is naturally in the details. While this may seem a semantic and even insignificant concern, it can problematise both analysis and practice. When exploring opportunities to support governments and civil societies to promote local variations of citizen security, the challenges only multiply.

Figure 1: Operationalising citizen security: a selection of multilateral agencies



Source: Igarapé Institute with insights from IADB (2012, 2010, 2009), OAS (2011), UNDP (2010), and World Bank (2011)

Figure 2: Spending on U.S.-led “Safety of the Hemisphere’s Citizens” citizen security initiatives (blue bars) vs all other citizen security initiatives (orange bar), 1998-2012



Source: Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security Interventions Database. Plan Colombia, Mérida Initiative, Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARS) and Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) data is from reports produced by the Congressional Research Service.⁵

Section 2: mapping citizen security interventions

This section features an empirical review of citizen security interventions supported by multilateral and bilateral agencies, foundations, and private actors. The time period under consideration was from 1998 to 2012 and the review builds on previous assessments supported by the IADB and Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).⁶ This database was developed by the Igarapé Institute with support from a wide array of bilateral and multilateral partners.

A basic coding framework was developed that categorises citizen security activities and allows for the tracking of their spatial, temporal and thematic scale, distribution, and costs. Methodologically this required identifying, aggregating and analysing a wide variety of different experiences. In addition to tracking regional, national and municipal activities in a number of countries, as well as multilateral

and non-governmental sources such as the IADB, OAS, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), UNDP and World Bank, among others.⁷ At the centre of the project to map citizen security interventions is a single unified database featuring almost a dozen core variables of all documented interventions.⁸ While the assessment is not exhaustive, it is nevertheless complete and facilitates the analysis of trends.

All sources from the database have information on citizen security or related concepts such as armed violence and crime prevention. The main sources are multilateral agencies, including the IADB (78 interventions),⁹ UNDP (174 interventions)¹⁰ and the World Bank (12 interventions).¹¹ Other actors included in the dataset are the EU (111 interventions),¹² WOLA (466 interventions),¹³ the OECD (368),¹⁴ the Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (16 interventions), the International Centre for Crime Prevention (four interventions),¹⁵ and others such as Paz Ciudadana (ten

5 Plan Colombia (CRS, 2011: 30); Iniciativa Mérida (Mérida Initiative, 2012); CARS (CRS, 2012: 22); CBSI (U.S. DoS, n.d.b).

6 This mapping does not review the impacts of the interventions or evaluate specific cases. Research in this field will be developed by the Igarapé Institute in the future. Also, this is not a compilation of “best practices” or “promissory interventions”.

7 The Citizen Security Interventions Database includes information drawn from public sources. Specifically, information was retrieved from online databases managed by major institutions such as the IADB, OAS, UNDP and World Bank. It also gathered supplementary data in a secondary phase through direct contact with key representatives of key institutions in capital city, regional and country offices. Additional information was collected from primary and grey data sources, including existing publications and reports on citizen security, as well as through direct contact with relevant government and civil society representatives in a cross-section of countries. The mapping process adopted comparatively restrictive inclusion categories focusing on “public” information and less on more grass-roots activities.

8 These variables included (i) intervention name, (ii) country, (iii) supporting agency, (iv) name of supporting agencies, (v) catchment, (vi) dates, (viii) intervention target and (ix) intervention target strategies.

9 See <<http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/projects,1229.html>>. Also, 33 interventions were included from the Banco de Buenas Prácticas de Prevención en Seguridad Ciudadana.

10 The information was gathered from the UNDP websites of each country. Projects related to citizen security are sometimes classified under “democratic governance” and at other times under “crisis prevention and recovery”. Additional information was gathered from the UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre (<<http://erc.undp.org/>>). UNDP provided a list of 144 interventions.

11 Information from the projects page of the World Bank, <<http://www.worldbank.org/projects/theme?lang=en>>. This website provided limited information on projects related to citizen security, because the available World Bank classifications do not facilitate the filtering out of projects related to violence reduction or citizen security. In fact, of the 614 projects in Latin America, only 12 interventions were included in our database. The World Bank provided a list of 33 interventions.

12 Database of projects supported by DEVCO (Development and Cooperation) and EEAS (European External Action Service) – 111 interventions. Counternarcotic interventions were excluded, as well as others unrelated to citizen security.

13 See <<http://seguridadciudadana-centroamerica.org>>.

14 For the report on the project, see <<http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/48927716.pdf>>.

15 See <http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/International_Report_on_Crime_Prevention_and_Community_Safety_ANG.pdf>.


interventions),¹⁶ the Fundación Mujeres (12 interventions),¹⁷ Georgetown University (23 interventions),¹⁸ the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (four interventions),¹⁹ the OAS (18 interventions)²⁰ and the Secretaría de la Gobernación de México (16 interventions).²¹

Section 3: scale, distribution and trends of citizen security interventions in Latin America

As indicated above, there has been a considerable institutional expansion in citizen security activities since the concept first emerged in the 1990s. Indeed, most interven-


tions were launched since 2007 and peaked in 2009. Figure 3 highlights the launch of “new” citizen security initiatives (the red line) and cumulative increases (the blue line).²² The peak in 2009 reflects the start of many projects at the regional level (mostly in Central America). Colombia has many projects starting in 2004, 2008 and 2011, as does Guatemala starting in 2010. Brazil is the country with the longest time series of information on citizen security, stretching back to 1988. The highest annual spending on citizen security interventions occurred in 2008-12, however, as well as in the period 1998-2002.²³

Figure 3: Tracking citizen security interventions, 1998-2012 (n = 1,304)



Source: Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security Interventions Database

Figure 4: Citizen security interventions by country, 1998-2012 (n = 1,304)



Source: Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security Interventions Database

16 See <http://www.pazciudadana.cl/docs/pub_20120622125143.pdf>.

17 See <<http://www.observatorioviolencia.org/bbpp.php>>.

18 See <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Security/citizensecurity/citizensec_e.html>.

19 See <<http://www.cepal.org/dds/InnovacionSocial/e/experiencias.htm>>.

20 See <http://www.oas.org/en/sms/sms_programas.asp>.

21 See <http://www.secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/es/SecretariadoEjecutivo/Catalogo_de_Programas_Proyectos_y_Acciones_>.

22 It is worth noting that some 79% of all 1,304 citizen security interventions have ended, with just 21% still under way as of 2013.

23 Consider that Brazil will see an increase in spending on citizen security in the period 2012-14 owing to two large projects funded by the IADB in Rio Grande do Sul and Parana valued at \$55 million and \$67 million, respectively.

A review of the interventions’ geographic distribution across the region suggests a clustering in some areas. Specifically, there is a heavy concentration in Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, with these countries accounting for some 67% of total interventions (see Figure 4). Projects at the regional level (mainly in Central America) are also important, with 250 interventions recorded (19%). Large countries tend to have more programmes by sheer force of scale, but countries with a long experience of violence are also heavily represented.


There is considerable variation in spending on citizen security, with six countries – Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador – accounting for the vast majority of spending, while regional programmes are also significant in monetary terms (see Figure 5). When inspecting the profile of spending by project, it is also notable that three-quarters of documented citizen security interventions feature budgets of \$5 million or less. Indeed, fewer than 10% of the interventions included in the sample

feature budgets exceeding \$10 million, and virtually all of the larger interventions were concentrated in a small number of countries, including Colombia and Mexico. Citizen security interventions thus tend by and large to be low cost, potentially reflecting their novelty, but also the higher level of risk accorded to them by multilateral and bilateral donors and implementing governments.

A review of citizen security policies and programmes highlights a number of important trends related to the scale of interventions and the levels at which they are pursued (see Figure 6). Indeed, the assessment of these interventions reveals that while the majority (42%) of documented activities are pursued at the national level, a wide distribution of interventions are also pursued at the city level (32%), the sub-state level (19%) and regionally (7%).


Intriguingly, an emerging finding is that most “effective” interventions occur at the city level, as the experiences of Bogotá, Cali and Medellín (Colombia); Santa Tecla (El Salvador); and Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro and São

Figure 5: Distribution of spending on citizen security




Source: Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security Interventions Database

Figure 6: Number and value (\$ millions) of citizen security activities by scale (n = 1,304)



Source: Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security Interventions Database

Figure 7: Number of citizen security interventions and value (\$ millions) of assistance by donor type (n = 1,304)



Source: Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security Interventions Database

Paulo (Brazil) all attest (see Araya, 2011; Gaviria et al., 2010; Mockus, 2008; Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, 2004; Villaveces et al., 2000; Dammert, 2007). This is attributed in part to the catalytic potential of legitimate local leadership, measures associated with situational prevention, the promotion of policing and social prevention activities, efforts to enhance citizen participation, and investments in information systems to improve priority setting and monitor progress (Iglesias, 2012).

Profile of citizen security supporters

A wide range of actors invest in citizen security, including multilateral and bilateral co-operation and development agencies that together represent 71% of total spending. Other important sources of funding include national and local governments: this amount is likely to grow significantly across the region. Figure 7 compares the number of interventions by donors and the value of their assistance. In contrast to the number of interventions, multilateral agencies, national institutions and non-profit organisations have a higher relevance in terms of spending, while bilateral and private foundations and local governments seem to contribute a smaller share.

It is worth noting that many of these contributors offer only partial support for large-scale citizen security interventions, with national public entities often shouldering a comparatively heavy burden. Indeed, with many countries across Latin America “graduating” to middle-income status, notably Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico, the amount of external investment in citizen security tends to be comparatively modest in relation to overall national allotments.

The most important funding agencies in the region include multilateral agencies and financial institutions such as the IADB, World Bank and EU. Similarly, bilateral agencies such as U.S. aid agencies (the US State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development – USAID), the Germany Development Bank and the Spanish Agency for International Development (AECID) are key players

(see Table 1). The mayorship of Bogotá reports the highest participation of a local government, although it is likely that cities such as Mexico, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo will soon rival and exceed the level of participation of Colombia’s capital.

Table 1: Top ten supporting agencies by value of their assistance

Supporting agency	Type of agency	Value of assistance (\$ millions)	Number of interventions
IADB	Multilateral	981.29	83
World Bank	Multilateral	713.41	50
EU	Multilateral	414.63	125
U.S. Department of State	Bilateral	274.83	89
European Commission	Multilateral	240.62	32
UNDP	Multilateral	210.30	77
USAID	Bilateral	192.94	41
Mayorship of Bogotá	Local government	170.14	23
German Development Bank	Bilateral	136.25	18
AECID	Bilateral	135.35	109


Source: Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security Interventions Database

Target threats and strategies

The practical focus of citizen security interventions is heterogeneous, whether they are focused on transnational or more localised types of threats. As noted above, a considerable amount of resources are invested in flagship counternarcotics and organised-crime-reduction interventions in Mexico (Mérida Initiative), Central America (CARSI) and Colombia (Plan Colombia). But there is also variation when it comes to programmes targeting common crime

juvenile crime, organised crime, gender crime and state-related crime. When examining the areas that specific interventions defined as their primary focus in functional terms, more than half emphasised common crime. The remainder noted youth, organised and gender crime (see Figure 8). It is worth noting that less than 1% of citizen security interventions focused on state crimes such as extrajudicial killings, police misconduct, or crimes in prisons and jails.

Figure 8: Core threats addressed by citizen security interventions, 1998-2013 (n = 1,304)




Source: Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security Interventions Database

The countries reporting the most significant proportion of interventions targeting common violence are Argentina, Guyana and Uruguay. Brazil and Mexico report the largest share of interventions associated with preventing and reducing gender crime, while Belize, Chile and El Salvador tend to register more investments in juvenile crime projects. Similarly, regional-level projects tend to focus most prominently on organised crime and are frequently aided by bilateral agencies. This stands in contrast to multilateral agencies, which tend to focus more on pre-

venting and reducing juvenile violence and common crime. Foundations and non-profit organisations tend most frequently to address gender violence, while the few interventions concerned with state crime tend to be the preserve of national entities only (see Figure 9).


The database registers management improvements and capacity strengthening for public entities, non-governmental organisations, and others as the main strategy implemented across the region, followed by “preventive” interventions. In smaller proportions, other projects are intended to reinforce police investigative capabilities and improve forensics. A smaller number of interventions focus on promoting participatory strategies, data collection capacities and the introduction of observatories (see Figure 10). Furthermore, there is considerable variation among donors in their operational approach to supporting citizen security. As Figure 11 indicates, not-for profit, private and local government entities tend to focus on preventive strategies, while multilateral and bilateral agencies favour institutional strengthening and management improvements.

Figure 10: Citizen security interventions by strategy, 1998-2012 (n = 1,304)




Source: Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security Interventions Database

Figure 9: Citizen security interventions by donor and target, 1998-2012 (n = 1,304)



Source: Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security Interventions Database

Figure 11: Sector-specific approach pursued by citizen security, 1998-2012 (n = 1,304)



Source: Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security Interventions Database

Conclusions

The transformation of violence across Latin America has precipitated an evolution in public and private responses to prevention and reduction. The mapping of citizen security activities provides insights into how the priorities of the various actors across the region, whether governments, security and justice institutions, multilateral and bilateral donors, or civil society groups and foundations, have changed over time. What this report shows is that while there may be some consensus on the generic concept of citizen security, strategies to promote security and safety are heterogeneous and diverse in a region that stretches from Mexico and Central America to the Andean region and South America.

It is easy to forget that the concept of citizen security is relatively new. Predictably, there have been some challenges in defining its parameters. For historical, institutional and resource-related reasons, different agencies adopt different approaches. But the lack of common understanding about what citizen security is (and what it is not) can also be problematic. It can frustrate co-ordination, coherence, and effectiveness and, potentially, undermine future investment in innovation. Similarly, the absence of standardised and evidence-based information on the scale and distribution of citizen security interventions across Latin America can also impede their expansion. This report has attempted to fill this knowledge gap by showing the tremendous spread of such interventions in a relatively short time.

As a discrete programming area, citizen security has genuinely arrived in Latin America. The number of interventions has expanded rapidly over the past decade and citizen security has been adopted by virtually all countries in the region, even if it has been unevenly applied. There is a clear concentration in some countries – mainly Brazil, Colombia and Central American countries – reflecting to some extent the priorities of governments and civil societies in these regions. And while most activities are

being pursued at the national level, there is evidence of expansion at both the regional and local levels, particularly in cities. The focus of citizen security, in contrast to more traditional national security paradigms, is on common and juvenile crime prevention. But there is also some evidence of strategies mobilised around containing organised crime, which is widely considered to be a driver of localised violence dynamics.

What is perhaps most remarkable about this review is the bewildering array of actors involved in promoting citizen security. The dataset reveals a wide range of players, from national and local governments to multilateral and bilateral agencies, civil society entities, foundations and private actors. This is to be celebrated, but it also warrants a caution: citizen security provision has become a “crowded market”. And with agencies mobilising different visions, methodologies, funding sources, metrics of success, etc., possible contradictions and confrontations are on the horizon. It will be important to deepen the analysis of the spread, diffusion and adoption of citizen security in the coming decade, with an eye on what works and what does not. Building on the exceptional contributions of others, this report provides a preliminary baseline to continue this exploration.

Bibliography

Apel, R. & D. Nagin. 2011. “General deterrence: a review of recent studies.” In J.Q. Wilson and J. Petersilia, eds. *Crime and Public Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Araya, J., ed. 2011. *Experiencias en América Latina: el desafío de evaluar programas de seguridad ciudadana*. Santiago: Universidad de Chile, Centro de Estudios en Seguridad Ciudadana, Instituto de Asuntos Públicos.

CRS [Congressional Research Service]. 2011. *Colombia: Issues for Congress 2011*. <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32250_20110318.pdf>

- CRS. 2012. *Background and Policy Issues for Congress 2012*. <<http://www.fas.org/spp/crs/row/R41731.pdf>>
- Cruz, José Miguel. 2004. "Pandillas y capital social en Centroamérica." In ERIC, IDESO, IDIES and IUDOP, eds. *Maras y pandillas en Centroamerica, vol. II: pandillas y capital social*. San Salvador: UCA Editores.
- Cruz, José Miguel & Marlon Carranza. 2006. "Pandillas y políticas públicas: el caso de El Salvador." In Javier Moro, ed. *Juventudes, violencia y exclusión: desafíos para las políticas públicas*. Guatemala City: Magna Terra Editores.
- Dammert, L. 2007. "Seguridad pública en América Latina: ¿qué pueden hacer los gobiernos locales?" *Nueva Sociedad*, 212 (November/December).
- FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales). 2007. *Report on the Security Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Santiago de Chile: FLACSO.
- Gaviria, A., C. Medina, L. Morales & J. Núñez. 2010. "The cost of avoiding crime: the case of Bogotá." In *The Economics of Crime: Lessons for and from Latin America*. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- IACHR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights). 2009. *Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights*. OEC/57. December 31st. <<http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Seguridad.eng/CitizenSecurity.Toc.htm>>
- Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). 2012. *Citizen Security: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence*. Discussion Paper 232. Washington, DC: IADB.
- IADB. 2010. *Crime and Violence Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Discussion Paper 378. Washington, DC: IADB.
- IADB. 2009. *Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public Safety*. Document G-2535. Washington, DC: IADB.
- Iglesias, C. 2012. "'Que Hemos Hecho?' Reflexiones sobre respuestas y políticas públicas frente al incremento de la violencia delincriminal en América Latina." Washington, DC: Wilson Center. <<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/QueHemosHecho>>
- Mérida Initiative. 2012. "Naturaleza y alcances de la Iniciativa Mérida." <http://www.iniciativamerida.gob.mx/work/models/IniciativaMerida/Resource/4/1/images/naturaleza_y_alcance_de_la_im.pdf>. Retrieved Feb 28/2012
- Mockus, A. 2008. "Cultura ciudadana como política pública y la medición de sus avances." Presentation in Foro cultura ciudadana al tablero. <http://www.semana.com/documents/Doc1571_200827.pdf>
- Muggah, R. & A. Mulli. 2012. "Rio tries counter-insurgency." *Current History*, 111(742). <<http://www.currenthistory.com/Article.php?ID=950>>
- Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation. 2004. *Prevention of Murders in Diadema, Brazil: The Influence of New Alcohol Policies*. <http://resources.prev.org/resource_pub_brazil.pdf>
- OAS (Organisation of American States). 2011. *Informe sobre seguridad ciudadana en las Américas 2011*. Estadísticas oficiales de Seguridad Ciudadana producidas por los Estados Miembros de la OEA. Washington, DC: OAS.
- Small Arms Survey. 2011. *Small Arms Survey 2011: States of Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2010. *Abrir espacios para la seguridad ciudadana y el desarrollo humano*. Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano para América Central 2009–2010. Colombia.
- UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). 2011. *Civilian Private Security Services: Their Role, Oversight, and Contribution to Crime Prevention and Community Safety*. UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.5/2011/CRP.1. Expert Group on Private Security Services. Vienna, October 12th–14th.
- U.S. DoS (U.S. Department of State Department). n.d.a. "Safety of the Hemisphere's Citizens." <<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/index.htm>>
- U.S. DoS. n.d.b. "Caribbean Basin Security Initiative." <<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cbsi/index.htm>>
- Villaveces, A. et al. 2000. "Effect of a ban on carrying firearms on homicide rates in two Colombian cities." *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 283(9): 1205-9.
- World Bank. 2011. *Violence in the City, Understanding and Supporting Community Responses to Urban Violence*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

■ THE AUTHORS

Robert Muggah is the research director of the Igarapé Institute and a director of research at the SecDev Foundation.

Katherine Aguirre is an Igarapé Institute associate researcher.



Disclaimer

The content of this publication is presented as is. The stated points of view are those of the authors and do not reflect those of the organisation for which they work or NOREF. NOREF does not give any warranties, either expressed or implied, concerning the content.



- **The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre**
- **Norsk ressurscenter for fredsbygging**

The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) is a resource centre integrating knowledge and experience to strengthen peacebuilding policy and practice. Established in 2008, it collaborates and promotes collaboration with a wide network of researchers, policymakers and practitioners in Norway and abroad.

Read NOREF's publications on
www.peacebuilding.no and sign up for notifications.

Connect with NOREF on Facebook or
[@PeacebuildingNO](https://twitter.com/PeacebuildingNO) on Twitter

Email: info@peacebuilding.no - Phone: +47 22 08 79 32